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Abstract
e growing need for computer aided processing of knowledge has led to an in-
creasing interest in description logics (DLs), which are applied to encode know-
ledge in order to make it explicit and accessible to logical reasoning.
DLs and in particular the family around the DL໦໱໨ have therefore been thor-
oughly investigated w.r.t. their complexity theory and proof theory. e question
arises which expressiveness these logics actually have.
e expressiveness of a logic can be inferred by a model theoretic characterisa-
tion. On concept level, these DLs are akin to modal logics whose model theoretic
properties have been investigated. Yet the model theoretic investigation of the
DLs with their TBoxes, which are an original part of DLs usually not considered
in context of modal logics, have remained unstudied.
is thesis studies the model theoretic properties of ໦໱໨, ໦໱໨໮, ໦໱໨໶, as
well as ໦໱໨໴, ໦໱໨໶໴, ໦໱໨໶໮໴ and ໪໱. It presents model theoretic proper-
ties, which characterise these logics as fragments of the ﬁrst order logic (FO).
e characterisations are not only carried out on concept level and on concept
level extended by the universal role, but focus in particular on TBoxes. e prop-
erties used to characterise the logics are ‘natural’ notions w.r.t. the logic under
investigation: On the concept-level, each of the logics is characterised by an ad-
apted form of bisimulation and simulation, respectively.
TBoxes of໦໱໨,໦໱໨໮ and໦໱໨໶ are characterised as fragments of FOwhich
are invariant under global bisimulation and disjoint unions. e logics ໦໱໨໴,
໦໱໨໶໴ and ໦໱໨໶໮໴, which incorporate individuals, are characterised w.r.t.
to the class 𝕂 of all interpretations which interpret individuals as singleton sets.
e characterisations for TBoxes of ໦໱໨໴ and ໦໱໨໶໴ both require, addi-
tionally to being invariant under the appropriate notion of global bisimulation
and an adapted version of disjoint unions, that an FO-sentence is, under certain
circumstances, preserved under forward generated subinterpretations.
FO-sentences equivalent to໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes, are—due to໦໱໨໶໮໴’s inverse
roles—characterised similarly to໦໱໨໴ and໦໱໨໶໴ but have as third additional
requirement that they are preserved under generated subinterpretations.
໪໱ as sub-boolean DL is characterised on concept level as the FO-fragment
which is preserved under simulation and preserved under direct products. Equally
valid is the characterisation by being preserved under simulation and havingmin-
imal models. For ໪໱-TBoxes, a global version of simulation was not suﬃcient but
FO-sentences of ໪໱-TBoxes are invariant under global equi-simulation, disjoint
unions and direct products.
For each of these description logics, the aracteristic concepts are explicated
and the characterisation is accompanied by an investigation under which notion
of saturation the logic in hand enjoys the Hennessy-and-Milner-Property.
As application of the results we determine theminimal globally bisimilar com-
panionw.r.t. ໦໱໨໶໴-bisimulation and introduce the໱1-to-໱2-rewritability prob-
lem for TBoxes, where໱1 and໱2 are (description) logics. e laer is the problem
to decide whether or not an ໱1-TBox can be equivalently expressed as ໱2-TBox.
We give algorithms which decide ໦໱໨໮-to-໦໱໨-rewritability and ໦໱໨-to-໪໱-
rewritability.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Description Logics in Context
is thesis will give a model theoretic characterisation of the description logics
family around ໦໱໨ [50, 15, 21] as well as of the description logic (DL) ໪໱ [10]
with a special emphasis on characterising TBoxes.
A formal deﬁnition of what a logic, a characterisation etc. is, shall be given in
Section 1.2 but essentially a logic is a set of syntactical entities, the formulae, of
which each has a precisely deﬁned meaning. e laer is the reason, why this
mathematical approach in modern logic has been consequently pursued, despite
of all the weaknesses and restrictions that come with it [89, section 1.5].
is syntactical nature and the fact that reasoning over the encoded informa-
tion in logic is to a certain extent possible by mechanical syntactic manipulation
has led to fruitful applications of logics in computer science.
e ever growing knowledge of our time has created the desire to not only store
this knowledge as mere data, but to be able to extract, reason and manipulate it
with the aid of computers. Logics seem to lend itself to accomplish this task.
Solving the problems and questions arising from expressing and managing
knowledge with logics are the objectives studied in the discipline of Knowledge
Representation (KR) which is considered to form a part of Artiﬁcial Intelligence.
1.1.1 Description Logics: A First Glimpse
DLs are considered to be logics which are predominantly derived from the໦໱໨-
language family, which are used in KR to encode the knowledge that needs to
be represented. Traditionally this knowledge is divided into several parts, mostly
into ABox, TBox and occasionally RBox.
Whilst the ABox (Assertion Box) contains assertions about properties of ob-
jects in the domain which is represented, the TBox (Terminology Box) contains
12
deﬁnitions and specialisations of the vocabulary that is used. ABoxes and RBoxes
(Role Boxes) are not of interest in this thesis. ey are mentioned for the sake of
completeness and we shall use ABoxes as a lead-up to TBoxes.
We shall give the following examples, using informally the DL ໪໱. Syntax and
semantics will be precisely introduced for each logic in its proper chapter. In the
description logic ໪໱, an ABox໦ could have the following form:
໦ = {isParentOf(Anna,Bob), Female(Anna),Male(Bob)},
expressing that Anna is a parent of Bob that Anna is female and Bob is male. Bob
andAnna are objects of the domain about which wewant to represent knowledge.
isParentOf, Female and Male are three symbols from our signature which we
have chosen appropriately to represented knowledge about family relations and
information of a set of people.
Male and Female are unary predicate symbols, which are called concept names
in DLs whilst isParentOf is a binary predicate symbol, called role name. e syn-
tactic entities of DLs (formulae) are called concepts. roughout this thesis we
shall only consider DLs over unary and binary predicate symbols.
In comparison to ABoxes which merely state facts about objects, the TBox con-
tains what one could call the binding essence or the knowledge behind these facts.
We illustrate this with an ໪໱-TBox ໹
໹ = {Mother ≡ Female ⊓ ∃isParentOf.⊤, ∃isParentOf.⊤ ⊑ ∃isAncestorOf.⊤}
e concept deﬁnitionMother ≡ Female⊓∃isParentOf.⊤ can be read as ‘Some-
thing is a mother iﬀ it is female and parent of something.’ It gives a deﬁnition
for the vocabulary itemMother. Similarly the concept inclusion ∃isParentOf.⊤ ⊑
∃isAncestorOf.⊤ specialises the concept ‘being parent o’: ‘If someone is a parent
of something then (s)he is also an ancestor of something (else).’
We have to add the word ‘else’, as it is a weakness of ໪໱-TBoxes not being able
to express that a parent is necessarily an ancestor of whom this person is parent
of.
An ໪໱-RBox contains syntactical entities, containing the symbol ⊑ or ≡ with
expressions involving role names on its le-hand and right-hand side. An RBox
໷ could look like, e.g., ໷ = {isParentOf ⊑ isAncestorOf} stating ‘If someone is
a parent of something then (s)he is its ancestor.’ RBoxes apparently remedy this
weakness of ໪໱-TBoxes discovered above. Many more constructs involving role
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names are allowed in RBoxes, but neither RBoxes nor ABoxes alike will concern
us henceforth. Instead we want to concentrate on TBoxes.
With the knowledge encoded in the TBox ໹ we can now deduce that Anna is
a mother or rather that Mother(Anna) is true for every family in which ໹ and ໦
holds. We can, from the TBox ໹ alone, infer that every mother is an ancestor of
something or ratherMother ⊑ ∃isAncestorOf.⊤.
Unlike ABox atoms which correspond to FO-sentences¹ which state proper-
ties for speciﬁc individuals, TBoxes correspond to FO-sentences which express
properties of global nature that aﬀect all elements in the domain of discourse.
1.1.2 Applications of Description Logic
In their capacity of encoding knowledge and deﬁning vocabularies, DLs have en-
joyed considerable success during the last decades: One direction of application
was to build ontologies from scratch and thus unifying eﬀorts and results of earlier
projects and carrying on the line of research:
e ontology SNOMED CT [101], the Systematised NOMenclature of MEDi-
cine—Clinical Terms, encodes knowledge about the human body, its parts, down
to the molecular level, their known illnesses and remedies for the laer. Its pur-
pose is to provide a consistent patient record which is transferable across the
diﬀerent stages of medical care.
Its roots go back to the 1950s when SNOP, the Systematized NOmenclature of
Pathology, was conceived and later published in the 1960s [39] (as book). Aer
SNOPwas extended to other ﬁelds of medicine becoming SNOMED in 1974, it was
ﬁnally converted into an the ontology SNOMED RT [125] in the late 1990s. From
the merger with the British National Healthcare System—Clinical Terms, a coded
thesaurus of clinical terms, ﬁnally SNOMED CT emerged [132]. e transition
to SNOMED RT was important as this knowledge and terminology was for the
ﬁrst time captured as ontology using description logic with its rigorous syntax
and precisely deﬁned meaning. SNOMED CT has grown to one of the largest and
most popular examples of ontologies: It encodes more than 311 000 concepts, and
is, in terms of what has been seen as real-life application so far, huge in size.
Another approach was to interlink and unify vocabularies of diﬀerent research
projects via ontologies: A noticeable example is the Gene Ontology (GO) [40]:
Deciphering the genome of living beings like humans, ﬂies and mice was an ob-
jective of several projects. Unfortunately diﬀerent structures and terms were used
¹A sentence is a formula in which every variable appears in the scope of a quantiﬁcation.
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whichmake these eﬀorts complementary but not joinable. GO applies DL in order
to deﬁne a standardised vocabulary and in this way to abstract from the under-
lying databases. e vocabulary is enriched with annotations in the sense that
it contains references which point back to the appropriate entity in the database.
is also allows projects which take part in GO to model their database in a GO
compatible way by using their vocabulary, which in turn grants biologists uniﬁed
access to data across diﬀerent areas of research.
A recent further development is the third approach known as ontology based
data access (OBDA)[32]. Similarly as in the case of GO, the ontology provides
a standardised and well deﬁned vocabulary abstracting from the database layer.
But the ontology also provides knowledge about the interrelations between the
database entities: OBDA uses DLs to endow the data collections with additional
meaning which can later be used to make up for incomplete data. e user then
accesses the database on the level of the DL, formulating the queries in the lan-
guage of the ontology, which also explains the name OBDA. In this seing, the
database is generally considered to be an ABox.
is recently sparked interest has been met by several papers and projects. e
papers either stress a more database oriented approach, where information of the
ontology is incorporated into the database and queries are rewrien [84, 93] or
a more ontology oriented investigation, where reasoning techniques are adapted
to cope with very large ABoxes [45, 70].
OBDA is currently under active investigation e.g. by the ExODA project which
looks into ‘IntegratingDescription Logics andDatabase Technologies for Express-
ive Ontology-Based Data Access’ [49]. As another example for OBDA which ap-
plies description logic ontologies outside of life sciences we name the the OP-
TIQUE project [100]:
OPTIQUE aims to facilitate uniform and intuitive access for engineers to het-
erogeneous data sources: in oil industry, experts want to extrapolate geological
data of past explorations to new exploration missions. e ontology which is to
be developed is not only meant to unify and abstract from the underlying diﬀerent
databases, in which the geophysical data is stored, but is also aimed at facilitating
query optimisation, which allows for eﬃcient data processing on the database
side. us a repository of 1000 Terabytes of data, stored in diﬀerent databases
with more then 2000 tables is to be queried.
Similarly, engineers in power plants want to relate sensor data to events, i.e.
technically speciﬁed phenomena, occurring during operation. e sensor data
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amounts to several Terabytes and is again spread over several diﬀerent databases.
Further possible applications of DLs are under investigation like concept learn-
ing and automated ontolgy building, but the three examples given have or will
have very soon impact on practice. e question arises whether everything can
and should be encoded in DLs and if not where the boundaries lie.
1.1.3 The Trade-Oﬀ between Expressivity and Complexity
Making inferences from knowledge encoded in ontologies, i.e. reasoning, allows
us to discover knowledge which might or might not be obvious in the real world.
e more precisely knowledge is encoded, the beer it ﬁts with the real world
and the more knowledge we can discover. One can therefore think of a lot more
constructs than e.g. RBoxes shortly discussed earlier, which one could introduce
to a DL like ໪໱ in order to remedy its weaknesses in terms of what can or cannot
be expressed in this language.
ough, increasing the expressivity of a language comes with a price: e reas-
oning complexity rises. With reasoning complexity we mean here a worst case
measure for how long or how much space the expected computation may take
w.r.t. the length of the input[87, 107]. As an example: One has to expect that for
any given ໦໱໨-TBox ໹ and an arbitrary ໦໱໨-concept inclusion C ⊑ D it might
take exponential time [15] in the length of ໹ and C ⊑ D to determine whether
C ⊑ D follows from ໹.
e reasoning complexity can quickly grow into undecidability, which is not
desirable for DLs, as automated reasoning becomes severely restricted. KL-ONE
[24], for example, one of the prominent eﬀorts to formalise knowledge representa-
tion in the late 1970s [25], turned out to be undecidable.[13]( [30, 119, introduction
sections] As a consequence, a host of DLs have since been developed in order
to achieve diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between expressivity and reasoning complexity,
always striving for decidability.
e prospect of embedding knowledge also in websites has led the World Wide
Web Commiee (W3C) to draw up a standard for knowledge representation lan-
guages, the OWL-speciﬁcation [78, 36]. OWL is the mnemonic abbreviation for
Web Ontology Language. In OWL [79], three sublanguages were speciﬁed: OWL
Lite, OWL DL and OWL Full.
While OWL Lite as a restriction of OWL DL was deemed to be closer to ap-
plications, it did not yield signiﬁcantly beer complexity than OWL DL; e sat-
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isﬁability problem is for OWL Lite ExpTime complete [128]² and for OWL DL
NExpTime complete [128]. OWL DL, in turn, contains various additional con-
structs with side conditions in order to be decidable[78, p.372]. OWL Full, ﬁnally,
contains all the constructs of OWL DL, yet without the side conditions, which
renders OWL Full undecidable.
e W3C issued the OWL 2 recommendation [35] containing additionally 3
proﬁles of tractable sublanguages: OWL 2 EL, OWL 2QL andOWL 2 RL.eOWL
2 EL proﬁle has the description logic ໪໱ as its logical underpinning. ໪໱ is thus a
DL which is used in signiﬁcant practical applications so that a characterisation of
its expressivity is a creditable objective in its own right.
1.1.4 The Language Family around໦໱໨
e ໦ributive ໱anguage with ໨omplements, ໦໱໨, was one of the new decid-
able languages proposed [122] as reaction to the discovery that formerly used
methods of knowledge representation turned out to be undecidable.
໦໱໨ is an extension of ໪໱ in the sense that ໦໱໨ is ໪໱ enriched by logical
negation (¬). As noticed in [121], it therefore corresponds on the concept level
to the multi-modal logic K[18, 21, 50]. e modal logic K is also known as stand-
ard modal logic ML. e laer was already under thorough investigation and
therefore provided a good theoretical foundation for໦໱໨.
Since໦໱໨-concepts are closed under boolean operations it is considered to be
a kind of core logic for expressive DLs. Many extensions have been proposed [31],
like inverse role names (໮) or counting quantiﬁcation (໶) and individual names
(໴), which shall be explained in detail in their appropriate chapters.
Indeed the combination of all the aforementioned extensions and therefore
໦໱໨ itself, form the underpinning of OWL Full. Since the concept level of ໦໱໨
and its extensions can be considered as extensions of modal logics, these exten-
sions of modal logics have been investigated from the model theoretic point of
view [21]. A lot of ໦໱໨-extensions were investigated in [85], but just on the
concept level. In this sense, they were treated like modal logics in disguise.
TBoxes, an original part of knowledge representation, are not of particular in-
terest in modal logics and therefore this thesis will give a model-theoretic char-
acterisation of the expressiveness of these fragments of ﬁrst order logic (FO) with
a particular focus on TBoxes over these fragments.
²Tobies showed that the reasoning problem for ໸໭໮໫, the DL underpinning OWL Lite, is Exp-
Time complete.
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1.1.5 Contribution
Clearly, one would want to know the expressivity of these description logics,
which have received so much scientiﬁc aention and have become a focal point
in applications. is thesis gives a model-theoretic characterisation for several
description logics from the ໦໱໨-family as well as for ໪໱ and shows how these
results can be applied.
emotivation for ‘characterising’ the expressivity of a logic໱ is to gain know-
ledge about its expressiveness in diﬀerent terms: Of course, one could give a
trivial answer to the question what the expressivity of a language is, by saying
‘everything that can be encoded by its syntax’.
e aim of characterising the expressivity of a logic ໱ is therefore to give an
answer to this question in diﬀerent terms. e answer can be given with respect
to another logic or in general:
If the answer is given with respect to another logic, it usually involves logics
whose expressivity is well known and of which the logic ໱ is a subset of formu-
lae. eorems that establish such a characterisation are sometimes called preser-
vation theorems. A typical representative for such a characterisation is e.g. van
Benthem’s model-theoretic characterisation [61] of ML w.r.t. FO or the model-
theoretic characterisations of several logics of Kourtonina and De Rijke [85].
A general answer, on the other hand, refers to any (abstract) logic that could
possibly comprise the logic ໱ that is to be characterised. ese theorems give
properties under which a surrounding logic satisfying these properties cannot
be more expressive than ໱ itself. is approach has been taken by Lindström
[47, 16](originally [90]) whose theorem characterises the expressiveness of FO. In
recent times logics like ໦໱໨[112, 126] and ໦໱໨u [105] have been characterised
on the concept level by Lindström-like theorems.
In this thesis we shall concentrate on characterisations which are given w.r.t.
to FO, i.e. on the former type of answer. We are hence looking for properties
which are satisﬁed by the logic ໱, which is to be characterised, so that for every
signature τ and for every formula in FO(τ), which satisﬁes the properties, there
exists some logically equivalent concept of ໱(τ).
Similarly we try to ﬁnd properties which are satisﬁed by all TBoxes over ໱(τ),
so that for every signature τ and for every sentence in FO(τ), which satisﬁes these
properties, there exists some logically equivalent TBox over ໱(τ).
Note that we only consider characterisations in which the formulae and con-
cepts (or sentences and TBoxes respectively) share the same symbols.
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e question arises, how these properties are selected. Why certain properties
and not some other properties? One could suggest the trivial property ‘must be
logically equivalently expressible in ໱’. Indeed, there is no ultimate property but
it is up to personal consideration whether or not the given properties are deemed
to be canonical and useful.
In the characterisations given in this thesis, those properties for a logic ໱ were
chosen, for which ໱ is broadly known for in the academic community: in the
case of ໦໱໨-TBoxes, say, the appropriate notion of bisimulation invariance and
invariance under disjoint unions were used.
In cases where this was not enough, we decided e.g. for direct products because
they are considered to be proper³ model theoretic notions. In the case where in-
dividual names were involved, we decided for a self-evident notion, which com-
plements invariance under disjoint unions.
It turns out that our decisions as to which properties to choose, were fruitful
w.r.t. to some application: In the last chapter we show that it is possible to al-
gorithmically decided whether or not characterising properties of ໦໱໨ and ໪໱,
respectively, are satisﬁed by TBoxes of a certain, stronger logic. us, we can al-
gorithmically decide whether these TBoxes of this stronger logic can be expressed
by໦໱໨-TBoxes or ໪໱-TBoxes respectively.
1.1.6 Structure of the Thesis
roughout the thesis, the characterisations follow a pick and mix scheme of cor-
responding properties as Table 1.1 shows: each feature ໮, ໶ and ໴ corresponds
to a certain extension of the syntax of໦໱໨ which is accounted for with an addi-
tional property in the model-theoretic game. In contrast, ໪໱ is w.r.t. simulation a
restriction of ໪໱⊔ and therefore needs a special property, namely being preserved
under direct products, to be captured. Syntax and notions will be introduced in
their appropriate chapters.
Similarly, Table 1.2 shows which properties were used in order to characterise
TBoxes of the logic in the le column. In all cases the appropriate model-theoretic
game is used in its global variant. Except for DLs with nominals (໴), all descrip-
tion logics use invariance under disjoint union. Description logics with nominals
use invariance of a special notion of disjoint unions (e.g. ⨄𝕂 the adaption of dis-
joint union for໦໱໨໶໴) plus being preserved under disjoint unions of generated
³Proper means here that these notions are established in (modal) model theory, e.g. [62] for
disjoint unoins.
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Logic Operators model-theoreticgame special property
໦໱໨ ¬, ⊓, ∃r bisimulation
໦໱໨໮ ໦໱໨ + ∃r− bisimulationwith inverse moves
໦໱໨໶ ໦໱໨ + ∃≥κr bisimulationwith successor sets
໦໱໨໴ ໦໱໨ + nominals bisimulation model-class 𝕂
໦໱໨໶໴ ໦໱໨໶ + nominals bisimulationwith successor sets model-class 𝕂
໦໱໨໶໮໴ ໦໱໨໶໴ + ∃≥κr−
bisimulation
with inverse moves
and successor sets
model-class 𝕂
໪໱ ⊓, ∃r simulation preserved underdirect products
໪໱⊔ ໪໱ + ⊔ simulation
໪໱¬ ໪໱ closed under⊓ and ¬ equi-simulation
Table 1.1: is table shows for the DL named in the le column which syntactic
constructs are allowed and which corresponding properties were used in order to
characterise the logic on concept level.
subinterpretations. is is also true for ໦໱໨໶໮໴ but for ໦໱໨໶໮໴ every nom-
inal disjoint union is a disjoint union over generated subinterpretations; hence
we can state invariance under disjoint unions without explicitly mentioning the
preservation under disjoint unions of generated subinterpretations.
We have that ໪໱¬-TBoxes coincide with ໪໱⊔-TBoxes. ໪໱-TBoxes, however,
relate to ໪໱⊔ in an analogous fashion as ໪໱-concepts relate to ໪໱⊔-concepts:
໪໱-TBoxes are those ໪໱⊔-TBoxes which are preserved under direct products.
Since the schema of extension of the syntax on the one hand and extension of
the model theoretic game on the other hand is always the same, the arguments in
the appropriate proofs may seem somewhat repetitive and might be skipped by
the reader, unless she or he needs reassurance. We therefore decided to spell out
the proofs in Chapter 2 in detail, even though they can be found in textbooks and
other literature.
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TBox Disjoint union model-theoreticgame special property
໦໱໨ invariant underdisjoint unions
global
bisimulation
໦໱໨໮ invariant underdisjoint unions
global bisimulation
with inverse moves
໦໱໨໶ invariant underdisjoint unions
global bisimulation
with successor sets
໦໱໨໴
inv. u. coherent⨄
pres. u. coherent⨄
of gen. subinterpr.
global
bisimulation model-class 𝕂
໦໱໨໶໴
inv. under⨄𝕂
preserved under⨄𝕂
of gen. subinterpr.
global bisimulation
with successor sets model-class 𝕂
໦໱໨໶໮໴
invariant under
nominal
disjoint unions
global bisimulation
with inverse moves
and successor sets
model-class 𝕂
໪໱ invariant underdisjoint unions
global
equi-simulation
preserved under
direct products
໪໱⊔/໪໱¬ invariant underdisjoint unions
global
equi-simulation
Table 1.2: is table shows the properties whichwere used in order to characterise
TBoxes of the logic named in the le column.
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e second section of this chapter concerns itself in the ﬁrst half with prelimin-
aries: ໦໱໨with its syntax and semantics are introduced along with the necessary
notion of interpretation and translations into other logics. e second half dis-
cusses the notion of logic, expressivity as well as compactness and deﬁnes certain
abbreviations.
e second chapter then recalls van Benthem’s model-theoretic characterisa-
tion of ໦໱໨ on concept level and introduces important notions which will be
used in adapted form throughout the rest of the thesis. ໦໱໨u will then be char-
acterised in an equally detailed fashion, and it becomes fairly obvious how the
syntax, the game and notions like type and saturation are adapted in order to ac-
commodate the global perspective introduced by the universal role u. is leads
up to TBoxes over໦໱໨which form a fragment of໦໱໨u. e chapter closes with
the characterisation of TBoxes over ໦໱໨. In the third chapter ໦໱໨໮, ໦໱໨໮u
and TBoxes over໦໱໨໮ will be characterised. e steps follow the same scheme
as in Chapter 2, yet making necessary adaptions of notions introduced in Chapter
2. Since no completely new notions are introduced, things are kept shorter. Sim-
ilarly໦໱໨໶will be introduced and໦໱໨໶,໦໱໨໶u and TBoxes over໦໱໨໶ are
characterised in the second half of the chapter.
In Chapter four໦໱໨໴,໦໱໨໶໴ and໦໱໨໶໮໴ with their extension by u, to-
gether with TBoxes over these three DLs are characterised, following the schema
of Chapter 2. We choose to characterise the logics with respect to a special class
of interpretations named 𝕂. Additionally the section treating ໦໱໨໶໴ contains
an extension explaining howminimal໦໱໨໶໴-bisimilar companions of an inter-
pretation can be obtained, thus making use of the machinery introduced for the
໦໱໨໶໴-characterisation.
Chapter ﬁve is devoted to the characterisation of ໪໱. In the course of ໪໱’s
investigation several interesting observations were made, leading to a charac-
terisation of not only ໪໱ but also of logics ໪໱⊔, ໪໱¬ and ໪໱u¬, which can be
considered to be newly introduced.
Chapter six gives algorithms to determine whether TBoxes can be rewrien
in weaker fragments. For speciﬁc details on these rewritings and the algorithms
itself, the reader is referred to the chapter itself. ese algorithms therefore yield
an application for the characterisation results. Finally Chapter seven concludes.
e characterisations of ໦໱໨໴, ໦໱໨໶໮໴ as well as ໦໱໨໶ and ໦໱໨໮ have
22
been published in [92] together with an investigation of its applicability presented
in Chapter 7. e characterisation for ໪໱ was published in [91].
1.2 Preliminaries
Since the model-theory of ໦໱໨-concepts or rather its modal logic counterpart
ML is well established, we shall make ໦໱໨-concepts the point of origin for our
investigations. In this section we shall introduce the notion of interpretation and
we shall then deﬁne the syntax and semantics of໦໱໨-concepts. Additionally, we
give transcriptions into ﬁrst order logic and modal logic.
It shall be remarked that we denote the ﬁrst limit ordinal by ω, and write n < ω
or similar, to indicate that n is a natural number. We always include the natural
number naught.
1.2.1 Signature and Interpretation
A signature τ is a set of symbols in connexion with a function ar ∶ τ ⟶ ω for
this signature that assigns to each symbol S ∈ τ a natural number ar(S), which is
called the arity of the symbol S.
An interpretation I is a pair consisting of a symbol Δ and an interpretation
function ⋅I. e function maps Δ to some non-empty set ΔI, called the carrier-
set of I. We call I a τ-interpretation, if ⋅I maps each symbol S ∈ τ to the cartesian
product (ΔI)ar(S) or any possibly empty subset of it. In case ar(S) = 0, SI is an
element of ΔI. Note that we do not allow for nullary predicate symbols, which
would simply be true (⊤) or false (⊥), but rather for nullary function symbols,
which yield a constant, which we interpret as singleton set, i.e. as set containing
only one element.
However, in this thesis, we shall not treat functional symbols in general, i.e.
the signatures are purely relational (except for nullary function symbols), and we
shall only consider those signatures τwhere each symbol S ∈ τ has ar(S) ≤ 2. We
partition these signatures into three (disjoint) subsets namely NR, NC and NI.
NR contains all binary symbols of τ, i.e. all S ∈ τ with ar(S) = 2. ey are
called role names (therefore NR) or accessibility relations and we usually denote
them with the leers r and s etc.
NC contains all unary symbols, i.e. all S ∈ τ with ar(S) = 1. ey are called
concept names, hence NC, and we usually denote them with leers A and B.
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NI, the set of all nullary symbols, contains all S ∈ τ with ar(S) = 0. ey are
called individual names (NI) or objects or constants. We represent themwith small
leers a and b.
In the example given earlier, the signatureNC = {Male, Female,Mother},NR =
{isPartenOf, isAncestorOf} and NI = {Anna,Bob} was used. If we set τ ∶= NC ∪
NR ∪NI a τ-interpretation is any function ⋅I such that the carrier-set ΔI contains
at least one element and all other symbols are interpreted according to their arity.
In particular, Anna and Bobmust be each assigned to some element, possibly even
the same element whilst all other symbols could be the empty set.
1.2.2 Syntax and Semantics of໦໱໨-concepts
e way, semantics is deﬁned in description logics is somewhat diﬀerent from
the classical approach. In order to make it accessible to readers with either back-
ground, we shall give, in addition to the notation in DL, the translation to modal
logic and ﬁrst order logic respectively.
Let τ be a signature, i.e. relational with symbols of arity 1 or 2, thus omiing
constants for now. RecallNC∪NR = τ. Instead being called formula, the syntactic
entities of description logics are called concepts in description logic. e reason
for this lies in the semantics: while formulae are assigned truth values for either
being satisﬁed or not satisﬁed in a given interpretation, a concept is assigned the
set of all elements which satisfy the concept for a given interpretation.
Depending on the signature τ the set໦໱໨(τ) of໦໱໨-concepts over τ is recurs-
ively deﬁned as follows:
1. ⊤ is a concept in໦໱໨ over τ.
2. if A ∈ NC then A is a concept in໦໱໨ over τ (i.e. A ∈ ໦໱໨(τ)).
3. if C,D ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) then C ⊓ D ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) and ¬C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ).
4. if r ∈ NR and C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) then ∃r.C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ).
Obviously, we avoid going into the intricacies of bracketing but we shall use
brackets when needed. We deﬁne the common abbreviations for all r ∈ NR and
C,D ∈ ໦໱໨(τ):
C ⊔ D ∶= ¬(¬C ⊓ ¬D) and ∀r.C ∶= ¬∃r.¬C and C→ D ∶= ¬C ⊔ D
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e length |C| of a concept is recursively deﬁned as
|C| ∶=
๰
1 if C ∈ NC, 1 + |D| + |E| if C = D ⊓ E
1 + |D| if C = ¬D, 1 + |D| if C = ∃r.D
e semantics of a concept is given by the recursive deﬁnition below. Whilst,
e.g., ﬁrst order sentences are either true or false w.r.t. a given interpretation, the
meaning of a concept w.r.t. a given interpretation is deﬁned by the set of all ele-
ments of this interpretation at which this concept is satisﬁed. e interpretation
function ⋅I is hence recursively extended for concepts in C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) as follows:
CI ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪⎩
ΔI if C = ⊤
AI if C = A and A ∈ NC
DI ∩ EI if C = D ⊓ E
ΔI ⧵ D if C = ¬D
{d ∈ ΔI ∣ ∃dໟ ∈ DI ∶ (d, dໟ) ∈ rI} if C = ∃r.D
1.2.3 Translation into Standard Modal Logic
We shall swily recall the one-to-one correspondence between ໦໱໨-concepts
and modal logic formulae thus making the subject maer accessible to readers
with background in modal logics. Indeed, it turns out that modal logics preceded
DLs by many decades: [18, Historical Overview] traces its roots back as far as
1918 and the ﬁeld of modal logic was fully developed by the 1980s, but only in
1991 aer [121] was published this intimate relation became clearer and was sub-
sequently studied in more detail [88]. We shall ﬁrst introduce the standard modal
logicML [18], in modal logics also known as (System) K [21]. Instead of giving a
lengthy deﬁnition for the syntax, we shall give a Backus-Naur form, again impli-
citly assuming proper bracketing: φ is a formula of the standard modal logic ML
over the signature τ if
φ ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ A ∣ χ ∧ ψ ∣ ¬χ ∣ ♢r χ
with A ∈ NC, i.e. A is unary, and r ∈ NR and χ,ψ formulae ofML over τ.
e semantics of a formula inML is given for pairs consisting of an interpret-
ation I and an element d ∈ ΔI. e pair (I, d) is called pointed interpretation,
as d is considered to be a distinguished point. For every formula in ML(τ) we
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recursively deﬁne (I, d) ⊨ φ by
(I, d) ⊨ ⊤
(I, d) ⊨ A if d ∈ AI
(I, d) ⊨ χ ∧ ψ if (I, d) ⊨ χ and (I, d) ⊨ ψ
(I, d) ⊨ ¬χ if not (I, d) ⊨ χ
(I, d) ⊨ ♢r χ if there is dໟ ∈ ΔI s.t. (d, dໟ) ∈ rI and (I, dໟ) ⊨ χ
If (I, d) ⊨ φ we read (I, d) satisﬁes φ or equivalently (I, d) is a model of φ.
Replacing ∧ by ⊓ and ♢r by ∃r. for each r ∈ NR yields a translation of ML-
formulae into໦໱໨-concepts. By reversing this process, one obtains a translation
from ໦໱໨-concepts into ML formulae. If φC is the translation of C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ)
intoML we have
CI = {d ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φC}
i.e CI is the set of all elements in ΔI that satisfy φC; analogously for Cφ being the
translation of φ ∈ ML(τ) into໦໱໨ we have
(I, d) ⊨ φ ⟺ d ∈ CIφ.
Indeed,໦໱໨-concepts have the same logical expressivity asML. is shall be
explained a bit further. A logic ໱1 is at least as expressive as another logic ໱0
(໱0 ≤ ໱1) if for all signatures τ and all φ ∈ ໱0(τ) there is ψ ∈ ໱1(τ) such that
(I, d) ⊨ φ iﬀ (I, d) ⊨ ψ. So practically, for each τ, ໱0(τ) can be regarded as subset
of ໱1(τ).
Although in description logics, the semantics of a concept is expressed as sets
of satisfying elements, rather than the model theoretic notion of a pointed inter-
pretation being a model of a formula, it makes sense to extend the satisfaction
relation ⊨ to໦໱໨-concepts, by seing
(I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ d ∈ CI.
is deﬁnition is consistent with the translation function, as (I, d) ⊨ C iﬀ (I, d) ⊨
φC. But this means that ໦໱໨ is at least as expressive as ML. As the converse is
true as well, both are equally expressive.
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1.2.4 Translation into First Order Logic
Readers familiar with ﬁrst order logic (FO) might ﬁnd it helpful to see a translation
of ໦໱໨-concepts into FO. From the outset of DLs it was known that DLs and in
particular໦໱໨ form fragments of FO. e relation ship of DLs and FO was aer
the revelations due to [121] and [88] further investigated in [22]. e translation
of໦໱໨-concepts into FO-formulae we are about to present is in fact the adaption
of the well known standard translation from ML into FO, which was presented in
[130].
Let FO(τ) denote all FO-formulae over the signature τ and let x0, x1 be two
variables. For i ∈ {0, 1} the translation function [ ⋅ ; ⋅ ] ∶ ໦໱໨(τ)×Var ⟶ FO(τ)
is recursively deﬁned as
[C; xi] ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪⎩
⊥ C = ⊥
A(xi) A = C and A ∈ τ
¬[D; xi] C = ¬D
[D; xi] ∧ [E; xi] C = D ⊓ E
∃x1−i.r(xi, x1−i) ∧ [D; x1−i] C = ∃r.D
We obtain (I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ I dx0 ⊨ [C; x0], where
d
x0
assigns d to the variable
x0. e translation function practically gives away the syntax of the FO-fragment
which is equally expressive to ໦໱໨-concepts. It also shows that ໦໱໨-concepts
are a fragment of the two-variable fragment of FO, as at most two variables, here
x0 and x1, are needed. is property was pointed out in [53] who at the time
expressed this circumstance as ‘having 2 dimensions’ and further investigated in
e.g. [64].
E 1.2.1 . In order to see, how the variable-index alternates between 0 and
1, the ﬁrst order translation of the ໦໱໨-concept ∀r.(A ⟶ ∃r.B) shall be given,
where, by our naming convention, NC = {A,B} andNR = {r}. e concept states
for every interpretation I: If d ∈ (∀r.(A ⟶ ∃r.B))I then every r-successor of d
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that satisﬁes A has an r-successor that satisﬁes B.
[∀r.(A⟶∃r.B); x0]
= ¬∃x1.r(x0, x1) ∧ ¬[A→ ∃r.B; x1]
= ∀x1.r(x0, x1) → [A → ∃r.B; x1]
= ∀x1.r(x0, x1) → (A(x1) → [∃r.B; x1])
= ∀x1.r(x0, x1) → (A(x1) → ∃x0.r(x1, x0) ∧ [B; x0])
= ∀x1.r(x0, x1) → (A(x1) → ∃x0.r(x1, x0) ∧ B(x0))
1.2.5 Abstract Logic
Before presenting a characterisation of a logic, the notion of logic itself, known
from abstract model theory [16][47] shall be discussed.
Amathematical logic ໱ is considered to be a pair (L, ⊨໱), where L is a function
that assigns to every signature τ a set L(τ)whose elements are called formulae over
τ. e satisfaction relation ⊨໱ is a relation between interpretations and formulae.
Additionally the following compatibility conditions for all signatures τ0, τ1 and τ
are required:
monotonicity of L τ0 ⊆ τ1 ⟹ L(τ0) ⊆ L(τ1)
isomorphy invariance I ≅τ H ⟹∀φ ∈ L(τ) ∶ I ⊨ φ ⟺ H ⊨ φ
where I ≅τ H means, there is a bijective function ι ∶ ΔI ⟶ΔH s.t. for all S ∈ τ
and d1,… , dar(S) we have
(d1,… , dar(S)) ∈ SI ⟺ (ι(d1),… , ι(dar(S))) ∈ SH
Indeed FO as well as໦໱໨with their deﬁnition of satisfaction relation are both
logics in this sense. Since all DLs considered in this thesis are fragments of FO,
the satisfaction relations of these DLs are subsets of the satisfaction relation of
FO.
Concerning the notation, we obviously use the same symbol for the logic itself
and for the set of formulae over some signature τ. E.g. ໦໱໨ and໦໱໨(τ) instead
of ໦໱໨ and ALC(τ) or similarly. As well, we do not distinguish the satisfaction
relations of diﬀerent logics and hence omit the index.
A logic ໱0 is a fragment of another logic ໱1 if for all τ we have ໱0(τ) ⊆ ໱1(τ)
and for every interpretation I and each φ ∈ ໱0(τ)we have I ⊨໱0 φ ⟺ I ⊨໱1 φ.
A formula φ ∈ ໱0(τ) is called logically equivalent to some formula ψ ∈ ໱1(τ) if
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for all τ-interpretations I we have I ⊨໱0 φ iﬀ I ⊨໱1⊨ ψ.
A logic ໱0 is at least as expressive as ໱1, (໱0 ≤ ໱1) if for every signature τ and
every formula φ ∈ ໱0(τ) there is a logically equivalent formula ψ ∈ ໱1(τ).
Clearly, if ໱0 ≤ ໱1 then there is a fragment ໱ໟ1 of ໱1 such that for each signa-
ture τ, ໱ໟ1(τ) contains exactly the formulae of ໱0(τ) which are logically equival-
ent. erefore, we shall henceforth in our context call a logic ໱0 a fragment of ໱1
whenever ໱0 ≤ ໱1; in particular, we call ໦໱໨ and all the other DLs fragments
of FO, as we have eﬀective translation procedures to translate their concepts into
FO-formulae.
It is also possible to compare the expressivity of two logics w.r.t. diﬀerent sig-
natures: In [8], the expressivity of certain knowledge representation languages
were compared and successfully distinguished admiing, in particular, signature
extensions. Under signature extensions a logic ໱1 is considered to be more ex-
pressive than some logic ໱0 if there is a signature τ1 and a formula φ ∈ ໱1(τ1)
such that for all signatures τ0 ⊇ τ1 there is no ‘equivalent’ formula ψ ∈ ໱0(τ0).
e problem here is the notion equivalence as it has to refer to sets of interpret-
ations in diﬀerent signatures: If τ0 ⊇ τ1 and φ ∈ ໱0(τ0) equivalent to ψ ∈ ໱(τ1)
then the classModτ0(ψ) of all τ0-models of ψ comprises the subclass of all models
of ψ in which signature symbols in τ0 ⧵ τ1 are interpreted as empty. is subclass
has a one-to-one correspondence to the classModτ1(ψ) of all τ1-models of ψ. But
Modτ0(ψ) also comprises all ψ-models with arbitrary interpretation of symbols in
τ0 ⧵τ1 includingModτ0(φ)which most likely forms a proper subclass ofModτ0(ψ).
e relationship between Modτ0(φ) and the subclass of Modτ0(ψ) corresponding
toModτ1(ψ) is highly dependent on the logics ໱0 and ໱1. e more in generality
w.r.t. signatures hence has to be paid oﬀ with a more speciﬁc notion of logical
equivalence.
Where characterisations of logics are treated, e.g. in [129, 85] but also [90, 112,
126, 105] and so forth, logics are exceptionally characterised as fragments of other
logics w.r.t. to the same signature. Characterisations with respect to one and the
same signature will be our approach in this thesis as well.
Let ໱ be a logic and τ a signature. en for every set Γ ⊆ ໱(τ) and every
formula φ ∈ ໱(τ) we deﬁne Γ ⊨ φ if for all τ-interpretations I we have if for all
ψ ∈ Γ I ⊨ ψ then I ⊨ φ. Similarly we shall write φ ⊨ Γ as abbreviation for φ ⊨ ψ
for all ψ ∈ Γ.
A logic໱ is compact if for every signature τ and every set of Γ ⊆ ໱(τ) and every
formula φ ∈ FO(τ) we have Γ ⊨ φ iﬀ there is some ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that
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Γ0 ⊨ φ.
It is well known that ﬁrst order logic is compact [34, 47]. By the deﬁnition of
compactness, it follows that every fragment of FO must be compact, too.
Let ໱⟷−− be a relation on (pointed) interpretations. We call an FO-formula φ(x)
(with at most one free variable) invariant under ໱⟷−− if
(I, d) ໱⟷−− (H, e) ⟹ ึI
d
x ⊨ φ(x)⟺ H
e
x ⊨ φ(x)ื .
Let ໱ be a description logic and τ some signature. For concepts C,D ∈ ໱(τ) we
call C ⊑ D a concept inclusion and read C ⊑ D as C is subsumed by D. We say I
satisﬁes or is a model of C ⊑ D, in symbols I ⊨ C ⊑ D if CI ⊆ DI, i.e. if for all
d ∈ ΔI we have (I, d) ⊨ C implies (I, d) ⊨ D. A TBox ໹ over ໱ is a ﬁnite set
of concept inclusions. We say I satisﬁes or is a model of ໹ if I ⊨ C ⊑ D for all
C ⊑ D ∈ ໹.
Let τ0, τ1 be signatures such that τ0 ⊆ τ1. Let I be a τ1-interpretation. en
I↾τ0 is the τ0-interpretation K, where ΔK ∶= ΔI and SK ∶= SI for all symbols
S ∈ τ0. We call I↾τ0 the τ0-reduct of I.
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2. The characterisation of໦໱໨
2.1 The Characterisation of໦໱໨-Concepts
In this section we shall give a characterisation of ໦໱໨ as FO-fragment. In es-
sence, we repeat the characterisation given by van Benthem [129]. We shall ﬁrst
recall the model-theoretic invariance notion called bisimulation for ໦໱໨ con-
cepts. Via characteristic ໦໱໨-concepts [61] (Characteristic formulae [47] for
໦໱໨) we shall show that we can describe in an interpretation the neighbour-
hood of some element, i.e. all those elements accessible from this element up to
a certain distance, suﬃciently precisely in order to show that every FO-formula
which is invariant under bisimulation can be expressed by a disjunction of those
characteristic໦໱໨-concepts.
Almost all of the following has been discovered before and is succinctly presen-
ted in [61], but we shall wander on the trodden paths of modal logics in order to
introduce notions and motivate our search for certain properties in later chapters.
2.1.1 Bisimulation and Tree-Unravelling
e notion of bisimulation was introduced to modal logics by van Benthem in
[129] called p-relation and later zigzag-relation [118]. Bisimulation and its vari-
ants will be central throughout all chapters of this thesis. It will be adapted for
every logic that is to be characterised. It is a model-theoretic notion, in that it
relates interpretations that satisfy the same໦໱໨-concepts. Hence all these inter-
pretations are models of the same໦໱໨-theory on concept-level.
D 2.1.1 . Let I and H be interpretations of the same signature τ. en
the relation Z ⊆ ΔI×ΔH is called bisimulation between I andH if for all (d, e) ∈ Z
the following holds:
1. for all A ∈ NC we have d ∈ AI iﬀ e ∈ AH. (ATOM)
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2. for all r ∈ NR we have if there is d0 ∈ ΔI with (d, d0) ∈ rI then there is
e0 ∈ ΔH with (e, e0) ∈ rH and (d0, e0) ∈ Z. (FORTH)
3. for all r ∈ NR we have if there is e0 ∈ ΔH with (e, e0) ∈ rH then there is
d0 ∈ ΔI with (d, d0) ∈ rI and (d0, e0) ∈ Z. (BACK)
We write (I, d) ⟷−− (H, e) and say (I, d) is bisimilar to (H, e) if there is a bisimu-
lation Z between I and H such that (d, e) ∈ Z. ♢
It is sometimes more convenient to show that two pointed structures are bisim-
ilar, if the bisimulation is described by a pebble game between two players I
and II, where II has a winning strategy. Bisimulation games are derived from
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games [48]. e laer correspond to potential isomorphisms
which are the analogous notion [42] of bisimulation on FO level and can be found
in standard textbooks like [47]. Bisimulation games are of particular interest in
characterisations of model logics over ﬁnite models [115, 104]. Although we shall
not endeavour into ﬁnite model theory, we shall use them because their descript-
ive and illustrative nature facilitates our arguments in proofs to come.
In the bisimulation game G(I, d;H, e), the interpretations (I, d) and (H, e) are
considered as separate graphs. For each interpretation there is one pebble which
can be placed on an element of the interpretation, and whenever a pebble is on
some element d0 ∈ ΔI and there is d1 ∈ ΔI with (d0, d1) ∈ rI then the pebble
can be moved along an r-edge to d1. e same applies for H.
e position of both pebbles in each interpretation is summarised as conﬁgur-
ation (I, d0,H, e0) whenever the pebble in I is placed on d0 and the pebble in H is
placed on e0.
e gameG(I, d;H, e) is played according to the following rules: e 0-th round
starts in conﬁguration (I, d;H, e), where for all A ∈ NC: d ∈ AI iﬀ e ∈ AH must
hold, or II has lost the game in the 0-th round. For any conﬁguration (I, d0;H, e1)
the following rules apply:
1. In each round I picks one of the two interpretations, I say, and moves the
pebble along some edge, say an r-edge emerging from the pebble’s position
to some element d1. If there is no such edge along which player I could
move, II has won the game.
2. II has to respond to player I’s move in the other interpretation, here H, by
moving the pebble from e0 along some edge with the same label, in our case
an r-edge, to some element e1 such that for all A ∈ NC: d1 ∈ AI iﬀ e1 ∈ AH.
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In case player II cannot move accordingly, II has lost the game; otherwise
a new round begins.
Clearly, these rules mirror the ATOM-property as well as the FORTH- and
BACK-property, respectively, depending on which interpretation I chooses.
D 2.1.2 . II has a winning strategy in the game G(I, d;H, e) if she can
respond to every move of I such that she either wins the game or can play forever.
♢
P 2.1.3 . II has a winning strategy in the game G(I, d;H, e) iﬀ (I, d)⟷−−
(H, e).
P. For the if-direction, we deﬁne the following relation, which is obviously a
bisimulation: Z ∶= {(d, e) ∈ ΔI×ΔH ∣ II has a winning strategy for G(I, d;H, e)}.
For the only-if direction, let II play such that each new conﬁguration (I, d0;H, e0)
has a pair (d0, e0) in Z. To see that this is possible, let the game have reached
(I, d0;H, e0) such that (d0, e0) ∈ Z. Let I move in I, say, from d0 along some r-
edge to d1. en, by deﬁnition of Z, there must be a pair (d1, e1) ∈ Z such that e1
is an r-successor of e0 in H and d1 is atomically equivalent to e1. Hence II moves
to e1. us, II either wins the game or can play forever. 2
For each signature τ the bisimulation relation is an equivalence relation on the
pointed τ-interpretations. We therefore talk, w.r.t. to a signature τ, about bisim-
ulation types, which are the classes formed by this equivalence relation.
e bisimulation type links interesting structures together: Tree-unravellings
are interpretations which, viewed as a graph, form a tree whose elements cor-
respond to all ﬁnite path sequences. According to [18, Notes to Chapter 2] and
[20] the method of tree unravelling ﬁrst appeared 1959 in [46] but became pop-
ular due to [117]. In particular, every pointed interpretation is bisimilar to its
tree-unravelling:
D 2.1.4 . Let (I, d) be a pointed τ interpretation. We call Id its tree-
unravelling in d where ΔId is recursively deﬁned by
1. d ∈ ΔId
2. Let d̄ ∶= d r1d1r2…rndn ∈ ΔId . For all r ∈ NR: if (dn, dn+1) ∈ rI then
d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ dn+1 ∈ ΔId , where d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ dn+1 is the word we obtain by concatenation.
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For all A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR we deﬁne
rId ∶= {(d̄, d̄rdໟ) ∣ d̄, d̄rdໟ ∈ ΔId}
AId ∶= {d̄ ∈ ΔId ∣ d̄ = d r1d1r2…rndn and dn ∈ AI}
♢
Hence each element d̄ = d r1d1r2…rndn inΔId represents a path of ﬁnite length
beginning in d and noting all traversed nodes and the edges by which they were
accessed. Id is a proper tree-interpretation: d cannot be reached via any edge and
every other element in Id has exactly one predecessor and exactly one edge with
which it is connected to its predecessor.
By the recursive deﬁnition of a tree-unravelling, the depth of such a tree-structure
is at most countably inﬁnite.
O 2.1.5 . (I, d)⟷−− (Id, d)
P. By maintaining conﬁgurations (I, dໟ; I, d r1d1r2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ rndnrn+1dໟ) II has a
winning strategy in the game G(I, d; Id, d). 2
2.1.2 Finite Bisimulation and Locality of໦໱໨-Concepts
In this section the the notion of n-bisimulation [55] and the appropriate n-round
bisimulation game will be introduced. We shall show that for every໦໱໨-concept
there is an appropriate n < ω such that this concept is invariant under n-bisimulation
and conversely that n-bisimulation can, if the signature is ﬁnite, be captured by
characteristic ໦໱໨-concepts, in the sense that if two interpretations satisfy the
same characteristic concept, they are n-bisimilar:
For every natural number n, the n-round bisimulation game Gn(I, d;H, n) is the
bisimulation game G(I, d;H, n) which breaks oﬀ aer n-rounds.
D 2.1.6 . II has a winning strategy in Gn(I, d;H, e) if II either wins the
game within n-rounds or can play for n-rounds. ♢
Equivalently, one can deﬁne n-bisimulation between I and H as a system (or
family) (Zk)0≤k≤n of relations Zk ⊆ ΔI×ΔH such that all of the following require-
ments are met:
1. for all k ≤ n and all (d0, e0) ∈ Zk and all A ∈ NC we have d0 ∈ AI iﬀ
e0 ∈ AH (ATOM)
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2. for all k < n, (d0, e0) ∈ Zk+1 and r ∈ NR we have: if there is an r-successor
d1 of d0 in I then there is an r-successor e1 of e0 in H such that (d1, e1) ∈ Zk
(FORTH)
3. for all k < n, (d0, e0) ∈ Zk+1 and r ∈ NR we have: if there is an r-successor
e1 of e0 in H then there is an r-successor d1 of d0 in I such that (d1, e1) ∈ Zk
(BACK)
Proposition 2.1.3 equally holds for n-bisimulations and n-round bisimulation
games: Every pair in Zk gives II to a winning strategy for the k-round bisimulation
game, hence II can play n rounds and conversely, if II has a winning strategy for
Gn(I, d;H, e) then for each k ≤ n we obtain a relation
Zk ∶= {(d0, e0) ∣ II has a winning strategy for Gk(I, d0;H, e0)}
such that (Zk)k≤n forms an n-bisimulation between I and H with (d, e) ∈ Zn.
Analogously to bisimulation, we write (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e) if there is an n-bisimu-
lation (Zk)k≤n between I and H with (d, e) ∈ Zn.
O 2.1.7 . For all τ and all n < ω we have
1. ⟷−− n is an equivalence relation on the pointed interpretations
2. If (I, d)⟷−− n+1 (H, e) then (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
3. If (I, d)⟷−− (H, e) then (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
Interestingly, the concepts of ໦໱໨ can be stratiﬁed according to the nesting-
depth of their quantiﬁcations, which we shall call rank. e fragments of ໦໱໨-
concepts, which are induced by this stratiﬁcation, are preserved by the appropri-
ate notion of n-bisimulation, where n is the rank of the concepts.
For all τ the rank of an C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) is deﬁned as follows:
rankC ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
0 C ∈ NC or C = ⊥
max{rankD, rank E} C = D ⊓ E
rankD C = ¬D
1 + rankD C = ∃r.D, for all r ∈ NR
P 2.1.8 . Let C be an໦໱໨-concept of rank≤ n as well as (I, d) and (H, e)
pointed interpretations. If (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e) then d ∈ CI ⟺ e ∈ CH.
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P. e proof is carried out via induction upon n. For n = 0, C is w.l.o.g. a
concept name. As II has a winning strategy for G0(I, d;H, e), she does not lose
the 0-th round. Hence d and e are atomically equivalent and therefore d ∈ CI iﬀ
e ∈ CH.
For n + 1 the cases C = D ⊓ E and C = ¬D can be reduced to showing the
equivalence for D and E respectively. We can therefore w.o.l.g. assume that C =
∃r.D for some r ∈ NR.
Let d ∈ (∃r.D)I, thus there is an r-successor d0 of d in I such that d0 ∈ DI. As
II has a winning strategy for Gn+1(I, d;H, e), there is an r-successor e0 of e in H
such that II has a winning strategy for Gn(I, d0;H, e0). e induction hypothesis
yields now e0 ∈ DH and hence e ∈ (∃r.D)H. e only-if direction follows the same
rationale. 2
C 2.1.9 . If (I, d)⟷−− (H, e) then for every໦໱໨-concept Cwe have d ∈ CI
iﬀ e ∈ CH.
Although the corollary is obvious, it reveals the interesting fact that no prop-
erty is expressible by໦໱໨ which could distinguish the tree-unravelling from its
original structure. Furthermore each concept C is local:
Let Iℓd be deﬁned as the restriction of the tree-unravelling Id to path-elements
up to length ℓ:
ΔIℓd ∶= {dr0d1r1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ rkdk ∣ k < ℓ}
AIℓd ∶= AId ∩ ΔIℓd
rIℓd ∶= rId ∩ กΔI
ℓ
d × ΔIℓdข
L 2.1.10 . For all ℓ < ω we have (I, d)⟷−− ℓ (Iℓd , d).
P. Consider the game Gℓ(Id, d; Iℓd , d). As the game starts uniformly on d
in both interpretations, the path-elements in each conﬁguration get successively
longer with each round, but do not exceed length ℓ. By simply copying every
move of I, II has a winning strategy in Gℓ(Id, d; Iℓd , d).
As (I, d) is in particular ℓ-bisimilar to (Id, d) and ⟷−− ℓ is transitive we have
(I, d)⟷−− ℓ (Iℓd , d). 2
D 2.1.11 . An໦໱໨-concept C is ℓ-local if for every interpretation I and
every d ∈ ΔI we have d ∈ CI iﬀ d ∈ CIℓd . ♢
We remark that the notion of locality stems from classical model theory where
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it appears in the context of Gaifman-Graphs [54] for which the notion of being
ℓ-local is deﬁned in much greater generality. It is not unusual though to restrict
locality in the context of standard modal logics and therefore also in our context
to forward reachable elements [103].
C 2.1.12 . Let C be an໦໱໨-concept of rank ℓ. en C is ℓ-local.
is result shows that໦໱໨-concepts can only express properties whose truth
can be checked within ﬁnite depth from distinguished point. ໦໱໨-concepts are
also oblivious to copies of successors, i.e. the number of successors, which are
bisimilar to each other, nor can໦໱໨ distinguish elements that have predecessors
from those that do not.
໦໱໨-concepts are not aﬀected by disjoint unions with other structures either:
Let I and H be two structures such that ΔI and ΔH are disjoint. en I ⊎ H is
called the disjoint union of I and H, has the carrier set ΔI⊎H ∶= ΔI ⊎ ΔH and
AI⊎H ∶= AI ⊎ AH for all A ∈ NC and rI⊎H ∶= rI ⊎ rH for all r ∈ NR.
Since the tree-structure retains only those elements accessible on the connected
component of its root, we have Id = (I⊎H)d, so locality of໦໱໨-concepts entails
for all d ∈ I and every interpretation H that (I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ (I ⊎ H, d) ⊨ C.
e notion of being ℓ-local for໦໱໨-concepts or modal logic formulae however
plays a central role in the characterisation of standard modal logics: de Rijke [113]
used locality as characteristic property to deﬁne abstract modal logics (abstract in
the sense of generic) which he named ﬁnite rank, alluding to the statement Co-
rollary 2.1.12. Clearly, locality is also the reason why we can decide for an໦໱໨-
concept, whether or not it is satisﬁable. For an ℓ-local concept C, we only need to
build every tree of depth ℓ involving only the (ﬁnitely many) signature symbols of
C. e result goes back to [124] where the decidability of the 2-variable fragment
of FO without equality is proven. Later, the result is extended in [97] allowing
equality, though using completely diﬀerent techniques. A complexity theoretical
investigation is conducted in [86, 68] showing PSPACE-completeness for the sat-
isﬁability problem of standard modal logic formulae. Fourteen years aer [86] an
໦໱໨-speciﬁc version showing PSPACE-completeness for concept satisﬁability is
presented alongwith the logic໦໱໨ itself in [122]. How a naïve search for amodel
could be accomplished will be clearer when looking at characteristic concepts.
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2.1.3 Characteristic Concepts
We shall now introduce characteristic concepts. If the signature τ is ﬁnite we can
assemble a concept that captures the n-bisimulation type of an interpretationw.r.t.
τ. is means that every interpretation which satisﬁes this concept is n-bisimilar
to our original interpretation and vice versa.
Characteristic formulae in FO are also known as Hintikka-formulae [71] where
they are intimately connected to ﬁnite Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games. Characteristic
formulae [61] or here, characteristic concepts, are the straight forward adaption
of Hintikka-formulae to ﬁnite bisimulation.
Before deﬁning these concepts we shall introduce a short-hand notation: For
an n-element set Γ of concepts whose elements are enumerated C0, …Cn−1, we set
⨅Γ ∶= C0 ⊓ C1 ⊓ … ⊓ Cn−1. Since there are only ﬁnitely many enumerations
for the elements in Γ, there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent outcomes for ⨅Γ.
Analogously we deﬁne⨆Γ.
D 2.1.13 . Let τ be a ﬁnite signature and (I, d) an interpretation. en
the characteristic concept XnI,d for (I, d) on level n w.r.t. τ is recursively deﬁned
as follows:
X0I,d ∶= ⨅{A ∈ NC ∣ d ∈ AI} ⊓ ¬⨆{A ∈ NC ∣ d ∉ AI}
Xn+1I,d ∶= X0I,d ⊓⨅r∈NR ค⨅{∃r.XnI,d0 ∣ (d, d0) ∈ r
I} ⊓ ∀r.⨆{XnI,d0 ∣ (d, d0) ∈ r
I}ฅ
♢
We shall give an intuition for the characteristic concepts aer Observation
2.1.15. In order to claim that XnI,d is an ໦໱໨-concept we have to show that for
each level k < n there are at most ﬁnitely many characteristic concept, as we do
not allow inﬁnite disjunctions or conjunctions.
L 2.1.14 . Let τ be a ﬁnite signature. ere are at most ﬁnitely many diﬀerent
aracteristic concepts on level n
P. e proof is carried out by induction upon n. For n = 0 the characteristic
concept is already determined by the non-negated concept names occurring in
it, which could be any subset of NC. Since NC is ﬁnite, there are only ﬁnitely
many concepts on level 0. On level n + 1, the bracketed conjunction is already
determined by those concepts with existential operator, for each r ∈ NR. e
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induction hypothesis yields a ﬁnite cardinality for the number of characteristic
concepts on level n. e concepts with existential operator form a subset of the
characteristic concepts on level n and hence there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent
of these bracketed conjunctions for each r ∈ NR. But also NR was ﬁnite and
hence, combined with the ﬁnitely many characteristic concepts on level 0, there
are solely ﬁnitely many characteristic concepts on level n + 1. 2
O 2.1.15 . Let τ be a ﬁnite signature and let (I, d) be a pointed τ-inter-
pretation. For every natural number n we have
1. d ∈ (XnI,d)I
2. rankXnI,d = n
e observation is immediate. Before presenting the next proposition we shall
give an intuitive explanation what a characteristic ໦໱໨-concept encodes. As-
sume therefore we have two pointed τ-interpretations (I, d) and (H, e). For level
0, XnI,d states exactly which concept names are satisﬁed by d andwhich are not sat-
isﬁed. If e satisﬁes Xn+1I,d , it must be atomically equivalent to d and it must provide
for each r-successor of d an ‘appropriate’ r-successor on level n and all of e’s r-
successors must be ‘appropriate’ for at least one r-successor of d. If appropriate
means n-bisimilar, and this is what will be shown now, then the le-hand side of
the bracketed conjunction ensures the FORTH-condition and the right-hand side
the BACK-condition for an n + 1-bisimulation between d and e.
P 2.1.16 . Let τ be a ﬁnite signature and XnI,d the aracteristic formula
w.r.t. to this signature. en for any interpretation H we have
e ∈ (XnI,d)H ⟺ (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e).
P. ‘⟹’: e proof is carried out via induction upon n. We show the in-
duction step, whose proof rests on the intuition given for characteristic concepts.
As e ∈ (Xn+1I,d )I we have e ∈ X0I,d and so II does not lose the 0-th round.
For any challenge of I with some r-successor dໟ of d in I, there is ∃r.XnI,dໟ
amongst the le-hand side of the bracketed conjunction. Hence e ∈ (∃r.XnI,dໟ)H
and so there is an r-successor eໟ of e with eໟ ∈ (XnI,dໟ)H for which, by induction
hypothesis, II has a winning strategy in Gn(I, dໟ;H, eໟ).
In case I challenges II with some r-successor eໟ of e in H, we know that e sat-
isﬁes the right-hand side of the bracketed conjunction, hence e ∈ (∀r.⨆{XnI,dໟ ∣
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(d, dໟ) ∈ rI})H, i.e. eໟ ∈ (XnI,dໟ)H for some r-successor d
ໟ of d. e induction
hypothesis yields again that II has a winning strategy for Gn(I, dໟ;H, eໟ).
us II can ward oﬀ any challenge from I in n + 1 rounds, and hence II has a
winning strategy for Gn+1(I, d;H, e).
‘⟸’: For the only-if direction we use from Observation 2.1.15 that rankXnI,d =
n as well as d ∈ (XnI,d)I and from Proposition 2.1.8 that, since (I, d) ⟷−− n (H, e)
by assumption, we have d ∈ (XnI,d)I iﬀ e ∈ (XnI,d)H 2
Let n(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI and rankC ≤ n}. We shall summarise
the results from Propositions 2.1.16 and 2.1.8 as well as Observation 2.1.15 in the
following
T 2.1.17 . For ﬁnite τ and τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e) the following state-
ments are equivalent for all n < ω
1. e ∈ (XnI,d)H
2. (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
e question arises if—although we cannot construct a single formula for in-
ﬁnite signatures—n(I, d) = n(H, e) iﬀ (I, d) ⟷−− n (H, e) holds. Clearly the
only-if direction is true, but for the if-direction a counter-example can be con-
structed:
E 2.1.18 . Let NC = ℕ and NR = {r}. Let further I be the interpretation,
where d ∈ ΔI has for each ﬁnite subsetM ⊆ ℕ an r-successor dM with (I, d) ⊨ n iﬀ
n ∈ M. Let now (H, e) be a copy of (I, d), where we delete an arbitrary r-successor
eM from H.
It is clear that II cannot ﬁnd an appropriate answer when I challenges her by
moving in I from d to dM: No response in H would be atomically equivalent to
dM and hence not (I, d) ⟷−− (H, e). We shall show that nevertheless for every
C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) we have
d ∈ CI ⟺ e ∈ CI
in the root element d and e.
e proof is carried out by induction: Atomic equivalence is clear by construc-
tion. We can reduce the step-case to C = ∃r.D where rankD = 0. By assuming
D is in disjunctive normal form, we can further reduce this case to D being a
conjunction of negated and non-negated concept names.
40
Let M− be the set of negated concept names and M+ be the set of non-negated
concept names in D. Clearly (I, dM+) ⊨ D and hence (I, d) ⊨ C; we only need to
consider the if-direction. If eM+ is still present in H we are done. Otherwise take
n ∶= maxM+ ∪M− and set M ∶= M+ ∪ {n + 1}. en M ⊆ ℕ is still ﬁnite and so
eM ∈ ΔH. We obtain (H, eM) ⊨ D, which shows that (H, e) ⊨ C.
2.1.4 Saturation and the Theorem of Hennessy and Milner
What saturation means diﬀers and is dependent on the notion of type. A type of
an element is nothing else but its theory, in our case the set of all໦໱໨-concepts
that are satisﬁed by this element. It turns out that there are interpretations which
do not realise all the types which are possible and we shall shortly see, what this
means.
Such an interpretation can be extended to an interpretation which realises all
possible types and this interpretation is called saturated (with types). We shall
give an adapted notion of type and saturation for each logic that we treat.
Aer the setback exhibited in Example 2.1.18 that even 1-bisimilarity cannot be
captured when τ is inﬁnite, we shall discover that saturated interpretations are in
this respect a remarkable class of interpretations. e Hennessy-Milner-eorem
will summarise the special property of saturated interpretations.
As mentioned earlier, the equivalence relation⟷−− n+1 is a reﬁnement of⟷−− n
and ⟷−− is a reﬁnement of ⟷−− n for all natural numbers n. e question arises
whether the limit for the chain of reﬁnements (⟷−− n)n<ω ﬁnally coincides with
⟷−− .
D 2.1.19 . (I, d)⟷−− ω (H, e) if for all n < ω we have (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e).
♢
Analogously anω-bisimulation Zω is a system of bisimulations (Zn)n<ω between
I and H. II has a winning strategy in Gω(I, d;H, e) if she has a winning strategy
in Gn(I, d;H, e) for all n < ω, or equivalently (d, e) ∈ Zn for all n < ω.
As we have counter-examples for n(I, d) = n(H, e) implies (I, d) ⟷−− n
(H, e) on each level n, we cannot hope to have (I, d) = (H, e) iﬀ (I, d) ⟷−− ω
(H, e) in general.
Even for ﬁnite signatures (I, d) ⟷−− ω (H, e) iﬀ (I, d) ⟷−− (H, e) fails as the
following counter-example shows:
E 2.1.20 . Let ΔI ∶= {(k, n) ∈ ω× ω ∣ 1 ≤ k ≤ n} ∪ {(0, 0)}, NC ∶= ∅ and
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Figure 2.1: On the le the interpretation I with point of origin (0, 0) and on the
right the interpretation H with point of origin (0, 0) and its inﬁnite path.
NR ∶= {r} where rI ⊆ ΔI × ΔI is deﬁned as
rI ∶= {((k, n), (k + 1, n)) ∣ k < n and 1 ≤ n < ω} ∪ {((0, 0), (1, n)) ∣ n < ω}.
Hence (0, 0) is the root of a tree so that for every n < ω a non-branching, non-
cyclic chain (1, n),… , (n, n) of r-successors emerges from (0, 0), which has length
n. erefore I looks like bristles sprouting from the end of a broom, where each
bristle has ﬁnite length. Let now (H, (0, 0)) be a copy of (I, (0, 0))where (0, 0) has
additionally an inﬁnite r-successor path. More concrete: ΔH ∶= ΔI ∪ {(0, n) ∣
n < ω} and rH ∶= rI ∪ {((0, n), (0, n + 1)) ∣ n < ω}.
We show that (I, (0, 0)) ⟷−− ω (H, (0, 0)). Let n < ω be arbitrary. We have
to show that II has a winning strategy in Gn(I, (0, 0);H, (0, 0)): In which ever
branch Imightmove in his ﬁrst challenge, IIwill move into the branchwith length
min{length, n} where length is the length of the branch I has moved to. II thus
makes sure that both parties can move at least min{length, n} further rounds.
Either both will reach the end in their chains aer min{length, n} − 1 rounds and
II wins, or II can play n rounds and therefore wins.
We show that I has a winning strategy in the game G(I, (0, 0);H, (0, 0)), i.e. II
loses the game: Let Imove ﬁrst in H from (0, 0) into the inﬁnite chain. According
to the rules IImust move in I from (0, 0) inevitably into some ﬁnite chain of depth
n, say. Let I move in the inﬁnite path of H for further n-times. II cannot ward oﬀ
the last challenge as she is at the end of the chain in I and loses.
But there is a class of structures for which not only⟷−− ω immediately upgrades
to⟷−− but where even equality in ໦໱໨-theories is enough to entail bisimilarity,
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and despite of Example 2.1.18 even for inﬁnite signatures τ! We therefore li the
restriction to ﬁnite signatures and allow signatures of arbitrary cardinality.
In order to deﬁne this class of structures we have to introduce the notion of
໦໱໨-types and saturated interpretations.
D 2.1.21 . Let τ be a signature and (I, d) a pointed τ-interpretation. For
each r ∈ NR we call
1. Γ an r-type of d, if for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have d ∈ (∃r.⨅Γ0)I.
2. an r-type Γ of d realised at d, if there is an r-successor d0 of d in I such that
d0 ∈ ⋂C∈Γ CI.
♢
As we predominantly need this notion in its adaption for ໦໱໨, we shall refer
to ໦໱໨-r-types simply as r-types or even only types if r is clear. Similarly we
refer to the notion of ໦໱໨-saturation, which will be introduced next, simply as
saturation.
D 2.1.22 . Let τ be a signature and I a τ-interpretation. en I is satur-
ated if for every d ∈ ΔI and every r ∈ NR every r-type of d is realised at d.
♢
P 2.1.23 (Hennessy-Milner). For saturated pointed interpretations (I, d),
(H, e) we have
(I, d) =(H, e) ⟺ (I, d)⟷−− (H, e)
P. e only-if direction is immediate. Assume (I, d) = (H, e). en d
and e are atomically equivalent and so II has not lost the 0-th round. We show
that II has a winning strategy by maintaining conﬁgurations (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) such
that (I, dໟ) =(H, eໟ):
Assume the game has reached the conﬁguration (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) with (I, dໟ) =
(H, eໟ) and I moves from dໟ along an r-edge to d໠. en for every ﬁnite subset
Γ0 ⊆ (I, d໠) we have dໟ ∈ ∃r.⨅Γ0, so ∃r.⨅Γ0 ∈ (I, dໟ). As (I, dໟ) =
(H, eໟ) we have ∃r.⨅Γ0 ∈(H, eໟ) for every such Γ0 ⊆(I, d໠).
Hence (I, d໠) is an r-type of eໟ and since H is saturated, (I, d໠) is realised
at eໟ, meaning, there is some r-successor e໠ of eໟ with e ∈ ⋂C∈(I,d໠) CH. Since
໦໱໨ is closed under negation we obtain (I, d໠) =(H, e໠).
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By moving to e໠, II can again obtain a conﬁguration that satisﬁes the require-
ment. e same rationale can be applied for any other r ∈ NR and in case Iwould
have challenged II in H. Hence II has a winning strategy in G(I, d;H, e). 2
In Example 2.1.18, we saw that under inﬁnite signatures ໦໱໨-concepts can-
not even capture 1-bisimilarity let alone bisimilarity. Example 2.1.20 showed that
even ω-bisimilarity does not necessarily coincide with full bisimilarity. us, the
surprising thing about the Hennessy-Milner-eorem is not only that⟷−− ω would
upgrade to⟷−− but that even for inﬁnite signatures merely having the same໦໱໨-
theory is enough for saturated interpretations to be bisimilar!
Note that the Hennessy-Milner-eorem in its original form in [69] was re-
stricted to the class of ﬁnitely branching interpretations. Its generalisation to
saturated interpretations is due to [73].
A Remark on Saturation and Types
Saturation and in particular ω-saturation are long standing notions in classical
model theory [109, 34], which are closely connected to the notion of type. Poizat
describes in [109] the type of an element as being nothing else but its theory, i.e.
the set of all FO-formulae with at most one free variable which are satisﬁed by
this element.
An n-type tA(d) of an element d in a τ-interpretation I is, for a ﬁxed n-element
setA ⊆ ΔI (parameter set), the type of dwhere the signature τ is extended by a set
of fresh constant symbols {ca ∣ a ∈ A} and each ca is considered to be interpreted
as cIa = a. If A is clear, we may refer to tA(d) just as type, omiing the n.
So tA(d) describes d relative to the elements in A. Note that tA(d) contains t∅(d)
i.e. the theory of d without the signature extensions, as well as for each a ∈ A all
sentences obtained by replacing the free variable in formulae from t∅(a) with the
constant symbol ca.
A non-realised type of I over the parameter set A, is a set of FO-formulae over
τ ∪ {ca ∣ a ∈ A} with at most one free variable such that each of its ﬁnite subsets
is satisﬁed by some element of the interpretation but no element of I satisﬁes all
formulae at once.
As we have seen in Example 2.1.20, there are interpretations which have non-
realised types. is is where saturation comes into play: An interpretation is
ω-saturated if it realises all types over ﬁnite parameter sets or in other words
if this interpretation has no non-realised types over ﬁnite parameter sets. From
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classical model theory it is known that every interpretation I has an ω-saturated
interpretation, which is an elementary extension of I (see [109, 34]). In particular
the interpretations and its elementary extension are elementary equivalent, i.e.
they satisfy the same FO-sentences.
Potential isomorphisms [47] play in the context of FO the same role as bisimu-
lation in the context of໦໱໨-concepts: If a potential isomorphism exists between
two interpretations they are elementary equivalent. e converse is in general
not true, just as lile as satisfying the same ໦໱໨-concepts implies bisimilarity
(cf. Examples 2.1.18 and 2.1.20).
In this respect, ω-saturated interpretations are of interest as they form a special
class of interpretations in which elementary equivalence between two interpret-
ations implies that there is a potential isomorphism between these two interpret-
ations.
We thus have explored analogue notions of type and saturation in the context
of໦໱໨ on concept level for which the eorem of Hennessy and Milner yields a
result analogue to FO namely that໦໱໨-saturated interpretations (I, d) and (H, e)
which satisfy the same໦໱໨-concepts are bisimilar.
So what is the relationship between an FO-type and its adaption to the ໦໱໨-
seing? In principle, an໦໱໨-typeΓ of an element d is the set of all໦໱໨-concepts
which are satisﬁed by this element, i.e. its ໦໱໨-theory. Since we can always
switch to the tree-unravelling of an interpretation, we describe an element by
its ໦໱໨-theory and its position in this tree-unravelling, i.e. its predecessor and
the label on the edge with which it is connected to this predecessor. Let this
unique predecessor be e ∈ ΔI such that (e, d) ∈ rI. e predecessor e takes the
role of a single parameter relative to which d is described; hence Γ is actually a
sort of 1-type. Yet໦໱໨ does not incorporate constant symbols and so we cannot
incorporate the predecessor inΓ itself, as the FO-formula r(ce, x)would have done.
We therefore have to explicitly refer to Γ as ∃r-type of e.
As we have seen, this notion of ໦໱໨-type is ‘suﬃcient’ in order to obtain the
eorem of Hennessy and Milner. It turns out that every ω-saturated interpret-
ation is already ໦໱໨-saturated. So, instead of explaining for each DL ໱ we are
about to investigate, how we could obtain an ໱-saturated extension of our inter-
pretation (cf. [105]), we shall simply use the result from classical model theory
which states that every interpretation has an ω-saturated extension.
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2.1.5 ໦໱໨-Concepts as Bisimulation Invariant Fragment of FO
Equipped with this knowledge, we shall now characterise໦໱໨-concepts as frag-
ment of FO, restating and reproving a variant of van Benthem’s characterisation
theorem [129] for standard modal logic. In what follows, we shall ﬁrst state the
theorem and then prove several lemmas that we need before proving the theorem
itself. In particular we shall show that every FO-formula which is invariant un-
der bisimulation is already invariant under n-bisimulation for some n < ω, a view
particularly stressed in [112]. Using characteristic ໦໱໨-concepts we can then
construct for every bisimulation invariant FO-formula an໦໱໨-concept over the
same signature which is equivalent to this FO-formula.
T 2.1.24 . If φ(x) is a bisimulation invariant FO-formula over τ then there is
an໦໱໨-concept C over τ su that I dx ⊨ φ(x) iﬀ (I, d) ⊨ C.
We occasionally write (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) instead of I dx ⊨ φ(x). As FO has the ﬁnite
occurrence property, i.e. every formula uses only a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent
symbols, we may for this section assume that τ contains exactly the same role
and concept names of φ(x) and therefore that τ is ﬁnite.
L 2.1.25 . If φ is invariant under bisimulation then φ is invariant under n-
bisimulation.
eproof of Lemma 2.1.25 will make use the following lemma inwhichwe shall
use compactness of FO. We use an equivalent variant to the way compactness
was deﬁned in Section 1.2.5: If for a set Γ ⊆ FO(τ) all ﬁnite subsets Γ0 ⊆ Γ are
satisﬁable, then Γ is satisﬁable.
L 2.1.26 . If φ is an FO-formula and invariant under ⟷−− but not invariant
under⟷−− n for any n < ω then there are two interpretations (I, d) (H, e) su that
(I, d) =(H, e) but I ⊨ φ and H ⊭ φ
P. Let the premise be true. en for each n < ω there are pointed interpreta-
tions (I, d) and (H, e) such that (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e) yet (I, d) ⊨ φ and (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x).
So none of the
Xn ∶= {XnI,d ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) ∣ ∃(I, d), (H, e) ∶ φ(x)
⊨(I, d)⟷−− n (H, e) ⊭ φ(x)}
is empty. As there are only ﬁnitely many characteristic concepts on each level n,
⨆Xn is an ໦໱໨-concept. Let X ∶= {⨆Xn ∣ n < ω}. en, by compactness of
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FO, there is an interpretation (I, d) ⊨ X with (I, d) ⊨ φ. By the deﬁnition of Xn,
for every n < ω there is (Hn, en) ⊭ φ(x) with (I, d)⟷−− n (Hn, en). Hence again by
compactness, {XnI,d ∣ n < ω} ∪ {¬φ(x)} has a model (H, e) with (H, e) ⊭ φ(x).
is implies (I, d)⟷−− ω (H, e) and ﬁnally (I, d) =(H, e), so that (I, d) and
(H, e) are the interpretations we are looking for.
2
P  L 2.1.25. Let (I, d) and (H, e) be as in Lemma 2.1.26. Asmentioned
above, we can ﬁnd ω-saturated extensions (I∗, d) for (I, d) and (H∗, e) for (H, e)
such that they satisfy the same FO formulae as their original models. is implies
in particular that (I∗, d) ⊨ φ(x) and (H∗, e) ⊭ φ(x), and since ໦໱໨-concepts
correspond to FO-formulae that (I, d) =(I∗, d) and (H, e) =(H∗, e).
ese ω-saturated extensions are also saturated in the sense of ໦໱໨. By the
theorem of Hennessy and Milner we therefore infer (I∗, d) ⟷−− (H∗, e). But this
is a contradiction to φ(x) being invariant under bisimulation. Hence there is an n
such that φ(x) is invariant under n-bisimulation. 2
P  T 2.1.24. As Lemma 2.1.25 shows, φ is n-bisimulation invariant
for some n < ω. Let Cφ ∶= {XnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}. Cφ is ﬁnite as on every
level n only ﬁnitely many characteristic concepts exist. Hence⨆Cφ is an ໦໱໨-
concept. We have φ(x) ⊨ ⨆Cφ. But we also have⨆Cφ ⊨ φ(x), so φ(x) is logically
equivalent to Cφ. 2
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2.2 The Characterisation of໦໱໨u-Concepts
໦໱໨u is ໦໱໨ extended with the universal role u, i.e. a role which is for every
interpretation I interpreted as uI = ΔI × ΔI. us it allows each element to be
reachable by a forward edge labelled u from each element in the carrier set.
In the ﬁeld of modal logics, the corresponding extension of the standard modal
logicML is known as standard modal logic with global modalityML[∀] [21]. e
global modality is therefore sometimes also called universal modality [18, Notes
to Chapter 7]. In description logics it is called value restriction on the universal
role (existential quantiﬁcation on the universal role), expressed by ∀u (∃u), where
u is a role name, representing the universal role [13]. Whilst the global modality
∀ is in a modal context considered to be a logical symbol, value restrictions on the
universal role are considered to be a common value restriction over a special role.
Since we do not want to consider u to be part of the signature, we shall follow the
modal perspective and consider u to be logical symbol.
Several reasons led to this decision: We would need to restrict signatures τ to
those with u ∈ τ as otherwise we would look at plain ໦໱໨-concepts. Addition-
ally the model class for ໦໱໨u-concepts would need to be restricted to the class
of interpretations with uI = ΔI×ΔI. is, in turn, would mean that also the FO-
fragment to which the set of໦໱໨u-concepts corresponds needs to be restricted to
this class. Meanwhile the actual feature, namely that global quantiﬁcation corres-
ponds to the unrestricted FO-quantifying over the free variable in the translated
໦໱໨-part of the concept, would be obfuscated. We shall therefore consider u as
logical symbol which does not belong to the signature.
It will turn out that the extension of ໦໱໨ with universal quantiﬁcation has a
straight forward correspondence in the notion of global bisimulation, the notion
of forest unravelling and global ໦໱໨-saturation. It is therefore diﬃcult to ﬁnd
references to whom all these notions are aributed [18, Notes for Chapter 7]. A
ﬁrst thorough investigation has been performed in [62].
Note that our notion of universal quantiﬁcation using the universal role u should
not be confused with the notion of a universal role mentioned in [76, Section
9.2.4]: the laer is interpreted as the reﬂexive and transitive closure of the union
over all relations in an interpretation and simply encodes reachability. In modal
logics the universal role with this deﬁnition has been established as master mod-
ality [18, cf. Chapter 6.5 and Notes for Chapter 7]. Our universal quantiﬁcation is
strictly more than the reﬂexive, transitive closure of the union over all relations
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in a given interpretation!
E 2.2.1 . Let ΔI = {d, e} and the signature τ = {R} where RI = ∅. e
reﬂexive, transitive closure over R is {(d, d), (e, e)}, the universal role in our sense,
however, is equal to the set {(d, d), (d, e), (e, d), (e, e)} and thus diﬀerent.
As we have seen in our lile example at the beginning, TBoxes seem to express
general interrelations between concepts which must hold for all individuals. It
turns out that TBoxes form a fragment of this logic ໦໱໨u. We shall use the
characterisation result presented here to characterise TBoxes later on.
Obviously, in an interpretation I which interprets u as uI = ΔI × ΔI, all no-
tions for໦໱໨ like bisimulation, type and saturation would implicitly turn out to
coincide with the notions we shall introduce further down. Yet point is that sig-
natures τ over which we shall formulate TBoxes are not required to incorporate a
universal rule. Furthermore, even if τ would contain a symbol u one would have
to restrict the class of interpretations to those which interpret u as a universal
role.
We therefore treat u as a logical symbol and adapt the notions introduced in
໦໱໨ in such a way that the extension of໦໱໨with universal quantiﬁcation is ac-
commodated. In this sense, the reader should not expect great revelations, nor is it
necessary to follow each proof in detail: e proof are only meant as reassurance
and convenience for the reader.
2.2.1 Syntax, Semantics and Normal Form of໦໱໨u-Concepts
e description logics ໦໱໨u allows, additionally to all ໦໱໨-operators, for the
universal role u. e syntax is then as follows
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃r.D ∣ ∃u.D
whereA ∈ NC, r ∈ NR, D, E ∈ ໦໱໨u(τ) and u is the universal role. e semantics
is exactly the same as for ໦໱໨ where uI ∶= ΔI × ΔI for every interpretation
I. ough, we do not consider u to be symbol in our signature, but a logical
symbol, like ∃ or ⊓ which comes with the logic. Again, we use the abbreviation
∀u.D ∶= ¬∃u.¬D.
As the universal role connects all elements with each other, the interpretation
of a globally quantiﬁed concept, i.e. a concept of the form ∃u.D or ∀u.D, is inde-
pendent of the distinguished point. Instead of (I, d) ⊨ ∃u.D we may also write
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I ⊨ ∃u.D and similarly for ∀u.
e interpretation of a globally quantiﬁed concept under any interpretation I
can either be ∅ or ΔI; we have (∃u.D)I = ∅ iﬀ DI = ∅ and (∃u.D)I = ΔI
otherwise. In the case of (∀u.D)Iwe have (∀u.D)I = ΔI iﬀDI = ΔI and (∀u.D)I =
∅ otherwise.
Of course, for concepts that have non-globally and globally quantiﬁed parts,
like A ⊓ ∃u.E, we still need the distinguished point to evaluate whether or not
(I, d) ⊨ A ⊓ ∃u.E.
e translation into ﬁrst order logic is given by the continuation of the trans-
lation function for ໦໱໨ (Section 1.2.4) on ໦໱໨u-concepts with [∃u.C; xi] ∶=
∃xi.[C; xi], where i ∈ {0, 1}.
Interestingly, concepts in ໦໱໨u split into a global and a local part where the
global part is local in nature: e local part of an ໦໱໨u-concept C needs to be
evaluated at the distinguished element and is therefore comparable to an ໦໱໨-
concept. e global part, however, must be satisﬁed at every element of an inter-
pretation, but at each element, it behaves like an ໦໱໨-concept, i.e. it only talks
about properties of elements which are reachable from this speciﬁc element via
edges.
One way to highlight this property is to deﬁne a normal-form for ໦໱໨u-con-
cepts which represents the original concept by a boolean connexion of ໦໱໨-
concepts (the local component) and those ໦໱໨u-concepts which are composed
of a global quantiﬁer followed by an໦໱໨-concept.
D 2.2.2 . An ໦໱໨u-concept is in disjunctive normal form, if it has the
following structure where Di,j is an໦໱໨-concept and Qi,j ∈ {∃, ∀}:
෼i<m
මDi,0 ⊓ ෻j<ni
Qi,ju.Di,j+1ඹ
♢
L 2.2.3 . Every໦໱໨u-concept C can be rewrien as logically equivalent concept
in disjunctive normal form.
P. e proof is carried out by induction over໦໱໨u concepts: Atomic con-
cepts are already in normal form. In case C = D ⊓ E we my apply the induction
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hypothesis to D and E and obtain
C = ก⨆i<m Di,0 ⊓⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1ข ⊓ ก⨆r<k Er,0 ⊓⨅s<ℓr Qr,su.Er,s+1ข
= ⨆i<m กDi,0 ⊓⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 ⊓ ก⨆r<k Er,0 ⊓⨅s<ℓr Qr,su.Er,s+1ขข
= ⨆i<m⨆r<k กDi,0 ⊓⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 ⊓ Er,0 ⊓⨅s<ℓr Qr,su.Er,s+1ข
where the last line is a concept in disjunctive normal form. In a similar way, the
induction hypothesis can be applied to D in the case C = ¬D.
C = ¬෼i<m
Di,0 ⊓ ෻j<ni
Qi,ju.Di,j+1 = ෻i<m
Dໟi,0 ⊔ ෼j<ni
Qໟi,ju.Dໟi,j+1
where Dໟi,j is the negation of Di,j and Qໟi,j is the dual of Qi,j. is can be considered
as a conjunction of disjunctive normal forms, which can be rendered into a dis-
junctive normal form by applying the distributivity laws like in the case C = D⊓E.
To treat the case C = ∃t.Dwhere t ∈ NR∪{u}, we ﬁrst show that ∃t.⨆i<m Di,0⊓
⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 is logically equivalent to ⨆i<m(∃t.Di,0) ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1. For
then ∃t.Di,0 is either a globally quantiﬁed or still an໦໱໨-concept, depending on
t; in any case,⨆i<m(∃t.Di,0) ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 is a disjunctive normal form.
Clearly, ∃t.⨆i<m Di,0 ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 ≡ ⨆i<m ∃t.(Di,0 ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1).
For arbitrary I and d ∈ ΔI, we have d ∈ ∃t.(Di,0 ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I for some
i < m, iﬀ there is some t-successor dໟ of d, with dໟ ∈ DIi,0 ∩ ⋂j<ni(Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I.
As remarked above ⋂j<ni(Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I ≠ ∅ iﬀ ⋂j<ni(Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I = ΔI, hence
dໟ ∈ DIi,0 ∩⋂j<ni(Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I iﬀ d
ໟ ∈ DIi,0 and⋂j<ni(Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I = ΔI.
e laer is the case iﬀ d ∈ (ම∃t.Di,0ඹ ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I, which proves our
claim
∃t. ෼i<m
Di,0 ⊓ ෻j<ni
Qi,ju.Di,j+1 ≡ ෼i<m
(∃t.Di,0) ⊓ ෻j<ni
Qi,ju.Di,j+1
and conludes the induction step for C = ∃t.D. 2
2.2.2 Global Bisimulation, Finite Global Bisimulation and
Characteristic໦໱໨u-Concepts
e notion of bisimulation for ໦໱໨ can now be lied onto the global level for
໦໱໨u:
D 2.2.4 . Let I0 and I1 be two structures. en I0 g⟷−− I1 if both of the
following conditions hold
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1. for all d ∈ ΔI0 there is e ∈ ΔI1 with (I0, d)⟷−− (I1, e)
2. for all e ∈ ΔI1 there is d ∈ ΔI0 with (I0, d)⟷−− (I1, e)
We write (I0, d) g⟷−− (I1, e) if I0 g⟷−− I1 and (I0, d)⟷−− (I1, e). ♢
In particular Oo, e.g. [102], deﬁnes global bisimulation via games with reset
rounds: at the beginning of every round, I can call a reset-round, where I chooses
one of the interpretations and places its pebble on any element in this interpret-
ation. II can place the pebble of the other structure on some arbitrary element
which must be atomically equivalent. If she cannot ﬁnd such an element, she
loses the game. Otherwise a new໦໱໨-bisimulation game starts in this conﬁgur-
ation.
Our deﬁnition of global bisimulation, although equivalent to games with reset
rounds, are very close to the intuition of the local nature of globally quantiﬁed
໦໱໨u concepts, in that we require for every element in one interpretation a loc-
ally bisimilar partner in the other interpretation.
In analogy to ໦໱໨-bisimulation, we can introduce a bounded bisimulation
g⟷−− n by replacing ⟷−− with ⟷−− n in the deﬁnition above. To make use of this
stratiﬁcation, we continue the rank-function deﬁned in Section 2.1.2 on ໦໱໨u-
concepts, by seing rank ∃u.C ∶= rankC, therefore ignoring global quantiﬁcation.
We want to show that the disjunctive normal form does not increase the rank
of a concept:
L 2.2.5 . Let C be an ໦໱໨u-concept then there is a concept Cໟ in disjunctive
normal form su that C ≡ Cໟ and rankCໟ ≤ rankC.
e proof is readily carried out by induction over the structure of ໦໱໨u-con-
cepts. e inequality between the ranks is necessary as the following example
shows: Let r ∈ NR and C ∶= ∃r.(⊤ ⊓ ∀u.∃s.⊤) then Cໟ ∶= (∃r.⊤) ⊓ ∀u.∃s.⊤ is its
normal form with rankCໟ < rankC.
O 2.2.6 . ໦໱໨u is invariant under g⟷−− .
With the following lemma and the remark that for all n < ω
(I0, d) g⟷−− (I1, e) ⟹ (I0, d) g⟷−− n+1 (I1, e) ⟹ (I0, d) g⟷−− n (I1, e)
the observation is clear.
L 2.2.7 . Let C ∈ ໦໱໨u and rankC ≤ n then for all pointed interpretations
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(I0, d), (I1, e) with (I0, d) g⟷−− n (I1, e) we have d ∈ CI0 iﬀ e ∈ CI1 .
P. Under the given preconditions let d ∈ CI0 . en C has a disjunctive
normal form Cໟ ∶= ⨆i<m Di,0 ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 such that rankCໟ ≤ rankC. Let
i < m such that d ∈ (Di,0 ⊓⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I0 . By deﬁnition Cໟ all Di,j are໦໱໨-
concepts of rank ≤ n. In particular (I0, d) g⟷−− n (I1, e) entails (I0, d) ⟷−− n (I1, e)
so, by eorem 2.1.17, we have e ∈ DI1i,0. If Qi,j = ∃ then there is dໟ ∈ D
I0
i,j+1 which
ﬁnds some eໟ ∈ ΔI1 such that (I0, dໟ) ⟷−− n (I1, eໟ), so e ∈ (∃u.Di,j+1)I1 . In the
other case, where Qi,j = ∀, we have ΔI0 = DI0i,j+1. But every eໟ ∈ ΔI1 ﬁnds a
dໟ ∈ ΔI0 such that (I0, dໟ) ⟷−− n (I1, eໟ). Again with eorem 2.1.17 one obtains
that all eໟ ∈ ΔI1 must be in in D MI1i,j+1 which entails that e ∈ ∀u.Di,j+1. Hence
e ∈ (Di,0 ⊓ ⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1)I1 . e symmetry of
g⟷−− clinches the argument for
the converse direction. 2
Given, the signature τ is ﬁnite, characteristic concepts for ໦໱໨ were intro-
duced in Deﬁnition 2.1.13. Similarly we can deﬁne characteristic concepts for
໦໱໨u; indeed their construction is based on ໦໱໨-concepts and is straight for-
ward: In order to ensure that a τ-interpretation I1 is globally n-bisimilar to some
interpretation I0,
1. for every element in d ∈ ΔI0 there must be some n-bisimilar element in I1,
hence I1 has to satisfy⨅{∃u.XnI0,d ∣ d ∈ Δ
I0}.
2. every element in I1 must be n-bisimilar to some element I0, i.e. I1 has to
satisfy ∀u.⨆{XnI0,d ∣ d ∈ Δ
I0}.
In both cases XnI0,d are the characteristic ໦໱໨-concepts from Deﬁnition 2.1.13,
with respect to the given signature. Since there are only ﬁnitely many charac-
teristic concepts on each level, the sets given in item 1. and 2. are ﬁnite. So we
obtain the characteristic໦໱໨u-concept for I0
XnI0 ∶= ෻{∃u.X
n
I0,d ∣ d ∈ Δ
I0} ⊓ ∀u.෼{X
n
I0,d ∣ d ∈ Δ
I0}
e characteristic໦໱໨u concept for a pointed interpretation (I0, d) is then given
by XnI0,d ∶= X
n
I0
⊓ YnI0,d where X
n
I0
is the characteristic ໦໱໨u-concept deﬁned
above and YnI0,d is the characteristic໦໱໨-concept.
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2.2.3 ໦໱໨u-Concepts as Global Bisimulation Invariant
Fragment of FO
We can extend the notion of r-types given in Deﬁnition 2.1.21 immediately on
໦໱໨u by allowing r ∈ NR ∪ {u}. We shall give an explicit deﬁnition anyway.
Note that types are still subsets of໦໱໨ rather than of໦໱໨u:
D 2.2.8 . Let τ be a signature and (I, d) a pointed τ-interpretation.
1. For each r ∈ NR ∪ {u} we call Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨(τ) an r-type of d, if for every ﬁnite
subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have d ∈ ∃r.⨅Γ0. In case r = u we also say Γ is a u-type
of I.
2. For each r ∈ NR ∪ {u}, an r-type Γ of d is realised at d, if there is an r-
successor d0 of d in I such that d0 ∈ ⋂C∈Γ CI. If r = u we also say that Γ
is realised in I.
3. I is saturated if for all r ∈ NR ∪ {u} and all d ∈ ΔI every r-type Γ of d is
realised at d.
♢
As the theorem of Hennessy-Milner was mainly aimed at the standard modal
logicML, we shall say that an arbitrary logic໱ has theHennessy-Milner Property,
if it satisﬁes an analogous theorem. More formally: Let ໱ be a logic and ໱⟷−−
an appropriate variant of bisimulation for ໱. Similarly let ໱-saturation be an
appropriate notion of saturation w.r.t. ໱.
D 2.2.9 . ໱ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property if for ໱-saturated τ-inter-
pretations (I, d) and (H, e) the following is true
໱(I, d) =໱(H, e) ⟺ (I, d) ໱⟷−− (H, e)
where ໱(I, d) = {C ∈ ໱(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI}. ♢
e Hennessy-Milner-Property obviously not only depends on the logic itself
but also on the chosen model-theoretic relation ໱⟷−− on the interpretation and the
notion of saturation. Clearly, in every instance where we prove the Hennessy-
Milner-Property it will be clear what ໱, the concrete variant of bisimulation ໱⟷−−
and the notion of ໱-saturation is.
or our concrete case of ໦໱໨u we now (re)deﬁne (I, d) as follows: For every
τ-interpretation I, we deﬁne (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨u(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI}.
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T 2.2.10 . ໦໱໨u has the Hennessy and Milner-Property, i.e. for any satur-
ated interpretation (I, d) and (H, e) we have
(I, d)(H, e) ⟺ (I, d) g⟷−− (H, e)
P. ‘⟹’: Let dໟ ∈ ΔI be arbitrary and ໦໱໨(I, dໟ) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨ ∣
dໟ ∈ C} of d ∈ ΔI its ໦໱໨-eory. ໦໱໨(I, dໟ) is a u-type in H. Since H is
saturated, there is an element eໟ ∈ ΔH such that eໟ ∈ ⋂{CH ∣ C ∈໦໱໨(I, dໟ)}.
Applying the result fromHennessy andMilner (Proposition 2.1.23) we obtain that
(I, dໟ) ⟷−− (H, eໟ). Hence there for all dໟ there is an element eໟ ∈ ΔH such that
(I, dໟ) ⟷−− (H, eໟ). With the same argument we can ﬁnd for every eໟ ∈ ΔH a
locally bisimilar element dໟ ∈ ΔI. Hence I g⟷−− H. As by assumption e ∈ ⋂{CH ∣
C ∈ ໦໱໨(I, d)}, we also have (I, d) g⟷−− (H, e) and so (I, d) g⟷−− (H, e). e
converse is entailed by Observation 2.2.6. 2
Merely requiring that ∃u-types are realised in a in interpretation is not enough!
E 2.2.11 . Consider Example 2.1.20, with its interpretations I and H. We
consider two new interpretations, one being K0 containing two disjoint copies of
H and one being K1 containing a copy of I and a copy H, who are both disjoint.
Both K0 and K1 realise all ∃u-types and although K0 g⟷−− n K1 for every n < ω,
(K1, d) where d is the root element of the copy of I is not fully bisimilar to any
element in K0: e only bisimilar candidates to d in K0 are the root elements of
the two copies of H. But Example 2.1.20 showed that d and the root element of H
is not bisimilar.
T 2.2.12 . Let φ(x) be an FO formula over τ whi is invariant under g⟷−−
then there is an ໦໱໨u-concept over τ su that for all τ-interpretations I we have
I dx ⊨ φ(x) iﬀ (I, d) ⊨ C.
Using the same rational as in Lemma 2.1.25 and 2.1.26 we can show the equi-
valent of Lemma 2.1.25:
L 2.2.13 . If φ is invariant under g⟷−− then there is some n < ω s.t. φ is invariant
under g⟷−− n.
P  T 2.2.12. e concept C in eorem 2.2.12 is then given by
C ∶= ⨆{XnI,d ∣ I dx ⊨ φ(x)} where n is given by Lemma 2.2.13 and XnI,d is the
characteristic ໦໱໨u-concept. Again, C is well deﬁned as there are only ﬁnitely
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many diﬀerent characteristic concepts on each level n.
It is clear that I dx ⊨ φ(x) implies (I, d) ⊨ C. If, for the converse, (I, d) ⊨ C
then there is H ex ⊨ φ(x) and (I, d)
g⟷−− n (H, e). As φ is invariant under global
n-bisimulation we have I dx ⊨ φ(x). 2
We call IF ∶= ⋃d∈ΔI Id the forest unravelling of I, where Id is the tree-
unravelling of I in d (cf. Deﬁnition 2.1.4).
O 2.2.14 . IF g⟷−− I
P. Clearly, for every element d ∈ ΔI there is the root element of Id which
is bisimilar to d. Hence IF g⟷−− I. We have to show the opposite direction:
From the winning-strategy given in Observation 2.1.5 we infer immediately
that for every element d̄ ∈ ΔId there is some element dໟ ∈ ΔI such that (Id, d̄)⟷−−
(I, dໟ). e element dໟ is the last element in the path d̄. is shows that for all
d̄ ∈ ΔIF there is an element d ∈ ΔI such that (IF, d̄)⟷−− (I, d) and 2
is Observation and the characterisation shows that ໦໱໨u-concepts cannot
distinguish between an interpretation and its forest unravelling. It also shows
that໦໱໨u-concepts are local in the sense that these global quantiﬁcation merely
encapsulate ordinary local໦໱໨-concepts.
ough, they are sensitive to disjoint unions: ∀u.A ⊔ ∀u.B can be satisﬁed by
one interpretation containing exactly one element satisfying A and by another
interpretation containing one element satisfying only B. e disjoint union of
both interpretations however does not satisfy ∀u.A ⊔ ∀u.B!
2.3 The Characterisation of໦໱໨-TBoxes
TBoxes play a great role in knowledge representation as pointed out in the intro-
duction. We shall give a characterisation for these TBoxes and later in Chapter 6
an application of these characterisation results.
A characterisation result has been given in the context of global deﬁnability in
modal logic [43]. It does not concern TBoxes directly but characterises element-
ary¹ classes which are closed under surjective bisimulations and disjoint unions
as those whose interpretations are models of universally quantiﬁed translations
of modal formulae.
Our equivalent characterisation result diﬀers in that we characterise TBoxes as
¹Deﬁned by a set of ﬁrst order formulae.
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being equivalent to exactly the fragment of FO formulae which is invariant under
TBoxes and invariant under global bisimulation. e more specialised notion of
global bisimulation (every global bisimulation is surjective) is countered by the
broader notion of invariance under disjoint unions which requires a formula also
to be preserved under subinterpretations; We therefore characterise TBoxes not
only as fragment of FO but also as fragment of໦໱໨u and present our character-
isation result as extension of the໦໱໨u-characterisation.
໦໱໨-TBoxes are ﬁnite sets of concept inclusion C ⊑ D where C,D are ໦໱໨-
concepts. An ໦໱໨-concept is satisﬁed by an interpretation I, I ⊨ C ⊑ D, iﬀ
CI ⊆ DI. An໦໱໨-TBox ໹ is true or satisﬁed by an interpretation I, I ⊨ ໹ iﬀ for
all C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ we have I ⊨ C ⊑ D.
We deﬁne rank (C ⊑ D) ∶= max{rankC, rankD} and
rank ໹ ∶= max{rank (C ⊑ D) ∣ C ⊑ D ∈ ໹}.
e length |໹| of a TBox ໹ is deﬁned as |໹| ∶= ∑C⊑D∈໹ |C| + |D|
We have I ⊨ C ⊑ D iﬀ CI ⊆ DI iﬀ for all d ∈ Iwe have (I, d) ⊨ C→ D. Hence
an ໦໱໨-concept inclusion can be rewrien as ໦໱໨u-concept: ∀u.C → D. is
means in particular that the set of all TBoxes is a fragment of໦໱໨u and therefore
invariant under global bisimulation.
e question, which property singles out those FO-sentences that are equival-
ent to an ໦໱໨-TBox, reduces to the question which property singles out those
global໦໱໨u-concepts that are equivalent to໦໱໨-TBoxes.
As we shall see in the next proposition, the closure of ໦໱໨-TBoxes under ¬
and ⊔ has the same expressivity as global໦໱໨u-concepts. We shall specify what
global ໦໱໨u-concepts are and how we interpret ໦໱໨-TBoxes connected by ⊔
and ¬:
A global໦໱໨u-concept is an໦໱໨u-concept which is logically equivalent to a
disjunctive normal form⨆i<m Di,0 ⊓⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 as introduced in Deﬁnition
2.2.2 such that for all i < m we have Di,0 = ⊤ and Qi,j ∈ {∃, ∀}. Note that all
Di,j are ໦໱໨-concepts, and thus are local in nature but each of them is globally
quantiﬁed. ese global concepts are equivalent to global bisimulation invariant
FO-sentences.
We recursively deﬁne elements of the set which contains ໦໱໨-TBoxes and is
closed under ⊔ and ¬ as follows: ໨ ∶∶= ໹ ∣ ໨0⊔໨1 ∣ ¬໨0 where ໹ is an໦໱໨-TBox
and ໨0, ໨1 are both elements of this set. We extend the usual satisfaction relation
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for TBoxes: I ⊨ ໨0 ⊔ ໨1 if I ⊨ ໨0 or I ⊨ ໨1 and I ⊨ ¬໨0 if not I ⊨ ໨0.
P 2.3.1 . Let C be a global໦໱໨u-concept. en there is boolean combin-
ation ໨ of໦໱໨-TBoxes su that I ⊨ C iﬀ I ⊨ ໨.
P. Assume⨆i<m⨅j<ni Qi,ju.Di,j+1 would be a disjunctive normal form of C.
In case Qi,j = ∃, one can rewrite Qi,ju.Di,j+1 equivalently as the negated TBox
¬{Di,j+1 ⊑ ⊥}. If Qi,j = ∀ then Qi,ju.Di,j+1 is equivalent to the TBox {⊤ ⊑ Di,j+1}.
Replacing all conjuncts by their rewritings renders the normal form into a boolean
connexion of໦໱໨-TBoxes which is logically equivalent to C. 2
2.3.1 Invariance under Disjoint Unions
e missing property which highlights the universal character of ໦໱໨-TBoxes
in the sense that ໦໱໨-TBoxes are ∀u-quantiﬁed implications of ໦໱໨-concepts
is being invariant under disjoint unions.
Let I be an index set and (Ii)i∈I a family of interpretations. We can enforce
pairwise disjointness of the carrier-sets by seing ΔIໟi ∶= ΔIi × {i} and adapting
the interpretation of symbols accordingly. We may therefore assume w.l.o.g. that
all carrier-sets are disjoint. We then deﬁne the disjoint union⨄i∈I Ii as follows
Δ⨄i Ii ∶= ⋃i∈IΔIi recall ΔIi ∩ ΔIj = ∅
A⨄i Ii ∶= ⋃i∈I AIi for all A ∈ NC
r⨄i Ii ∶= ⋃i∈I rIi for all r ∈ NR
Complementary to disjoint unions we have generated subinterpretations: Let
I be an interpretation and G ⊆ ΔI. e generated subinterpretation U of I over G
is essentially all connected components containing elements of G. Formally this
is deﬁned as follows:
ΔU ∶= ⋂G
AU ∶= AI ∩ ΔU for all A ∈ NC
rU ∶= rI ∩ ΔU × ΔU for all r ∈ NR
where G contains all subsets S ⊆ ΔI such that G ⊆ S and for all r ∈ NR we have
if d ∈ S and (d, e) ∈ rI or (e, d) ∈ rI then e ∈ S.
e last requirement reminds somewhat of a functional closure. As result, ele-
ments in the generated subinterpretation are extracted together with their con-
nected component. erefore a generated subinterpretation U is not merely a
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restriction of the underlying structure I to a subset G of its carrier-set. is fact
highlights the following lemma:
L 2.3.2 . Let U be a generated subinterpretation of I. en for all d ∈ ΔU we
have (U, d)⟷−− (I, d)
P. We show that player II canmaintain conﬁgurations (U, dໟ; I, dໟ) through-
out the game. e requirement is true for the start conﬁguration. Assume the
game has reached conﬁguration (U, dໟ; I, dໟ) As U is a subinterpretation of I it is
clear that II can always copy challenges from I, if he chooses to play in U.
In case I challenges II with an r-successor d໠ of dໟ in I. As dໟ ∈ ΔU, dໟ ﬁnds
itself in all S ∈ G, used to construct U. By deﬁnition for all S ∈ G, also d໠ ∈ S.
Hence d໠ ∈ ΔU and as U is a subinterpretation of I, d໠ is an r-successor of dໟ and
a valid conﬁguration (U, d໠; I, d໠) is reached. 2
D 2.3.3 . A concept is invariant under disjoint union, if for every family
(Ii, di)i∈I of pointed interpretations we have
∀i ∈ I ∶ (Ii, di) ⊨ C ⟺ ∀j ∈ I ∶ (෺i∈I
Ii, dj) ⊨ C
a TBox is invariant under disjoint unions if
∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ ໹ ⟺ ∀j ∈ I ∶ ෺i∈I
Ii ⊨ ໹.
♢
O 2.3.4 . ໦໱໨-TBoxes are invariant under disjoint unions.
Before we give a proof we furnish two lemmas stating that ໦໱໨-TBoxes are
preserved under disjoint unions and preserved under generated subinterpreta-
tions:
L 2.3.5 . ໦໱໨-TBoxes are preserved under subinterpretations, i.e. if I ⊨ ໹ and
U is a generated substructre of I then U ⊨ ໹.
P. Assume C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ and d ∈ CU. With Lemma 2.3.2 we infer d ∈ CI.
As I ⊨ ໹, we have CI ⊆ DI and therefore d ∈ DI, which, again via Lemma 2.3.2,
entails d ∈ DU. 2
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L 2.3.6 . ໦໱໨-TBoxes are preserved under disjoint unions, i.e. for every໦໱໨-
TBox ໹ holds
∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ ໹ ⟹ ෺i∈I
Ii ⊨ ໹
P. For every d ∈ C⨄i Ii there is i ∈ I such that d ∈ ΔIi . Since Ii can be
recovered as generated subinterpretation of⨄i∈I Ii by seing G ∶= ΔIi , Lemma
2.3.2 yields d ∈ CIi . As Ii ⊨ ໹ by assumption, d ∈ DIi , whence again with 2.3.2
d ∈ D⨄i Ii is inferred, which proves the claim. 2
P O 2.3.4. e if direction is given by Lemma 2.3.6. It remains
to show that ⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹ implies Ii ⊨ ໹ for all i ∈ I. Let G ∶= ΔIi . en the
generated subinterpretation of U from G in ⨄i∈I Ii satisﬁes ໹. But U is identical
to Ii, too. So Ii ⊨ ໹. 2
2.3.2 ໦໱໨-TBoxes as FO-Fragment
We can now give a characterisation for໦໱໨-TBoxes.
T 2.3.7 . Every sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under global bisimu-
lation and invariant under disjoint unions is equivalent to some ໦໱໨-TBox ໹ over
τ.
P. It is suﬃcient to so show that there is a possibly inﬁnite set cons φ of
໦໱໨-concept inclusions such that φ logically equivalent to cons φ. As໦໱໨u is a
fragment of FO, it has compactness and therefore there is a ﬁnite subset ໹ ⊆ cons φ
such that ໹ is logically equivalent to φ.
Let cons φ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨(τ) and ∀I ∶ I ⊨ φ ⟹ I ⊨ C ⊑ D}.
Clearly, φ ⊨ cons φ. Assume φ is not logically equivalent to cons φ, i.e. there is
I ⊨ cons φ and I ⊨ ¬φ. Let
T ∶= {p ⊆ ໦໱໨(τ) ∣ there is (I, d) ⊨ p with I ⊨ φ}
and for each p ∈ T let Ip be a model of φ such that there is dp ∈ ΔIp for which
(Ip, dp) ⊨ p.
Let I ∶= ⨄p∈T Ip. As φ is invariant under disjoint unions I is a model of φ. As
φ is not logically equivalent to cons φ there is an interpretationH ⊨ cons φ∪{¬φ}.
For K ∶= I ⊎H, invariance under disjoint unions entails K ⊨ cons φ ∪ {¬φ}. Still
for every p ∈ T there is dp ∈ ΔK such that (K, dp) ⊨ p. As I is a subinterpretation
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of H, I is a generated subinterpretation of K and therefore every d ∈ ΔI is locally
bisimilar to d ∈ ΔK.
Let now d ∈ ΔK ∩ ΔH and assume there is no element in I that satisﬁes the
type p ∶= ໦໱໨(K, d). en p is not satisﬁable with φ. Let [p; x0] ∶= {[C; x0] ∣
C ∈ p} be the set of FO-formulae that contains all FO-rewritings of concepts in p.
Since φ cannot be satisﬁed together with p, the set {φ} ∪ [p; x0] is unsatisﬁable.
Compactness of FO yields a ﬁnite subset P(x0) ⊆ [p; x0] such that P(x0) ∪ {φ}
is unsatisﬁable. All formulae in P(x0) can be re-translated into ໦໱໨-concepts,
whence we obtain P ⊆ ໦໱໨(τ). In particular for every element d in any model H
of φ we have d ∉ (⨅ P)H or rather (⨅ P)H ⊆ ∅, which entails⨅ P ⊑ ⊥ ∈ cons φ.
Since K ⊨ cons φ, this contradicts the assumption there would be some element
d ∈ ΔK such that d satisﬁes p.
Hence for every element in K there is a counterpart in I satisfying the same
type. Let K∗ be a saturated extension of K and I∗ be the saturated extension
of I such that still I∗ ⊨ φ and K∗ ⊨ ¬φ. From the theorem by Hennessy and
Milner 2.2.10. We obtain I∗ g⟷−− K∗ which is absurd as I∗ ⊨ φ and K∗ ⊨ ¬φ yet
φ is supposed to be invariant under global bisimulation at the same time. is
contradicts the assumption φ is not logically equivalent to cons φ and concludes
the proof. 2
is concludes the chapter for ໦໱໨. We have seen characterisations of the
expressiveness of ໦໱໨-concepts, the ໦໱໨u-concepts and ﬁnally a character-
isation for ໦໱໨-TBoxes. e expressiveness of ໦໱໨ and ໦໱໨u is closely re-
lated to the capability of໦໱໨-bisimulation and໦໱໨u-bisimulation (global໦໱໨-
bisimulation) to distinguish interpretations: Properties that get lost under tree-
unravellings and forest-unravellings respectively cannot be expressed in ໦໱໨
and໦໱໨u, respectively, which is the reason for the decidability [131, 63].
Examples for what cannot be expressed is most notably transitivity amongst
others like the multiplicity of elements of a certain type or properties of prede-
cessors of elements, as they all get lost under tree-unravellings.
e characterisation of TBoxes revealed that additionally no properties can be
expressed which are not invariant under disjoint unions. Examples are disjunc-
tions of TBoxes, like {⊤ ⊑ A} ⊔ {⊤ ⊑ B}, as the disjoint union of two interpreta-
tions IA where all elements satisfy A but not B and IB where all elements satisfy
B but not A does not satisfy the TBox.
Similarly every property which requires the presence of an element of a speciﬁc
type, e.g. ∃A, cannot be expressed: Let I be an interpretation of two separate
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elements dA satisfying A and d not satisfying A. e generated sub-interpretation
of d will only contain d and hence will not satisfy A at any element.
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3. The Characterisation of
໦໱໨໮ and໦໱໨໶
3.1 ໦໱໨໮
3.1.1 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໮-Concepts
In this section we shall investigate an extension of ໦໱໨, namely ໦໱໨໮. ໦໱໨໮
possess, unlike ໦໱໨, the capability to not only express properties concerning
successors but also properties of predecessors. is is achieved by introducing
an additional quantiﬁcation operator. In particular, from a given distinguished
element, all elements in this element’s connected component are now ‘accessible’
to the language. Still, we cannot directly express numbers of successors or the
number of elements of a certain type.
To accommodate the increase in expressivity, a new model theoretic notion,
inverse bisimulation is introduced. In analogy but without detailed explanation,
we reassure ourselves that the new notion of bisimulation ﬁts into the framework:
1. inverse bisimulation can be stratiﬁed and characteristic concepts exist
2. ໦໱໨໮-concepts have, together with inverse bisimulation, the Hennessy-
and-Milner-Property
3. inverse bisimulation characterises໦໱໨໮-concepts as fragment of FO.
We then carry on to extend ໦໱໨໮ to ໦໱໨໮u for which we prove that the
three items just given apply as well. e characterisation of ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes is
then analogous to໦໱໨-TBoxes.
Being an extension and very similar in its model-theoretic behaviour to ໦໱໨,
໦໱໨໮ is seldom treated separately in literature on its model-theory. As examples
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for ໦໱໨໮ on concept level not being treated separately, see [18, Chapter 7] but
also [104]. is is clearly in contrast to literature on reasoning over໦໱໨໮where
rewritings have been investigated which reduce in particular ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes to
໦໱໨-TBoxes, whose size is polynomial in the size of the ໦໱໨໮-TBox. As Liter-
ature related to this approach can be named [41, 58] and later for ໦໱໨໮ [33] as
well as [44] with another approach. e reason for this discrepancy is that reas-
oning over ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes in practice does not behave as well as ໦໱໨-TBoxes,
contrarily to what their model theoretic analogies suggest.
Syntax and Semantic of໦໱໨໮-Concepts
Each໦໱໨໮-concept C over τ can be constructed as follows:
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃r.D ∣ ∃r−.D
where A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR and D, E are ໦໱໨໮-concepts. e set of ໦໱໨໮-concepts
over τ is denoted by໦໱໨໮(τ). e interpretation of these concepts follows exactly
໦໱໨ (cf. the deﬁnition on page 25) and is simply extended for interpretations I
and elements d ∈ ΔI by
d ∈ (∃r−.D)I if there is dໟ ∈ ΔI such that (dໟ, d) ∈ rI and dໟ ∈ DI
Note that we do not treat r− as a separate symbol of our signature. Although the
minus is annotated as superscript of r, we understand ∃ ⋅ − rather as a circumscript
around the symbol r, which indicates that the exists quantiﬁcation ranges over
predecessors. We shall however allow r− to be treated like a separate signature
symbol when explicitly stated.
E 3.1.1 . Whilst໦໱໨ could only speak about r-successors,໦໱໨໮ can now
also talk about predecessors: ‘Every r-predecessor satisﬁes B’ can be expressed by
∀r−.B in ໦໱໨໮. But clearly, ໦໱໨໮ can still express every concept that could be
expressed by໦໱໨.
For any two pointed structures (I, d) and (H, e) the ໦໱໨໮-bisimulation game
G(I, d;H, e) is played by two players I and II. e game starts in the conﬁguration
(I, d;H, e), i.e. one of the two pebbles is placed on d and the other one on e. For
every conﬁguration (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) during the game, the following rules apply:
1. For every A ∈ NC we have dໟ ∈ AI iﬀ eໟ ∈ AH or II has lost the game.
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2. In every turn of the game, I can choose one of the structures, I say, and
some r ∈ NR to challenge II by moving the pebble along an outgoing or
incoming r-edge to some adjacent element d໠. If player I cannot move then
II has won the game.
3. II must move the pebble in the other structure, here H, from eໟ along some
r-edge in the same direction to some element e໠. e same direction means,
if I took an incoming(outgoing) edge labelled with r ∈ NR from d໠ to dໟ then
II must move along an incoming(outgoing) r-edge from eໟ to some element
e໠. us the next conﬁguration (I, d໠;H, e໠) is reached and a new round
begins. If II cannot move accordingly, she has lost the game.
In comparison to the໦໱໨ game, this game is extended by the possibility to move
in the reverse direction of the arrows: if the game has reached the conﬁguration
(I, dໟ;H, eໟ) and (d໠, dໟ) ∈ rI then I can challenge II by moving from dໟ to d໠.
D 3.1.2 . Two pointed structures (I, d) and (H, e) are ໦໱໨໮-bisimilar,
(I, d) i⟷−− (H, e), if II has a winning strategy in the ໦໱໨໮-bisimulation game
G(I, d;H, e), i.e. if II can respond to any challenge of I such that she does not lose
any round. ♢
O 3.1.3 .
1. i⟷−− is an equivalence relation on the set of pointed interpretations
2. Being໦໱໨໮-bisimilar implies being໦໱໨-bisimilar.
Again the notion of໦໱໨໮-bisimilarity can be graded into໦໱໨໮-n-bisimilarity
where two pointed structures (I, d), (H, e) are໦໱໨໮-n-bisimilar, (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e),
if II can play in the bisimulation game G(I, d;H, e) for at least n-rounds.
O 3.1.4 . For all n < ω we have
1. i⟷−− n is an equivalence relation on the set of pointed interpretations
2. If (I, d) i⟷−− n+1 (H, e) then (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e)
3. If (I, d) i⟷−− (H, e) then (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e)
4. If (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e) then (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
Like for ໦໱໨-bisimulation, (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e) for all n < ω does not imply
(I, d) i⟷−− (H, e) nor does it imply (I, d) ⟷−− (H, e). As counterexample for such
an implication can serve the Counterexample 2.1.20 given for໦໱໨.
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Speaking of tree-unravellings, we can immediately apply the Deﬁnition 2.1.4
for tree-unravellings to໦໱໨໮, by treating r− as separate role names in the signa-
ture. Except for isolated elements, this leads always to inﬁnite tree-unravellings.
e analog of Observation 2.1.5 stating (I, d) i⟷−− (Id, d) is readily shown.
e rank -function can be continued from໦໱໨-concepts onto໦໱໨໮-concepts
by seing rank ∃r−.D ∶= 1 + rankD for all r ∈ NR and every ໦໱໨໮-concept
D. A proof by induction upon the rank of ໦໱໨໮-concepts then shows for all
໦໱໨໮-concepts D:
if (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e) and rankD = n then d ∈ DI iﬀ e ∈ DH.
In case the signature is ﬁnite, characteristic concepts can be constructed that
allow to describe ໦໱໨໮ n-bisimilarity types: Let (I, d) be an interpretation and
τ ∶= NR ∪ NC a ﬁnite signature. e aracteristic ໦໱໨໮-concept for each level
n < ω are recursively deﬁned as
X0I,d ∶= ෻{A ∈ NC ∣ d ∈ A
I} ⊓෻{¬A ∣ A ∈ NC and d ∉ A
I}
Xn+1I,d ∶= X0I,d⊓ ⨅r∈NR ⨅{∃r.XnI,dໟ ∣ (d, d
ໟ) ∈ rI} ⊓ ∀r.⨆{XnI,dໟ ∣ (d, d
ໟ) ∈ rI}
⊓⨅{∃r−.XnI,dໟ ∣ (d
ໟ, d) ∈ rI} ⊓ ∀r−.⨆{XnI,dໟ ∣ (d
ໟ, d) ∈ rI}
Again, these concepts exist in ໦໱໨໮ because τ is ﬁnite, and therefore on every
level there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent characteristic concepts:
O 3.1.5 . Let the signature τ ∶= NR ∪ NC be ﬁnite and (I, d) and (H, e)
be τ-interpretations. e following statements are equivalent for all aracteristic
໦໱໨໮-concepts
1. (H, e) ⊨ XnI,d
2. (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
where n(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໮(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI and rankC ≤ n} is the ໦໱໨໮-theory
of (I, d).
P. 1.⟹ 2.e proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1.16 which is
the analogous statement for໦໱໨. It can be carried out via induction upon n and
diﬀers to the induction step of Proposition 2.1.16 in that I can also challenge II by
moving in reverse direction which is analog to the cases where Imoves in forward
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direction. Nevertheless, we shall shortly discuss the case where I challenges II in I
bymoving in reverse direction from d along some r-edge to dໟ. en (H, e) satisﬁes
the subconcept ∃r−.XnI,dໟ of Xn+1I,d and so there is some eໟ ∈ ΔH with (eໟ, e) ∈ rH
such that (H, eໟ) ⊨ XnI,dໟ . e induction hypothesis holds which yields that II has
a winning strategy for n-further rounds, i.e. in total n + 1 rounds.
2. ⟹ 3. has been informally stated earlier on. e proof is analogous to
Proposition 2.1.8 which states the same claim for໦໱໨.
For 3.⟹ 1. it is easy to see that XnI,d ∈n(I, d). Hence (H, e) ⊨ XnI,d.
2
Saturation and the Hennessy-Milner-Property for໦໱໨໮
As in earlier sections, aer exploring properties and model-theoretic notions dir-
ectly connected with the logic in question, we are now gathering the necessary
ingredients for a characterisation of໦໱໨໮. An adapted notion of saturation shall
be established and the Hennessy-Milner-Property with respect to this saturation
will be proven.
D 3.1.6 . (I, d) i⟷−− ω (H, e) if for all n < ω we have (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e). ♢
We have to adapt and extend the deﬁnition of types that has been made in
deﬁnition 2.1.21.
D 3.1.7 . Let τ be a signature and (I, d) a pointed interpretation. en
for each r ∈ NR we call
1. Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໮(τ) an r-type of d if for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have
d ∈ ∃r.⨅Γ0.
2. Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໮(τ) an r−-type of d if for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have
d ∈ ∃r−.⨅Γ0.
3. an r-type of d realised at d if there is an r-successor dໟ in I such that dໟ ∈
⋂C∈Γ CI
4. an r−-type of d realised at d if there is an r-predecessor dໟ in I such that
dໟ ∈ ⋂C∈Γ CI
♢
D 3.1.8 . An interpretation I is saturated if for all d ∈ ΔI and all r ∈ NR
every r-type and every r−-type of d is realised at d. ♢
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Let (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໮(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} for every pointed τ-interpretation
(I, d).
P 3.1.9 . ໦໱໨໮ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, i.e. for saturated in-
terpretations (I, d) and (H, e) we have (I, d) =(H, e) iﬀ (I, d) i⟷−− (H, e).
P. e proof follows the scheme we used to show the analogue result
for ໦໱໨ in Proposition 2.1.23. We show that for every round in the ໦໱໨໮-
bisimulation game G(I, d;H, e) II can a achieve conﬁguration (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) such
that (I, dໟ) =(H, eໟ).
We thus show that the relation (I, dໟ) = (H, eໟ) satisﬁes atomic equival-
ence and is closed under the forth- and back-property. As we can use the ar-
gument symmetrically for all cases we shall show exactly one case: Assume the
game has reached the conﬁguration (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) and I challenges II in I by mov-
ing from dໟ via an incoming edge labelled with r ∈ NR to d໠. As eໟ and dໟ has
the same theory, for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆(I, d໠) we have dໟ ∈ (∃r−.⨅Γ0)I
and therefore e ∈ (∃r−.⨅Γ0)H. Hence (I, d໠) forms an r−-type at eໟ and since
H is saturated, there is an r-predecessor e໠ of eໟ that satisﬁes (I, d໠). II can
choose this e໠ and thus reaches a new conﬁguration (I, d໠;H, e໠) that satisﬁes
(I, d໠) =(H, e໠). 2
໦໱໨໮ as໦໱໨໮-Bisimulation Invariant Fragment of FO
P 3.1.10 . Every FO formula that is invariant under i⟷−− is invariant un-
der i⟷−− n for some n < ω.
P. e proof uses the same construction as in Lemma 2.1.25; e only dif-
ference is that we now refer to characteristic ໦໱໨໮-concepts instead of charac-
teristic໦໱໨-concepts:
e construction yields, if the claim of this proposition would not be true, an
FO-formula φ(x) and two interpretations (I, d) and (H, e)would exist, which share
the same໦໱໨໮-theory, yet (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) and (H, e) ⊭ φ(x).
For each of themwe can ﬁnd a saturated extension (I∗, d) ⊨ φ(x), and (H∗, e) ⊭
φ(x) respectively, which has the same FO-theory and hence the same ໦໱໨໮-
theory as (I, d), and (H, e) respectively. We can use theHennessy-Milner-Property
of໦໱໨໮ stated in Proposition 3.1.9 to argue that (I∗, d) i⟷−− (H∗, e). is is a con-
tradiction of φ(x) being invariant under i⟷−− which proves the proposition. 2
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With this lemma we can characterise໦໱໨໮ as fragment of FO in the following
way:
T 3.1.11 . ໦໱໨໮ is the i⟷−− -invariant fragment of FO
P. Let φ(x) be an FO-formula over some signature τ ∶= NC ∪ NR such that
φ(x) is invariant under i⟷−− . We have to show that there is a logically equivalent
໦໱໨໮-concept Cφ.
W.l.o.g. we assume that τ is ﬁnite and Proposition 3.1.10 yields some n < ω
such that φ(x) is invariant under i⟷−− n. Let XnI,d denote the characteristic ໦໱໨໮-
concept for (I, d) on level n for τ. en Cφ ∶= ⨆{XnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}. As
mentioned below, the deﬁnition of characteristic ໦໱໨໮-concepts, there are only
ﬁnitely many such concepts on each level n for τ. Hence the disjunction Cφ is an
໦໱໨໮-concept and φ(x) ⊨ Cφ. Invariance under i⟷−− n also yields ⨆Cφ ⊨ φ(x)
and thus φ(x) is logically equivalent to Cφ. 2
3.1.2 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໮u-Concepts
Similar to ໦໱໨ we extend ໦໱໨໮ by the universal role u with uI = ΔI × ΔI for
all interpretations I. Although u is a logical constant in໦໱໨໮u and not a symbol
of the signature, it can be treated like any other role-name. Note that it would not
make sense to introduce the inverse role u− for u, as all elements are connected
by ’forward’ u-arrows anyway. Hence any concept ∃u−.C is logically equivalent
to ∃u.C and so no expressivity would be added. We thus deﬁne໦໱໨໮u-concepts
as follows:
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃r.D ∣ ∃r−.D ∣ ∃u.D
where A ∈ NC, D, E are ໦໱໨໮u-concepts and r ∈ NR. e usual abbreviations
∀, ⊔,→ etc. apply. We can extend the rank -function from ໦໱໨໮-concepts to
໦໱໨໮u-concepts by simply ignoring universal roles, thus seing rank ∃u.C ∶=
rankC.
D 3.1.12 . Interpretations I andH are globally໦໱໨໮-bisimilar, I gi⟷−− H
if both of the following conditions are met
1. for all d ∈ ΔI there is e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) i⟷−− (H, e)
2. for all e ∈ ΔH there is d ∈ ΔI with (I, d) i⟷−− (H, e)
We write (I, d) gi⟷−− (H, e) if I gi⟷−− H and (I, d) i⟷−− (H, e). ♢
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is notion for global ໦໱໨໮-bisimulation is analogous to the global ໦໱໨-
bisimulation given in Deﬁnition 2.2.4. Again, the global notion can be stratiﬁed
with respect to n < ω into gi⟷−− n with the obvious deﬁnition. e following chain
of implications hold for all n < ω:
(I, d) gi⟷−− (H, e) ⟹ (I, d) gi⟷−− n+1 (H, e) ⟹ (I, d) gi⟷−− n (H, e)
D 3.1.13 . Characteristic ໦໱໨໮u-concepts are deﬁned for a ﬁnite sig-
nature τ ∶= NC ∪ NR and an interpretation I as follows:
XnI ∶= ෻{∃u.X
n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀u.෼{X
n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
where XnI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໮-concept for τ. ♢
We shall give a short explanation. Characteristic ໦໱໨໮u-concepts are com-
posed of two parts: One requires that the interpretationwhich satisﬁesXnI provides
elements for each n-໦໱໨໮-bisimulation type realised in I. So if H ⊨ XnI, then
for all d ∈ ΔI there must be e ∈ ΔH such that (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e). e second
part restricts the occurrence of n-໦໱໨໮-bisimulation types. Every interpreta-
tion H ⊨ XnI can only realise n-໦໱໨໮-bisimulation types which are present in I.
Hence for all e ∈ ΔH there is d ∈ ΔI such that (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e). So we have that
I gi⟷−− n H.
O 3.1.14 . e following is equivalent for all n < ω and ﬁnite signature
τ:
1. (H, e) ⊨ XnI ⊓ XnI,d
2. (I, d) gi⟷−− n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
where I,H are τ-interpretations, XnI is the aracteristic ໦໱໨໮u-concept for τ, XnI,d
is the aracteristic ໦໱໨໮-concept for τ and n(I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໮u(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨
C and rankC ≤ n}
is Observation is a global version of the anlogous Observation 3.1.5. Since
we omied this statement for ໦໱໨u we shall give a proof in full length, yet the
reader might skip it as it is analog to the proof in Observation 3.1.5 and simply
deals with the extra arguments for global໦໱໨໮-bismilarity.
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P. For 1. ⟹ 2. From Observation 3.1.5 we obtain (I, d) gi⟷−− n (H, e) im-
mediately. We now show I gi⟷−− n H Let d0 ∈ ΔI be arbitrary. en ∃u.XnI,d0 is
amongst the conjuncts of XnI. As H ⊨ XnI there is an element e0 ∈ ΔH such that
(H, e0) ⊨ XnI,d0 . From Observation 3.1.5 we infer that (I, d0) i⟷−− n (H, e0).
Conversely, let e0 ∈ ΔH arbitrary. As H ⊨ XnI, there must be a disjunct in
∀u.{XnI,d0 ∣ d0 ∈ Δ
I} such that (H, e0) ⊨ XnI,d0 . Hence Observation 3.1.5 im-
plies (I, d0) i⟷−− n (H, e0). Both arguments together show I gi⟷−− n H and with
(I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e) we obtain (I, d) gi⟷−− n (H, e).
For 2. ⟹ 3. let (I, d) gi⟷−− n (H, e). We show by induction upon the construc-
tion of concepts C ∈ ໦໱໨໮u(τ)with rankC ≤ n that (I, d) ⊨ C iﬀ (H, e) ⊨ C. e
claim is true for atomic concepts as in particular (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e). Conjunctions
and negations are immediately yield by the induction hypothesis.
In case C = ∃u.D and I ⊨ C, there is d0 ∈ ΔI such that (I, d0) ⊨ D. Since
I gi⟷−− n H there is e0 ∈ ΔH such that (I, d0) i⟷−− n (H, e0). Still I gi⟷−− n H and
thus (I, d0) gi⟷−− n (H, e0). e induction hypothesis yields that (H, e0) ⊨ D and so
H ⊨ ∃u.D. e converse can be shown with the same rationale.
In case C = ∃r−.D and (I, d) ⊨ C, we have 1 ≤ rankC ≤ n and there is an
r-predecessor d0 of d such that (I, d0) ⊨ D. As (I, d) i⟷−− n (H, e) there is an r-
predecessor of e0 such that (I, d0) i⟷−− n−1 (H, e0). In particular, I gi⟷−− n H implies
I gi⟷−− n−1 H, hence (I, d0) gi⟷−− n−1 (H, e0). Since rankD ≤ n − 1 the induction
hypothesis applies and (H, e0) ⊨ D. Hence (H, e) ⊨ ∃r−.D. e converse can be
argued in the same way. e case where C = ∃r.D is explained analogously.
3.⟹ 1. is immediate, as rankXnI ≤ n and rankXnI,d ≤ n. 2
Since we can treat u like a role name, we extend the notion of໦໱໨໮-saturation
(cf. Deﬁnition 3.1.7) to ໦໱໨໮u-saturation by simply additionally requiring that
all ໦໱໨໮-u-types must be realised as well. Types, though, are still subsets of
໦໱໨໮. is is analogous to the deﬁnition of໦໱໨-u-types in Deﬁnition 2.2.8.
Let (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໮u(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} for every pointed τ-interpretation
(I, d).
P 3.1.15 . ໦໱໨໮u has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, i.e. for two satur-
ated໦໱໨໮u-interpretations (I, d) and (H, e) we have
(I, d) =(H, e) ⟺ (I, d) gi⟷−− (H, e).
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P. As I andH are໦໱໨໮-saturated, theHennessy-Milner-Property of໦໱໨໮
yields (I, d) i⟷−− (H, e). For each d0 ∈ ΔI and every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆(I, d0) of
its໦໱໨໮-theory we have I ⊨ ∃u.⨅Γ0. As I satisﬁes exactly the same໦໱໨໮u-
concepts as H, we have H ⊨ ∃u.⨅Γ0 and thus the ໦໱໨໮-theory of d0 forms a
u-type in H. As H is ໦໱໨໮u-saturated there is an e0 that satisﬁes this type. e
Hennessy-Milner-Property of ໦໱໨໮ yields (I, d0) i⟷−− (H, e0). With the same
arguments it is shown that for every e0 ∈ ΔH there is some d0 ∈ ΔI such that
(I, d0) i⟷−− (H, e0) which proves I gi⟷−− H and thus (I, d) gi⟷−− (H, e). 2
P 3.1.16 . Let φ(x) be an FO-formula that is invariant under gi⟷−− then
φ(x) is invariant under gi⟷−− n for some n < ω.
P. Like in the proof of Proposition 3.1.10 the proof rests on an adaption of
Lemma 2.1.25: Assume this would not be the case then for every n < ω we have
(I, d)⟷−− n (H, e) yet I dx ⊨ φ(x) and H
e
x ⊭ φ(x).
Xn ∶= {XnI ⊓ XnI,d ∣ ∃(H, e) ∶ φ(x)
⊨(I, d) gi⟷−− n (H, e) ⊭ φ(x)}
where XnI⊓XnI,d is the conjunction of the characteristic໦໱໨໮u-concept and char-
acteristic໦໱໨໮-concept over the signature τwhich contains exactly the symbols
used in φ and thus is ﬁnite. As mentioned before, on every level n < ω there are
only ﬁnitely many characteristic໦໱໨໮u- and໦໱໨໮-concepts, so Xn is ﬁnite.
Every ﬁnite subset of X ∶= {⨆Xn ∣ n < ω} is satisﬁable with φ(x) so that the
compactness of FO yields the existence of some model (K, d) for X ∪ {φ(x)}. In
turn {XnK ⊓ XnK,d ∣ n < ω} is satisﬁable with ¬φ(x) as (K, d) ⊨ ⨆Xn for all n < ω.
Hence there are two pointed interpretations with the same ໦໱໨໮u-theory
distinguished by φ(x). W.l.o.g. we may assume that these interpretations are
໦໱໨໮u-saturated since for both of themω-saturated extensions exist which share
their ໦໱໨໮u-theory yet are still distinguished by φ(x). e Hennessy-Milner-
Property of໦໱໨໮u yields that these ω-saturated extensions are globally໦໱໨໮-
bisimilar. But this contradicts that they are distinguished by some globally໦໱໨໮-
bisimulation invariant FO-formula and thus proves the claim. 2
T 3.1.17 . Every FO-formula over τ whi is invariant under global໦໱໨໮-
bisimulation is equivalent to some໦໱໨໮u-concept.
P. Let φ(x) ∈ FO(τ). As FO has the ﬁnite occurrence property, i.e. every
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FO-formula contains only ﬁnitely many signature symbols, we may assume that τ
is ﬁnite. Let n < ω be the natural number for which φ(x) is invariant under gi⟷−− n.
en φ(x) is logically equivalent to the disjunction of Cφ ∶= {XnI ⊓ XnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨
φ(x)}. Since there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent characteristic formulae on each
level n,⨆Cφ is a concept in໦໱໨໮u. 2
We say C ∈ ໦໱໨໮u(τ) is a global ໦໱໨໮u-concept if C ≡ ⨆{XnI ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C}.
A global concept is therefore analogous to the notion of a sentence in FO.
C 3.1.18 . Every FO-sentence that is invariant under global ໦໱໨໮-bi-
simulation is logically equivalent to some global໦໱໨໮u-concept.
3.1.3 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໮-TBoxes
In this section, the notion of ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes is to be introduced and then the im-
portant property, being invariant under disjoint unions, shall be shown. A char-
acterisation is then immediate.
P 3.1.19 . Every global ໦໱໨໮u-concept is equivalent to some boolean
combination of໦໱໨໮-TBoxes.
P. Every characteristic ໦໱໨໮u-concept XnI = ⨅{∃u.XnI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓
∀u.⨆{XnI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} can be rewrien as the following boolean combination of
໦໱໨໮u-TBoxes:
෻
d∈ΔI
¬{XnI,d ⊑ ⊥} ⊓ {⊤ ⊑ ෼
d∈ΔI
XnI,d}
As global໦໱໨໮u-concepts are equivalent to disjunctions of characteristic໦໱໨໮u-
concepts, this proves the claim. 2
Wemay use the exact same notion of disjoint union and generated substructure
introduced aer in Section 2.3.1 on page 58. Note that we deﬁned a substructure to
be the union over the (full) connected component of each element in the generator
set G. Although, e.g., the union of all tree-unravellings in elements of G would
have suﬃced for ໦໱໨, we decided for one notion which carries through all the
description logics we treat with mild adaptions when nominals are involved.
We formulate analogously to Lemma 2.3.2
L 3.1.20 . Let U be a generated substructure of I. For all d ∈ ΔU we have
(U, d) i⟷−− (I, d)
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P. II has a winning-strategy in the game G(U, d; I, d) if she maintains con-
ﬁgurations (U, dໟ, I, dໟ) throughout the game. Clearly, if she can maintain these
kinds of conﬁgurations, atomic equivalence is always given. It hence suﬃces to
show that every path dr0d1r1d1…rn−1dn with n < ω in I, where rn ∈ NR ∪ {r− ∣
r ∈ NR} and di ∈ ΔI, is also a path in U and vice versa.
e proof is carried out via the length of the path. As d ∈ ΔU the claim is
true for paths of length 0. Let d…dn−1rn−1dn is a path in I of length n + 1 then
d… dn−1 is a path in U by induction hypothesis. In particular dn−1 is in every
subset S ⊆ ΔI which comprises the generator set G and which contains for all
r ∈ NR every predecessor and successor of elements in S. We shall just tackle the
case where rn−1 = r−, where r ∈ NR. en dn is an r-predecessor of dn−1. is
element is contained in⋂G and therefore contained in ΔU. As for all r ∈ NR, rU
is merely the restriction of rI to the carrier-set of U, the given path is a path in U.
e laer argument also explains, why every path in U is a path in I. 2
P 3.1.21 . ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes are invariant under disjoint unions.
P. Let ໹ be an ໦໱໨໮-TBox and (Ii)i∈I a family of interpretations. Assume
that⨄ Ii ⊨ ໹. en Ii is a generated substructure of⨄Ii, where the generator-
set G ∶= ΔIi . Assume now C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ and d ∈ CIi then (⨄ Ii, d) i⟷−− (Ii, d) and
hence d ∈ C⨄ Ii . As⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹, we have d ∈ D⨄ Ii and since (⨄ I, d) i⟷−− (Ii, d)
the bisimulation invariance of໦໱໨໮ ensures d ∈ DIi . is shows that Ii ⊨ C ⊑ D
for all C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ which entails Ii ⊨ ໹.
Assume Ii ⊨ ໹ for all i ∈ I. As each Ii is a generated substructure of ⨄i∈I Ii
we have (Ii, d) i⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d) for all d ∈ ΔIi and the invariance of໦໱໨໮ under
໦໱໨໮-bisimulation yields (Ii, d) ⊨ C ⟺ (⨄i∈I Ii, d) ⊨ C for every ໦໱໨໮-
concept C. Assume now C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ and d ∈ C⨄ Ii then d ∈ CIi for some i ∈ I
and as Ii ⊨ ໹ we have d ∈ DIi which entails d ∈ D⨄ Ii as (Ii, d) ⊨ D ⟺
(⨄i∈I Ii, d) ⊨ D. Hence ⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ C ⊑ D for all C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ which had to be
shown. 2
T 3.1.22 . Every sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under global໦໱໨໮-
bisimulation and invariant under disjoint unions is equivalent to some໦໱໨໮-TBox
over τ.
P. Let cons φ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨໮(τ) ∣ φ ⊨ C ⊑ D}, so φ ⊨ cons φ. If
we can prove that cons φ ⊨ φ then, by compactness of FO, there is a ﬁnite subset
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໹ ⊆ cons φ such that ໹ ⊨ φ. ໹ would be a logically equivalent໦໱໨໮-TBox to φ.
e proof for cons φ ⊨ φ is carried out via proof by contradiction. Assume
cons φ ⊭ φ then there is an interpretation K ⊨ cons φ ∪ {¬φ}. Let
T ∶= {p ∈ ໦໱໨໮(τ) ∣ there is (I, d) ⊨ p and I ⊨ φ}
and let for every p ∈ T be Ip some τ-interpretation s.t. there is dp ∈ ΔIp with
(Ip, dp) ⊨ p and Ip ⊨ φ. We set H ∶= ⨄{Ip ∣ p ∈ T}. As φ is invariant under
disjoint unions, H ⊨ φ. Let I ∶= K ⊎ H. en I ⊨ cons φ as every concept-
inclusion of cons φ, considered as TBox, is invariant under disjoint unions. Yet
I ⊭ φ for the same reason.
We now show I gi⟷−− H. W.l.o.g. we assume that I and H are ω-saturated.
Using the Hennessy-Milner-Property, it suﬃces to show for every element in one
structure that there is an element with the same໦໱໨໮-theory in the other struc-
ture. As H is a generated substructure of I we sele on proving for all d ∈ ΔI
there is e ∈ ΔH such that (I, d) =(H, e).
Assume this element e would not exist in H. en (I, d) must be unsatis-
ﬁable with φ. For otherwise p ∶= (I, d) is in T and (H, dp) ⊨ p ∪ {φ}. By the
compactness of FO there is a ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ (I, d) such that Γ0 ∪ {φ} is
unsatisﬁable and hence φ ⊨ ⨅Γ0 ⊑ ⊥. But then Γ0 ⊑ ⊥ ∈ cons φ and so the gen-
erated substructure of d from I does not satisfy cons φ; a contradiction to cons φ
being invariant under disjoint union.
is proved I gi⟷−− H, which is, in turn, a contradiction to φ being invariant
under global໦໱໨໮-bisimulation. So cons φ ⊨ φ which had to be shown. 2
3.2 ໦໱໨໶
In this chapter, the description logic໦໱໨໶ shall be introduced, which allows for
counting quantiﬁcations, also known as graded modal operators in modal logic
[60, 52, 51] or qualiﬁed number restriction in description logics [74]. e laer
explains the ໶ in໦໱໨໶.
ese operators allow to express not only all properties ໦໱໨ can express, but
additionally they allow to specify at how many r-successors for r ∈ NR of a dis-
tinguished element, a certain concept is satisﬁed. But only a ﬁnite number of
successors can be speciﬁed.
ere is another description logic໦໱໨໳ [75, 14] whose model-theoretic char-
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acterisation on concept-level was treated in [85]. ໳ stands here for number re-
striction: In comparison to ໦໱໨໶, it can specify a ﬁnite minimum number of
r-successors, but it cannot specify which concepts these r-successors satisfy. e
laer is the reason why number restrictions in ໦໱໨໳ are called unqualiﬁed,
whilst number restrictions in ໦໱໨໶ are qualiﬁed. Its expressivity (for ﬁxed sig-
nature) is therefore strictly less than໦໱໨໶.
E 3.2.1 . Although we do not have introduced the syntax of ໦໱໨໶, we
shall give an example of how the two logics diﬀer. Whilst໦໱໨໶ allows to express
∃≥3.A which is ‘there are at least three r-successors that satisfy A’ concepts from
໦໱໨໳ can only express ∃≥3.⊤ ‘there are at least three r-successors’, yet they
cannot qualify what properties these three r-successors have.
It shall be remarked that themodel theoretic characterisation in [85] for໦໱໨໳
was only carried out on concept level. TBoxes over໦໱໨໳ or the extension with
the universal role were not considered.
In comparison to ໦໱໨໮, we are not able to address predecessors of a distin-
guished element.
We shall investigate ໦໱໨໶-concepts in the usual way, deﬁning a model the-
oretic notion of໦໱໨໶which is used to characterise໦໱໨໶ as FO-fragment. e
model-theoretic notion of counting bisimulation could have also be deﬁned using
bijective functions on successor sets but further down we shall give good reasons
for why we chose this notion in the speciﬁc way. We present an explicit con-
struction for characteristic concepts and show that they capture the appropriate
bisimulation level.
We then li໦໱໨໶-bisimulation onto the global level and give a characterisa-
tion for ໦໱໨໶u, where we allow us to present a variant with a counting global
quantiﬁer. e usual extension with a non-counting global quantiﬁer໦໱໨໶u1 is
a special case of໦໱໨໶u. ໦໱໨໶-TBoxes are then a fragment of໦໱໨໶u1 which
is characterised as FO-fragment.
3.2.1 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶-Concepts
໦໱໨໶ itself was ﬁrst proposed in [74] as generalisation of ordinary quantiﬁcation
and unqualiﬁed number restrictions. is paper concentrated on the satisﬁabil-
ity problem and investigated its complexity. Since then, reasoning with ໦໱໨໶
has had some aention (e.g. [74, 127, 65]) as ໦໱໨໶ is an important fragment of
໦໱໨໶໮໴ and hence ໸໷໴໮໶ [77] which underpins OWL 2. ough, the model-
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theoretic properties of ໦໱໨໶ have not been investigated so far. ere is one
explicit model-theoretic investigation of graded modalities [114] where in other
cases this extension of standard modal logic is merely mentioned [61] or com-
pletely omied [18]. e results of this section have been published in [92] and
were novel.
Syntax and Semantics
For every signature τ, the syntax of an ໦໱໨໶-concept C over τ is deﬁned as
follows:
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃≥κr.D
where A ∈ NC, D, E are ໦໱໨໶-concepts over τ and r ∈ NR with κ < ω. e
set of all ໦໱໨໶-concepts over τ is denoted as ໦໱໨໶(τ). We use the common
abbreviations ⊔,→ etc.
e notation ∃≥κ, more common in context of FOwith counting quantiﬁers (e.g.
[123]), is not the usual one used in Description Logics. Instead, ∃≥κr.C is in the
DL literature consistently expressed as ≥ κ r C. We, however, want to appeal to
the analogy of the existential quantiﬁcation ∃r.C, and ∃r−.C respectively, which
we have introduced so far. Our particular notation naturally begs the question
whether ∀≥κ-quantiﬁcations are possible, and its answer will explain why quali-
fying number restrictions ≥ κ r C do not have a separate symbol equivalent to a
value restriction in DLs.
e semantic is explained by recursively continuing the interpretation function
⋅I on concepts C ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) as follows:
CI ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
CI if C ∈ NC
DI ∩ EI if C = D ⊓ E
ΔI ⧵ D if C = ¬D
{d ∈ ΔI ∣ |rI(d) ∩ DI| ≥ κ} if C = ∃≥κr.D
where |M| yields the cardinality of a set M and rI(d) ∶= {e ∈ ΔI ∣ (d, e) ∈ rI}.
Hence |rI(d) ∩ DI| is the number of r-successors of d in I that satisfy D. e
interpretation function coincides with the interpretation function for ໦໱໨ from
page 25 in all but one case: the existential quantiﬁcation. e interpretation func-
tion for໦໱໨໶ is simply a generalisation of the interpretation function for໦໱໨
in that it interprets ∃≥1r.C like the concept ∃r.C. In particular, ໦໱໨໶ subsumes
໦໱໨.
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We can deﬁne several abbreviations:
∃>nr.D ∶= ∃≥n+1r.D
∃≤nr.D ∶= ¬∃≥n+1r.D
∃<nr.D ∶= ¬∃≥nr.D
∃=nr.D ∶= (∃≥nr.D) ⊓ (¬∃≥n+1r.D)
We shall merely check that ∃<nr.D meets our intuition as all other abbreviations
are then straight forward:
(∃<nr.D)I = ΔI ⧵ {d ∈ ΔI ∣ |rI(d) ∩ DI| ≥ n}
= {d ∈ ΔI ∣ not |rI(d) ∩ DI| ≥ n} = {d ∈ ΔI ∣ |rI(d) ∩ DI| < n}
Clearly ∃<0r.D always yields the empty set and is therefore logically equivalent
to ⊥.
໦໱໨໶ is at least as expressive as໦໱໨ as every ∃r-quantiﬁcation simply needs
to be replaced by ∃≥1r. We can translate ∀≥nr.D ∶= ¬∃≥nr.¬D to ‘all but less than
n r-successors satisfy D’ or ’from the n-th r-successor onwards all satisfy D’. It
is analogue to the ∀r quantiﬁcation in the sense that one could read them out as
’from the ﬁrst r-successor onwards all satisfy D’.
But in context of໦໱໨໶, it is diﬃcult to make sense of ∀≤nr.Dwhich is logically
equivalent to ∃≥n+1r.¬D. It cannot be satisﬁed by an element with less than n+1-
successors and even an element that satisﬁes ∀≤nr.D and has at least n + 1 r-
successors needs not to have any r-successors that satisfy D. We shall therefore
not deﬁne these kinds of abbreviations.
Note that ໦໱໨໶ only allows for ﬁnite cardinality restrictions. For otherwise,
an໦໱໨໶-concept could state that the distinguished element has inﬁnitely many
successors. But this would catapult໦໱໨໶ outside of FO: In case໦໱໨໶ could ex-
press ‘there are uncountablymany r-successors’, the Löwenheim-Skolem-Property
[47, 72, 109] of FO would be violated: is property states that every FO-formula
can be satisﬁed by some countable (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) interpretation.
If ໦໱໨໶ could express ‘there are only countably inﬁnite many r-successors’
then {∃≥κr.⊤ ∣ κ < ω} ⊨ ∃≥ωr.⊤. Compactness would then yield a ﬁnite subset
of {∃≥κr.⊤ ∣ κ < ω} and therefore a ﬁnite ordinal λ such that {∃≥κr.⊤ ∣ κ ≤ λ} ⊨
∃≥ωr.⊤, which is obviously false. Hence໦໱໨໶would not be compact, and hence
could not be a fragment of FO.
In the next step, we shall deﬁne the rank-function for໦໱໨໶-concepts and we
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shall give a grade-function which yields the greatest κ that occurs as grade in a
concept:
rankC ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
0 if C ∈ NC
max{rankD, rank E} if C = D ⊓ E
rankD if C = ¬D
1 + rankD if C = ∃≥κr.D for all κ < ω
gradeC ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
1 if C ∈ NC
max{gradeD, grade E} if C = D ⊓ E
gradeD if C = ¬D
max{κ, gradeD} if C = ∃≥κr.D
We always have gradeC < ω : only natural numbers are admied as grades and
every໦໱໨໶-concept C is of ﬁnite length.
We shall deﬁne a translation into FO recursively on the structure of ໦໱໨໶-
concepts. In contrast to ໦໱໨-concepts which indeed translate into ‘plain’ FO-
formulae, ໦໱໨໶-concepts are translated into FO≡-formulae, i.e. into formulae
of First Order Logic with equality (≡). Contrary to previous chapters, we need
κ+ 1-many variables to translate an໦໱໨໶-concept of grade κ equivalently into
FO:
[C; xi] ∶=
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
C(xi) if C ∈ NC
[D; xi] ∧ [E; xi] if C = D ⊓ E
¬[D; xi] if C = ¬D
as usual, and in case C = ∃≥κr.D, we have
[C; xi] ∶= ∃(xℓ)ℓ∈κ⧵{i} ෘk,ℓ∈κ⧵{i}
{¬xk ≡ xℓ ∣ k ≠ ℓ} ∧ ෘk∈κ⧵{i}
r(xi, xk) ∧ [D; xk]
A simple inductive argument shows that the translation is correct; in particular
I dxi ⊨ [∃
≥κr.D; xi] iﬀ there are at least κ many pairwise distinct r-successors of d
which all satisfy the FO-translation of D hence iﬀ (I, d) ⊨ ∃≥κr.D.
Indeed, this shows that ໦໱໨໶ is a fragment of FO and hence ໦໱໨໶ is com-
pact.
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໦໱໨໶ Bisimulation and Properties
e notion of໦໱໨໶-bisimulation can be found in [114] and is here expressed as
game, similar to໦໱໨໮-bisimulation and໦໱໨-bisimulation.
Let I,H be two τ-interpretations. e ໦໱໨໶-bisimulation game G(I, d;H, e)
is a round-based game played by two players I and II as follows: e state of the
game is captured in a bijection β ∶ D⟶ E where D ⊆ ΔI and E ⊆ ΔH.
e game G(I, d;H, e) starts with the bijection d⟼ e. If not d ∈ AI ⟺ e ∈
AH for all A ∈ NC then II has lost the game in the 0-th round.
Each round is played as follows: It starts with the bijection resulting from the
previous round; let the bijection be β ∶ D⟶ E. I chooses one element from D or
E and some r ∈ NR. Say I chooses e ∈ E and r ∈ NR. He then plays a non-empty,
ﬁnite subset Eໟ ⊆ rH(e). If I cannot deliver such a subset, II wins the game.
II then has to play a subset from the r-successors of the element which is re-
lated to e by β. In our case this is some Dໟ ⊆ rI(d) with d = β−1(e). Dໟ must be
chosen in way such that there is a bijection β ∶ Dໟ ⟶ Eໟ that satisﬁes dໟ ∈ AI iﬀ
β(dໟ) ∈ AH for all A ∈ NC and all dໟ ∈ Dໟ. If II cannot deliver such a set Dໟ then
II has lost the game. e next round starts with the bijection βໟ.
D 3.2.2 . II has a winning strategy in G(I, d;H, e), if she wins the game
or can ward oﬀ any challenge of I and thus never loses a round. We then say,
(I, d) is໦໱໨໶-bisimilar to (H, e) and denote this with (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e). ♢
We introduce a restricted version of the game which is bound in rounds and in
the cardinality of sets that I and II may play: Gκn(I, d;H, e) is the n-round game in
which only sets of positive cardinality of at most κ < ω may be played. II wins
the game, if she does not lose within n rounds.
D 3.2.3 . II has a winning strategy in Gκn(I, d;H, e) if she can ward oﬀ
challenges of I up to positive cardinalities κ < ω during the ﬁrst n rounds. We
then say, (I, d) is (κ, n)-bisimilar to (H, e) and denote this with (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e).
♢
Before wemove on to characteristic໦໱໨໶-concepts, a remark should bemade.
Assume, ໦໱໨໶-bisimulation would be deﬁned as relation Z which requires for
an element (d, e) ∈ Z a full bijection β ∶ rI(d) ⟶ rH(e) between all r-successors
such that (d0, β(d0)) ∈ Z for all d0 ∈ rI. en this coincides with the notion we
have given above, only if we restrict ourselves ﬁnitely branching interpretations,
80
i.e. every node has but ﬁnitely many successors.
But having the ﬁnite branching property is a severe restriction imposed on the
interpretations we allow and clearly it is not the right notion when characterising
໦໱໨໶ over arbitrary interpretations. We shall argue more about this aer we
have proved that ໦໱໨໶ satisﬁes the Hennessy-Milner-Property (cf. Proposition
3.2.12).
P 3.2.4 . For all C ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) with rankC ≤ n and gradeC ≤ κ we
have
(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) ⟹ (I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ C.
P. e proof is carried out by induction upon n < ω. n = 0 is immediate.
Assume (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n+1 (H, e). Let C ∈ κn+1(I, d) arbitrary. We may w.l.o.g.
assume C = ∃≥λr.D where λ ≤ κ, D ∈ ໦໱໨໶ with rankD ≤ n and gradeD ≤ κ.
en (I, d) ⊨ C iﬀ there is a set D0 ⊆ DI∩rI(d)with |D0| = λ. Since (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n+1
(H, e) there is a set E0 ⊆ rH(e) with |E0| = λ and a bijection β ∶ D0 ⟶ E0
such that (I, d0) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d0)) for all d0 ∈ D0. e induction hypothesis yields
(H, β(d0)) ⊨ D for all d0 ∈ D0 and so (H, e) ⊨ ∃≥λr.D. e only-if direction is
derived in the same manner. 2
Characteristic໦໱໨໶-Concepts
It does not make much sense to deﬁne characteristic ໦໱໨໶-concepts for κ = 0,
as domain and image of each bijection during the game would be empty. So even
the start bijection would not ﬁt this scheme. Hence for ﬁnite signature τwe deﬁne
characteristic໦໱໨໶-concepts for each positive κ < ω.
Due to the restriction to sets of cardinality κ, our players can only count r-
successors of a certain (κ, n)-bisimulation-type up to κ. e following construct
will accommodate this handicap.
Let therefore τ be ﬁnite and I a τ-interpretation with d ∈ ΔI. #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ ∶=
|{d1 ∈ rI(d) ∣ (I, d1) ⊨ Xκ,nI,e}| i.e. the number of all r-successors of d that satisfy
the same characteristic໦໱໨໶-concept as e on level (κ, n). Clearly, the expression
#⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ is underspeciﬁed as it does not mention I and κ. But we shall always
have this expression in context of the characteristic concept, where it belongs to
and for which we shall know κ. We now create a function which yields a suitable
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number-restriction for quantiﬁers:
?⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ ∶=
๰
= #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ if #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ < κ
≥ κ else
Note that ?⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ yields a string: if κ = 4 and #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ = 3 then ?⟨n, r(d, e)⟩
yields the string ‘= 3’. If #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ = 5 then ?⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ yields the string ‘≥ 4’.
e aracteristic ໦໱໨໶-concept is recursively deﬁned upon n < ω deﬁned as
follows:
Xκ,0I,d ∶= ⨅{A ∈ NC ∣ d ∈ AI} ⊓ ⨅{¬A ∣ d ∉ AI}
Xκ,n+1I,d ∶= Xκ,0I,d ⊓⨅r∈NR{∃?⟨n,r(d,e)⟩r.X
κ,n
I,e ∣ e ∈ rI(d)}
⊓⨅r∈NR ∀
≥1r.⨆{Xκ,nI,e ∣ e ∈ rI(d)}
∀≥1r.⨆{Xκ,nI,e ∣ e ∈ r(d)} merely assures that no (κ, n)-bisimulation-types are
allowed, which are not satisﬁed by some e ∈ r(d).
L 3.2.5 . For every positive κ < ω and all n < ω the aracteristic ໦໱໨໶-
concept Xκ,nI,d is well deﬁned.
P. is Lemma is the analogue of Lemma 2.1.14 which stated that charac-
teristic ໦໱໨-concepts are well deﬁned. We merely have to check, whether all
sets mentioned in such a concept are ﬁnite. For ﬁxed positive κ < ω, we show by
induction upon n < ω that there are only ﬁnitely many characteristic concepts
on each level n. In contrast to Lemma 2.1.14, we now have to consider quantiﬁc-
ations with diﬀerent cardinalities. Since they only occur in the step case we omit
the base case.
In the step-case, we assume that there are only ﬁnitely many characteristic
໦໱໨໶-concepts on level n. For each r ∈ NR, a concept can be paired up with a
quantiﬁer from {∃=1,… , ∃=κ−1, ∃≥κ}. ere are only κmany quantiﬁers andNR is
ﬁnite, hence the number of subsets containing concepts of the form ∃?⟨n,r(d,e)⟩r.Xκ,nI,e
is ﬁnite. erefore there are also just ﬁnitely many combinations of
෻r∈NR
{∃?⟨n,r(d,e)⟩r.Xκ,nI,e ∣ e ∈ rI(d)} and ෻r∈NR
∀≥1r.෼{X
κ,n
I,e ∣ e ∈ r(d)}
which shows that there are only ﬁnitely many formulae Xκ,n+1I,d on level n + 1.
From this follows that all characteristic໦໱໨໶-concepts are well deﬁned. 2
P 3.2.6 . If (I, d) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e then (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e)
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We shall need the following lemma during the proof the proposition. For given
κ, n and (I, d) and (H, e) we state
L 3.2.7 . Assume (M,w) ⊨ Xκ,nN,v ⟹ (M,w) ≤κ⟷−− n (N, v) for allM,N with
w ∈ ΔM and v ∈ ΔN. en for all (K, g)
ก(K, g) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d and (K, g) ⊨ Xκ,nH,eข⟹ Xκ,nI,d ≡ Xκ,nH,e
P. From the premise we obtain (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (K, g) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e). Assume that
for some (M,w), we have (M,w) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d. en (M,w) ≤κ⟷−− n (I, d) and since
concepts of grade ≤ κ and rank ≤ n are invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n and (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e
we have (M,w) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e, which shows Xκ,nI,d ⊨ Xκ,nH,e. In the same way, one shows
Xκ,nH,e ⊨ Xκ,nI,d whence Xκ,nI,d ≡ Xκ,nH,e follows. 2
P  P 3.2.6. e claim is immediate for n = 0. For n+1 assume
that I challenges II in the start conﬁguration with some r-successor set D with
|D| ≤ κ of d in I.
We shall partition D and rH(e) into equivalence classes and match them ac-
cordingly. For D we set d0 ∼I d1 iﬀ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e0 and (I, d1) ⊨ X
κ,n
H,e0 for any
e0 ∈ rH(e). is relation is reﬂexive because (I, d) ⊨ ∀≥1r.⨆{Xκ,nH,e0 ∣ e0 ∈ r
H(e)}
and so every d0 ∈ D satisﬁes some Xκ,nH,e0 . e relation is trivially symmetric and
transitivity follows from the induction hypothesis with Lemma 3.2.7. For rH(e)
we set e0 ∼H e1 iﬀ Xκ,nH,e0 ≡ X
κ,n
H,e1 .
Because |D| ≤ κ, every class in D/ ∼I is ≤ κ. Let for [d0] ∈ D/ ∼I be e0 ∈ rH(e)
such that (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e0 .
We observe that all dໟ ∈ [d0] satisfy Xκ,nH,e0 because each pair (d
ໟ
0, dໟ1) ∈∼I satis-
ﬁes a common Xκ,nH,eໟ and the induction hypothesis yields (I, dໟ0) ≤κ⟷−− (H, eໟ) ≤κ⟷−− n
(I, dໟ1). In particular, (I, dໟ) ≤κ⟷−− n (I, d0) and so (I, dໟ) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e0 .
Togetherwith (I, d) ⊨ ∃?⟨n,r(e,e0)⟩r.Xκ,nH,e0 our observation shows |[d0]| ≤ #⟨n, r(e, e0)⟩.
Hence for each class inD/ ∼I we can ﬁx an injective function β[d0] ∶ [d0]⟶ [e0],
where (I, d0) ⊨ ∃?⟨n,r(e,e0)⟩r.Xκ,nH,e0 .
We set β ∶ d1 ⟼ β[d1](d1) and have to show that β is injective. If [β(d0)] =
[β(d1)] then Xκ,nH,β(d0) ≡ X
κ,n
H,β(d1) by deﬁnition of ∼H. By deﬁnition of ∼I, in turn,
[d0] = [d1]. Since β[d0] was injective, d0 = d1.
Seing E ∶= β(D) yields the necessary response for II: β ∶ D⟶ E is injective
and for each dໟ ∈ Dwith where β[dໟ] ∶ [dໟ]⟶ [e0]we have (I, dໟ) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e0 . Since
β(d0) ∈ [e0] we have by deﬁnition of ∼H that Xκ,nH,e0 ≡ X
κ,n
H,β(dໟ) from which we infer
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(I, dໟ) ⊨ Xκ,nH,β(dໟ) and so the induction hypothesis yields (I, d
ໟ) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(dໟ)). So
II can play for n more rounds, giving her a winning strategy in this game.
Assume I challenges II with some r-successor set |E| ≤ κ of e in H. Let now
∼I be deﬁned as above, yet continued on rI(d) and let ∼H be deﬁned as above yet
restricted to E.
For each class [e0]we can ﬁx an injection β[e0] ∶ [e0]⟶ [d0] such that (I, d0) ⊨
Xκ,nH,e0 : e class [d0] exists because #⟨n, r(e, e0)⟩ > 0 and (I, d) ⊨ ∃
?⟨n,r(e,e0)⟩r.Xκ,nH,e0 .
Since |E| ≤ κ we have also |[e0]| ≤ #⟨n, r(e, e0)⟩ ≤ |[d0]|. e laer is true
as all elements in rI(d) that satisfy Xκ,nH,e0 are in [d0] by the deﬁnition of ∼I and
(I, d) ⊨ ∃?⟨n,r(e,e0)⟩r.Xκ,nH,e0 .
We set β ∶ e0 ⟼ β[e0](e0) for all e0 ∈ E. We have to show that β is injective.
Again for elements from the same class this is trivial. Assume e0 ≠ e1 and [e0] ≠
[e1]. en Xκ,nH,e0 ≢ X
κ,n
H,e1 by deﬁnition of ∼H. From the deﬁnition of ∼H follows
that all elements in β[e0]([e0]) satisfy X
κ,n
H,e0 . erefore no element in β[e0]([e0])may
satisfy Xκ,nH,e1 for otherwise Lemma 3.2.7 shows X
κ,n
H,e0 ≡ X
κ,n
H,e1 . Hence β[e0]([e0]) ≠
β[e1]([e1]) and so both classes are disjoint.
Seing D ∶= β(E) yields the appropriate response for II: β−1 ∶ D ⟶ E is
bijective. By deﬁnition of β−1, each dໟ ∈ D satisﬁes Xκ,nH,e0 for some e0 ∈ [β
−1(dໟ)].
By deﬁnition of ∼H we have Xκ,nH,e0 ≡ X
κ,n
H,β−1(d). erefore (I, d
ໟ) ⊨ Xκ,n
H,β−1(d) and the
induction hypothesis shows that II has a winning strategy for the next n-rounds,
which proves her winning strategy for this game. 2
We deﬁne κn(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI, gradeC ≤ κ and rankC ≤ n}
and deliver the following important theorem:
T 3.2.8 . Let τ be ﬁnite and let I,H be τ-interpretations. e following three
statements are equivalent for all positive κ < ω and all n < ω:
1. (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d
2. (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e)
3. κn(I, d) =κn(H, e)
P.
‘1. ⟹ 2.’ was given by Proposition 3.2.6
‘2. ⟹ 3.’ was proven by Proposition 3.2.4.
‘3.⟹ 1.’ is immediate.
2
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Saturation and Hennessy-Milner-Property
We li the restriction of signatures τ being ﬁnite.
D 3.2.9 . Let τ be a signature and (I, d) a pointed τ-interpretation.
1. Let κ < ω be positive, r ∈ NR. en Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໶(τ) is called ∃≥κr-type of
(I, d) if for all ﬁnite Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have (I, d) ⊨ ∃≥κr.⨅Γ0.
2. An ∃≥κr-type Γ of (I, d) is realised at d if there is a setD ⊆ rI(d)with |D| ≥ κ
such that for all d0 ∈ D we have (I, d) ⊨ Γ.
♢
D 3.2.10 . An interpretation I is໦໱໨໶-saturated, if for all positive κ <
ω, all r ∈ NR and every d ∈ ΔI, every ∃≥κr-type of (I, d) is realised at d. ♢
Regarding the subsection Remark on Saturation and Types on page 44, one
notices that also for໦໱໨໶-types the unique predecessor in the tree-unravelling
forms the only parameter and hence ω-saturation is enough to obtain ໦໱໨໶-
saturation. We state this fact in the following observation:
O 3.2.11 . Every ω-saturated interpretation is໦໱໨໶-saturated
P 3.2.12 . ໦໱໨໶-concepts have the Hennessy-Milner-property, i.e. if I
and H are both໦໱໨໶-saturated then
(I, d) =(H, e) iﬀ (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e)
where (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C}.
Like for໦໱໨ (Proposition 2.1.23, II canwin bymaintaining conﬁgurations such
that corresponding pebbles are always on elements with equivalent of theories.
It might be interesting for the reader to see how we deal with successor-sets D,
played as challenges by I which contain elements with diﬀerent theories.
P. II has a winning strategy for this game, if she can maintain conﬁgur-
ations, i.e. bijections, β ∶ D ⟶ E such that (I, d0) = (H, β(d0)) for all
d0 ∈ D. e start-conﬁguration is clearly of this form. Let the game have reached
a conﬁguration of this kind and let I choose d0 whose image is e0 under β then
(I, d0) =(H, e0).
Assume I challenges II by playing some ﬁnite set D ⊆ rI(d0) with κ ∶= |D|.
We partition D by the equivalence relation d0 ≡ d1 iﬀ (I, d0) =(I, d1). en
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each class [d1] ∈ D/ ∼I has at most κ elements.
Let [d1] ∈ D/ ∼I be arbitrary and ω([d1]) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) ∣ (I, d1) ⊨
C}. As (I, d0) ⊨ ∃≥|[d1]|r.⨅Γ0 and (I, d0) = (H, e0), we have (H, e0) ⊨
∃≥|[d1]|r.⨅Γ0 for all ﬁnite Γ0 ⊆ ω([d0]) and so ω([d1]) is an ∃≥|[d1]|r-type
of e0. As (H, e0) is saturated, ω([d1]) is realised at e0 and hence there is a set
Ed1 ⊆ rH(e0)with at least |[d1]|many elements that satisfyω([d1]). us there is
an injection β[d1] ∶ [d1]⟶ Ed1 . Note that this injection is chosen independently
of the representative.
Clearly, for any two diﬀerent classes [d1], [d2] ∈ D/ ∼I we have ω([d1]) ≠
ω([d2]) and therefore Ed1 ∩ Ed2 = ∅, i.e. β[d1] and β[d2] have disjoint ranges.
Hence β ∶ d1 ↦ β[d1](d1) is a bijection between D and β(D) such that (I, d1) =
(H, β(d1)) for all d1 ∈ D.
Hence II can ward oﬀ any challenge D with |D| < ω from I in I. A similar
argument shows that II can respond to any such challenge in H, too. is proves,
she has a winning strategy in the game and so (I, d) < ω⟷−− (H, e). 2
Observing the results from໦໱໨,໦໱໨໮ and໦໱໨໶, it seems that the triplet of
notions logic, bisimulation and saturation form a unit. If these notions are chosen
in a manner such that they complement each other, one obtains the Hennessy-
Milner-Property and eventually a characterisation.
is phenomenon is not restricted to description logics but is known in clas-
sical model theory as well: elementary equivalent ω-saturated interpretations are
partially isomorphic [109, 34].
is unit would have been broken for ໦໱໨໶ if we had required for ໦໱໨໶-
bisimulations Z that for each element (d, e) ∈ Z there is a bijection β ∶ rI(d) ⟶
rH(e).
E 3.2.13 . We denote the smallest inﬁnite limit ordinal with ω as usual and
use ω1 to denote the smallest uncountable limit ordinal which contains all count-
able ordinals. In particular ω1 is uncountable. Consider I with ΔI = {∗} ∪ω and
rI ∶= {∗}×ω andHwithΔH = {∗}∪ω1 and rI ∶= {∗}×ω1. en I andH are both
ω-saturated and elementary equivalent and hence they are partially isomorphic.
Clearly, they would be distinguished by the ໦໱໨໶-bisimulation which requires
bijections between successor sets and the Hennessy-Milner-Property would not
be given for໦໱໨໶-concepts, not even under the strong notion of ω-saturation.
For exactly this reason, we opted for amodel-theoretic notionwhich requires only
bijections between ﬁnite subsets of the successor sets.
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The Characterisation Theorem for໦໱໨໶-Concepts
P 3.2.14 . If φ ∈ FO(τ) is invariant under < ω⟷−− then there is a positive
κ < ω and n < ω su that φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n.
L 3.2.15 . If φ ∈ FO(τ) and φ is not invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n for any n < ω and
any positive κ < ω then there are pointed τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e) su that
φ(x) ⊨(I, d) ≡໦໱໨໶ (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x)
W.l.o.g. we may assume for the rest this section that τ contains exactly the sym-
bols of φ and is hence ﬁnite. We deﬁne I ∶= (ω ⧵ {0}) × ω.
e proof is basically the proof of Lemma 2.1.25. e only diﬀerence is, that
we deal with two indices and therefore have to use the supremum instead of the
maximum.
P. Let Xκ,n ∶= {Xκ,nI,d ∣ ∃(I, d), (H, e) ∶ φ(x)
⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x)},
where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶-concept for (I, d) on level (κ, n) ∈ I over
τ.
As required by the premise of this lemma, for each (κ, n) ∈ I no Xκ,n is empty.
ere are only ﬁnitely many characteristic໦໱໨໶-concepts on level (κ, n) and so
Xκ,n is ﬁnite. erefore⨆Xκ,n is an໦໱໨໶-concept for all (κ, n) ∈ I.
X ∶= {⨆Xκ,n ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I} is satisﬁable with φ : For any ﬁnite set X0 ⊆ X
let (μ,m) be the supremum in I of all pairs (κ, n) with ⨆Xκ,n occurring in X0.
Since Xμ,m ≠ ∅ there are τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e) such that φ ⊨(I, d) ≤ μ⟷−− m
(H, e) ⊭ φ. is implies (I, d) ≤ κ⟷−− n (H, e) for all κ ≤ μ and n ≤ m and so
Xκ,nI,d ∈ Xκ,n for all κ ≤ μ and n ≤ m. Hence (I, d) ⊨ X0 ∪ {φ}.
As every ﬁnite subset of X is satisﬁable with φ, the compactness of FO yields a
τ-model (K, c) of X ∪ {φ}.
We shall show that XK,c ∶= {Xκ,nK,c ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I} is satisﬁable with ¬φ. Let
X0 ⊆ XK,c be ﬁnite, and let (μ,m) be the supremum in I of all (κ, n) with Xκ,nK,c
occurring in X0. As (K, c) ⊨ X, there is Xμ,mI,d ∈ Xμ,m satisﬁed by (K, c). For (I, d)
there is a (μ,m)-bisimilar partner (H, e), which is a model of ¬φ. It follows that
(K, c) ≤ μ⟷−− m (I, d) ≤ μ⟷−− m (H, e)
and in particular that (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nK,c for all κ ≤ μ and n ≤ m. Hence (H, e) ⊨
X0 ∪ {¬φ}. As every ﬁnite subset of XK,c is satisﬁable with ¬φ, compactness of
FO yields a τ-model (M, g) of XK,c ∪ {¬φ}. With eorem 3.2.8 it follows that
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(M, g) ≡໦໱໨໶ (K, c). Which proves the claim. 2
P  P 3.2.14. Assume there would not be (κ, n) ∈ I such that
φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n. Lemma 3.2.15 furnishes two pointed interpretations
(I, d) and (H, e) such that
φ ⊨(I, d) ≡໦໱໨໶ (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ.
eir ω-saturated extensions (I∗, d) and (H∗, e) satisfy the same FO-theory as the
originals and in particular they realise the FO-type of d and e so that
φ ⊨(I∗, d) ≡໦໱໨໶ (H∗, e) ⊨ ¬φ.
But since໦໱໨໶ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, we have (I∗, d) < ω⟷−− (H∗, e).
is is absurd, as φ is < ω⟷−− invariant. It shows that there must be (κ, n) ∈ I such
that φ is ≤κ⟷−− n invariant. 2
T 3.2.16 . Every FO-formula over τ whi is invariant under < ω⟷−− is logically
equivalent to some໦໱໨໶-concept C over τ.
e proof uses the exact same rational as the proof for 2.1.24.
P. Let φ(x) be an FO-formula over τ which is invariant under < ω⟷−− . From
Proposition 3.2.14, we obtain (κ, n) ∈ I so that φ is ≤κ⟷−− n invariant.
Let Cφ contain all characteristic ໦໱໨໶-concepts Xκ,nI,d over symbols occurring
in φ such that (I, d) ⊨ φ(x). Cφ is ﬁnite because there are only ﬁnitely many
characteristic໦໱໨໶-concepts on level (κ, n). Clearly φ(x) ⊨ ⨆Cφ.
But also ⨆Cφ ⊨ φ(x): Let (H, e) ⊨ ⨆Cφ then there is (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) such that
Xκ,nI,d ∈ Cφ and (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d. Now (H, e) ≤κ⟷−− n (I, d) and since φ is invariant under
(κ, n)-bisimulation we have (H, e) ⊨ φ. 2
3.2.2 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶u-Concepts
໦໱໨໶u has been introduced in [11] and is the extension of໦໱໨໶with a univer-
sal role. Unlike the description logics {໦໱໨} × {໶, ໮, ε} that have been treated
so far, we have here the opportunity to introduce a graded universal role. e
syntax for໦໱໨໶u-concepts C over a signature τ would look as follows
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃≥κr.D ∣ ∃≥κu.D
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where A ∈ NC, E,D are໦໱໨໶u-concepts, r ∈ NR, κ < ω an u is a logical symbol
which does not belong to τ. e set of all ໦໱໨໶u-concepts over τ is denoted as
໦໱໨໶u(τ). e semantics is simply the extension of the ໦໱໨໶-interpretation
onto໦໱໨໶u by seing
(I, d) ⊨ ∃≥κu.D ⟺ |DI| ≥ κ
is is independent of the distinguished element d and we hence also write I ⊨
∃≥κu.D.
e rank -function ignores ∃≥κu: rank (∃≥κu.D) ∶= rankD whilst the grade -
function is deﬁned as grade ∃≥κu.D = max{κ, gradeD} and hence treats ∃≥κu like
any other quantiﬁcation ∃≥κr :
D 3.2.17 . Two interpretations I,H are globally໦໱໨໶-bisimilar, I <ω⟷−− ∀
H, if both of the following is true:
1. for all ﬁnite D ⊆ ΔI there is an injective function β ∶ D ⟶ ΔH with
(I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, β(d)) for all d ∈ D.
2. for all ﬁnite E ⊆ ΔH there is an injective function β ∶ E ⟶ ΔI with
(I, β−1(e)) <ω⟷−− (H, e) for all e ∈ E.
Analogously we say I and H are globally ໦໱໨໶-(κ, n)-bisimilar, I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H, if
both of the following holds:
1. for all D ⊆ ΔI with |D| ≤ κ there is an injective function β ∶ D ⟶ ΔH
with (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d)) for all d ∈ D.
2. for all E ⊆ ΔH with |E| ≤ κ there is an injective function β ∶ E ⟶ ΔH
with (I, β−1(e)) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) for all e ∈ E.
As usual we deﬁne (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (I, e) if I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H and (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) and
similarly for < ω etc. ♢
Characteristic Concepts for໦໱໨໶u
roughout this section let τ be ﬁnite and I ∶= (ω⧵{0})×ω. Let a τ-interpretation
I and (κ, n) ∈ I be given. We deﬁne for all d ∈ ΔI
?κ(d) ∶=
๰
= |{d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d}| if |{d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d}| < κ
≥ κ else,
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where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶-concept over τ for (I, d) on level (κ, n).
?κ(d) evaluates to a string, e.g. ‘= 2’ or ‘≥ κ’ for the given cardinal κ. It might be
read out as ‘the number of type d up to κ’.
In connexion with a characteristic concept Xκ,nI,d the necessary parameters I,
n and κ to evaluate ?κ(d) are given; hence for ∃?κ(d)u.Xκ,nI,d we shall not specify
them explicitly and we may use ?κ(d) in other contexts, when the corresponding
characteristic concept is deducible.
e global aracteristic໦໱໨໶u-concept over τ on level (κ, n) is deﬁned as
Xκ,nI ∶= ෻{∃
?κ(d)u.Xκ,nI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀≥1u.෼{X
κ,n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
again, where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶-concept over τ for (I, d) on level
(κ, n). Xκ,nI is well deﬁned as there are only up to κ many diﬀerent global quan-
tiﬁers {∃=1,…∃=κ−1, ∃≥κ} and on each level (κ, n) there are only ﬁnitely many
characteristic໦໱໨໶-concepts (cf. proof of Lemma 3.2.5).
If C is constructed by the following scheme then C is called a global ໦໱໨໶u-
concept over τ :
C ∶∶= ∃≥κu.D ∣ E ⊓ F ∣ ¬E
where D ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) and κ < ω and E, F are global ໦໱໨໶u-concepts over τ;
clearly then C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ). Apparently, global໦໱໨໶u-concepts do not depend
on a distinguished element. Let
κn(I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C,C is global, rankC ≤ n, gradeC ≤ κ}.
Note that not all ໦໱໨໶u-concepts which do not depend on a distinguished
elements are captured with our deﬁnition of a global concept: we exclude all con-
cepts with nested global operators, e.g. ∃≥1u.∃≥1u.⊤. However, Corollary 3.2.20
will show that all໦໱໨໶u-concepts that do not depend on distinguished elements
are logically equivalent to some global ໦໱໨໶u-concept. In this sense, global
໦໱໨໶u-concepts can be considered as a normal form of those໦໱໨໶u-concepts
independent of distinguished elements.
P 3.2.18 . Let (κ, n) ∈ I and τ ﬁnite. e following three statements are
equivalent:
1. H ⊨ Xκ,nI
2. I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H
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3. κn(I) =κn(H)
e proof uses the same technique as the proof of Proposition 3.2.6: We parti-
tion successor sets by factorising them over equivalent theories.
P. ‘1.⟹ 2.’ LetD ⊆ ΔIwith |D| ≤ κ. We deﬁne the following equivalence
relation on D: d0 ∼I d1 iﬀ Xκ,nI,d0 ≡ X
κ,n
I,d1 .
We introduce the following relation on ΔH: e0 ∼H e1 iﬀ there is d1 ∈ ΔI with
(H, e0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d1 and (H, e1) ⊨ X
κ,n
I,d1 for some d1 ∈ Δ
I. Since H ⊨ ∀≥1u.⨆{Xκ,nI,d ∣
d ∈ ΔI} this relation is reﬂexive. It is symmetric by deﬁnition.
For transitivity assume e0 ∼H e1 ∼H e2. en there is d0, d2 ∈ ΔI such that
(H, e1) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d0 and (H, e0) ⊨ X
κ,n
I,d0 as well as (H, e1) ⊨ X
κ,n
I,d2 and (H, e2) ⊨ X
κ,n
I,d2 .
Lemma 3.2.7 yields Xκ,nI,d0 ≡ X
κ,n
H,e1 ≡ X
κ,n
I,d2 , which shows that e0 ∼H e2.
Let [d] ∈ D/ ∼I be arbitrary. H ⊨ ∃?κ(d)u.Xκ,nI,d so there is an equivalence
class [e] ∈ ΔH/ ∼H such that (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d with |[e]|?κ(d) respectively. We have
[d] ⊆ {d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d} and since |{d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d}|?κ(d) we
have |[d]| ≤ |[e]|. Hence there is an injection β[d] ∶ [d]⟶ [e], which we choose
for the class [d] and independently from the representative.
We deﬁne β ∶ d ⟼ β[d](d) for all d ∈ D. is function is well-deﬁned as
the domains of β[d0] and β[d1] are disjoint if [d0] ≠ [d1] and still injective because
[β(d0)] = [β(d1)] implies Xκ,nI,d0 ≡ X
κ,n
I,d1 (see transitivity of ∼H) and therefore [d0] =
[d1]; as β[d0] was injective this implies d0 = d1. For all d ∈ Deorem 3.2.8 yields
(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d)) since (H, β(d)) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d. is shows 1. in Deﬁnition 3.2.17
For 2. in Deﬁnition 3.2.17 let E ⊆ ΔH with |E| ≤ κ and let [e] ∈ E/ ∼H be
arbitrary. For some d ∈ ΔI we have H ⊨ ∃?κ(d)u.Xκ,nI,d and (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d. For this
[d] ∈ ΔI/ ∼I there is an injective function β[e] ∶ [e] ⟶ [d]. Again β ∶ e ⟼
β[e](e) is an injective function for all e ∈ E such that (H, e) ≤κ⟷−− n (I, β(e)). is
shows 2. and so I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H.
‘2.⟹ 3.’ We show the claim by induction over the structure of C. For the base
case assume ∃≥λu.D ∈κn(I)where λ ≤ κ. Hence there isD0 ⊆ DI with |D0| ≤ κ.
Since I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H there is an injection β ∶ D0 ⟶ΔH such that (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d))
for all d ∈ D0. eorem 3.2.8 yields β(D0) ⊆ DH and so H ⊨ ∃≥λu.D. With the
same arguments the only-if direction is shown. Conjunctions and negations are
immediate through the induction hypothesis.
’3.⟹ 1.’ Every global characteristic໦໱໨໶u-concept is a global concept. 2
What has been shown in Proposition 3.2.18 for interpretations without distin-
guished element, can now be extended to interpretations which feature a dis-
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tinguished element. In this case, characteristic ໦໱໨໶u-concepts and bounded
໦໱໨໶u-bisimulation are assembled from global characteristic໦໱໨໶u-concepts
and໦໱໨໶-concepts and similarly from໦໱໨໶u-bisimulation and໦໱໨໶-bisim-
ulation. e only new notion is the ໦໱໨໶u-theory of an interpretation with
distinguished element:
κn(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C, rankC ≤ n and gradeC ≤ κ}
P 3.2.19 . Let (κ, n) ∈ I and τ ﬁnite. e following three statements are
equivalent:
1. (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d
2. (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (H, e)
3. κn(I, d) =κn(H, e)
P. ‘1. ⟹ 2.’ is immediate from Proposition 3.2.18 and eorem 3.2.8.
‘2. ⟹ 3.’ Let κ < ω be ﬁx but arbitrary. e proof is carried out by induction
over n and the structure of concepts, using the componentwise order: We show
that for all n < ω and all C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u
if gradeC ≤ κ and rankC ≤ n and (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (H, e) then
(I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ C.
If C is an atomic concept then C ∈ ໦໱໨໶; (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀0 (H, e) implies (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− 0
(H, e), and so (I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ C. If C = ¬D our induction hypothesis
yields (I, d) ⊨ D ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ D but the laer is true iﬀ (I, d) ⊨ C ⟺ (H, e) ⊨
C. Again using the induction hypothesis, the case C = D ⊓ E can be treated.
Let C = ∃≥λu.D where λ ≤ κ and assume I ⊨ C. en there is a subset of
D0 ⊆ DI with |D0| = λ. Since I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H there is an injection β ∶ D0 ⟶ΔH such
that (I, d0) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d0)) for all d0 ∈ D0. In particular (I, d0) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (H, β(d0))
for all d0 ∈ D0. e induction hypothesis yields β(D0) ⊆ DH. Hence (H, β(d0)) ⊨
∃≥λu.D. e only-if direction is inferred similarly.
Finally assume C = ∃≥λr.D with λ ≤ κ. In this case rankC = n + 1. (I, d) ⊨ C
iﬀ there is D0 ⊆ rI(d) ∩ DI such that |D0| = λ. Since (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n+1 (H, e) there
is an injective function β ∶ D0 ⟶ rH(e) such that (I, d0) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d0)) for all
d0 ∈ D0. Since I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n+1 H we have also I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H and so (I, d0) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (H, β(d0))
for each d0 ∈ D0. e induction hypothesis forDwith rankD ≤ n and gradeD ≤ λ
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yields β(D0) ⊆ rH(e) ∩ DH. Hence (H, e) ⊨ ∃≥λr.D. e same argument apply for
the only-if direction. is proves the claim.
‘3.⟹ 1.’ is immediate. 2
C 3.2.20 . Every concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ) su that I <ω⟷−− ∀ H implies I ⊨
C ⟺ H ⊨ C is equivalent to a global concept D ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ).
P. Let κ ∶= gradeC and n ∶= rankC as well as XC ∶= {Xκ,nI ∣ I ⊨ C}. We
show that ⨆XC is logically equivalent to C: Clearly C ⊨ ⨆XC. If, on the other
hand, H ⊨ ⨆XC then Proposition 3.2.18 yields a model I of C with I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H.
Form Proposition 3.2.18 we gather H ⊨ C. Hence XC ⊨ C. 2
Saturation and Hennessy-Milner-Property
We li the restriction on τ being ﬁnite and allow signatures of arbitrary size.
D 3.2.21 . Let τ be a signature, I a τ-interpretation and letΓ ⊆ ໦໱໨໶(τ).
1. Γ is an ∃≥κu-type of I if for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have I ⊨
∃≥κu.⨅Γ0
2. An ∃≥κu-type of I is realised in I if there is a set D ⊆ ΔI with |D| ≥ κ such
that for all d ∈ D we have (I, d) ⊨ Γ.
A τ-interpretation I is໦໱໨໶u-saturated, if all ∃≥κu-types are realised in I and I
is ໦໱໨໶-saturated, i.e. if for all d ∈ ΔI, r ∈ NR and all κ < ω all ∃≥κr-types of
(I, d) are realised at d. ♢
P 3.2.22 . ໦໱໨໶u has the Hennessy-Milner property, i.e. for any two
໦໱໨໶u-saturated τ-interpretations I,H the following holds:
(I) =(H) ⟺ I <ω⟷−− H.
where (I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ) ∣ C is global and I ⊨ C}.
P. Let D ⊆ ΔI be a ﬁnite set. We factorise this set by ≡໦໱໨໶. Every class d
in this partition has some ﬁnite cardinality κ. Let Γ be the ໦໱໨໶-theory of the
elements in d and κ ∶= |d|. en I ⊨ ∃≥κu.⨅Γ0 for all ﬁnite Γ0 ⊆ Γ. Since
I ≡໦໱໨໶u H we have H ⊨ ∃≥κu.⨅Γ0 and so Γ forms an ∃≥κu-type in H. As H is
saturated, this type is realised and a subset Ed of cardinality κ can be extracted.
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Hence for every class d in the partition of D there is an injection βd ∶ d⟶ Ed.
We set β ∶ d ⟼ βd(d) for all d ∈ D where d ∈ D/≡໦໱໨໶ is the class of d.
β ∶ D⟶ΔH satisﬁes (I, d) ≡໦໱໨໶ (H, β(d)) for all d ∈ D and is well deﬁned and
injective: It is well deﬁned as intersections between classes are empty and it is
injective since corresponding sets Ed0 and Ed1 are disjoint if d0 and d1 are disjoint,
as the elements of Ed0 and Ed0 satisfy diﬀerent໦໱໨໶-theories.
As I and H are in particular ໦໱໨໶-saturated, the Hennessy-Milner-Property
of໦໱໨໶ yields (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, β(d)) and so 1. in Deﬁnition 3.2.17 is satisﬁed. e
same arguments apply in order to show 2. Hence I <ω⟷−− H.
e only-if direction follows from the invariance of ໦໱໨໶u-concepts under
<ω⟷−− . 2
The Characterisation Theorem for໦໱໨໶u-Concepts
For this section, let I ∶= (ω ⧵ {0}) ×ω. W.l.o.g. we may assume that the signature
τ is ﬁnite.
T 3.2.23 . Let φ(x) ∈ FO(τ). en φ is equivalent to an ໦໱໨໶u-concept
over τ iﬀ φ is invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀.
e following proposition is analogous to Proposition 3.2.14. Instead of provid-
ing an additional Lemma like Lemma 3.2.15 we have just one proof, which ﬁrst
proves the analogue statement of Lemma 3.2.15 and then clinches the ﬁnal ar-
gument. Since the proof is only there to point out the details but uses the exact
same rationale as Lemma 3.2.15 and Proposition 3.2.14 respectively, the reader
may simply skip the proof.
P 3.2.24 . Every FO-formula that is invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀ is invariant
under <κ⟷−− ∀n for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
P. We ﬁrst show that if the claim does not hold, pointed interpretations
(I∗, d) and (H∗, e) exists such that
φ(x) ⊨(I∗, d) <ω⟷−− ∀ (H∗, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x).
Assume that the statement of our proposition is not true. en for every (κ, n) ∈
I there are pointed τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e) such that φ(x) ⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n
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(H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). e set
Xκ,n ∶= {Xκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d ∣ ∃(I, d), (H, e) ∶ φ(x)
⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ},
where Xκ,nI is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶u-concept for I over τ on level (κ, n) and
Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໶-concept, is ﬁnite and not empty. Compactness of
FO yields that X ∶= {⨆Xκ,n ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I} is satisﬁable with φ and so we obtain
some model (I, d) of X ∪ {φ(x)}.
For this (I, d), let XI,d ∶= {Xκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I}. Since (I, d) ⊨ X, every
ﬁnite subset of XI,d is satisﬁable with ¬φ. Compactness of FO yields: there is
(H, e) ⊨ XI,d ∪ {¬φ(x)}.
It follows φ(x) ⊨(I, d) ≡໦໱໨໶u (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). Both interpretations have ω-
saturated extensions (I∗, d) and (H∗, e) such that φ(x) ⊨(I∗, d) ≡໦໱໨໶u (H∗, e) ⊨
¬φ(x). e Hennessy-Milner-Property of໦໱໨໶u (cf. Proposition 3.2.22) yields
φ(x) ⊨(I∗, d) <ω⟷−− ∀ (H∗, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x).
is however contradicts the assumption φwould be invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀. Hence
there must be (κ, n) ∈ I such that φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n. 2
P  T 3.2.23. Assume φ ∈ FO(τ) is invariant under ໦໱໨໶u-
bisimulation. en φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n for some (κ, n) ∈ I. Let Cφ ∶=
{Xκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}. en Cφ is ﬁnite and φ ⊨ ⨆Cφ.
Assume now (H, e) ⊨ ⨆Cφ. en (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI ⊓Xκ,nI,d for some Xκ,nI ⊓Xκ,nI,d ∈ Cφ.
So (H, e) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (I, d) and since φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n we have (H, e) ⊨ φ(x).
is shows⨆Cφ ⊨ φ(x) and hence proves the theorem. 2
C 3.2.25 . Every sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀ is equi-
valent to some global concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u(τ).
P. φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n for some κ, n < ω. Let Cφ ∶= {Xκ,nI ∣ I ⊨ φ}.
en Cφ is ﬁnite and φ ⊨ ⨆Cφ. If H ⊨ ⨆Cφ then H ⊨ Xκ,nI for some I ⊨ φ and
from the invariance under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n of φ we obtain H ⊨ φ. 2
໦໱໨໶u1
We give a characterisation for ໦໱໨໶u1, i.e. the logic which only allows ∃≥1u-
quantiﬁcations.
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D 3.2.26 . I <ω⟷−− Q H if both of the following holds:
1. for all d ∈ ΔI there is some e ∈ ΔH such that (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e)
2. for all e ∈ ΔH there is some d ∈ ΔI such that (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e)
Analogously we deﬁne I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H if both of the following holds:
1. for all d ∈ ΔI there is some e ∈ ΔH such that (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e)
2. for all e ∈ ΔH there is some d ∈ ΔI such that (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e)
We also write (I, d) <ω⟷−− Q (H, e) if I <ω⟷−− Q H and (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e). We deﬁne
(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H, e) similarly. ♢
Let I be an interpretation. en its forest-unravelling IF is deﬁned as⨄d∈ΔI Id,
where Id is the tree-unravelling of I in d. We denote the last leer in d̄ by λd̄
L 3.2.27 . For arbitrary d ∈ ΔI we have (I, d) <ω⟷−− (IF, d̄) with λd̄ = d
P. II has a winning strategy if she maintains conﬁgurations β ∶ D ⟶ E
such that λ ∘ β(d) = d for all d ∈ D. In particular, β(d) and d are then atomically
equivalent.
e start-conﬁguration meets this requirement and by deﬁnition of the tree-
unravelling d̄ is atomically equivalent to λd̄, which is d; II does not lose the 0-th
round.
Assume now the game has reached β ∶ D ⟶ E which meets the requirement
and I chooses d ∈ D and some ﬁnite set of r-successors Dໟ of d for some r ∈ NR.
Since λd̄ = d the deﬁnition of the tree-unravelling yields d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ dໟ ∈ ΔIF for all
dໟ ∈ Dໟ. Hence βໟ ∶ dໟ ⟼ d̄⋅r⋅dໟ is a bijection betweenDໟ and {d⋅r⋅dໟ ∣ dໟ ∈ Dໟ}
which meets the requirement. Again by deﬁnition, d̄⋅r⋅dໟ is atomically equivalent
to dໟ which shows that II can respond with an admissible move.
Assume I challenges IIwith some r-successor set Eໟ for some r ∈ NR and d̄ ∈ E.
Every element d̄ໟ ∈ Eໟ has the form d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄ໟ. Hence λd̄0 ≠ λd̄1 if d̄0 = d̄1 and λd̄ໟ
is an r-successor of λd̄ for all d̄ໟ ∈ E. Hence β ∶ d̄ໟ ↦ λd̄ໟ is injective and β−1 is
injective and satisﬁes the requirement.
is shows that II has a winning strategy. 2
C 3.2.28 . I <ω⟷−− Q IF
I <ω⟷−− ∀ I
F does not hold in general as every element d in I becomes a root of its
own tree-unravelling in IF and several copies might be produced during the forest
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unravelling, if it is successor of other elements. Hence the number of elements
which are໦໱໨໶-bisimilar to d rises IF which destroys global໦໱໨໶-bisimilarity
between I and IF.
D 3.2.29 . For ﬁnite τ the characteristic ໦໱໨໶u1-concept for (I, d) on
level (n, κ) is deﬁned as follows:
Yκ,nI ∶= ෻{∃
≥1u.Xκ,nI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀≥1u.෼{X
κ,n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໶-concept on level (κ, n). ♢
κQ,n(I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u1(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C,C is global , rankC ≤ n, gradeC ≤ κ}
P 3.2.30 . Let τ be ﬁnite and let I,H be two τ-interpretations e follow-
ing three statements are equivalent:
1. H ⊨ Yκ,nI
2. I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H
3. κQ,n(I) =κQ,n(H)
P. ‘1. ⟹ 2.’ For every d ∈ ΔI, there is e ∈ ΔH such that (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d.
eorem 3.2.8 yields (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e). Conversely, for every e ∈ ΔH there is
a subformula Xκ,nI,d of ∀≥1u.⨆{Xκ,nI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} such that (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d. Again
eorem 3.2.8 yields (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) and so I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H.
‘2.⟹ 3.’ Let n, κ < ω be arbitrary and assume I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H. We show by induc-
tion upon the structure of C that C ∈ κQ,n(I) iﬀ C ∈ κQ,n(H). e induction
hypothesis readily yields negation and conjunction. Let C = ∃≥1u.D; recall that
D ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) since is C is global. I ⊨ C iﬀ there is d ∈ ΔI such that (I, d) ⊨ D.
For d ∈ ΔI there is e ∈ ΔH such that (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) and with eorem 3.2.8
we obtain (H, e) ⊨ D. Hence H ⊨ ∃≥1u.D which is C ∈ κQ,n(H). One can show
with the same arguments that κQ,n(H) ⊆κQ,n(I).
‘3.⟹ 1.’ is immediate. 2
Let τ be of arbitrary size. An interpretation is໦໱໨໶u1-saturated, if it is໦໱໨໶-
saturated and every ∃≥1u-type is realised. Clearly, every໦໱໨໶u-saturated inter-
pretation is໦໱໨໶u1-saturated. e proof of the following proposition is straight
forward.
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P 3.2.31 . ໦໱໨໶u1 has the Hennessy-Milner property, i.e. for any two
໦໱໨໶u1-saturated τ-interpretations I, H the following holds
(I) =(H) ⟺ I ≤κ⟷−− Q H
P. Let d ∈ ΔI be ﬁx but arbitrary. We have H ⊨ ∃≥1u.Γ0 for all ﬁnite
Γ0 ⊆ κn(I, d) since I ⊨ ∃≥1u.Γ0 and I ≡໦໱໨໶u1 H. Hence κn(I, d) is an ∃≥1u-
type in H and so there is e ∈ ΔH such that (H, e) ⊨ κn(I, d). In particular, I
and H are໦໱໨໶-saturated and the Hennessy-Milner-Property for໦໱໨໶ yields
(I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e). is shows 1. in Deﬁnition 3.2.26. We obtain 2. in the same way
and hence I ≤κ⟷−− Q H. e converse is immediate. 2
For the rest of this section, we assume w.l.o.g. that τ contains only symbols
occurring in φ. Recall that I = ω ⧵ {0} × ω (page 87).
P 3.2.32 . Every φ ∈ FO(τ) formula whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q is
invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
P. Assume for every (κ, n) ∈ I there are pointed τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e)
such that φ(x) ⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). Let
Yκ,n ∶= {Yκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d ∣ ∃(I, d), (H, e) ∶ φ(x)
⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x)},
where Yκ,nI is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶u1-concept for I over τ on level (κ, n) and
Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໶-concept on the level (κ, n). Yκ,n is ﬁnite and not
empty. Compactness of FO yields that Y ∶= {⨆Yκ,n ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I} is satisﬁable
with φ and so we obtain some (I, d) ⊨ Y ∪ {φ(x)}.
LetYI,d ∶= {Yκ,nI ⊓Xκ,nI,d ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I}. Since (I, d) ⊨ Y, every ﬁnite subset ofYI,d
is satisﬁable with ¬φ. Compactness of FO yields, there is (H, e) ⊨ YI,d ∪{¬φ(x)}.
It follows φ(x) ⊨(I, d) ≡໦໱໨໶u (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). Both interpretations have ω-
saturated extensions (I∗, d) and (H∗, e) such that φ(x) ⊨(I∗, d) ≡໦໱໨໶u (H∗, e) ⊨
¬φ(x). e Hennessy-Milner-Property of໦໱໨໶u1 (cf. Proposition 3.2.22) yields
φ(x) ⊨(I∗, d) <ω⟷−− Q (H∗, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x).
is contradicts the assumption φ would be invariant under <ω⟷−− Q. Hence there
must be (κ, n) ∈ I such that φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn. 2
T 3.2.33 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) that is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q is equi-
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valent to some C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u1(τ).
P. Proposition 3.2.32 yields that φ is invariant under ≥ κ⟷−− Qn for some (κ, n) ∈
I. Let Cφ ∶= {Yκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}. en φ(x) ⊨ ⨆Cφ. We also have
⨆Cφ ⊨ φ(x): everyCφ-satisfying pointed interpretation is ≤κ⟷−− Qn bisimilar to some
model (I, d) of φ(x). Since φ(x) is invariant ≤κ⟷−− Qn, this interpretation satisﬁes φ(x).
2
C 3.2.34 . Every sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q is equi-
valent to some global concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶u1(τ).
3.2.3 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶-TBoxes
We call C ⊑ D an ໦໱໨໶-concept inclusion if C and D are ໦໱໨໶-concepts. An
interpretation I is a model of C ⊑ D or satisﬁes C ⊑ D, in symbols I ⊨ C ⊑ D if
CI ⊆ DI. A ﬁnite set ໹ of ໦໱໨໶-concept inclusions is called ໦໱໨໶-TBox and
I ⊨ ໹ if I is a model of every concept-inclusion C ⊑ D ∈ ໹.
P 3.2.35 . Every global໦໱໨໶u1-concept over τ is equivalent to a boolean
combination of໦໱໨໶-TBoxes.
P. First consider the global concept ∃≥1u.D, where D is an໦໱໨໶-concept.
en ∃≥1u.D is logically equivalent to ¬∀≥1u.¬D, which is logically equivalent
to ¬{D ⊑ ⊥}. e inductive deﬁnition of global concepts allows to recursively
replace global concepts C yielding a boolean combination of໦໱໨໶-TBoxes. 2
P 3.2.36 . ໦໱໨໶-TBoxes are invariant under disjoint unions, i.e. for any
family (Ii)i∈I of τ-interpretations and any໦໱໨໶-TBox over τ we have
(∀i ∈ I ∶ I ⊨ ໹) ⟺ ෺i∈I
I ⊨ ໹
P. ‘⟹’ Let for all i ∈ I be Ii ⊨ ໹ and assumeC ⊑ D ∈ ໹. Assume d ∈ C⨄ Ii .
en there is i ∈ I such that d ∈ ΔIi and (I, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d). Hence d ∈ CIi
and since Ii ⊨ ໹ also d ∈ DIi . But (I, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d) and so d ∈ D⨄ Ii . Hence
⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ C ⊑ D. is shows⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹.
‘⟸’ Let⨄i∈I I ⊨ ໹ and assume C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ and let i ∈ I be arbitrary. For any
d ∈ CIi we have (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d). erefore d ∈ C⨄ Ii . Since⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹,
we also have d ∈ D⨄ Ii . Again (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d) and so d ∈ DIi . Hence Ii ⊨
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C ⊑ D and this shows Ii ⊨ ໹. Since i was arbitrary in I we have ∀i ∈ I ∶ I ⊨ ໹. 2
T 3.2.37 . Every FO-sentence whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q and invariant
under disjoint unions is equivalent to an໦໱໨໶-TBox.
P. Let φ ∈ FO(τ) which is invariant under <ω⟷−− and disjoint unions and let
cons φ = {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) and φ ⊨ C ⊑ D}. Clearly φ ⊨ cons φ.
Assume φ would not be equivalent to any ໦໱໨໶-TBox; then every ﬁnite ໹ ⊆
cons φ, which is an ໦໱໨໶-TBox, must be satisﬁable with ¬φ. Compactness of
FO yields that cons φ ∪ {¬φ} is satisﬁable by some interpretation I¬φ.
Let T ∶= {p ⊆ ໦໱໨໶(τ) ∣ p ∪ {φ} is satisﬁable }. For each p ∈ T there is a
model (Ip, dp) of p∪{φ}. Since φ is invariant under disjoint unionsH ∶= ⨄p∈T Ip
is a model of φ. Let K ∶= H ⊎ I¬φ. Both, H and I¬φ are models of cons φ and
therefore K ⊨ cons φ. But φ is invariant under disjoint unions, which implies that
K ⊭ φ.
Let H∗ and K∗ be the ω-saturated extension of H and K respectively. We show
that H∗ <ω⟷−− Q K∗; for then we derive a contradiction to φ being invariant under
<ω⟷−− Q which, in turn, proves that φ must be equivalent to some໦໱໨໶-TBox.
Clearly, for all d ∈ ΔH∗ we have (H∗, d) <ω⟷−− (K∗, d). Let now e ∈ ΔK
∗ . If any
ﬁnite subset p ⊆ ໦໱໨໶(K∗, e) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶(τ) ∣ e ∈ CK
∗} is not satisﬁable
with φ then φ ⊨ ම⨅ pඹ ⊑ ⊥ and K∗ would not be a model of cons φ. So p ∈ T
and (H, dp) ⊨ p for all ﬁnite subsets p ⊆໦໱໨໶(K∗, e). erefore, ໦໱໨໶(K∗, e)
is an ∃≥1u-type in H∗ and must be realised by some element d ∈ ΔH∗ because H∗
is saturated. e Hennessy-Milner-Property of ໦໱໨໶ yields (H∗, d) <ω⟷−− (K∗, e).
Hence for all e ∈ ΔK∗ there is d ∈ ΔH∗ with (H∗, d) <ω⟷−− (K∗, e). is shows
H∗ ≤κ⟷−− Q K
∗ and derives the contradiction. 2
Using adapted notions, we have proved characterisation theorems of ໦໱໨໶
on diﬀerent levels. e notions used and in particular໦໱໨໶-bisimulation are in
good coherence with those used to characterise the diﬀerent fragments of ໦໱໨
and໦໱໨໮: e Hennessy-Milner-Property could be proved for໦໱໨໶-concepts,
໦໱໨໶u-concepts and໦໱໨໶u1-concepts and we found the counterparts of char-
acteristic໦໱໨-concepts for all three mentioned logics. All this reassures us in the
choice of our conceptualisation.
Additionally we obtain insights into the expressiveness of ໦໱໨໶: it only al-
lows to talk about ﬁnite successor sets and co-ﬁnite successor sets (i.e. their com-
plement w.r.t. all successors of the element is ﬁnite) in a precise way, as we can
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only state that something is true for more than a ﬁnite cardinality, ∃≥κ.C, or at
most a ﬁnite cardinality ∃≤κ.C. is only changes for theories, e.g. {∃≥κ.C ∣ κ <
ω}. Furthermore, even though we gained control over the multiplicity of suc-
cessor elements,໦໱໨໶ and໦໱໨໶u1 only allow to encode FO-properties which
are invariant under tree-unravellings. is is diﬀerent for ໦໱໨໶u which allows
for the control of multiplicity on the global level.
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4. The Characterisation of
໦໱໨໴,໦໱໨໶໴ and໦໱໨໶໮໴
໦໱໨໴ [4, 3] (and its extensions໦໱໨໶໴ and໦໱໨໶໮໴) is an extension of໦໱໨
by individuals, also called nominals, whose leer ‘o’ explains the໴ in໦໱໨໴. e
classical counterpart of individuals are constants in FO, i.e. those symbols, which
are interpreted as a nullary function, yielding exactly one element. Nominals
were ﬁrst investigated within modal logics, called Hybrid Logics, already in the
1950s by Prior (cf. [18, Notes to Chapter 7]). In diﬀerent seings, nominals were
re-investigated over the years in [28, 108, 17] until they eventually became an
integral part of DLs [88].
In the spirit of description logics, individual names are rather interpreted as
singleton subsets of the carrier-set of an interpretation, which brings certain tech-
nical diﬃculties along as we shall see.
Traditionally [23], individual names occur in ABoxes and are not considered to
be a feature of the logic: An ໦໱໨-ABox assertion is an expression C(a) or r(a, b)
where a and b are individuals, C is a concept and r is a role name. A ﬁnite set
of໦໱໨-ABox assertions is called an໦໱໨-ABox and an interpretation I satisﬁes
C(a) if aI ∈ CI or rather aI ⊆ CI as individual names are interpreted as singleton
sets. Similarly I satisﬁes r(a, b) if (aI, bI) ∈ rI.
So in an ABox, we can express properties for a certain individual a, say, but we
cannot express that e.g. a certain property holds for all elements which are not
a. Description logics which are extended by individual names can now refer to
these speciﬁc objects in a concept and therefore allow to refer to them in TBoxes
as well:
Consider NI ∶= {Anne, John} and NR ∶= {isSisterOf, isBrotherOf, isChildOf}
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and NC ∶= {Boy}. With individuals it is now possible to express the TBox
໹ ∶= {(∃isChildOf.Anne) ⊓ ¬John ⊑ (∃isSisterOf.John) ⊔ (∃isBrotherOf.John)}
which states that every child of Annewhich is not John himself, must be a brother
or a sister of John. is extends the expressivity of the original language໦໱໨ and
generalises TBoxes as now all ABox-facts, provided the constants are interpreted
as the appropriate elements, are expressible as TBox Axioms:
໦ ∶= {isChildOf(John,Anne),Boy(John)}
໹ ∶= {John ⊑ ∃isChildOf.Anne, John ⊑ Boy}
໹ is logically equivalent to໦; Hence reasoning with TBoxes in໦໱໨໴ subsumes
reasoning with knowledge bases consisting of TBoxes and ABoxes.
In this chapterwe shall investigate in sequence໦໱໨໴,໦໱໨໶໴ and໦໱໨໶໮໴.
In the development of໦໱໨໴ we shall justify and explain issues arising with the
extension of individuals. Whilst there is lile new concerning the behaviour of
໦໱໨໴-concepts and໦໱໨໴u-concepts, we shall require amodiﬁed notion of sub-
structure and disjoint union. ese results were published in [92].
e altered notion of disjoint unions made the investigation of໦໱໨໶໴ which
underpins ໸໭໴໶ [80] particularly interesting. emodel-theoretic investigation
of໦໱໨໶໴ is therefore novel.
Finally we present the results for໦໱໨໶໮໴, where the incorporation of inverse
quantiﬁcation eases the technical diﬃculties which arise in໦໱໨໶໴. e results
for໦໱໨໶໮໴ were published in [92] as well.
4.1 The Model Class 𝕂
With NI we denote the set of individual names in our signature. Most of the
time, we shall use leers a and b for individual names. We continue the recursive
deﬁnition of the interpretation function for ໦໱໨-concepts by deﬁning aI to be
a singleton subset of ΔI. In particular no interpretation of an individual name
is empty, though we do not require diﬀerent individual names to have diﬀerent
interpretations. Hence we do not have the unique name assumption.
Although we are inclined to think the interpretation of a as single element,
the individual, we deﬁne aI to be a singleton set since (C ⊓ a)I = CI ∩ aI is
only a well formed set-theoretic term, if a is interpreted as set. is is the typical
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description-logic ﬂavour in contrast to the more classical approach e.g. in FO
where such symbols would be interpreted as constants.
is comes along with the technical diﬃculty mentioned above: As individual
symbols are not interpreted as constants but as predicates with one element, we
are not looking at a special type of signatures containing constants but at a special
class𝕂 of interpretations, namely those interpretations that assign a singleton set
to every symbol in NI.
Note that similar to expressions like Mod τ or Mod τφ denoting the class of all
τ-interpretations and the class of all τ-models of φ, 𝕂 is not a set in the sense of
the von Neumann Universe as it contains elements of non-bounded cardinality.
Hence constructions like ⨄𝕂 or⨉𝕂 are not well deﬁned and we shall abstain
from expressions like I ∈ 𝕂. Instead we shall refer to ‘I in 𝕂’ whenever we want
to express that the interpretation I assigns a singleton set to every a ∈ NI.
Since we explicitly want to refer to interpretations in 𝕂 we need to adapt the
notion of satisﬁability and we need a restricted satisfaction relation:
D 4.1.1 .
1. (I, d) ⊨𝕂 C if I in𝕂 and (I, d) ⊨໦໱໨ Cwhere symbols inNI are treated like
symbols in NC.
2. (I, d) ⊭𝕂 C if I in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⊭໦໱໨ C where symbols in NI are treated
like symbols in NC. Hence I ⊨𝕂 ¬C iﬀ I ⊭𝕂 C.
3. A໦໱໨໴-concept C is satisﬁable if there is I in 𝕂 such that I ⊨𝕂 C.
4. φ ⊨𝕂 ψ if for all I in 𝕂 we have I ⊨𝕂 φ implies I ⊨𝕂 ψ.
♢
For every FO-formula φ(x), we deﬁne I dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x) if I in 𝕂 and I
d
x ⊨FO φ(x) and
analogously to the above I dx ⊭𝕂 φ(x).
is might raise the question, whether ໦໱໨໴ is compact with respect to 𝕂.
Especially when later an arbitrary bisimulation invariant FO-formula is used.
D 4.1.2 . We deﬁne ‘a ∈ NI’∶= [∃x0.a(x0) ∧ ∀x0x1.(a(x0) ∧ a(x1)) ⟶
x0 ≡ x1] for every a ∈ NI. ♢
So ‘a ∈ NI’ is simply the FO-sentence which states that a is interpreted by
exactly one element.
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P 4.1.3 . If every ﬁnite subset of Γ ⊆ FO(τ) has a τ-model in 𝕂 then Γ
has a τ-model in 𝕂.
P. Let φa ∶=‘a ∈ NI’ and Θ ∶= {φa ∣ a ∈ NI}. Every τ-interpretation in
𝕂 is a model of Θ and vice versa. So, since every ﬁnite subset Γ0 has a model in
𝕂, every ﬁnite subset of Γ ∪ Θ is satisﬁable. By the compactness of FO, Γ ∪ Θ is
satisﬁable and hence Γ has a τ-model in 𝕂. 2
We use the standard translation of໦໱໨ to FO for໦໱໨໴-concepts, where we
treat individual names like concept names. is readily shows that also໦໱໨໴ is
compact over 𝕂.
O 4.1.4 . Every interpretation in I in 𝕂 has an ω-saturated extension I∗
in 𝕂 that satisﬁes the same FO-theory.
P. if I in𝕂 then I is a model of the FO-sentence φ ∶=‘a ∈ NI’ for all a ∈ NI.
As I and I∗ have the same FO-theory, i.e. they satisfy the same sentences, I∗ is
a model of every φ ∶=‘a ∈ NI’, too, and so I∗ in 𝕂. 2
4.2 ໦໱໨໴
We start with the usual introduction of syntax and semantics and we shall then
elaborate on the special circumstances that arise with the interpretation of indi-
vidual names as singleton predicates.
From there on we follow the scheme we previously applied: we shall use໦໱໨-
bisimulation as model-theoretic relation between pointed interpretations, shortly
discuss saturation and theHennessy-Milner-Property and ﬁnally give a character-
isation for໦໱໨໴-concepts within FO. e same scheme is applied for໦໱໨໴u-
concepts.
For ໦໱໨໴-TBoxes we have to introduce an adapted notion of disjoint union
and an additional property that explains how, under the given constraints, FO-
formulae can be preserved in tree-unravellings. We ﬁnally give a characterisation
for໦໱໨໴-TBoxes.
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4.2.1 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໴-Concepts
Syntax and Semantics
e syntax of an໦໱໨໴-concept C is then given by
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ a ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃r.D
where a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR andD, E are໦໱໨໴-concepts. We use the common
abbreviations ⊥, ⊔,→, ∀r etc.
e increase in expressivity for໦໱໨໴ on concept-level is rather moderate, but
it is now possible to express the whole theory of an individual which is reachable
from the distinguished element in ﬁnitely many steps by an inﬁnite set of con-
cepts. As an example, take an individual which is reachable within two steps via
an s and an r labelled edge:
{∀s.∀r.(a → C) ∣ C ∈ ໦໱໨໴(τ) with (I, aI) ⊨ C}
Pinning down the whole໦໱໨-theory for a single element in໦໱໨was previously
only possible in the distinguished element itself. We saw Example 2.1.18 in which
the inability to express the whole ໦໱໨-theory for a speciﬁc successor-element
led to the failure of capturing even 1-bisimilarity. We shall make use of this new
ability when characterising໦໱໨໴-TBoxes.
As shortcoming of ໦໱໨໴, we can still only express properties of individuals
which are reachable from the distinguished element. is problem will be over-
come with the introduction of the universal role.
As the interpretation as singleton set is given as feature of the interpretation
and not as property of the logic, individual names can be treated as concept names.
We are hence looking at a special class of interpretations 𝕂. us the deﬁnition
for ໦໱໨-bisimulation can be immediately used as ໦໱໨໴-bisimulation. is is
distinctively diﬀerent from the notion of hybrid bisimulation introduced in [2],
where elements are ‘stored’ in the tuples of the bisimulation. For the following
statements the proofs of the analogous statements for໦໱໨ can be used:
O 4.2.1 . ⟷−− is an equivalence relation on the set of pointed interpreta-
tions in 𝕂. For all pointed interpretations in 𝕂 and every n < ω we have
1. ⟷−− n is an equivalence relation on pointed interpretations in 𝕂
2. If (I, d)⟷−− n+1 (H, e) then (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
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3. If (I, d)⟷−− (H, e) then (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
O 4.2.2 . For pointed interpretations (I, d), (H, e) in 𝕂, all n < ω and
every໦໱໨໴-concept D we have
If (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e) and rankD = n then d ∈ DI iﬀ e ∈ DH.
Let τ = NC ∪ NR ∪ NI be ﬁnite. Characteristic ໦໱໨໴-concepts XnI,d for a τ-
interpretation I on level n are deﬁned as characteristic concepts for ໦໱໨ (cf.
Deﬁnition 2.1.13) where again elements in NI are treated as concept names.
Due to treating individual names as concept names, characteristic໦໱໨໴-con-
cepts incorporate individual names on level 0 and the deﬁnition for characteristic
໦໱໨໴-concepts on level n ≥ 1 can be immediately transferred from ໦໱໨. One
has to be careful, though: For ໦໱໨, the structure of characteristic concepts sug-
gested that every concept C that had the syntactical make up of a characteristic
formula was indeed a characteristic formula, i.e. there was a model (I, d) and
n < ω such that C ≡ XnI,d. is is not the case anymore:
X1 = (a ⊓ b) ⊓ ∃r.(a ⊓ ¬b) ⊓ ∀r.(a ⊓ ¬b)
does not have amodel in𝕂 yet would be equivalent to some characteristic concept
for some model on level 1 if NC ∶= {a, b},NR ∶= {r} and NI = ∅. Caveats of
this type can be avoided if we always refer to an interpretation (I, d) in the index
of XnI,d which is an interpretation in the class 𝕂. For then every element that is
not identical (we stay with the idea of individuals) with the interpretation of an
individual name, a say, satisﬁes ¬a.
P 4.2.3 . For ﬁnite τ and pointed τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e) in 𝕂 the
following statement is equivalent for all n < ω
1. (H, e) ⊨𝕂 XnI,d
2. (I, d)⟷−− n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
where n ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໴ ∣ (I, d) ⊨𝕂 C and rankC = n}
We li the restriction to ﬁnite signatures. Deﬁnition 2.1.21 for ໦໱໨-types,
realisation of types and the notion of saturation (Deﬁnition 2.1.22) are the same for
໦໱໨໴. Of course now an ∃r.-type of an element d in a τ-interpretation I is a set
Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໴(τ) such that for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have (I, d) ⊨ ∃r.⨅Γ0.
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P 4.2.4 . ໦໱໨໴ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property.
໦໱໨໴-Concepts as Bisimulation Invariant FO-Fragment over 𝕂
We need to be careful not to neglect signature symbols as we usually do, in order
to assure that we really show the claim for interpretations in 𝕂. Recall (page 30)
that I↾τ is the τ-reduct of I.
L 4.2.5 . Let τ be a signature, φ ∈ FO(τ) be invariant under ⟷−− † in 𝕂 with
† < ω or omied, and τφ ⊆ τ exactly the set of symbols of τ occurring in φ. en
(I↾τφ, d)⟷−− † (H↾τφ, e) implies I dx ⊨ φ(x) iﬀ H
e
x ⊨ φ(x)
P. We add an element ofNI to τφ. Assume (I, d) and (H, e) are τ-interpretations
in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⟷−− † (H, e). Let a ∈ NI ∩ τφ. We obtain I0 from I by adding a
fresh element dໟ. In an analogous manner we obtain H0 by adding eໟ. We obtain
I1 by redeﬁning bI1 ∶= {dໟ} for all b ∈ NI ⧵ τφ and interpreting all other symbols
S ∈ (NC∪NR)⧵ τφ as SI1 ∶= ∅. In an analogously fashion we obtainH1. We have
(I, d)⟷−− (I0, d) ≅τφ (I1, d)⟷−− † (H1, e) ≅τφ (H0, e)⟷−− (H, e).
e chain holds for the following reasons: Adding disconnected elements goes
unnoticed by ⟷−− , so (I, d) ⟷−− (I0, d). Moving or removing labels or edges
outside of τφ cannot be detected by isomorphisms restricted to τφ, so (I0, d) ≅τφ
(I1, d). Since the connected component of d in I is unaltered w.r.t. τφ in I1 we
have (I↾τφ, d) ⟷−− (I1, d). Analogously we obtain (H↾τφ, e) ⟷−− (H1, e) and
so (I↾τφ, d) ⟷−− † (H↾τφ, e) yields (I1, d) ⟷−− † (H1, e). Both I1 and H1 are τ-
interpretations in 𝕂.
We show that I dx ⊨ φ(x) iﬀ H
e
x ⊨ φ(x): Both I and I0 are in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⟷−−
(I0, d) always implies (I, d) ⟷−− † (I0, d), we have I dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ I0
d
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x).
Every FO-formula is invariant under isomorphisms of their signatures, hence
I0 dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ I1
d
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x). Again, invariance under⟷−− † in 𝕂 yields I1
d
x ⊨𝕂
φ(x) iﬀ H1 ex ⊨𝕂 φ(x) and using the reverse order of our arguments we obtain
H1 ex ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ H
e
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x). 2
L 4.2.6 . If φ is bisimulation invariant in 𝕂 then there is n < ω su that φ is
n-bisimulation invariant in 𝕂.
is lemma is not a corollary of Lemma 2.1.25! We admit FO-formulae which
are invariant under bisimulation in 𝕂, and hence we admit more formulae than
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those which are bisimulation invariant within the class of all τ-interpretations.
In particular φ ∶=‘a ∈ NI’ which is equivalent to ⊤ in 𝕂 is such an invariant
formula. Nevertheless, the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2.1.25 are analogous
to those that would be used in a proof for Lemma 4.2.6, which we thus omit. We
just have to recall that FO is compact w.r.t. 𝕂 (cf. Proposition 4.1.3).
T 4.2.7 . If φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) is bisimulation invariant in 𝕂 then there is an
໦໱໨-concept C over τ su that I dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ (I, d) ⊨𝕂 C.
P. Let φ(x) be a bisimulation invariant FO-formula over τ. According to
Lemma 4.2.6, φ(x) is n-bisimulation invariant for some n < ω. We deﬁne τφ as all
the symbols in τ that appear in φ, hence τφ is ﬁnite.
Let cons φ ∶= {XnI↾τφ,d ∈ ໦໱໨໴(τφ) ∣ I
d
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x)}, where XnI↾τφ,d is the char-
acteristic ໦໱໨໴-concept for (I↾τφ, d) on level n < ω. As τφ is ﬁnite, cons φ
is well deﬁned and ﬁnite, and so ⨆cons φ is a concept in ໦໱໨໴(τφ). We shall
show that⨆cons φ is the໦໱໨໴-concept that is logically equivalent to φ(x). We
have I dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x), whenever XnI↾τφ,d ∈ cons φ and so (I, d) ⊨𝕂 ⨆cons φ entailing
φ(x) ⊨𝕂 ⨆cons φ.
To show the converse, assume I is a τ-interpretation in𝕂 and (I, d) ⊨𝕂 ⨆cons φ.
en there is XnH↾τφ,e ∈ cons φ such that (I, d) ⊨𝕂 X
n
H↾τφ,e and H
e
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x); now
(I↾τφ, d)⟷−− n (H↾τφ, e), and so Lemma 4.2.5 yields I dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x). 2
4.2.2 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໴u-Concepts
e syntax of໦໱໨໴u is recursively deﬁned as follows
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ a ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃r.D ∣ ∃u.D
where a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, D, E ∈ ໦໱໨໴ as well as r ∈ NR and u being the universal
role. e deﬁnitions for the rank-function and global bisimulation stay the same.
We shall use the usual abbreviations ⊥, ⊔,→, ∀r, ∀u etc.
In comparison to ໦໱໨໴-concepts which can address individuals only if they
are in the scope of the distinguished element,໦໱໨໴u can now address arbitrary
individuals elsewhere through expressions like ∀u.(a → C) which is equivalent
to the@-operator of hybrid logic [21]: For every individual name a ∈ NI, hybrid
logic has an operator@a where@a φ, for some hybrid logic formula φ, is satisﬁed
by an interpretation I iﬀ (I, aI) satisﬁes φ. In ໦໱໨໴ the laer is true iﬀ I ⊨
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∀u.(a→ Cφ) for a suitable translation Cφ of φ.
O 4.2.8 . For all n < ω the following is true
(I, d) g⟷−− (H, e)⟹ (I, d) g⟷−− n+1 (H, e)⟹ (I, d) g⟷−− n (H, e)
For ﬁnite signature τ ∶= NR∪NC∪NI the global characteristic໦໱໨໴u-concepts
are deﬁned as we have done before:
XnI ∶= ෻{∃u.X
n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀u.෼{X
n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
where XnI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໴-concept with respect to τ.
P 4.2.9 . e following is equivalent for ea n < ω and ﬁnite signature
τ and all τ-interpretations I,H in 𝕂
1. (H, e) ⊨𝕂 XnI ⊓ XnI,d
2. (I, d) g⟷−− n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
where XnI is the global aracteristic໦໱໨໴u-concept for τ, XnI,d is the aracteristic
໦໱໨໴-concept for τ and n(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໴u(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C and rankC ≤
n}.
As this claim is true for all τ-interpretations, it is in particular true for τ-inter-
pretations in 𝕂. We li the restriction on τ being ﬁnite. e next deﬁnition for
types is the same as for ໦໱໨u (cf. Deﬁnition 2.2.8) and will yield appropriate
notions for໦໱໨໴u-saturation.
D 4.2.10 . Let τ be a signature and I a τ-interpretation. Let r ∈ NR then
1. Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໴(τ) is an r-໦໱໨໴-type of (I, d) with d ∈ ΔI if for every ﬁnite
subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have d ∈ (∃r.⨅Γ0)I.
2. an r-type Γ of (I, d) is realised at d if there is some r-successor dໟ ∈ ΔI such
that dໟ ∈ ⋂C∈Γ CI.
3. Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໴(τ) is a u-໦໱໨໴-type in ΔI if for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we
have I ⊨ ∃u.⨅Γ0.
4. a u-type of I is realised in I if there is d ∈ ΔI such that d ∈ ⋂C∈Γ CI.
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♢D 4.2.11 . A τ-interpretation I in 𝕂 is໦໱໨໴u-saturated if
1. for all d ∈ ΔI and every r ∈ NR every r-໦໱໨໴-type of d is realised at d
2. every u-໦໱໨໴-type of I is realised in I.
♢
P 4.2.12 . ໦໱໨໴u has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, i.e. for two໦໱໨໴u-
saturated τ-interpretations I,H in 𝕂 we have
(I, d) =(H, e) ⟺ (I, d) g⟷−− (H, e).
where (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໴u(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} and analogously for (H, e).
Proposition 2.2.10 carries over to interpretations in 𝕂 and thus proves this pro-
position. It shall be remarked again that every interpretation I in 𝕂 has an ω-
saturated interpretation I∗. As this interpretation shares the same FO-theory
with I, it satisﬁes the FO-sentences φ ∶=‘a ∈ NI’ for all a ∈ NI. hence I∗ in𝕂. In
particular for every d ∈ ΔI∗ every r-type is realised at d and every u-໦໱໨໴-type
in I∗ is realised in I∗, thus I∗ is໦໱໨໴u-saturated.
L 4.2.13 . Let τ be a signature, φ ∈ FO(τ) be invariant under g⟷−− † in 𝕂 with
† < ω or omied, and τφ ⊆ τ exactly the set of symbols of τ occurring in φ. en
(I↾τφ, d) g⟷−− † (H↾τφ, e) implies I dx ⊨ φ(x) iﬀ H
e
x ⊨ φ(x)
In comparison to Lemma 4.2.5 we cannot simply add a new element to the
interpretation as this could destroy g⟷−− . Instead we have to choose one of the
individuals on which we shall ‘park’ all non-used individual names.
P. We assume w.l.o.g. that NI is not empty and we add an element of NI to
τφ. Assume (I, d) and (H, e) are τ-interpretations in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⟷−− † (H, e). Let
a ∈ NI ∩ τφ. We obtain I0 from I by redeﬁning bI0 ∶= aI for all b ∈ NI ⧵ τφ and
interpreting all other symbols S ∈ (NC ∪NR) ⧵ τφ as SI0 ∶= ∅. In an analogously
fashion we obtain H1. We have
(I, d) ≅τφ (I0, d)⟷−− † (H0, e) ≅τφ (H, e).
e chain holds for the following reasons: Moving or removing labels or edges
outside of τφ cannot be detected by isomorphisms restricted to τφ, so (I, d) ≅τφ
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(I0, d). Since the connected component of d in I is unaltered w.r.t. τφ in I0
we have (I↾τφ, d) ⟷−− (I0, d). Analogously we obtain (H↾τφ, e) ⟷−− (H0, e) and
so (I↾τφ, d) ⟷−− † (H↾τφ, e) yields (I0, d) ⟷−− † (H0, e). Both I0 and H0 are τ-
interpretations in 𝕂.
We show that I dx ⊨ φ(x) iﬀ H
e
x ⊨ φ(x): Every FO-formula is invariant under
isomorphisms of their signatures, hence I dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ I0
d
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x). Invariance
under ⟷−− † in 𝕂 yields I0 dx ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ H0
e
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x) and using argument from
above we obtain H0 ex ⊨𝕂 φ(x) iﬀ H
e
x ⊨𝕂 φ(x). 2
P 4.2.14 . Let φ(x) be an FO-formula that is invariant under g⟷−− then
φ(x) is invariant under g⟷−− n for some n < ω.
Similarly to Lemma 4.2.6 the proof of the analogue Lemma 2.2.13 for ໦໱໨u
carries over to this proposition.
T 4.2.15 . Every FO-formula over τ whi is satisﬁable in 𝕂 and invariant
under g⟷−− is equivalent to some໦໱໨໴u-concept in 𝕂
P. Let τφ be the part of τ occurring in φ, and let τφ w.l.o.g. contain at
least one element, say b ∈ NI. Furthermore let cons φ ∶= {XnI↾τφ ⊓ X
n
I↾τφ,d ∣
I in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}, where XnI↾τφ is the characteristic ໦໱໨໴u-concept for
τ and XnI↾τφ,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໴-concept for τ. is set is non-empty as
φ(x) is satisﬁable over 𝕂 and τφ is ﬁnite, so that the characteristic concepts exist.
Moreover cons φ itself is ﬁnite and hence⨆cons φ ∈ ໦໱໨໴u(τφ). We show that
⨆cons φ is the concept we are looking for.
If (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) then XnI↾τφ ⊓ X
n
I↾τφ,d ∈ cons φ. (I↾τφ, d) ⊨ X
n
I↾τφ ⊓ X
n
I↾τφ,d and
since every formula is invariant under signature extensions, I ≅τφ I↾τφ yields
(I, d) ⊨𝕂 ⨆cons φ.
Assume, on the other hand, (I, d) ⊨𝕂 ⨆cons φ. en (I, d) is a model of
XnH↾τφ ⊓ X
n
H↾τφ,e ∈ cons φ for some (H, e) ⊨ φ(x) and so is (I↾τφ, d). is entails
(I↾τφ, d) g⟷−− n (H↾τφ, e) and so Lemma 4.2.13 yields (I, d) ⊨ φ(x). 2
4.2.3 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໴-TBoxes
e structure of this section is dictated by the necessary notions which are needed
to characterise ໦໱໨໴-TBoxes. Merely considered as ໦໱໨-TBoxes, they are in-
deed invariant under disjoint unions. Yet, the class 𝕂 is not closed under disjoint
unions, as for example, the disjoint union of I,H in 𝕂 would have to assign aI
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and aK to the individual name a ∈ NI and hence would not be a member of 𝕂
anymore.
e solution to this problem is to merge the individuals into one element. But
another problem arises: e໦໱໨໴-TBox {a⊓∃r.⊤ ⊑ ¬A}, where a ∈ NI,A ∈ NC
and r ∈ NR, allows—amongst others—for the following two interpretations I,K in
𝕂, where aI ⊆ AI and (aK, aK) ∈ rK. What should the individual aI⊎K as outcome
of the merging between aI and aK satisfy in order to make ໹ true?
A deﬁnite answer cannot be given. Hence we do not allow disjoint unions of
arbitrary interpretations in 𝕂, but we require them to be coherent in the sense
that two individuals of the same name can only be merged, if they are bisimilar.
Our road-map is therefore as follows: First, we have to formally deﬁne the
process of merging and show properties we can infer from the resulting inter-
pretations. Aer this, we shall give our adapted notions of disjoint unions and,
in this case, also the adapted disjoint union of generated substructures before we
ﬁnally prove the theorem.
Factorising Interpretations
emerging of elements will be performed by factorising with a suitable equival-
ence relation. We hence deﬁne what the factor-interpretation of an interpretation
is and prove a proposition on such interpretations for when they are induced by
an equivalence relation which is respected by bisimulation.
Let I be a τ-interpretation and E an equivalence relation on ΔI ×ΔI. For every
d ∈ ΔI we deﬁne [d]E ∶= {e ∈ ΔI ∣ (d, e) ∈ E} to be the class of d under E. e
factor-interpretation I/E of I induced by E is deﬁned as follows:
ΔI/E ∶= {[d]E ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
aI/E ∶= {d ∈ ΔI/E ∣ ∃e ∈ d ∶ e ∈ aI} where a ∈ NI
AI/E ∶= {d ∈ ΔI/E ∣ ∃e ∈ d ∶ e ∈ AI} where A ∈ NC
rI/E ∶= {(d, e) ∈ ΔI/E × ΔI/E ∣ ∃d ∈ d.∃e ∈ e ∶ (d, e) ∈ rI} where r ∈ NR
P 4.2.16 . Let I be an interpretation and let E be an equivalence relation
on ΔI su that (I, d)⟷−− (I, e) for all (d, e) ∈ E. en
(I, d)⟷−− (I, e) ⟺ (I, d)⟷−− (I/E, [e]E)
P. ‘⟹’: We assume (I, d)⟷−− (I, e) and have to show that II has awinning
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strategy for the game G(I, d; I/E, [e]E).
As a ﬁrst intermediate step we show that under the condition (I, d)⟷−− (I, e),
d is atomically equivalent to [e]E: if d ∈ AI then, since e is bisimilar to e also
e ∈ AI and according to the deﬁnition of AI/E we have [e]E ∈ AI/E. If [e]E ∈ AI/E
by deﬁnition of AI/E there is some e0 ∈ [e]E such that e0 ∈ AI. Now e0 ∈ [e]E iﬀ
(e0, e) ∈ E and by requirement for E we have e0 is bisimilar to e. Hence e ∈ AI
and since d is bisimilar to e by assumption, we have d ∈ AI. is proves the
intermediate claim.
We now show that II has a winning strategy if she maintains conﬁgurations
(I, d0; I/E, [e0]E) such that (I, d0) ⟷−− (I, e0). Clearly the start-conﬁguration of
this type. As d and [e]E are atomically equivalent, II does not lose the 0-th round.
Assume the game has reached conﬁguration (I, d0; I/E, [e0]E) and (I, d0) ⟷−−
(I, e0).
Let I challenge II by moving in I from d0 via an edge labelled with r ∈ NR to
d1. Since d0 is bisimilar to e0 by assumption, there is some r-successor e1 of e0 in
I such that (I, d1)⟷−− (I, e1). By the deﬁnition of rI/E we have ([e0], [e1]) ∈ rI/E.
Hence II can move via an r-edge from [e0] to [e1]. As shown at the beginning,
d1 and [e1] are atomically equivalent because (I, d1)⟷−− (I, e1). In this sense the
new conﬁguration (I, d1; I/E[e1]E) is admissible and satisﬁes the requirement that
d1 is bisimilar to e1.
Let I challenge II by moving in I/E from [e0]E via some r-edge to [e1]E. By
deﬁnition of rI/E there are e2 ∈ [e0]E and e3 ∈ [e1]E such that (e2, e3) ∈ rI/E. But
e2 ∈ [e0]E also implies that (I, e0) ⟷−− (I, e2) by the requirement for E. Hence
there must be an r-successor eໟ1 of e0 such that (I, eໟ1) ⟷−− (I, e3). As (I, d0) ⟷−−
(I, e0) there must be an r-successor d1 of d0 in I such that (I, d1)⟷−− (I, eໟ1)⟷−−
(I, e3). II moves from d0 via the r-edge to d1. For then (I, d1) ⟷−− (I, e3) and
since [e1]E = [e3]E be obtain a conﬁguration (I, d1; I/E, [e3]E). As shown at the
beginning d1 and [e3]E are atomically equivalent and hence this conﬁguration is
admissible. is proves
(I, d)⟷−− (I, e)⟹ (I, d)⟷−− (I/E, [e]E).
‘⟸’: Assume (I, d) ⟷−− (I/E, [e]E). We have to show that II has a winning
strategy in the Game G(I, d; I, e).
Again as an intermediary step we show that under the condition (I, d) ⟷−−
(I/E, [e]E), d is atomically equivalent to e: Assume d ∈ AI. en [e]E ∈ AI/E and
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by deﬁnition of AI/E there is some element e0 ∈ [e]E such that e0 ∈ AI. But then
also, (e0, e) ∈ E which entails that (I, e0) ⟷−− (I, e), whence e ∈ AI is inferred.
If, conversely, e ∈ AI then by the deﬁnition of AI/E also [e] ∈ AI/E and since
(I, d)⟷−− (I/E, [e]E), we have d ∈ AI, which proves our claim.
We now show that II has a winning strategy if she maintains conﬁgurations
(I, d0; I, e0) such that (I, d0) ⟷−− (I/E, [e0]E). e start conﬁguration is of the
desired kind, and as just shown d is atomically equivalent to e; so II does not lose
the 0-th round. Assume that the game has reached conﬁguration (I, d0; I, e0).
Let ﬁrst I challenge II by moving from d0 via some r-edge to d1 in I. As
(I, d0)⟷−− (I/E, [e0]E), there is some r-successor [e1]E of [e0]E such that (I, d1)⟷−−
(I/E, [e1]E). By the deﬁnition of rI/E there must be e2 ∈ [e0]E and e3 ∈ [e1]E
such that (e2, e3) ∈ rI. We also have (e2, e0) ∈ E and by requirement for E
this implies (I, e0) ⟷−− (I, e2). Hence there is an r-successor eໟ1 of e0 such that
(I, eໟ1) ⟷−− (I, e3). We now have to show that (I, d1) ⟷−− (I/E, [eໟ1]E). For then II
is able to move from e0 via an r-edge to eໟ1 and obtaining an admissible conﬁgur-
ation such that (I, d1)⟷−− (I/E, [eໟ1]E).
We know (I, eໟ1) ⟷−− (I, e3), and since e3 ∈ [e1]E, we also know (I, e3) ⟷−−
(I, e1). We infer from ‘⟹’ that (I/E, [eໟ1]E)⟷−− (I, e3) and (I, e3)⟷−− (I/E, [e1]E).
Together with the fact that (I, d1) ⟷−− (I/E, [e1]E), transitivity of ⟷−− yields
(I, d1)⟷−− (I/E, [eໟ1]E)
Conversely, let I challenge II by moving from e0 via some r-edge to e1. en, by
deﬁnition of rI/E we obtain [e1]E being an r-successor of [e0]E. Since (I, d0) ⟷−−
(I/E, [e0]E), there is an r-successor d1 of d0 such that (I, d1) ⟷−− (I/E, [e1]E). As
shown above, under this condition d1 is atomically equivalent to e1 and hence
II reaches, by moving from d0 via this r-edge to d1, an admissible conﬁguration
(I, d1; I, e1) such that (I, d1)⟷−− (I/E, [e1]E). is proves
(I, d)⟷−− (I/E, [e]E) ⟹ (I, d)⟷−− (I, e).
2
Factor-interpretations of this kind are also known as bisimulation-quotients
[61]. If E ∶= {(d, dໟ) ∈ ΔI × ΔH ∣ (I, d) ⟷−− (I, dໟ)}, i.e. E is the largest auto-
bisimulation then I/E is a minimal bisimilar companion for a given interpretation.
Proposition 4.2.16, however, does not require E to be the largest bisimulation.
It is diﬃcult to trace the origins of bisimulation-quotients. Factor-interpretations
as such are fairly common in (universal) algebra [29] and the origins of bisimu-
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lation in process algebras [118] suggest that bisimulation quotients have been
explored early on. [118] thus quotes [1] where bisimulation-quotients already
appear as exercise in lecture notes.
Coherent Interpretations and Coherent Disjoint Unions
In the following, we shall introduce coherent interpretations and in turn coherent
disjoint unions, which will provide an adequate replacement for arbitrary disjoint
unions in ໦໱໨. e construction to be given for coherent disjoint unions will
ensure that they are objects in 𝕂. Note that in the deﬁnitions to come, we do not
assume that interpretations are members of 𝕂 unless explicitly stated; individual
names in NI are thus treated like concept names.
D 4.2.17 . A τ-interpretation I is coherent if for all a ∈ NI and all d, e ∈
aI we have (I, d)⟷−− (I, e). ♢
For all coherent τ-interpretations I we deﬁne the following relation:
EI ∶= {(d, d) ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ∪ ෛa∈NI
aI × aI.
L 4.2.18 . EI is an equivalence relation on ΔI su that for all (d, e) ∈ EI ∶
(I, d)⟷−− (I, e).
P. We ﬁrst show that for all (d, e) ∈ EI ∶ (I, d) ⟷−− (I, e): Assume d ≠ e
then d, e ∈ aI for some a ∈ NI. As I is coherent, all elements in a are bisimilar to
each other, so are d and e.
Reﬂexivity holds by deﬁnition. If (d, e) ∈ EI and d ≠ e then (d, e) ∈ aI × aI and
so is (e, d). is shows symmetry. For transitivity assume (d0, d1), (d1, d2) ∈ EI.
e claim is trivial if either d0 = d1 or d1 = d2. Assume therefore d0 ≠ d1 and
d1 ≠ d2. en there is a ∈ NI such that (d0, d1) ∈ aI × aI and there is b ∈ NI
such that (d1, d2) ∈ bI × bI. From the laer follows by requirement for E that
(I, d1)⟷−− (I, d2) and so d2 ∈ aI, hence (d0, d2) ∈ E. 2
C 4.2.19 . I/EI in 𝕂 if I is a coherent interpretation with aI ≠ ∅ for all
a ∈ NI.
D 4.2.20 . A family (Ii)i∈I of τ-interpretations is called coherent, if aIi ≠
∅ for all i ∈ I and for all i, j ∈ I, all a ∈ NI and all d ∈ aIi and e ∈ aIj we have
(Ii, d)⟷−− (Ij, e). ♢
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O 4.2.21 . e disjoint union ⨄i∈I Ii of a coherent family (Ii)i∈I of τ-
interpretations is a coherent interpretation. erefore
1. (⨄i∈I Ii, d)⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii/E⨄ Ii , [d]E⨄ Ii ), for all d ∈ Δ
⨄ Ii ,
2. ⨄i∈I Ii g⟷−− ⨄i∈I Ii/E⨄ Ii ,
3. ⨄i∈I Ii/E⨄ Ii in 𝕂.
We omit the proof as 1. follows from Proposition 4.2.16, 2. follows from 1. and
3. is an instance of Corollary 4.2.19.
D 4.2.22 . An FO-sentence φ is invariant under coherent disjoint union,
if for a coherent family of τ-interpretations we have
∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ φ ⟺ (෺i∈I
Ii)/E⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ φ.
♢
We also need to provide an additional notion, namely being preserved under
coherent forward generated subinterpretations: In the case of ໦໱໨, invariance
under disjoint unions not only entailed that an FO-sentence was preserved by
disjoint unions but also these sentences were preserved under generated subin-
terpretations. Together with the invariance of global bisimulation which allowed
for forest unravellings, these FO-sentences were preserved under arbitrary tree-
unravellings.
e deﬁnition for invariance under coherent disjoint unions however does not
allow for arbitrary tree-unravellings or the disassembling of interpretations: in-
terpretations for which an FO-sentence is invariant under coherent disjoint uni-
ons are all required to be in 𝕂 which forbids disassembling of interpretations in
general and tree-unravellings in particular as otherwise individual names would
remain being interpreted as empty.
But for a characterisation analogue to ໦໱໨ (cf. eorem 2.3.7) we need a re-
placement for this property which allowed us to use parts of an interpretation.
We shall therefore introduce forward generated subinterpretations, which do not
cut out complete connected components of an element, but only those parts of
a connected component which contain reachable elements from a distinguished
element; therefore forward generated. FO-sentences will then be required to be
preserved in a coherent disjoint union of these forward generated subinterpreta-
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tions, is seems to be an ad hoc solution at ﬁrst, but it is not, as we shall discuss
aer having given the deﬁnitions.
D 4.2.23 . A forward generated subinterpretation K of I in d ∈ ΔI is
deﬁned as K ∶= I↾ΔK where ΔK ∶= {dໟ ∈ ΔI ∣ ∃d…dໟ ∈ ΔId} with ΔId the
carrier-set of the tree-unravelling of I in d. ♢
In essence, ΔK contains all elements reachable in ﬁnitely many steps from d
as ΔK contains all last leers of path-elements in ΔId . Note that a forward
generated subinterpretation need not to be in𝕂 as individuals not reachable from
the distinguished element d will be lost and hence interpreted as empty.
O 4.2.24 . Let I be a τ-interpretation and K a forward generated subin-
terpretation of I in some element d0 ∈ ΔI. en (K, d)⟷−− (I, d) for all d ∈ ΔK.
It is clear that K contains all elements reachable from d. Hence II can copy
every challenge set out by I and thus has a winning-strategy.
D 4.2.25 . A sentence φ is preserved under coherent disjoint unions of
forward generated subinterpretations, if for a family (Ii)i∈I of τ-interpretations
∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ φ ⟹ ෺i∈I
Ki/E⨄Ki ⊨ φ
whereKi is the forward generated subinterpretation of Ii in some element d ∈ ΔI
and⨄i∈I Ki is a coherent τ-interpretation. ♢
O 4.2.26 . ໦໱໨໴-TBoxes are
1. invariant under global bisimulation
2. invariant under coherent disjoint unions
3. preserved under coherent disjoint unions of forward generated subinterpreta-
tions.
P. Let ໹ be an໦໱໨໴-TBox and (Ii)i∈I a coherent family of τ-interpretations.
1. As every໦໱໨໴-TBox is merely an໦໱໨-TBox, the claim is immediate.
2. As individual names are treated like concept names, we may consider ໹ as
໦໱໨-TBox. It then follows that ໹ is invariant under disjoint union and
hence ∀i ∈ I ∶ I ⊨ ໹ iﬀ ⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹. As Observation 4.2.21 assures,
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⨄i∈I Ii g⟷−− ⨄i∈I /E⨄ Ii and as ໦໱໨໴-TBoxes are invariant under global
໦໱໨-bisimulation we obtain⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹ iﬀ⨄i∈I Ii/E⨄ Ii ⊨ ໹.
3. ໹, considered as ໦໱໨-TBox, is preserved under forward generated subin-
terpretations: If I ⊨ ໹ and C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ then every element in I satisﬁes the
໦໱໨-concept of C → D. Since (K, d) ⟷−− (I, d) for all d ∈ ΔK also every
element in K satisﬁes C→ D and so K ⊨ C ⊑ D.
As ໹ is also preserved under disjoint union,⨄i∈I Ki ⊨ ໹. Assume addition-
ally that⨄i∈I Ki is coherent. en⨄i∈I Ki g⟷−− ⨄i∈I Ki/E⨄Ki and invariance
of ໹ under global bisimulation yields⨄i∈I Ki/E⨄Ki ⊨ ໹.
2
At this point we have not made the requirement that structures must interpret
every a ∈ NI with a non-empty set, short of interpreting this set as singleton.
Observation 4.2.26 is strengthened if we require additionally that every member
of the family (Ii)i∈I is in 𝕂. We then obtain that every໦໱໨໴-TBox ໹ is invariant
under coherent disjoint unions in 𝕂, i.e. ∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨𝕂 ໹ ⟺ (⨄ Ii)/E⨄ Ii ⊨𝕂 ໹.
Similarly every ໦໱໨໴-TBox ໹ is preserved under coherent disjoint unions of
tree-unravellings in 𝕂.
Concerning whether or not being preserved under the coherent disjoint union
of forward generated subinterpretation is ad hoc, we have witnessed in Obser-
vation 4.2.26, TBoxes are preserved from K to I if every element in K ﬁnds a
bisimilar partner in I. is is in particular true for interpretations K, I in𝕂. us
FO-sentences which can be expressed as TBoxes must have this property. But
instead of subjecting FO-sentences to an abstract and non-constructive condition
like ‘is preserved under total bisimulations (i.e. the domain of the bisimulation re-
lation S coincides with ΔK) in 𝕂’ we give a constructive procedure how to obtain
such interpretations.
The Characterisation of໦໱໨໴-TBoxes as FO-Fragment over 𝕂
We shall now state the theorem and furnish another lemma towards the proof.
T 4.2.27 . Let τ be a signature and φ ∈ FO(τ) a sentence whi is
1. invariant under bisimulation in 𝕂
2. invariant under coherent disjoint unions in 𝕂
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3. preserved under coherent disjoint unions of forward generated subinterpreta-
tions in 𝕂
then φ is equivalent to an໦໱໨໴-TBox over τ.
Before giving the lemma, we deﬁne NR∗ ∶= ⋃n<ωNRn where NR0 ∶= {ε} and
NRn+1 = NR × NRn for all n < ω. Intuitively, NR∗ contains all words (of ﬁnite
length) over the alphabet NR. We speak of an r∗-path, if we mean a sequence of
edges (di, di+1) ∈ ri for i ∈ {0,… , n} such that r∗ corresponds to the word r0…rn.
For every໦໱໨໴-concept C and every r∗ ∈ NR∗ we recursively deﬁne
∃r∗C ∶=
๰
C if r∗ = ε
∃s.∃s∗C if r∗ = s ⋅ s∗.
We use ∀r∗C as abbreviation for ¬(∃r∗¬C). Every unfolding of ∃r∗ leads to a
ﬁnite or empty chain of quantiﬁcations and for every expression ∃r∗C we obtain
a proper໦໱໨໴-concept if C is a proper໦໱໨໴-concept.
E.g. the semantics in𝕂 of ∀r∗.(a→ C) is, ‘whenever the individual labelled a is
reachable via some r∗-path then it satisﬁes C.’ {∀r∗(a → C) ∣ r∗ ∈ NR∗} amounts
to: ‘if the individual is reachable it satisﬁes C.’
D 4.2.28 . An element e is in the scope of an element d or d sees e, if for
some r∗ ∈ NR∗ there is an r∗-path beginning with d and ending with e. ♢
Let for some τ, φ be as required byeorem 4.2.27. Assume there isH ⊨ cons φ∪
{¬φ}. Let (H, e) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໴(τ) ∣ e ∈ CH} and (H,NI) ∶= {a ⊑ C ∣ C ∈
(H, aH) and a ∈ NI}.
L 4.2.29 . For ea e ∈ ΔH there is a model Ie in 𝕂 of φ with an element
d ∈ ΔI su that (Ie, d) ⊨(H, e) and if a ∈ NI is in the scope of d then (Ie, aIe) ⊨
(H, aH).
P. Assume the claim would not hold. en there is some e ∈ ΔH such that
{φ} ∪(H, e) together with the set
Γ ∶= {∀r∗(a→ C) ∣ a ∈ NI, r∗ ∈ NR∗ and C ∈(H, aH)}
is unsatisﬁable in 𝕂. As FO is compact w.r.t. to 𝕂 there is a ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ
and some ﬁnite set T ⊆ (H, e) such that for every modelM of φ in 𝕂 and all
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d ∈ ΔM we have (M, d) ⊨ ¬(⨅ T ⊓⨅Γ0). Hence for all d ∈ ΔM we obtain
(M, d) ⊨ ම¬෻ T ඹ ⊔෼{∃r
∗(a ⊓ ¬C) ∣ ∀r∗(a→ C) ∈ Γ0}
SoM ⊨ ⨅ T ⊑ ⨆{∃r∗(a ⊓ ¬C) ∣ ∀r∗(a → C) ∈ Γ0}; is is true for all models of
φ in 𝕂 and it follows
෻ T ⊑ ෼{∃r
∗(a ⊓ ¬C) ∣ ∀r∗(a→ C) ∈ Γ0} ∈ cons φ
As H ⊨ cons φ and (H, e) ⊨ ⨅ T, there must be a path from e to aH for some
a ∈ NI such that this aH does not satisfy the type of (H, aH). But this is absurd
and hence Ie must exist. 2
P  T 4.2.27. We shall prove further down that ¬φ is unsatisﬁable
in 𝕂 with the following set
cons φ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨໴(τ) and φ ⊨𝕂 C ⊑ D}.
For then, as FO is compact over 𝕂, the unsatisﬁability of cons φ ∪ {¬φ} implies
that there is a ﬁnite subset ໹ ⊆ cons φ which is unsatisﬁable with ¬φ in 𝕂 and
hence ໹ ⊨𝕂 φ. As φ ⊨𝕂 ໹, the ໦໱໨໴-TBox is logically equivalent to φ in 𝕂 and
so ໹ is the໦໱໨໴-TBox we were looking for; this proves the theorem.
For the sake of contradiction let H be an ω-saturated model in 𝕂 of cons φ ∪
{¬φ}. Let T be the set of all p ⊆ ໦໱໨໴(τ) such that
{φ} ∪ p ∪ {∀r∗(a → C) ∣ a ∈ NI, r∗ ∈ NR∗ and C ∈(H, aH)} is satisﬁable in 𝕂.
For each p ∈ T, we set Ip to be the forward generated subinterpretation in dp of
the ω-saturated interpretation I in 𝕂 with
(I, dp) ⊨𝕂 {φ} ∪ p ∪ {∀r∗(a→ C) ∣ a ∈ NI, r∗ ∈ NR∗ and C ∈(H, aH)}.
As Ip and H are saturated, (H, aH) ⟷−− (Ip, aI) for all a in the scope of dp.
Hence⨄p∈T Ip is a coherent interpretation and I ∶= ⨄p∈T Ip/E⨄ Ip is a coherent
disjoint union of forward generated subinterpretations. Lemma 4.2.29 applied to
the case e = aH yields (H, aH) ∈ T for all a ∈ NI, and so aI ≠ ∅. Since I
emerges from a factorisation by E⨄ Ip there is at most one element in aI for all
a ∈ NI; hence I in 𝕂. In particular we have (I, aI)⟷−− (H, aH) for all a ∈ NI.
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໦໱໨໴-theories and φ itself are preserved under coherent disjoint unions of
forward generated subinterpretations in 𝕂, so I ⊨𝕂 φ and for all p ∈ T there is
[dp]E ∈ ΔI such that (I, [dp]) ⊨ p.
We set K to be the ω-saturated extension of (I ⊎ H)/EI⊎H. Again K is in 𝕂
and (K, aK)⟷−− (H, aH) for all a ∈ NI. Also K ⊨ cons φ as every ﬁnite subset ໹ ⊆
cons φ is an໦໱໨໴-TBox satisﬁed by both interpretations and therefore preserved
by coherent disjoint unions. But K ⊨𝕂 ¬φ since φ is invariant under coherent
disjoint unions and H ⊭𝕂 φ.
We have to show I g⟷−− K. Lemma 4.2.18 tells us that E0 ∶= EI⊎H is suitable
for Proposition 4.2.16, whence (I, d) ⟷−− (K, [d]E0) for all d ∈ ΔI is inferred.
Let now [e]E0 ∈ ΔK such that e ∈ ΔH. en [d(H,e)]E1 with E1 = E⨄ Ip is in I
and satisﬁes (H, e). Its class [e]E0 ∈ ΔK satisﬁes (H, e) as well and since K
and I are both໦໱໨໴-saturated, the Hennessy-Milner-Property of໦໱໨໴ yields
(K, [e]E0)⟷−− (I, [d(H,e)]E1).
So K, I in 𝕂 and I g⟷−− K. Since φ is invariant under bisimulation between two
interpretations in 𝕂, K ⊨ φ. But this is absurd and so there cannot be model of
cons φ ∪ {¬φ} in 𝕂. 2
Concluding it shall be remarked that individuals introduce some kind of orient-
ation in the sense that we need speciﬁcally forward generated subinterpretations.
In Lemma 4.2.29 coherent models of φ are created for every໦໱໨໴-u-type realised
in H. In order to prove this lemma we had to derive a contradiction. is con-
tradiction however had to be in terms of cons φ i.e. in terms of positive concept
inclusions because we only new H ⊨𝕂 cons φ and H ⊨𝕂 ¬φ. It is therefore not
possible to create interpretations which are per se coherent with H:
Assume for a moment we wanted to prove that for some element e ∈ ΔH there
is some model of φ and(H, e)which is coherent withH. In this instance we had
to show that either
(H, e) ∪ {φ} ∪ ෛa∈NI
{a ⊑ C ∣ C ∈(H, aH)}
or
(H, e) ∪ {φ} ∪ ෛa∈NI
{∃u.a ⊓ C ∣ C ∈(H, aH)}
is satisﬁable in 𝕂. If this is not the case, compactness of FO over 𝕂 yields for the
former set a ﬁnite subset T0 ⊆ (H, e) and a ﬁnite subset Γ ⊆ ⋃a∈NI{a ⊑ C ∣
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C ∈(H, aH)} and so we obtain
φ ⊨ ම෻ T0ඹ → ෼{∃u.a ⊓ ¬C ∣ a ⊑ C ∈ Γ}
contradicts the satisﬁability of the former set, without leading to a contradiction
in H. Similarly, compactness yields for some ﬁnite sets T0 ⊆ (H, e) and Γ ⊆
⋃a∈NI{∃u.a ⊓ C ∣ C ∈(H, aH)} to
φ ⊨ ම෻ T0ඹ → ෼{a ⊑ ¬C ∣ a ⊑ C ∈ Γ}
without leading to a contradiction in H—unless we require that those individuals
a are mentioned in Γ are in the scope of e. Hence we need forward generated
subinterpretations to cut away individuals outside the scope of e, which may not
be bisimilar to individuals in H.
e stronger requirement, used in the໦໱໨-TBox characterisation, that an FO-
sentence φ need not only to be invariant under bisimulation and disjoint unions
w.r.t. to a certain restricted class of interpretations but w.r.t. all interpretations,
implicitly included the preservation under forward generated subinterpretations.
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4.3 ໦໱໨໶໴
4.3.1 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໴-Concepts
e syntax for an໦໱໨໶໴-concept C over τ = NI ∪ NC ∪ NR is given by
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ a ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃≥κr.D
where a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR, κ < ω and D, E are໦໱໨໶໴-concepts over τ. e
set of all ໦໱໨໶໴-concepts over τ is denoted by ໦໱໨໶໴(τ). As usual ⊥, ⊔, →,
∀≥κ etc. are considered to be abbreviations.
We use the semantics deﬁned in the chapter for ໦໱໨໴ where concepts are
interpreted over a special class 𝕂 of interpretations, which assign singleton sub-
sets of their carrier-sets to individual names. Yet in principle we treat individual
names like concept names and allow໦໱໨໶໴-concepts to be interpreted outside
of 𝕂 like໦໱໨໶-concepts.
Note that concepts of the form ∃≥2r.a do not have a model in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⊨
∃≥1r.a iﬀ (I, d) ⊨ ∃=1r.a for all a ∈ NI and all pointed interpretations (I, d) in 𝕂.
໦໱໨໶໴-bisimulation is merely ໦໱໨໶-bisimulation as deﬁned on page 80.
Characteristic ໦໱໨໶໴-concepts are obtained like their ໦໱໨໶-counterpart (cf.
page 82). eorem 3.2.8 and therefore invariance of ໦໱໨໶໴-concepts under
໦໱໨໶-bisimulation is immediate. ໦໱໨໶໴-saturation is the same as ໦໱໨໶-
saturation as stipulated by Deﬁnition 3.2.10 using ໦໱໨໶-types (cf. Deﬁnition
3.2.9) and Proposition 3.2.12 stating the Hennessy-Milner-Property applies also
for ໦໱໨໶. As mentioned in Observation 4.1.4, every interpretation in 𝕂 has an
ω-saturated extension in 𝕂 and therefore an໦໱໨໶໴-saturated extension in 𝕂.
The Characterisation Theorem for໦໱໨໶໴-Concepts
Let τ be arbitrary and I ∶= (ω ⧵ {0}) × ω. We may assume w.l.o.g. that τ contains
at least one element in NI, for otherwise this case would reduce to໦໱໨໶.
L 4.3.1 . Let φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) be invariant under ∗⟷−− † in 𝕂, where ∗ ∈ {‘< ω’}∪
{‘≤ κ’ ∣ κ < ω} and † < ω or simply omied. Let τφ ⊆ τ contain all signature
symbols occurring in φ and I,H in 𝕂.
(I↾τφ, d) ∗⟷−− † (H↾τφ, e) ⟹ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ φ(x)
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P. We add a fresh element d0 to I obtaining I0 and a fresh element e0 to H
obtaining H0. We have
(I, d) <ω⟷−− (I0, d) ≅τφ (I0↾τφ, d) ∗⟷−− † (H0↾τφ, e) ≅τφ (H0, e) <ω⟷−− (H, e)
We set I1 to be I0↾τφ where aI1 ∶= {d0} for all a ∈ NI ⧵ τφ and all other symbols
in τ ⧵ (τφ ∪ NI) are interpreted as ∅. Analogously we set H1 to be H0↾τφ where
aH1 ∶= {e0} and again all other symbols in τ ⧵ (τφ ∪NI) are interpreted as ∅. We
have I1,H1 in 𝕂 and (I1, d) ∗⟷−− † (H1, e).
Let now (I, d) ⊨ φ; (I, d) <ω⟷−− (I0, d) always implies (I, d) ∗⟷−− † (I0, d), so
invariance of φ(x) under ∗⟷−− † implies (I0, d) ⊨ φ(x). Since all ﬁrst order formulae
are invariant under isomorphims of their signature we have (I0↾τφ, d) ⊨ φ(x). But
we also have I0↾τφ ≅τφ I1 and so (I1, d) ⊨ φ(x). Invariance under ∗⟷−− † yields
(H1, e) ⊨ φ(x) and using the chain of arguments backwards we can infer that
(H, e) ⊨ φ(x). e only-if direction is obtained similarly. 2
P 4.3.2 . Every formula φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− in 𝕂 is
invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n in 𝕂 for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
On one hand, the proof would use the exact same rationale as Proposition 3.2.24
for໦໱໨໶ only that we nowwould have to be careful with the signature τ and the
class 𝕂. On the other hand Proposition 4.2.14 deals with τ and 𝕂 accordingly but
does not need to take care about diﬀerent κ. Due to the fact that we are right in
the intersection of both other proves, we shall skip the proof entirely and rather
refer the reader to Proposition 4.3.7
T 4.3.3 . Let τ be a signature. For all φ(x) ∈ FO(τ), whi are invariant under
<ω⟷−− in 𝕂 exists a concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴(τ) su that φ(x) is logically equivalent to
C.
P. According to Proposition 4.3.2 φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n for some (κ, n) ∈
I. Let τφ ⊆ τ contain all signature symbols occuring in φ and let C ∶= ⨆{Xκ,nI↾τφ,d ∣
(I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}, where Xκ,nI↾τφ,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶໴-concept of (I, d) over
the signature τφ on level (κ, n).
Since φ(x) ⊨ C it remains to show C ⊨ φ(x). Assume (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nK↾τφ,c with
Xκ,nK↾τφ,c ∈ {X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}. en (H↾τφ, e)
≤κ⟷−− n (K↾τφ, c) and Lemma 4.3.1
yields (H, e) ⊨ φ(x). Hence C ⊨ φ(x) which shows that C is logically equivalent
to φ(x). 2
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4.3.2 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໴u-Concepts
e syntax for໦໱໨໶໴u-concepts C is recursively given by
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ a ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃≥κr.D ∣ ∃≥κu.D
where a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR, κ < ω andD, E are໦໱໨໶໴-concepts over τ. u is a
logical symbol, i.e. it is not part of the signature. e set of all໦໱໨໶໴-concepts
over τ is denoted by໦໱໨໶໴u(τ). As usual ⊥,→, ⊔, ∀≥κ etc. are considered to be
abbreviations.
Modulo whether a symbol S belongs to NC or NI, ໦໱໨໶u-concepts already
capture ໦໱໨໶໴u-concepts: an ໦໱໨໶໴u-concept C can simply be translated
into D ∶= C ⊓ ⨅a∈NI(C) ∃=1u.a where NI(C) ∶= {a ∈ NI ∣ a occurs in C}. D is
now an໦໱໨໶u-concept in which all elements of NI(C) belong to NC.
However, our characterisations so far focused on interpretations from the class
𝕂 especially with its ramiﬁcations on tree-unravellings and forest-unravellings
respectively. is one-to-one correspondence between ໦໱໨໶໴u-concepts and
໦໱໨໶u-concepts makes the fact explicit that also໦໱໨໶u is not invariant under
forest-unravellings as elements multiply.
e question arises, whether a characterisationw.r.t. 𝕂 is sensible, as໦໱໨໶໴u-
concepts like ∃≥2r.a and ∃≥2u.a with a ∈ NI do not have a model in 𝕂 and
∃≥1t.a ⊨ ∃=1t.a with a ∈ NI and t ∈ NR ∪ {u} is always true in 𝕂. We do
not gain much insight:
e notion of໦໱໨໶໴u-bisimulation is given by໦໱໨໶u-bisimulation and for
ﬁnite signatures τ the characteristic ໦໱໨໶໴u-concepts Xκ,nI for I on level (κ, n)
is given by the characteristic໦໱໨໶u-concept Xκ,nI (cf. page 90) where individual
names in NI are treated like concept names.
Proposition 3.2.18 holds for characteristic ໦໱໨໶໴u-concepts and ໦໱໨໶໴u-
theories and thus shows the invariance of໦໱໨໶໴u-concept under ≤κ⟷−− n and < ω⟷−−
for appropriate (κ, n) ∈ I. As demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3.2.22
the Hennessy-Milner-Property can be inferred for ໦໱໨໶໴u, where we use the
notion of໦໱໨໶u-saturation and໦໱໨໶u-types as given in Deﬁnition 3.2.21 and
below.
One needs to prove a lemma analogously to Lemma 4.3.6 further down and can
then proceed with the following proposition and theorem:
P 4.3.4 . Let τ be an arbitrary signature. If φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) and φ is invari-
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ant under <ω⟷−− ∀ in 𝕂 then φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
T 4.3.5 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀ in 𝕂 is
logically equivalent to some concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴u(τ).
The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໴u1-Concepts as FO-Fragment over 𝕂
໦໱໨໶໴u1 is the extension of໦໱໨໶໴with ∃≥1u. We use <ω⟷−− Q, the໦໱໨໶u1-bi-
simulation, as deﬁned in 3.2.26 and for ﬁnite signatures we declare characteristic
໦໱໨໶໴u1-concepts to be the corresponding characteristic໦໱໨໶u1-concept de-
ﬁned in 3.2.29 where individual names have been treated like concept names. Pro-
position 3.2.30 translates immediately to interpretations in𝕂. ໦໱໨໶u1-saturation
is suﬃcient to show the Hennessy-Milner-Property of ໦໱໨໶໴u1 (cf. analogue
Proposition 3.2.31).
L 4.3.6 . Let φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) be invariant under ∗⟷−− Q† in𝕂, where ∗ ∈ {‘< ω’}∪
{‘≤ κ’ ∣ κ < ω} and † < ω or simply omied. Let τφ ⊆ τ contain the signature
symbols occurring in φ, as well as at least one a ∈ NI and let I,H in 𝕂.
(I↾τφ, d) ∗⟷−− Q† (H↾τφ, e) ⟹ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ φ(x)
e proof follows the exact same rationale as Lemma 4.2.13 and is therefore
omied.
P 4.3.7 . Every formula φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂 is
invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn in 𝕂 for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
P. Assume the claim would be false. en for every (κ, n) ∈ I there are
pointed interpretations (I, d), (H, e) in 𝕂 such that φ(x) ⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H, e) ⊨
¬φ(x). Let τφ contain all signature symbols occurring in φ, at least one symbol
from NI and be ﬁnite; in case φ does not contain a symbol from NI we simply add
a symbol a ∈ NI to τφ.
Yκ,n ∶= {Yκ,nI↾τφ ⊓X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d ∣ ∃(I, d), (H, e) in 𝕂 ∶ φ(x)
⊨(I, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x)}
where Yκ,nI↾τφ is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶໴u1-concept and X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d is the character-
istic໦໱໨໶໴-concept for (I, d) over τφ on level (κ, n). EachYκ,n is ﬁnite and not
empty. We setY ∶= {⨆Yκ,n ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I}.
Similar to໦໱໨໶໴u, Yμ,mI↾τφ ⊓X
μ,m
I↾τφ,d ⊨ Y0 for every ﬁniteY0 ⊆ Y, where (μ,m)
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is the supremum in I of all (κ, n)with⨆Yκ,n ∈ Y0 and Yμ,mI↾τφ⊓X
μ,m
I↾τφ,d ∈ Y
μ,m. is
shows that every ﬁnite Y0 ⊆ Y has a model for Y0 ∪ {φ(x)} in 𝕂. Compactness
of FO over 𝕂 yields a pointed model (I, d) forY ∪ {φ(x)} in 𝕂.
Let YI,d ∶= {Yμ,mI↾τφ ⊓ X
μ,m
I↾τφ,d ∣ (κ, n) ∈ I} where Y
κ,n
I,d is the characteristic
໦໱໨໶໴u1-concept for (I, d) over τφ on level (κ, n). Every ﬁnite Y0 ⊆ YI,d is
satisﬁable with ¬φ: Let (μ,m) be the supremum in I for all (κ, n) with Yκ,nI↾τφ ⊓
Xκ,nI↾τφ,d ∈ Y0. en Y
μ,m
I↾τφ ⊓ X
μ,m
I↾τφ,d ⊨ Y0 and since (I, d) ⊨ Y, there is (H, e) in
𝕂 with (I↾τφ, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H↾τφ, e), where (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). In particular, (H, e) ⊨
{Yμ,mI↾τφ ⊓ X
μ,m
I↾τφ,d, ¬φ(x)} and so Y0 ∪ {¬φ(x)} is satisﬁable in 𝕂. Compactness of
FO over 𝕂 yields a model (H, e) in 𝕂 for YI,d ∪ {¬φ(x)}.
e Hennessy-Milner-Property yields φ(x) ⊨(I∗↾τφ, d) <ω⟷−− Q (H∗↾τφ, e) ⊨
¬φ(x) for the ω-saturated extensions I∗, H∗ in 𝕂 of I and H respectively. In
contradiction to this, Lemma 4.3.6 yields (H∗, e) ⊨ φ(x). is shows that there
must be (κ, n) ∈ I such that φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn. 2
T 4.3.8 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂 is
equivalent to some concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴u1(τ)
P. Let τφ comprise the symbols occurring in φ. If φ does not contain an
element of NI, we simply choose an element from NI and add this to τφ.
According to Proposition 4.3.7 φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
Let C ∶= {Yκ,nI↾τφ⊓X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d ∣ (I, d) in 𝕂 and (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}where Y
κ,n
I↾τφ is the charac-
teristic ໦໱໨໶໴u1-concept and Xκ,nI↾τφ,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶໴-concept for
(I↾τφ, d) over τφ on level (κ, n).
φ(x) is logically equivalent to ⨆C: We show ⨆C ⊨ φ(x). Let (H, e) ⊨ ⨆C.
en there is (I, d) in 𝕂 such that Yκ,nI↾τφ ⊓ X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d ∈ C and (H, e) ⊨ Y
κ,n
I↾τφ ⊓ X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d.
Hence (H↾τφ, e) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (I↾τφ, d) and Lemma 4.3.6 yields (H, e) ⊨ φ(x). 2
C 4.3.9 . If the sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂 then φ is
logically equivalent to some global concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴u1(τ).
4.3.3 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes
C ⊑ D is called a ໦໱໨໶໴-concept inclusion over τ if C,D ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴(τ). An
໦໱໨໶໴-TBox is a ﬁnite set of ໦໱໨໶໴-concept inclusions. An interpretation I
satisﬁes C ⊑ D or is a model of C ⊑ D, I ⊨ C ⊑ D, if CI ⊆ DI. An໦໱໨໶໴-TBox
໹ is satisﬁed by I, I ⊨ ໹, iﬀ I ⊨ C ⊑ D for all C ⊑ D ∈ ໹.
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Proposition 3.2.35 transfers to໦໱໨໶໴u1-concepts and so we can deduce that
every global໦໱໨໶໴u1-concept is equivalent to a boolean໦໱໨໶໴-TBox of the
same signature.
Considering ໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes simply as ໦໱໨໶-TBoxes without referring to
the class 𝕂, the following is true for interpretations, in particular, of course, for
those contained in 𝕂.
O 4.3.10 . Let (Ii)i∈I be a family of τ-interpretations. ໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes
are
1. invariant under global໦໱໨໶-bisimulation <ω⟷−− Q
2. invariant under disjoint unions
e the former is immediate because everyTBox is equivalent to some໦໱໨໶໴u1-
concept. e laer follows directly from the proof of the corresponding Proposi-
tion 3.2.36 for໦໱໨໶-TBoxes.
But like in ໦໱໨໴ the disjoint union of elements in 𝕂 is not contained in 𝕂
as soon as NI ≠ ∅ since individual names are no longer interpreted as singleton
sets but become predicates with more than one element. Similar to ໦໱໨໴ we
need interpretations to be coherent, i.e. for each a ∈ NI and all i, j ∈ I we have
(Ii, aIi) <ω⟷−− (Ij, aIj). e solution for ໦໱໨໴ was simple: By factorisation, in-
dividuals with the same name were merged in an equivalence class. A simple
example shows now that this is no longer possible for໦໱໨໶໴ as the number of
successors is violated:
E 4.3.11 . Let I contain two elements d0 and d1with aI ∶= d0 and (d0, d1) ∈
rI andH contain three elements e0, e1 and e2 where aH ∶= e0 and (e0, e1), (e0, e2) ∈
rH. Both, I and H satisfy a ⊑ ∃≤2r.⊤. By simple merging aI and aH we would
obtain 3 r-successors of aI⊎H.
One could try to ﬁx this problem by also merging successor nodes. But how to
merge these successor nodes? A simple factorisation by <ω⟷−− wouldmerge໦໱໨໶-
bisimilar successors, again not preserving the number of successors: Our example
would end up with only one successor node. Even for tree-interpretations, the
examples can be arbitrarily complicated because the problem of surplus successor
propagates with each merged node.
But what we actually need is merely altering the structures so that they are still
globally໦໱໨໶-bisimilar to their original and stay in 𝕂. e solution given here
is the following:
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Let (Ii)i∈I be a family of coherent interpretations. For the sake of simplicity
we ﬁx just one i ∈ I at the moment. We perform a forest unravelling on each
structure Ij where j ∈ I and are now possibly outside of 𝕂. We replace every
subtree whose root is labelled with an individual name a by the tree with its root
labelled a in Ii obtaining for each IFj an IFj
ໟ. We then have for all j ∈ I
1. every subtree in IFj
ໟ with a root labelled a ∈ NI is isomorphic to the subtree
starting with aIi in Ii.
2. IFj
ໟ is still globally໦໱໨໶-bisimilar to IFj since we had coherent interpreta-
tions and so the subtrees starting with the same individual name are bisim-
ilar.
In order to get back into 𝕂 we now factorise each interpretation by equality of
the last leer in each element. Recall: forest unravellings (cf. page 56) have the
collection of all ﬁnite paths d0 ⋅r0 ⋅d1 ⋅r1ḋ2…rn−1 ⋅dn as carrier set. Hence diﬀerent
elements with the same last leer are in fact one and the same element reached via
diﬀerent paths. So factorising by this relation is the inverse of tree-unravelling.
Since we have altered our interpretations by replacing subtrees by ໦໱໨໶-
bisimilar subtrees, each quotient structures IFj
ໟ/E is bisimilar to Ij. But IFj
ໟ/E is
also in 𝕂 as every element labelled with an individual name a had as last leer
aIi .
One has therefore the possibility to assume that a coherent family has w.l.o.g.
identical tree-unravellings in their individuals. A factorisation of the disjoint
union of IFi
ໟ over all i ∈ I by the equality of the last leer, yields an interpretation
in 𝕂. In particular this equivalence relation respects numbers of r-successors for
all r ∈ NR up to ω and the resulting interpretation is globally໦໱໨໶-bisimilar to
the disjoint union of the original family (Ii)i∈I.
So: the aim is to uniformly replace <ω⟷−− -subtrees in tree-unravellings of inter-
pretations and later on to factorise by the equivalence relation. We shall perform
this in some generality as we later on have to deal with cases where we cannot
simply choose one single i ∈ I.
Construction of Coherent Sub-Interpretations.
Let I be an index set and (Ii)i∈I a family of pairwise disjoint τ-interpretations,
which are not necessarily coherent. A system of substitutions (σi)i∈I is a family
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σ0
σ0
σ1
σ2
I0
I1
I2
a
I0
b
I0
a
I1
b
I1
a
I2
b
I2
Figure 4.1: is picture exempliﬁes a system of substitutions (σi)i∈I: Depicted
is a family of pairwise disjoint τ-interpretations I0,I1,I2 where, as the picture
suggests, (Ii, aIi) <ω⟷−− (Ij, aIj) and similarly for b for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We havechosen one index for each individual a and b in NI, ia = 1 and ib = 2, where the
individuals of the other interpretations are mapped to.
of mappings such that for each i ∈ I
σi ∶ ΔIi ⊇ 𝔻i ⟶(ෛi∈I
ΔIi) ⧵ (ෛi∈I
𝔻i)
where 𝔻i denotes the domain of σi.
We have excluded the domains from the range in order to exclude compositions
of substitutions which would allow some sort of ‘forwarding’ and eventually in-
ﬁnite or circular chains of substitutions whose result would be undeﬁned.
We deﬁne [⋅] ∶ ⋃i∈I𝔻i ⟶ I where dm ⟼ j if dm ∈ 𝔻i ⟹ σi(dm) ∈ ΔIj .
is function is well deﬁned as all interpretations were pairwise disjoint.
We continue each σi to a mapping on the forest unravelling IFi of Ii. e
mapping σ̄i is recursively deﬁned over the length of the path-elements and we
shall consider at ﬁrst only those path-elements that contain some d ∈ 𝔻i. Let
d̄ = d0…dn have length n + 1 and let m be the smallest index such that dm ∈ 𝔻i.
en
σ̄i(d̄) ∶= {d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1} × {σi(dm)} ×
ก{ε} ∪ ⋃r∈NR{r ⋅ σ̄[dm]( ̄e) ∣ σi(dm) ⋅ r ⋅ ̄e in I
F
[dm] and | ̄e| = n −m}ข
Note that ̄e is properly shorter than d̄ which has a length of n + 1. Additionally
we added the empty-word ε to avoid σi(d̄) evaluating to the empty set in case dm
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I
σ¯0
0
I
σ¯1
1
I
σ¯2
2
Init(Iσ¯0
0
, e0)
Init(Iσ¯0
0
, d0)
Init(Iσ¯1
1
, e1)
Init(Iσ¯1
1
, d1)
. . .
. . .
Figure 4.2: We refer to the initial situation in Figure 4.1. is ﬁgure merely
gives an intuition of what happens. It does not take into account that Iσ̄ii arein fact forest-unravellings, etc. However, aer the substitution σ̄1 is performed
on I1, the subtree Init(I1, bI1) is ‘replaced’ with the subtree Init(I2, bI2), yield-
ing Init(Iσ̄11 , d1), where d1 corresponds to the former aI1 . In I0, Init(I0, aI0) is
replaced by Init(Iσ̄11 , d1)which results in the subtree Init(I
σ̄0
0 , d0)where, similarly,
d0 corresponds to aI0 . In I2, Init(I2, aI2) is replaced with Init(Iσ̄11 , d1).
is a leaf in IF[dm]. In this case σi(d̄) = {d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ σi(dm)}.
What σ̄i essentially does, is to delete from the tree-unravelling in d0 contained
in Ii the largest subtree that starts with an element dm from𝔻i and then glues the
fully substituted subtree (recursion) emerging from σi(dm) in its place. It accom-
plishes this by replacing each element d̄ with preﬁx d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ dm with all
paths of the from the fully substituted tree (recursion) of d0 which have the same
length |d̄| and preﬁx d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅dm. It uses the fact that the tree-unravelling
of I[dm] in σi(dm) ⋅ r ⋅ e0 is isomorphic to the tree-unravelling of I[dm] in e0. is
essentially shortens the path-element which is to be recursively substituted and
yields the well-foundedness of the recursion. Clearly, the elements of this fully
substituted tree might be ‘imported’ multiple times, but this not of importance.
If d̄ does not contain any element from𝔻i then σ̄i(d̄) = {d̄}. With λd̄we denote
the last element of the tuple d̄. For every i ∈ I we deﬁne Iσ̄ii as
ΔI
σ̄i
i ∶= ⋃{σ̄i(d̄) ∣ d̄ ∈ ΔI
F
i }
SIσ̄ii ∶= {d̄ ∈ ΔIσii ∣ λd̄ ∈ ⋃i∈I SIi} S ∈ NI ∪ NC
rIσ̄ii ∶= {(d̄, d̄ໟ) ∈ ΔIσ̄ii × ΔIσ̄ii ∣ d̄ໟ = d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄ໟ} r ∈ NR
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It is obvious from the deﬁnition of roles rIσ̄ii that Iσ̄ii is a forest interpretation. Yet
Iσ̄ii is in general not the tree-unravelling of an interpretation, i.e. not every last
leer λd̄ of some element d̄ in Iσ̄ii occurs as path-element in I
σ̄i
i
Let ΔInit(I,d̄) ∶= {d̄ໟ ∈ ΔI ∣ d̄ is initial piece of d̄ໟ} and Init(I, d̄) ∶= I↾ΔInit(I,d̄)
It is not obvious that Init(Iσ̄ii , d̄) is a tree. By deﬁnition of I
σ̄i
i , it is a forest inter-
pretation, but there could be ‘gaps’ between the elements, causing them to be in
diﬀerent connected components. In what follows we shall therefore show that the
intuition given by the ﬁgures above is true: We obtain forest-like interpretations,
whose subtrees emerging from some element in the domain of σi is isomorphic to
the subtree emerging from its image under σi. In order to not get lost we shall de-
scribe the structure: Proposition 4.3.12 rests on Lemma 4.3.13 whilst Proposition
4.3.18 uses Lemmas 4.3.15 as well as 4.3.16 and 4.3.17.
P 4.3.12 . Every element d̄ in Iσ̄ii with |d̄| > 1 has a predecessor in I
σ̄i
i .
We shall give the proof aer the following lemmawhich states: the predecessor
of e ∈ σ̄i(d̄) is in σ̄i(predecessor(d̄)).
L 4.3.13 . For all d̄ with |d̄| > 1 we have for all i ∈ I: if d̄ ∈ ΔIFi and d̃ is its
predecessor, i.e. there is r ∈ NR with d̃ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄, then
for all ̄e ∈ σ̄i(d̄) exists a predecessor ẽ ∈ σ̄i(d̃) in Iσ̄ii
P. We prove the claim by induction upon the length of d̄. It is easy to show
the claim directly if the predecessor does not contain an element from 𝔻i. Let
therefore d̄ ∈ ΔIFi such that d̃ contains an element in 𝔻i. Let m be the smallest
index of d̄ such that dm ∈ 𝔻i and let j such that σi(dm) ∈ ΔIj .
Assume ̄e ∈ σ̄i(d̄) then there is r ∈ NR and ḡ ∈ ΔI
F
j with σi(dm) ⋅ r ⋅ ḡ ∈ IFj such
that
̄e ∈ {d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1} × {σi(dm)} × r ⋅ σ̄j(ḡ)
If ḡ is a singleton then |d̃| = m + 1 and so σ̄i(d̃) = {d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ σi(dm)}
which contains the predecessor of ̄e and hence proves the claim. Otherwise, ḡ has
a predecessor g̃ in Iσ̄jj and by induction hypothesis σ̄(g̃) contains the predecessor
em+1…e| ̄e|−2 of em+1…e| ̄e|−1. Since σi(dm) ⋅ r ⋅ ḡ is an element in IFj , so is σi(dm) ⋅ r ⋅ g̃
and hence
{d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1} × {σi(dm)} × r ⋅ σ̄j(g̃) ⊆ σ̄i(d̃)
which proves the claim. 2
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P  P 4.3.12. As σ̄i preserves lengths, we have for all d̄ in Iσ̄ii
with |d̄| > 1: there is d̄ໟ in IFi with |d̄ໟ| = |d̄| such that d̄ ∈ σi(d̄ໟ) and hence for
the predecessor d̄໠ of d̄ໟ there is a predecessor contained in σ̄i(d̄໠). 2
C 4.3.14 . Init(Iσ̄ii , d̄) is a tree.
L 4.3.15 . For all ̄e and i ∈ I: if ̄e ∈ ΔIσ̄ii and λ ̄e ∈ ΔIj then λ ̄e ∈ ΔI
σ̄j
j .
P. We lay the induction base for a singleton e. e claim is immediate, if
i = j. If i ≠ j, there is d ∈ ΔIFi such that σi(d) = e. By the deﬁnition of σi this can
only be the case if e ∉ 𝔻j. Hence σ̄j(e) = {e} and so e ∈ ΔI
σ̄j
j .
For the step case, let | ̄e| > 1 and d̄ ∈ IFi such that ̄e ∈ σ̄i(d̄). If d̄ does not contain
any elements for 𝔻i. en ̄e = d̄ and in particular λd̄ ∉ 𝔻i. Hence λd̄ ∈ ΔI
σi
i .
Otherwise there is a minimalm < |d̄|with dm ∈ 𝔻i and some σi(dm)⋅r ⋅ ḡ ∈ ΔI
F
j
such that either
̄e = d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ σi(dm) or ̄e ∈ {d0…dm−1 ⋅ rm−1} × {σi(dm)} × r ⋅ σ̄j(ḡ)
In both cases σi(dm) ∉ 𝔻j by deﬁnition of σi and hence, in the former case σi(dm) ∈
ΔI
σj
j . In the laer case ẽ ∶= em+1…e| ̄e|−1 is in σ̄j(ḡ) and hence ẽ ∈ ΔI
σ̄j
j . Since
|ẽ| < | ̄e| the induction hypothesis yields for ẽ that if λẽ ∈ ΔIFk then λẽ ∈ ΔIσ̄kk . 2
For the following proposition, it is important to keep inmind that up to now, we
have not made any requirements that σi has to map elements to elements with a
special property, e.g. being bisimilar to its pre-image. Proposition 4.3.18 imposes a
weak restriction, namely that Init(IFi , d) and Init(IF[d], σi(d)) have the same depth
for all i ∈ I and d ∈ 𝔻i, i.e. for all d̄ ∈ ΔInit(I
F
i ,d) exists ̄e ∈ ΔInit(IF[d],σi(d)) with
|d̄| = | ̄e| and vice versa.
L 4.3.16 . If d̄ ∈ ΔIσii with d̄ = d0…dn, |d̄| > 1 and d0 ∈ ΔIi then d1…d|d̄|−1 ∈
ΔI
σi
i
P. Let ḡ ∈ IFi such that ̄e ∈ σ̄i(ḡ). Since σ̄i(g0) = {d0} ⊆ ΔI
σ̄i
i we may w.l.o.g.
assume that g0 = d0. If ḡ does not contain any elements in 𝔻i the claim is trivial.
Otherwise let m < |ḡ| − 1 minimal such that gm ∈ 𝔻i. en there is r ∈ NR and
ẽ ∈ IFj such that σi(gm) ⋅ r ⋅ ẽ ∈ IFj and d̄ ∈ {g0…gm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ σ(gm)} × r ⋅ σ̄j(ẽ).
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Now
{g0…gm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ σ(gm)} × r ⋅ σ̄j(ẽ)
= {g0} × r0 ⋅ {g1…gm−1 ⋅ rm−1 ⋅ σ(gm)} × r ⋅ σ̄j(ẽ)
⊆ {g0} × r0 ⋅ σ̄j(g̃)
where g̃ ∶= g1…g|ḡ|−1. Since g̃ ∈ ΔI
F
i we have d1…d|d̄|−1 ∈ ΔI
σ̄i
i . 2
L 4.3.17 . Assume the trees Init(IFi , d) and Init(IF[d], σi(d)) have the same depth
for all d ∈ 𝔻i and i ∈ I. For d0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ d1 ∈ Iσ̄ii with d0 ∈ IFi we have
d̄ ∈ Init(Iσii , d1)⟹ (d0 ⋅ r ⋅ d̄) ∈ Init(I
σi
i , d0)
P. We distinguish the case d1 ∈ ΔI
i : en d0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ d1 ∈ IFi . For d̄ ∈
Init(Iσ̄ii , d1) exists ḡ ∈ Init(IFi , d1) such that d̄ ∈ σ̄i(ḡ). Since d0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ d1 ∈ IFi and
g1 = d1 also d0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ ḡ ∈ IFi . It is σ̄i(d0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ ḡ) = {d0} × r0 ⋅ σ̄i(ḡ) which proves
d̄ ∈ ΔInit(Iσ̄ii ,d0).
If d1 ∈ ΔIj with j ≠ i then there is g̃ ∈ Init(IFi , d0) such that σ̄i(g̃) = {d0 ⋅r0 ⋅d1},
where σi(g̃1) = d1. Let d̄ ∈ Init(Iσ̄ii , d1) arbitrary, then there is q̄ ∈ IFi such that
d̄ ∈ σ̄i(q̄). From the premise of this lemma we infer Init(IFi , g̃1) and Init(IFi , q0)
have the same depth. Hence there is ḡ in Init(IFi , g̃1) with |ḡ| = |q̄| such that
σ̄i(ḡ) = σ̄i(q̄). Since g̃1 = g0 we also know that d0 ⋅r0 ⋅ ḡ ∈ IFi . Hence d0 ⋅r0 ⋅ σ̄i(ḡ) =
σ̄i(d0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ ḡ) ⊆ ΔInit(I
σ̄i
i ,d0) which proves that d̄ ∈ ΔInit(Iσ̄ii ,d0). 2
P 4.3.18 . If the trees Init(IFi , d) and Init(IF[d], σi(d)) have the same depth
for all d ∈ 𝔻i and i ∈ I then ι exists for every ̄e ∈ ΔI
σ̄i
i and is an isomorphism where
ι ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , ̄e)⟶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , λ ̄e) ∶ ̄e ⋅ r ⋅ ̄eໟ ⟼ λ ̄e ⋅ r ⋅ ̄eໟ with λ ̄e ∈ ΔIj
P. e proof is carried out by induction upon the length of ̄e. Let for the base
case e be a single leered path-element. It suﬃces to show id ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , e) ⟶
Init(Iσ̄jj , e) exists and is surjective. For then, due to the deﬁnition of I
σ̄i
i and I
σ̄j
j
respectively, this function is an isomorphism. If e ∈ ΔIi , i.e. i = j the claim is
trivial. Assume e ∈ ΔIj with j ≠ i.
Totality: Let ̄e ∈ Init(Iσ̄ii , e). en there is ḡ ∈ ΔI
F
i such that ̄e ∈ σ̄i(ḡ). Since ̄e
starts with e ∉ ΔIi , for any such ḡwe have g0 ∈ σ−1i (e), i.e. g0 ∈ 𝔻i and hence the
evaluation of σ̄i(ḡ) implies that there must be d̄ ∈ IFj and r ∈ NR with e ⋅ r ⋅ d̄ ∈ IFj
so that ̄e ∈ {e} × r ⋅ σ̄j(d̄).
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With e ∈ σi(𝔻i) the deﬁnition of σi yields e ∉ 𝔻j and so {e}×r⋅σ̄j(d̄) = σ̄j(e⋅r⋅d̄)
which proves that ̄e ∈ ΔI
σ̄j
j . It follows immediately that ̄e ∈ Init(Iσ̄jj , e).
Surjectivity: Assume ̄e ∈ ΔInit(I
σ̄j
j ,e). ere is ḡ ∈ ΔIFj with ̄e ∈ σ̄j(ḡ). We know
that ḡ ∈ Init(IFj , e) because σ̄j(g0) = {e} and e ∉ 𝔻j.
Let d ∈ σ−1(e) be arbitrary. Since Init(IFi , d) and Init(IFj , e) have the same depth,
there is d̄ ∈ ΔInit(IFi ,d) such that |d̄| = |ḡ|. For appropriate r0 ∈ NR
σ̄i(d̄) = {σi(d)} × ⋃r∈NR{r ⋅ σ̄j(g̃) ∣ e ⋅ r ⋅ g̃ ∈ Δ
IFj and |g̃| = |ḡ| − 1}
⊇ {e} × r0 ⋅ σ̄j(g1…g|ḡ|−1) = σ̄j(ḡ) ∋ ̄e
is shows ̄e ∈ ΔInit(Iσ̄ii ,e) and hence id is surjective.
In the step case we have to show that ι ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , ̄e)⟶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , λ ̄e) of the form
given above exists for | ̄e| > 1.
We distinguish the case e0 ∈ ΔIi . Since | ̄e| > 1 and all elements have prede-
cessors, e0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ e1 ∈ ΔI
σ̄i
i . Lemma 4.3.16 yields that for all d̄ in Init(Iσ̄ii , e0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ e1)
we have d1…d|d̄|−1 ∈ ΔI
σ̄i
i giving rise to an injection
ι1 ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , e0 ⋅ r ⋅ e1)⟶ Init(I
σ̄i
i , e1) ∶ d̄⟼ d1…d|d̄|−1.
ι0 is also surjective: Lemma 4.3.17 entails that whenever an element starts with
d̄ ∈ ΔInit(Iσ̄ii ,e1) we have e0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ d̄ ∈ ΔInit(I
σ̄i
i ,e0⋅r0⋅e1).
Hence ι1 is an isomorphism between Init(Iσ̄ii , e0 ⋅ r0 ⋅ e1) and Init(I
σ̄i
i , e1). For
the isomorphic image Init(Iσ̄ii , e1…e| ̄e|−1) of Init(I
σ̄i
i , ̄e)we can apply our induction
hypothesis and obtain an isomorphism
ι2 ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , e1…e| ̄e|−1)⟶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , e| ̄e|−1) ∶ d̄⟼ d1…d|d̄|−1
e composition ι2 ∘ ι1 ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , ̄e) ⟶ Init(I
σ̄i
i , λ ̄e) is the isomorphism we are
looking for.
In the other case, where e0 ∉ ΔIi , we have e0 ∈ ΔI
σ̄i
i because all elements have
predecessors according to Proposition 4.3.12. Let e0 ∈ ΔIj . Since e0 ∈ σi(𝔻i)
it follows that e0 ∉ 𝔻j and hence e0 ∈ ΔI
σ̄j
j . Like in the induction base we can
construct an isomorphism id ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , e0)⟶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , e0).
Since then e0 ∈ ΔIj we can construct in the same manner as above an iso-
morphism ι2 ∘ ι1 ∶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , ̄e) ⟶ Init(I
σ̄k
k , λ ̄e) and hence obtain the required
isomorphism ι2 ∘ ι1 ∘ id ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , ̄e)⟶ Init(I
σ̄k
k , λ ̄e). 2
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O 4.3.19 . If ι ∶ Init(I0, d0) ⟶ Init(I1, d1) is an isomorphism then
(I0, d0) <ω⟷−− (I1, d1).
Henceforth we shall apply σ̄i to single leers, pretending they were path ele-
ments (for which σ̄i is deﬁned), whenever we want to show a certain property for
all elements in the range of σi or those which are not in the domain 𝔻σi of σi.
We call σ̄i injective on successors-sets, if for all r ∈ NR and for every d ∈ ΔIi the
restriction σ̄i ∶ rIi(d)⟶ σ̄i(rIi(d)) is injective.
P 4.3.20 . If for all i ∈ I every σ̄i is injective on successor-sets and for all
i ∈ I and all d ∈ 𝔻i we have (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (Ij, σi(d)), we have Ii <ω⟷−− Q I
σ̄i
i
L 4.3.21 . For all d ∈ ΔIi : (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (I
σ̄i
i , σ̄i(d))
P. For every d̄ ∈ ΔIσii we call dm+1 a glue-point, if for any j, k ∈ I with j ≠ k
we have dm ∈ ΔIj and dm+1 ∈ ΔIk . We always call d0 a glue-point! e last
glue-point of an element is the glue-point with the highest index.
Let II maintain conﬁgurations (Ii, dໟ; Iσii , d̄ໟ) such that (Ii, dໟ) <ω⟷−− (Ik, λd̄ໟ),
where the last glue-point of d̄ໟ is in ΔIk . (∗)
is requirement is true for the start-conﬁguration, in particular because we
assume (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (Ij, σi(d)) for all d ∈ 𝔻i. By deﬁnition of I
σ̄i
i both (Ii, d) and
(Iσ̄ii , σ̄i(d)) are atomically equivalent.
Assume we have reached conﬁguration (Ii, dໟ; Iσ̄ii , d̄ໟ) with λd̄ໟ ∈ ΔIj which
satisﬁes the requirement (∗) and I challenges II with a ﬁnite set of r-successor D
of dໟ in Ii. en there is β ∶ D⟶ rIj(dໟ) such that (Ii, d໠) <ω⟷−− (Ij, β(d໠)) for all
d໠ ∈ D.
For each d໠ ∈ Dwe have λd̄ໟ ⋅r⋅β(d໠) ∈ IFj and since σ̄j(λd̄ໟ) = {λd̄ໟ} (cf. Lemma
4.3.15) we have σ̄j(λd̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ β(d໠)) = λd̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠) and hence λd̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠) is
an r-successor of λd̄ໟ in Iσ̄jj .
Let ι ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , d̄ໟ) ⟶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , λd̄) be the isomorphism constructed in Pro-
position 4.3.18. Using ι−1(λd̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠)) = d̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠) we ﬁnd a set
E = {d̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠)) ∣ d໠ ∈ D} of r-successors of d̄ໟ in Iσii . Since β is injective
and σ̄j is injective on successor-sets, |E| = |D|.
We set βໟ ∶ D ⟶ E ∶ d໠ ⟼ d̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠) as new conﬁguration and
show that it meets the requirement (∗): For all d໠ ∈ D, we have if β(d໠) ∉ 𝔻j
then σ̄j ∘ β(d໠) = {β(d໠)} and by deﬁnition of β we get (Ii, d໠) <ω⟷−− (Ij, β(d໠)). If
otherwise β(d໠) ∈ 𝔻j then σ̄j∘β(d໠) = {σj∘β(d໠)} and the requirement for σj entails
(Ij, β(d໠)) <ω⟷−− (Ik, σj∘β(d໠)). Transitivity of <ω⟷−− yields (Ii, d໠) <ω⟷−− (Ik, σj∘β(d໠)).
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In both cases the deﬁnition of Iσ̄ii yields that each d̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j ∘ β(d໠) is atomic-
ally equivalent to σ̄j ∘ β(d໠). Hence βໟ is a valid conﬁguration that satisﬁes the
requirement (∗).
Assume now I challenges II by playing a set of r-successors E of d̄ໟ in Iσ̄ii . Let
ι ∶ Init(Iσ̄ii , d̄ໟ) ⟶ Init(I
σ̄j
j , λd̄ໟ) be the isomorphism constructed in Proposition
4.3.18.
We have λd̄ໟ ∉ 𝔻j: For the requirement λd̄ ∈ ΔIj Lemma 4.3.15 ensures λd̄ໟ ∈
ΔI
σ̄j
j . e laer and λd̄ໟ ∈ 𝔻j would result in σj(λd̄ໟ) = λd̄ໟ which violates the type
of σj.
Since σ̄j is injective for successor-sets we can determine a unique g ̄e ∈ ΔIj for
each ̄e ∈ E such that ι( ̄e) = λd̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄j(g ̄e) = σ̄j(λd̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅ g ̄e). Hence we have an
r-successor-set Dໟ ∶= {g ̄e ∈ rIj(λd̄ໟ) ∣ ̄e ∈ E} of λd̄ໟ in Ij for which there is an
injection βໟ ∶ Dໟ ⟶ rIi(dໟ) such that (Ii, βໟ(g ̄e)) <ω⟷−− (Ij, g ̄e) for all g ̄e ∈ Dໟ.
We show that the conﬁguration β ∶ ̄e ⟼ βໟ(g ̄e) meets requirement (∗) and is
valid: If g ̄e ∉ 𝔻j then λ ̄e = λ ∘ ι( ̄e) = σ̄j(g ̄e) = g ̄e and as just shown (Ii, βໟ(g ̄e)) <ω⟷−−
(Ij, g ̄e), so (Ii, β( ̄e)) <ω⟷−− (Ij, λ ̄e).
Or g ̄e ∈ 𝔻j. en (Ij, g ̄e) <ω⟷−− (Ik, σj(g ̄e)) as stipulated for all elements in 𝔻j.
Transitivity yields again (Ii, βໟ(g ̄e)) <ω⟷−− (Ik, σj(g ̄e)), i.e. (Ii, β( ̄e)) <ω⟷−− (Ik, λ ̄e). So
β satisﬁes the requirement.
e construction of Iσii yields ̄e is atomically equivalent to λ ̄e which is atomic-
ally equivalent to β( ̄e). Hence β is a valid conﬁguration. 2
P  P 4.3.20. Lemma 4.3.21 shows one direction. We only have
to show: For every d̄ ∈ ΔIσii there is d ∈ ΔIi such that (I, d) <ω⟷−− (I
σi
i , d̄).
Let d̄ ∈ ΔIσii be arbitrary and let d0 be the ﬁrst element of d̄. d̄ ∈ ΔInit(I
σi
i ,d0).
Corollary 4.3.14 tells us that Init(Iσii , d0) is a tree and hence there is a path from
d0 to d̄.
Let dໟ ∈ σ̄−1i (d0). Lemma 4.3.21 now yields that (Ii, dໟ) <ω⟷−− (I
σi
i , d0). In partic-
ular II could pretend being challenged by I along the path from d0 to d̄ coming up
with some d ∈ ΔIi such that (I, d) <ω⟷−− (I
σi
i , d̄). is proves the claim. 2
We set
E ∶= {(d̄, d̄ໟ) ∈ Δ⨄i∈I Iσii × Δ⨄i∈I Iσii ∣ λd̄ = λd̄ໟ}
O 4.3.22 . (Iσii , d̄) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I I
σi
i /E, [d̄])
P. II has a winning strategy if she maintains conﬁgurations β ∶ dໟ ⟼[d̄].
Every d̄ໟ is atomically equivalent to [d̄ໟ]. e start-conﬁguration is therefore valid.
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Figure 4.3: Depicted is the outcome of the factorisation performed on the inter-
pretations from Figure 4.2: Since the elements in Init(Iσ̄ii , di) are identical modulo
some initial segment, we can identify them accross the diﬀerent Iσ̄ii and mergethem into equivalence classes. is ensures that in particular the individuals with
the same name all fall into the same class; hence⨄i∈I Iσ̄ii /E ∈ 𝕂.
Assume we have reached a conﬁguration β ∶ Dໟ ⟶ Eໟ of the desired kind and
for some d̄ໟ ∈ Dໟ I plays a ﬁnite r-successor set D໠ of d̄ໟ in Iσii . Let E໠ ∶= {[d̄໠] ∣
d̄໠ ∈ D໠}.
Each d̄໠ ∈ D໠ is an r-successor of d̄ໟ. By deﬁnition of r⨄i∈I Iσii /E each [d̄໠] is an
r-successor of [d̄ໟ] in ⨄i∈I Iσii /E. We also have |D໠| = |E໠|: Since I
σi
i is a forest
interpretation, d̄໠ is an r-successor of d̄ໟ iﬀ d̄໠ = d̄ໟ ⋅ r ⋅λd̄໠. Hence two elements in
D໠ are distinguished iﬀ their last leer diﬀers, i.e. for d໠0 , d໠1 ∈ Dwe have d̄໠0 ≠ d̄໠1
iﬀ [d̄໠0 ] ≠ [d̄໠1 ] and so βໟ ∶ D໠ ⟶ E໠ ∶ d̄໠ ⟼[d̄໠] is a valid conﬁguration.
Assume on the other hand that II is challenged by I with an r-successor set E໠
of some [d̄ໟ] ∈ Eໟ. By deﬁnition of r⨄i∈I Iσ̄ii /E, each element e ∈ E໠ contains an
r-successor d̄໠ of some element d̄ໟe ∈ [d̄ໟ]. Assume d̄ໟe ∈ ΔI
σ̄k
k . Proposition 4.3.18
yields isomorphisms ι0 ∶ Init(Iσii , d̄ໟ) ⟶ Init(I
σj
j , λd̄ໟ) and ι1 ∶ Init(I
σ̄k
k , d̄ໟe) ⟶
Init(Iσjj , λd̄ໟ). Deﬁne d̄໠e ∶= ι−10 ∘ ι1(d໠). en d̄໠e is an r-successor of d̄ໟ in I
σ̄i
i with
λd̄໠e = λd̄໠. Hence d̄໠e is atomically equivalent to e.
Set βໟ ∶ E໠ ⟶ D໠ ∶ e⟼ d̄໠e whereD໠ ∶= {d̄໠e ∣ e ∈ E໠}. D໠ is an r-successor
set of d̄ໟ. We also have if d̄໠e = d̄໠eໟ iﬀ λd̄໠e = λd̄໠eໟ iﬀ e = [λd̄໠e ] = [λd̄໠eໟ] = eໟ. Hence
βໟ satisﬁes the requirement (∗), is bijective and therefore valid. 2
C 4.3.23 . ⨄i∈I Ii <ω⟷−− Q ⨄i∈I I
σ̄i
i /E
P. If d ∈ Δ⨄i∈I Ii then there is i ∈ I with d ∈ ΔIi . Lemma 4.3.21 and
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Observation 4.3.22 yield that (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I I
σi
i /E, [σ̄i(d)]). Hence (⨄ Ii, d) <ω⟷−−
(⨄i∈I I
σi
i /E, [σ̄i(d)]).
For d ∈ Δ⨄i∈I Iσ̄ii /E there is d̄ ∈ d and i ∈ I such that d̄ ∈ ΔIσ̄ii . Observation 4.3.22
yields (Iσ̄ii , d̄) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I I
σ̄i
i /E, d). Proposition 4.3.20 yields that there is d ∈ ΔIi
with (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (I
σ̄i
i , d̄). Hence (⨄i∈I Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I I
σ̄i
i /E, d). 2
The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes as FO-Fragment
We shall now introduce the notions necessary for the characterisation. rough-
out this section we shall assume that families of τ-interpretations (Ii)i∈I have pair-
wise disjoint carrier-sets!
It is now that we need our construction for coherent disjoint unions in all its
generality: e generated subinterpretations with which we shall deal further
down will not interpret all individual names and hence we need for each subin-
terpretation Ii its own substitution σi.
Let Ki be a family τ-interpretations with
1. for all a ∈ NI there is i ∈ I with aKi ≠ ∅
2. if aKi ≠ ∅ then |aKi| = 1 for all a ∈ NI and i ∈ I.
3. if aKi ≠ ∅ ≠ aKj then (Ii, aIi) <ω⟷−− (Ij, aIj) for any i, j ∈ I and all a ∈ NI.
Every family of coherent τ-interpretations (cf. Deﬁnition 4.2.20) satisﬁes the
requirements 1. 2. and 3. from above.
Note that if 2. and 3. is true, from a, b ∈ NI with aKi = bKi ≠ ∅ follows for all
i ∈ I that aKi = bKi . is is important for the existence of the function [⋅] which
we shall deﬁne now.
For this family of τ-interpretations, there is a function [⋅] ∶ NI ⟶ I such
that aK[a] ≠ ∅ and if aKi = bKi ≠ ∅ for any i ∈ I then [a] = [b]. We deﬁne
NI(Ki) ∶= {a ∈ NI ∣ aKi ≠ ∅} for every i ∈ I. For every i ∈ I we deﬁne
σi ∶ aKi ⟼ aK[a] with 𝔻i ∶= {aKi ∣ a ∈ NI(Ki) with [a] ≠ i}.
e requirement [a] ≠ i avoids that aKi in 𝔻i and allows for every j ∈ I that
σj is of the type 𝔻j ⟶ ⋃i∈I Ii ⧵ ⋃i∈I𝔻i. In particular, we have that for every
a ∈ NI all but one element of ⋃i∈I aIi is in ⋃i∈I𝔻i. All elements in ⋃i∈I aIi are
mapped to this single element in⋃i∈I aIi ⧵ ⋃i∈I𝔻i
e next lemma proves that this system (σi)i∈I is admissible in the sense of
Proposition 4.3.20.
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L 4.3.24 . For all i ∈ I, σ̄i is injective on successor sets.
P. Let d ∈ ΔKi and r ∈ NR be arbitrary. Consider dໟ0, dໟ1 ∈ rKi(d) with
dໟ0 ≠ dໟ1. We distinguish two cases: if none of them satisﬁes any individual name
then σ̄i(dໟ0) = {dໟ0} ≠ {dໟ1} = σ̄i(dໟ1). If only one of them or both satisfy an
individual name then (Ii, d0) ̸<ω⟷−− (Ii, d1). Hence also (Ij, σ̄i(d0)) ̸<ω⟷−− (Ik, σ̄i(d1)) and
so σ̄i(d0) ≠ σ̄i(d1). 2
L 4.3.25 . ⨄i∈I Kσ̄ii is in 𝕂.
P. Let d0, d1 ∈ a⨄i∈I K
σ̄i
i /E. en there is d̄0 ∈ d0 and d̄1 ∈ d1 such that
d̄0 ∈ aI
σ̄k
k and d̄1 ∈ aI
σ̄ℓ
ℓ .
Proposition 4.3.18 yields an isomorphism ι0 ∶ Init(Kσ̄kk , d̄0) ⟶ Init(I
σ̄mm , λd̄0)
where λd̄0 ∈ ΔIm . Since all members of the family were pairwise disjoint, m is
uniquely determined. e only possibility that λd̄0 ∈ ΔK
σ̄mm and λd̄0 ∈ aKm at the
same time is for m = [a]. For otherwise λd̄0 would have been replaced by aK[a]
which is, due to the disjointness, not in ΔIm .
e same applies for d̄1 ∈ d1 and so λd̄0 = λd̄1. But this shows that d0 = d1
and hence that a⨄i∈I Kσ̄ii /E is interpreted by at most one element. Since σ̄[a](aK[a]) =
{aK[a]}, we have aK[a] ⊆ Δ⨄i∈I Iσ̄ii and therefore each a ∈ NI is interpreted by
exactly one element in⨄i∈I Kσ̄ii /E. 2
Corollary 4.3.23 shows that it does not maer which function [⋅] ∶ NI ⟶ I
such that aK[a] ≠ ∅ we choose, we shall always obtain ⨄i∈I Ki <ω⟷−− Q ⨄i∈I K
σ̄i
i /E.
Since all these disjoint unions are globally໦໱໨໶-bisimilar we simply give
D 4.3.26 . For a family of τ-interpretations (Ii)i∈I that satisfy require-
ment 1. 2. 3. the coherent disjoint union ⨄𝕂i∈I Ii is deﬁned as ⨄i∈I Iσ̄ii /E, where
(σi)i∈I is a ﬁx but arbitrary system such that σi ∶ aIi ⟼ aI[a] with 𝔻i ∶= {aIi ∣
a ∈ NI(Ii) with [a] ≠ i} for all i ∈ I. ♢
e invariance of໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes under global bisimulation yields the follow-
ing result.
(∀i ∈ I ∶ Ki ⊨ ໹ )⟺෺i∈I
𝕂Ki ⊨ ໹
K is called a forward generated subinterpretation of I in d if it is equal to the
restriction of I to all the elements that are reachable from the element d ∈ ΔIi
(cf. Deﬁnition 4.2.23).
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D 4.3.27 . For a family of τ-interpretations (Ii)i∈I in 𝕂 a family of τ-
interpretations is called family of coherent generated subinterpretation if it satisﬁes
1. 2. and 3. of the requirements from above. ♢
D 4.3.28 . Let τ be a signature and φ ∈ FO(τ) a sentence. en φ is
1. invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂 iﬀ for any two interpretations I,H in 𝕂 we have
I <ω⟷−− Q H⟹ I ⊨ φ iﬀ H ⊨ φ
2. invariant under coherent disjoint unions in 𝕂 iﬀ for every family (Ii)i∈I of
coherent τ-interpretations in 𝕂, i.e. Ii in 𝕂 for all i ∈ I, we have
(∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ φ) ⟺ ⨄𝕂i∈I Ii ⊨ φ
3. preserved under coherent disjoint unions of generated subinterpretations
in 𝕂 iﬀ for any family of coherent subinterpretations (Ki)i∈I of some family
of τ-interpretations (Ii)i∈I in 𝕂 we have
(∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ φ)⟹⨄𝕂i∈I Ki ⊨ φ
♢
Since ໦໱໨໶-TBoxes and therefore also ໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes are invariant under
the normal disjoint union, i.e. in particular they are preserved under generated
subinterpretations, ໦໱໨໶໴-TBoxes are preserved under coherent disjoint uni-
ons of generated subinterpretations.
T 4.3.29 . Let τ be a signature and φ ∈ FO(τ) a sentence whi is
1. invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂
2. invariant under coherent disjoint unions in 𝕂
3. preserved under coherent disjoint unions of forward generated subinterpreta-
tions in 𝕂
then φ is equivalent to an໦໱໨໶໴-TBox over τ.
Let φ ∈ FO(τ) be as required by eorem 4.3.29 and let
cons φ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴(τ) and φ ⊨𝕂 C ⊑ D}.
Similarly to໦໱໨໴, we deﬁneNR∗ to be the set of all words over the alphabetNR,
including the empty word ε and we deﬁne for all r∗ ∈ NR∗ and every ໦໱໨໶໴-
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concept C
∃r∗.C ∶=
๰
C if r = ε
∃s≥10 .∃s∗1C if r = s0 ⋅ s∗1 with s0 ∈ NR and s∗1 ∈ NR∗
where we use ∀r∗C as abbreviation for ¬∃r∗¬C. For an interpretation H and e ∈
ΔH we say that an individual aH is in the scope of e if there is r∗ ∈ NR∗ such that
e ∈ (∃r∗.a)H. We deﬁne
(H, e) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໴(τ) ∣ (H, e) ⊨ C}
L 4.3.30 . If there is a model H in 𝕂 of cons φ ∪ {¬φ} then for every e ∈ ΔH
there is a model Ie in 𝕂 of φ with an element d ∈ ΔI su that (Ie, d) ⊨ (H, e),
and if a ∈ NI is in the scope of d then (Ie, aIe) ⊨(H, aH).
P. Assume the claim to be false. en there is e ∈ ΔH such that {φ} ∪
(H, e) together with the set
Γ ∶= {∀r∗(a→ C) ∣ a ∈ NI, r∗ ∈ NR∗, C ∈(H, aH)}
is unsatisﬁable in 𝕂.
Since FO is compact over 𝕂 there is a ﬁnite set T ⊆ (H, e) and Γ0 ⊆ Γ such
that {φ} ∪ T ∪ Γ0 is unsatisﬁable, i.e. for every model M in 𝕂 of φ and every
d ∈ ΔM we have (M, d) ⊨ ¬(⨅ T ⊓⨅Γ0). Hence for every d ∈ ΔM we obtain
(M, d) ⊨ ¬෻ T ⊔෼{∃r
∗(a ⊓ ¬C) ∣ ∀r∗(a→ C) ∈ Γ0}.
SoM ⊨ ⨅ T ⊑ ⨆{∃r∗(a ⊓ ¬C) ∣ ∀r∗(a → C) ∈ Γ0} and since this is true for all
models φ in 𝕂 it follows
෻ T ⊑ ෼{∃r
∗(a ⊓ ¬C) ∣ ∀r∗(a→ C) ∈ Γ0} ∈ cons φ.
Since H ⊨ cons φ there is a path from e to some individual aH such that this
individual does not satisfy the type (H, aH). A contradiction! 2
P  T 4.3.29. Since φ ⊨𝕂 cons φ it remains to show that cons φ ⊨𝕂
φ. For the sake of contradiction, assume cons φ ⊭𝕂 φ. en there must be model
H in 𝕂 of cons φ ∪ {¬φ} for which we can w.l.o.g. assume that it is ω-saturated.
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Let Γ be deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma 4.3.30 and let
P ∶= {p ⊆ ໦໱໨໶໴(τ) ∣ p ∪ Γ ∪ {φ} satisﬁable in 𝕂}
Let further for each p ∈ P be (Ip, dp) a pointed, ω-saturated interpretation in 𝕂
such that (Ip, dp) ⊨𝕂 p ∪ Γ ∪ {φ} for each p ∈ P. We deﬁne Kp be the forward
generated subinterpretation of Ip in dp. Each Kp is still໦໱໨໶໴-saturated.
For this family (Ip)p∈P, the forward generated subinterpretations (Kp)p∈P satisfy
the following properties:
1. for all a ∈ NI there is Kp with aKp ≠ ∅
2. if aKp ≠ ∅ then |aKp| = 1 for all a ∈ NI and p ∈ P
3. if aKp ≠ ∅ ≠ aKq then (Ip, aKp) <ω⟷−− (Kq, aIq) for any p, q ∈ P and all a ∈ NI.
e ﬁrst item is explained by the fact that {a} ∈ P for all a ∈ NI as Lemma 4.3.30
for e ∈ aH shows. e second item explains itself by the fact that each Kp is
generated subinterpretation of Ip in𝕂 and the third item is true since Kp ⊨ Γ and
every element inKp is in the scope of the root, which entails (Kp, aKp) ⊨(H, aH)
for all a ∈ NI with aKp ≠ ∅. e Hennessy-Milner-Property for ໦໱໨໶໴ yields
the full ໦໱໨໶໴-bisimilarity. erefore (Kp)p∈P is a family coherent generated
subinterpretation of the family (Ii)p∈P.
Hence we setK ∶= ⨄𝕂p∈P Kp to be the coherent disjoint unions generated subin-
terpretations and Lemma 4.3.25 conﬁrms that K in 𝕂. Note that Kp ⊨ ໹ with
໹ ∶= {a ⊑ C ∣ a ∈ NI and C ∈ (H, aH)}. Hence the coherent disjoint union K
of the Kp will satisfy ໹.
Furthermore we have by the໦໱໨໶໴ saturatedness of Kp for every a ∈ NI that
if aKp ≠ ∅ then (Kp, aKp) <ω⟷−− (H, aH). Proposition 4.3.20 and Observation 4.3.22
show that there is d ∈ K for which (Kp, aKp) <ω⟷−− (K, d). It immediately follows
that {d} = aK which proves that H and K are coherent.
Since φ is preserved by the coherent disjoint unions of generated subinterpret-
ations, we have K ⊨𝕂 φ. Let I ∶= K⊎𝕂 H be the coherent disjoint union. Since φ
is invariant under coherent disjoint unions and H ⊭𝕂 φ we have I ⊨𝕂 ¬φ.
For each e ∈ ΔK there is d ∈ ΔI with (K, e) <ω⟷−− (I, d) as Proposition 4.3.20
and Observation 4.3.22 shows. Let d ∈ ΔI be arbitrary. If d contains an element
d̄ from KσK then Observation 4.3.22 yields (KσK , d̄) <ω⟷−− (I, d). Proposition 4.3.20
provides a d ∈ ΔK such that (K, d) <ω⟷−− (KσK , d̄). Transitivity of <ω⟷−− then yields
(K, d) <ω⟷−− (I, d).
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Assume d̄ is in HσH . Again Observation 4.3.22 and Proposition 4.3.20 provide
a d ∈ ΔH such that (H, d) <ω⟷−− (I, d). Lemma 4.3.30 shows that there is p ∈ P
with p =(H, d). Since Kp and H are໦໱໨໶໴-saturated, we obtain (Kp, dp) <ω⟷−−
(H, d). Yet again, Proposition 4.3.20 and Observation 4.3.22 show that there is
e ∈ K such that (Kp, dp) <ω⟷−− (K, e) and transitivity yields (K, e) <ω⟷−− (I, d)
Assembling the whole chain of arguments, we obtainK <ω⟷−− Q I. A contradiction
to the assumption that φ would be invariant under global ໦໱໨໶-bisimulation
over 𝕂. Hence we infer that cons φ ⊨𝕂 φ. 2
4.3.4 Minimal໦໱໨໶u1-Bisimilar and໦໱໨໶u-Bisimilar Companions
In what follows, we shall use the substitutions σ introduced in Section 4.3.3 on
page 131 ﬀ. We shall use σ̄(d) very frequently as abbreviation for ‘σ(d) if d in 𝔻σ,
i.e. the domain of σ, or d’. is is, indeed, the deﬁnition of σ̄(d). Hencewe ﬂip back
and forth between stating properties for σ and puing them with σ̄ into formulae,
where the property will trivially hold for elements d ∉ 𝔻σ. e important bit is
that d will be always a leer in the context of σ̄, i.e. a single element of a path in
the tree-unravelling.
e Construction of Coherent Substructures (Section 4.3.3) was kept as general
as possible and, as a side note, we shall now show how this can be used to obtain
the smallest bisimilar companion of an interpretation.
In the context of໦໱໨u, the smallest g⟷−− -bisimilar companion for an interpret-
ation I can be obtained through factorisation by the largest auto-bisimulation
⟷−− ∶= {(d0, d1) ∈ ΔI × ΔI ∣ (I, d0)⟷−− (I, d1)}.
But this does not carry over to໦໱໨໶:
E 4.3.31 . Consider a 3-clique of nodes I or more concrete ΔI ∶= {0, 1, 2}
with rI ∶= {(d, dໟ) ∣ d < dໟ or dໟ < d}. Clearly, for all d, dໟ ∈ ΔI we have
(I, d) <ω⟷−− (I, dໟ) and the factorisation by the largest ໦໱໨໶u1-bisimulation rela-
tion for I, which is ΔI × ΔI, would yield a singleton set with a reﬂexive r-edge.
Yet, this element has only one successor whilst every element in I has two. Hence,
this factor-interpretation is not໦໱໨໶u1-bisimilar to I.
Essentially, in the case of ໦໱໨u, the smallest bisimilar companion reuses ele-
ments of the same bisimulation type. For໦໱໨໶u1 this is not as straight forward,
as one has to additionally preserve the number of successors up to ω. In order to
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construct such a smallest ໦໱໨໶u1-bisimilar companion, we shall construct the
substitution σ ∶ 𝔻σ ⟶ ΔI
F ⧵ 𝔻σ such that σ is injective on successor-sets up
to ω by distinguishing several cases: Let I be an interpretation and IF its forest
unravelling. Let d ∈ IF/ <ω⟷−− and
Ed ∶=඾(d̄0, d̄1) ∈ d2 ∣ d̄0 = d̄1 or ∃ d̄ ∈ ΔI
F .∃r ∈ NR ∶ d̄0 = d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄0
and d̄1 = d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄1๱
i.e. d̄0 and d̄1 are both r-successors of a common predecessor. In particular root
elements are in relation to themselves. Ed is an equivalence relation which groups
those elements in classes which are, for the same r ∈ NR, r-successors of the
same predecessor. Root elements are the only elements in their class. For each
d ∈ IF/ <ω⟷−− , we deﬁne σ piecewise via restrictions σ↾c of σ to classes c ∈ d/Ed:
1. In case d/Ed contains a largest class c which is ﬁnite, we set σ↾cໟ ∶ cໟ ⟶ c
to be some injective function for all cໟ ∈ d/Ed with cໟ ≠ c.
2. In case d/Ed contains an inﬁnite class cໟ we set, by using the axiom of choice,
c to be an countably inﬁnite subset of cໟ and deﬁne for each class c0 ∈ d/Ed:
If c0 = cໟ we set σ↾(c0 ⧵ c) ∶ (c0 ⧵ c)⟶ c to be an arbitrary function.
If c0 ≠ cໟ is inﬁnite, let, by the means of the axiom of choice, be c1 be a
countably inﬁnite subset of c0 and set σ↾c1 ∶ c1 ⟶ c to be an injective
function and for σ↾(c0 ⧵ c1) ∶ (c0 ⧵ c1)⟶ c an arbitrary function.
If c0 is ﬁnite, let σ↾c0 ∶ c0 ⟶ c be some injective function.
3. If d/Ed contains inﬁnitely many ﬁnite classes forming an inﬁnite ascending
chain of cardinalities, we ﬁx for each cardinality κ < ω a class cκ with
|cκ| = κ, if it exists, and set σ↾cໟ ∶ cໟ ⟶ cκ for all classes cໟ ∈ d/Ed with
cໟ ≠ cκ and |cໟ| = κ.
With this deﬁnition of σ we can obtain a globally ໦໱໨໶໴-bisimilar companion
of IF on which σ is bijective on r-successors for all r ∈ NR:
Consider item 2. Let M be the set of all elements in an inﬁnite class cໟ ∈ d/Ed
which do not belong to the range of σ and which are not in a countably inﬁnite
subset c1 of a class c0 ∈ d/Ed which had been chosen to be injectively mapped by
σ. We set H ∶= IF↾(ΔI ⧵M).
P 4.3.32 . IF <ω⟷−− Q H and σ is injective on successor sets in H.
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L 4.3.33 . For all d̄ ∈ ΔH we have: (IF, d̄) <ω⟷−− (H, d̄).
P. II has a winning strategy if she maintains conﬁgurations β ∶ D ⟶ E
such that (IF, d̄0) <ω⟷−− (IF, β(d̄0)). e atomic equivalence of d̄0 and β(d̄0) is im-
mediately clear for all these conﬁgurations. Since the start-conﬁguration satisﬁes
the requirement, II does not lose the 0-th round.
Assume, the game has reached a conﬁguration β0 ∶ D0 ⟶ E0 which meets
the requirement and assume, I challenges II by playing for some d̄0 ∈ D0 some
ﬁnite r-successor set D1.
We partition rI ∘ β(d̄0) into classes of the same <ω⟷−− -type. We also partition D1
into D1/ <ω⟷−− . Let d ∈ D1/ <ω⟷−− . Since (IF, d̄0) <ω⟷−− (IF, β(d̄0)) every element in D1
has a class e ∈ rI ∘ β(d̄0)/ <ω⟷−− which contains໦໱໨໶-bisimilar elements.
Either e ∩ M = ∅ then all elements in e are still present in H and so, using
her winning strategy for G(IF, d̄0; IF, β(d̄0)), II can set β1↾d ∶ d⟶ e, injectively
mapping d into e such that (IF, d̄1) <ω⟷−− (IF, β1(d̄1)) for all d1 ∈ d.
Or e∩M ≠ ∅. We know that there is, according to 2. a countably inﬁnite e0 ⊆ e
for which σ is injective and hence its elements are not contained in M. II can set
β1↾d ∶ d⟼ e0 injectively mapping d into e0 such that (IF, d̄1) <ω⟷−− (IF, β1(d̄1))
for all d1 ∈ d.
In any case, II can ﬁnd a new conﬁguration β1 ∶ D1 ⟶ β(D1) that yields the
requirement. If conversely I challenges II by playing some ﬁnite r-successor set
E1, II can ﬁnd, by virtue of (IF, d̄0) <ω⟷−− (IF, β(d̄0)), an r-successor setD1 of d̄0 such
that β1 ∶ D1 ⟶ E1 is an injection and (IF, d̄1) <ω⟷−− (IF, β(d̄1)) for all d1 ∈ d. 2
P  P 4.3.32. Since we have Lemma 4.3.33, we only have to
show the for elements in I and in particular for all d̄ ∈ M that there is ̄e ∈ ΔH
such that (IF, d̄) <ω⟷−− (H, ̄e).
Assume d̄ is in M. en d̄ is an r-successor of some element and hence located
on some tree in I with root d̄0, say. is root is, as mentioned above, the only
element in its class and hence cannot be an element of M. So d̄0 is present in H.
Lemma 4.3.33 yields a winning strategy for II in the game G(IF, d̄0;H, d̄0) and II
can pretend to be challenged in IF along the path from d̄0 to d̄ playing according
to her winning strategy, so that she can ﬁnally come up with some e ∈ ΔH such
that (IF, d̄) <ω⟷−− (H, ̄e). 2
Proposition 4.3.32 shows that we can w.l.o.g. switch to some globally ໦໱໨໶-
bisimilar companion for which σ̄ is injective on r-successor sets.
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O 4.3.34 . I <ω⟷−− Q IF <ω⟷−− Q (IF)σ̄.
is observation is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.3.20. Note that ⋅σ will
create a forest unravelling of the forest unravelling. We set
E ∶= {(d̄, d̄ໟ) ∈ Δ(IF)σ̄ × Δ(IF)σ̄ ∣ λd̄ = λd̄ໟ}
P 4.3.35 . (IF)σ̄/E is a minimal໦໱໨໶u1 bisimilar companion of I.
P. Assume there is a H with H <ω⟷−− Q I such that |ΔH| < |Δ(I
F)σ̄/E|. en
for some bisimilarity type d ∈ Δ(IF)σ̄/E/ <ω⟷−− there is e ∈ ΔH/ <ω⟷−− such that
|e| < |d|. Since every class d is at most countable, e is ﬁnite. We shall go through
the deﬁnition of σ to reveal a the contradiction. Let d0 ∈ ΔI
F / <ω⟷−− be of the same
<ω⟷−− -type as d i.e. for all d0 ∈ d0 and d ∈ d we have (IF, d0) <ω⟷−− ((IF)σ̄, d).
If case 2. applies to d0 then there was some r ∈ NR and an inﬁnite set of r-
successors of some element dໟ in I containing elements of the same <ω⟷−− -type as
e. Since each element in H has at most |e|many successors, for any e ∈ Δ, I could
challenge II in the ໦໱໨໶u1-bisimulation game G(I, dໟ;H, e), with a subset D of
size |e|+1 of this r-successor set of dໟ. IImust respondwith some r-successor set E
of size |e|+1, yielding a conﬁguration β ∶ D⟶ E such that (I, d0) <ω⟷−− (H, β(d0))
is false for at least one element d0 ∈ D. Clearly II loses the game G(I, dໟ;H, e) for
all e ∈ ΔH and hence H <ω⟷−− Q I is false. A contradiction to our assumption.
In case 1. applies to d0 then there is r ∈ NR and some r-successor set of some
element in IF and therefore some r-successor set of some element dໟ in I which
contains |d| many elements of the same <ω⟷−− -type. Since |e| < |d| no element in
H has as many r-successors as dໟ and hence H <ω⟷−− Q I is false. A contradiction to
our assumption.
In case 3. applies to d0, there is for every ﬁnite cardinality κ some r and a ﬁnite
set of r-successors D of some element dໟ ∈ ΔI such that |D| > κ of the same
<ω⟷−− -type as elements in e. Let in particular dໟ ∈ ΔI be such that there is some
r ∈ NR and some r-successor set D of dໟ with |D| > |e| of the same <ω⟷−− -type as
elements in e. Clearly, no element in H can be ໦໱໨໶-bisimilar to dໟ and hence
H <ω⟷−− Q I is false. A contradiction to our assumption. 2
It should be remarked that if root elements of IF are treated as group by Ed, i.e.
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for each d ∈ IF/ <ω⟷−−
Ed ∶= ඾ (d̄0, d̄1) ∈ d ∣ d̄0 and d̄1 are root elements or
∃ d̄ ∈ ΔIF .∃r ∈ NR ∶ d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄0 and d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄1๱
we can not only preserve the number (up to ω) of successors, but also the global
number of elements of a certain <ω⟷−− -type.
E 4.3.36 . Take the interpretation IwithΔI ∶= {0, 1}where all predicates
are empty. e construction before would yield (IF)σ/E with exactly on element,
whilst the new deﬁnition of Ed yields interpretation isomorphic to I, i.e. with two
elements.
We hence make, without proof, for the new deﬁnition of Ed the following
O 4.3.37 . I <ω⟷−− ∀ (IF)σ̄.
Note that in case one has a ﬁnite interpretation I and needs to stay ﬁnite, but
wants to ﬁnd the smallest ໦໱໨໶u1- or ໦໱໨໶u-bisimilar companion, it is not
necessary to perform a complete tree-unravelling. One can stop as soon as one
detects the same element twice in a path-element: We deﬁne this partial tree-
unravelling IP of I by seing IP ∶= IF↾ΔIP where
ΔIP ∶= {d̄ ∈ ΔIF ∣ for all d ∈ ΔI which occur twice in d̄ we have λd̄ = d}.
e length of the elements in ΔIP are bounded by |ΔI|+1 as exactly one element
can occur twice and hence IP is ﬁnite iﬀ I is ﬁnite.
ese partial tree-unravellings are known from blocking techniques [50] ap-
plied in tableau based reasoning [50, 122] which were for DLs ﬁrst applied in
[7] and have been since then reﬁned and improved [11, 27, 98]. In contrast to
blocking techniques we do not build interpretations from scratch but we block
the tree-unravelling of a given interpretation. is makes our blocking condition,
namely occurring twice in a path, rather simple in comparison to the strategies
aimed at detecting as soon as possible when the generation of new elements can
be stopped [59].
e substitution σ is constructed piecewise as follows: For each dໟ ∈ IF/ <ω⟷−−
let d ∶= dໟ∩ΔIP , i.e. d contains all elements of ΔIP that would have been໦໱໨໶-
bisimilar in IF. Again, we set
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Ed ∶= ඾(d̄0, d̄1) ∈ d2 ∣ d̄0 = d̄1 or ∃ d̄ ∈ ΔI
F .∃r ∈ NR ∶ d̄0 = d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄0
and d̄1 = d̄ ⋅ r ⋅ λd̄1๱
and choose a maximal class in c0 ∈ d/Ed. We deﬁne c to be the class c0 where
all elements d̄ = d0…di…dn in which some leer occurs twice, concretely where
di = dn with i ≠ n, is replaced by d0…di. With this replacement we do not
‘lose’ any elements: All elements in c0 are distinguished by their last leer. e
new element’s last leer is equal to the old element’s last leer and hence is still
distinguished from all other elements in c0. is argument can iteratively applied
for each replacement, whence |c0| = |c| is inferred.
For each class cໟ ∈ d/Ed we set σ↾cໟ ∶ cໟ ⧵ (cໟ ∩ c) ⟶ c ⧵ (cໟ ∩ c) to be some
injective function. σ is injective on successor-sets and due to the replacements
maps elements only on elements in which no leer occurs twice.
We deﬁne the following equivalence relation, where, due to the fact that σ̄ op-
erates on the forest-unravelling of IP we have to apply λ twice:
Θ ∶= {(d̄0, d̄1) ∈ (IP)σ̄ ∣ λ ∘ λd̄0 = λ ∘ λd̄1}
For all d in (IP)σ̄/E we deﬁne dd ∶= λ ∘ λd̄ for some arbitrary d̄ ∈ d. dd is uniquely
determined by the deﬁnition of Θ.
P 4.3.38 . For all d0 ∈ ΔI we have (I, d0) <ω⟷−− ((IP)σ̄/Θ, d) if (I, d0) <ω⟷−−
(I, dd).
P. We show that II has a winning strategy if she maintains conﬁgurations
β ∶ D⟶ E such that (I, d0) <ω⟷−− (I, dβ(d0)) for all d0 ∈ D.
We shall ﬁrst show that for conﬁgurations which satisfy this requirement, d0
and β(d0) are atomically equivalent: Let d̄ ∈ β(d0) be arbitrary. Since λ ∘ λd̄ is
atomically equivalent to d0, we shall merely show that [d̄] is atomically equivalent
to λ∘λd̄: λ∘λd̄ ∈ AI iﬀ λd̄ ∈ AIP iﬀ d̄ ∈ A(IP)σ̄ iﬀ [d̄] ∈ A(IP)σ̄/E. e only-if direction
of the laer follows from the fact that all elements d̄ໟ ∈ [d̄] share the same element
λ ∘ λd̄ໟ.
Assume the conﬁguration β ∶ D⟶ Ewith (I, d0) <ω⟷−− (I, dβ(d0)) for all d0 ∈ D
has been reached. Let I play for some r ∈ NR an r-successor set Dໟ of some d ∈ D.
Let d̄0…d̄n ∈ β(d) be ﬁx but arbitrary; note that d̄i ∈ IP for all i ∈ {0,… , n} as
σ̄ operates on the tree-unravelling of IP. All leers d̄i in d̄0…d̄n are the outcome of
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the substitution by σ̄, i.e. they are in the range of σ̄. As the range of σ is excluded
from its domain 𝔻σ, especially d̄n ∉ 𝔻σ and so d̄n is in (IP)σ. By the deﬁnition of
E, we have d̄n ∈ β(d), so [d̄n] = β(d).
e deﬁnition of σ implies that no leer appears twice in d̄n. erefore d̄n ∈ IP
and has all its (immediate) successors from IF in IP. Since (I, d) <ω⟷−− (I, λd̄n),
meaning in particular (I, d) <ω⟷−− (IF, d̄n), there is an r-successor set E0 of d̄n in IP
and β0 ∶ Dໟ ⟶ E0 such that β0 is injective and (I, dໟ0) <ω⟷−− (IF, β0(dໟ0)) for all
dໟ0 ∈ Dໟ. Since IP contains all successors of d̄n, for all dໟ0 ∈ Dໟ we have d̄n ⋅ r ⋅
β0(dໟ0) ∈ (ΔI
P)F on which σ̄ is deﬁned! In particular
σ̄(d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ β0(dໟ0)) = d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄(β0(dໟ0))
as d̄n ∉ 𝔻σ. Note that for each element ̄e ∈ IP we have σ̄(e) = σ(e) if e in 𝔻σ ⊆ IP
or σ̄(e) = e otherwise. As σ(e) and e is in IP it follows that σ̄(e) ∈ IF. By the
deﬁnition of σ, for all e ∈ IP we have (IF, e) <ω⟷−− (IF, σ̄(e)) and in particular
(I, dໟ0) <ω⟷−− (IF, β(dໟ0)) <ω⟷−− (IF, σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0)) <ω⟷−− (I, λ ∘ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0)),
the laer by deﬁnition of IF, for all dໟ0 ∈ Dໟ.
As σ is injective on successors, σ̄maps E0 injectively to an r-successor set of d̄n
in (IP)σ̄. We shall show the following intermediate claim: λ ∘ λ(d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0))
must be diﬀerent from λ ∘ λ(d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ1)) for all dໟ0, dໟ1 ∈ Dໟ with dໟ0 ≠ dໟ1:
Assume dໟ0 ≠ dໟ1. en eໟ0 ∶= β0(dໟ1) ≠ β0(dໟ1) =∶ eໟ1 because β0 is injective.
Either eໟ0 and eໟ1 have a diﬀerent <ω⟷−− -type, then σ̄ maps them to elements in IP
with diﬀerent <ω⟷−− -type in IF and so λ ∘ σ̄(eໟ0) ≠ λ ∘ σ̄(eໟ1). Or, if they have the same
<ω⟷−− -type, σ̄ maps them injectively to a maximal rໟ-successor set of some element
for some rໟ or a set which contains a root, containing elements of the same <ω⟷−− -
type. In our case, it must be a set of rໟ-successors, as sets containing roots are
singletons sets. Each of these successors, since they are successors of a common
predecessor in IP, must have a diﬀerent last element. In case these elements have
been replaced, as happened from c0 to c above, their last elements were preserved.
Hence λ ∘ σ̄(eໟ0) ≠ λ ∘ σ(eໟ1), which shows the intermediate claim.
e intermediate claim shows [d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0)] ≠ [d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ1)] and each
[d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0)] is an r-successor of [d̄n]. II can thus ﬁnd an injection
βໟ ∶ Dໟ ⟶ Eໟ ∶ dໟ0 ⟼[(d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0))]
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where Eໟ ∶= βໟ(Dໟ) is an r-successor set of [d̄n] such that for all dໟ0 ∈ Dໟ we have
(I, dໟ0) <ω⟷−− (I, λ ∘ λ(d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄ ∘ β0(dໟ0)).
Let conversely I challenge II by playing an r-successor set Eໟ for some β(d0) ∈ E.
Let e ∈ Eໟ be ﬁx but arbitrary. By the deﬁnition of (IP)σ̄ this is only the case, if
there is an element d̄0…d̄n ∈ β(d0) and an element d̄0…d̄n ⋅r⋅d̄n+1 ∈ e. As d̄n ∉ 𝔻σ,
d̄n and d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ d̄n+1 are in (IP)σ and we can, since σ is injective on r-successors,
uniquely determine an r-successor d̄ໟn+1 in IP such that d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ d̄n+1 = d̄n ⋅ r ⋅ σ̄(d̄ໟn+1)
and d̄n ⋅r⋅d̄ໟn+1 ∈ (IP)F. From the laer follows that λd̄n = dβ(d0) had an r-successor
λd̄ໟn+1 ∈ I and by the deﬁnition of σ it follows that (IF, d̄ໟn+1) <ω⟷−− (IF, σ̄(d̄ໟn+1))
which entails that (I, λd̄ໟn+1) <ω⟷−− (I, λ ∘ σ̄(d̄ໟn+1))
For each class e ∈ Eໟ we set de to be the appropriate λd̄ໟn+1 ∈ I as just determ-
ined in the previous paragraph. Each de is an r-successor of dβ(d0). Since de ≠ deໟ
whenever e ≠ eໟ for all e, eໟ ∈ Eໟ, there is a bijection β0 ∶ e⟼ de between Eໟ and
D0 ∶= {de ∣ e ∈ Eໟ}.
Since (I, d0) <ω⟷−− (I, dβ(d0)) II can ﬁnd an r-successor set Dໟ such that βໟ ∶
Dໟ ⟶ D0 is injective and (I, dໟ0) <ω⟷−− (I, βໟ(dໟ0)) for all dໟ0 ∈ Dໟ. Hence β0 ∘ βໟ ∶
Dໟ ⟶ Eໟ is injective and satisﬁes the requirement! is shows that II has a
winning strategy. 2
P 4.3.39 . (IP)σ̄/Θ is the minimal໦໱໨໶u-bisimilar companion of I.
P. We ﬁrst show that (IP)σ̄/Θ <ω⟷−− Q I. Every element d ∈ ΔI is present
in IP and mapped by σ̄ to some element in IP, such that (I, d) <ω⟷−− (IP, σ̄(d)). In
particular (I, d) <ω⟷−− (I, λ ∘ σ̄(d)). Since σ̄(d) ∉ 𝔻σ, σ̄(d) ∈ (IP)σ̄ and so with
Proposition 4.3.38 we obtain that (I, d) <ω⟷−− ((IP)σ̄/E, [σ̄(d)]).
For any d we have with Proposition 4.3.38 (I, dd) <ω⟷−− ((IP)σ̄/Θ, d) where dd is
deﬁned as before Proposition 4.3.38.
Finally (IP)σ̄/Θ is minimal, as for every <ω⟷−− -type we used one r-successor set
of one common predecessor d̄ ∈ IF for some r ∈ NR. Any interpretation H with
less elements has at least one <ω⟷−− -type with lesser elements. Hence there is no
element e ∈ ΔH such that (I, λd̄) <ω⟷−− (H, e). 2
It is not diﬃcult to see that with the same redeﬁnition of Ed as before, we can ob-
tain the ໦໱໨໶u-bisimilar companion of I. Similarly, using classes d ∈ IF/ ≤κ⟷−− n
will yield appropriate companions H such that I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H.
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4.4 ໦໱໨໶໮໴
is section will introduce ໦໱໨໶໮໴ and give again characterisation theorems
for the standard logic, the extension with a universal role and for TBoxes. As an
extension of ໦໱໨໶໮ with nominals, the reasoning complexity of ໦໱໨໶໮໴ has
been investigated in [128]. It is noted in [128] that [57] investigates໦໱໨໶໴ and
໦໱໨໮໴ yet not the combination ໦໱໨໶໮໴. e DL ໦໱໨໶໮໴ is of particular
interest since ໸໭໴໮໶ [81], the description logic underpinning OWL DL, extends
໦໱໨໶໮໴ by allowing also RBoxes which contain role hierarchies and explicitly
transitive roles. Similarly ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1 is akin to ໸໷໴໮໶ [77] which extends
໦໱໨໶໮໴u and is the underpinning description logics of OWL 2 [38].
4.4.1 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴-Concepts
Syntax and Semantics
As for ໦໱໨໴ and ໦໱໨໶໴ the signature τ comprises role names NR, concept
names NC and individual names NI. e syntax for an໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept C over
τ is given by
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ a ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃≥κr.D ∣ ∃≥κr−.D
where a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR, κ < ω and D, E are ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts over τ.
e set of all ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts over τ is denoted by ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ). As usual ⊥,
→, ⊔, ∀≥κ etc. are considered to be abbreviations.
e semantics for ໦໱໨໶໮໴ is explained by recursively continuing the inter-
pretation function ⋅I on concepts C ∈ ໦໱໨໴(τ) as follows:
CI ∶=
๰
{d ∈ ΔI ∣ |rI(d) ∩ DI| ≥ n} if C = ∃≥nr.D
{d ∈ ΔI ∣ |r−I(d) ∩ DI| ≥ n} if C = ∃≥nr−.D
where |M| yields the cardinality of a set M, rI(d) ∶= {e ∈ ΔI ∣ (d, e) ∈ rI} and
r−I(d) ∶= {e ∈ ΔI ∣ (e, d) ∈ rI}, i.e. the set of predecessors of d in I. Hence
|r−I(d) ∩ DI| is the number of r-predecessors of d in I that satisfy D.
Rank-function and grade-function for ໦໱໨໶໮໴ are straight forward exten-
sions of the rank- and grade-function for ໦໱໨໶໴ (page 78) to ໦໱໨໶໮໴. e
translation into FO≡ is the translation for໦໱໨໶ into FO≡, which is extended for
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C = ∃≥κr−.D as follows
[C; xi] ∶= ∃(xℓ)ℓ∈κ⧵{i}. ෘk,ℓ∈κ⧵{i}
{¬xk ≡ xℓ ∣ k ≠ ℓ} ∧ ෘk∈κ⧵{i}
r(xk, xi) ∧ [D; xk]
Note again thatwe treat individuals like ordinary concepts and interpret໦໱໨໶໮໴-
concepts over the class 𝕂 (cf. Section 4.1). Hence [a; xi] does not translate to a
constant, but as all other concept names to an atomic predicate formula a(xi).
Although we have gained a lot more expressivity by inverse roles and graded
modal operators, we are still not as expressive as e.g. the two-variable fragment
[53] of FO: reﬂexivity ∀x.r(x, x) or role inclusion ∀x, y.r(x, y) → s(x, y) etc. cannot
be expressed by an໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept.
However, ໦໱໨໶໮໴ is, since it is a fragment of FO, compact. Since 𝕂 is an
elementary class, i.e. it can be deﬁned by a set of FO-formulae Γ, also FO is
compact over 𝕂For a proof see Proposition 4.1.3.
໦໱໨໶໮໴-Bisimulation and Properties
e ໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimulation game G(I, d;H, e) is formalised as the bisimulation
game for ໦໱໨໶ (cf. Section 3.2.1), again treating individual names like concept
names, yet now I can challenge II additionally by playing sets of predecessors:
e state of the game is captured in a bijection β ∶ D⟶ E where D ⊆ ΔI and
E ⊆ ΔH. I chooses one element from D or E and some r ∈ NR, say dໟ ∈ D, and can
challenge II either with a ﬁnite subset Dໟ ⊆ rI(dໟ) or a ﬁnite subset Dໟ ⊆ r−I(dໟ).
II then has to respond accordingly with a set Eໟ ⊆ rH(β(dໟ)) and Eໟ ⊆ r−H(β(dໟ))
respectively, such that βໟ ∶ Dໟ ⟶ Eໟ is a bijection such that d໠ is atomically
equivalent to β(d໠) for all d໠ ∈ D. If II cannot deliver Eໟ accordingly II has lost
the game.
In every other aspect the game proceeds as for໦໱໨໶.
D 4.4.1 . II has a winning strategy in G(I, d;H, e), if she can ward oﬀ
any challenge of I and thus never loses a round. We then say, (I, d) is໦໱໨໶໮໴-
bisimilar to (H, e) and denote this with (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e). ♢
We introduce a restricted version of the game which is bound in the number
rounds and in the cardinality of sets that I may play: Gκn(I, d;H, e) is the n-round
game in which only sets of positive cardinality of at most κ < ω may be played.
II wins the game, if she does not lose for within n rounds.
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D 4.4.2 . II has a winning strategy in Gκn(I, d;H, e) if she can ward oﬀ
challenges of I up to positive cardinalities of κ < ω during the ﬁrst n rounds. We
then say, (I, d) is (κ, n)-bisimilar to (H, e) and denote this with (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e).
♢
We make the following observations for our notion of໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimulation
(and ໦໱໨໶໮-bisimulation respectively) which are also true for ໦໱໨໶-bisimu-
lation:
<ω⟷−− and ≤κ⟷−− n for all n < ω and all positive κ < ω form equivalence relations
on the set of pointed τ-interpretations. We have <ω⟷−− ⊆ ≤κ⟷−− n and ≤κ⟷−− n ⊆ ≤κ
ໟ
⟷−− nໟ
for all n, nໟ < ω and all positive κ, κໟ < ω, where n ≤ nໟ and κ ≤ κໟ. For all
n < ω the sequence ( ≤κ⟷−− n)0<κ<ω is an approximation for <ω⟷−− n in the sense that
⋂0<κ<ω ≤κ⟷−− n = <ω⟷−− n. Similarly⋂0<κ<ω ≤κ⟷−− = <ω⟷−− .
Since individual names are interpreted like concept names the following pro-
position can be stated without referring to the class 𝕂; they all hold in particular
in 𝕂; we are giving properties of໦໱໨໶໮, as it were.
P 4.4.3 . Every ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept C with gradeC ≤ κ and rankC ≤ n
is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n.
e proof is, barring predecessor sets, analogous the proof for Proposition 3.2.4
and is therefore omied. For ﬁnite signature τwe deﬁnearacteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-
concepts for each positive κ < ω. Let therefore τ be ﬁnite and I a τ-interpretation
with d ∈ ΔI.
#⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ ∶= |{d1 ∈ rI(d) ∣ (I, d1) ⊨ Xκ,nI,e}|
i.e. the number of all r-successors of d that satisfy the same characteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-
concept as e on level n and let similarly
#⟨n, r−(d, e)⟩ ∶= |{d1 ∈ r−I(d) ∣ (I, d1) ⊨ Xκ,nI,e}|
be the number of all r-predecessors of d that satisfy Xκ,nI,e . We set
?⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ ∶=
๰
= #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ if #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ < κ
≥ κ else
and analogously we set the same for ?⟨n, r−(d, e)⟩. Note that ?⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ delivers
a string: If κ = 5 and #⟨n, r(d, e)⟩ = 6 then ?⟨n, r−(d, e)⟩ evaluates to ‘≥ 5’. For
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ﬁxed κ the characteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept is recursively upon n < ω deﬁned as:
Xκ,0I,d ∶= ⨅{A ∈ NC ∣ d ∈ AI} ⊓ ⨅{¬A ∣ d ∉ AI}
Xκ,n+1I,d ∶= Xκ,0I,d ⊓⨅r∈NR{∃?⟨n,r(d,e)⟩r.X
κ,n
I,e ∣ e ∈ rI(d)}
⊓⨅r∈NR{∃
?⟨n,r−(d,e)⟩r.Xκ,nI,e ∣ e ∈ r−I(d)}
⊓⨅r∈NR ∀
≥1r.⨆{Xκ,nI,e ∣ e ∈ rI(d)} ⊓ ∀≥1r−.⨆{Xκ,nI,e ∣ e ∈ r−I(d)}
An inductive argument shows that each set cannot contain inﬁnitely many con-
cepts. Hence, for all positive κ < ω and all n the characteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept
is well deﬁned. Clearly, (I, d) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d for all positive κ < ω and all n < ω.
P 4.4.4 . If (I, d) ⊨ Xκ,nH,e then (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e)
Again the proof can be copied almost word for word from the proof of Pro-
position 3.2.6, which makes the correspondent claim for ໦໱໨໶, and is therefore
omied. Analogously to eorem 3.2.8, we can make the following summarising
statement:
T 4.4.5 . Let τ be ﬁnite and let I,H be τ-interpretations. e following three
statements are equivalent:
1. (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d
2. (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e)
3. κn(I, d) =κn(H, e)
P. ‘1.⟹ 2.’ follows from Proposition 4.4.4, ‘2.⟹ 3.’ follows from Proposi-
tion 4.4.3 and ‘3.⟹ 1.’ follows from the fact that rankXκ,nI,d = n and gradeXκ,nI,d ≤ κ.
2
Saturation and Hennessy-Milner-Property
We li the restriction of signatures τ being ﬁnite and admit signatures of arbitrary
size. We still need not to refer to the class 𝕂. e deﬁnition of type is the one for
໦໱໨໶ extended by a deﬁnition of ∃≥κr−-types.
D 4.4.6 . Let τ be a signature and (I, d) a pointed τ-interpretation.
1. Let κ < ω be positive, r ∈ NR. en Γ ⊆ ໦໱໨໴(τ) is called ∃≥κr-type
of (I, d) if for all ﬁnite Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have (I, d) ⊨ ∃≥κr.⨅Γ0. Similarly we
deﬁne ∃≥κr−-types.
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2. An ∃≥κr-type Γ of (I, d) is realised at d if there is a setD ⊆ rI(d)with |D| ≥ κ
such that for all d0 ∈ D we have (I, d0) ⊨ Γ.
3. An ∃≥κr−-type Γ of (I, d) is realised at d if there is a set D ⊆ r−I(d) with
|D| ≥ κ such that for all d0 ∈ D we have (I, d0) ⊨ Γ.
♢
D 4.4.7 . An interpretation I is ໦໱໨໶໮໴-saturated, if for all positive
κ < ω, all r ∈ NR and every d ∈ ΔI, every ∃≥κr-type and every ∃≥κr−-type of
(I, d) is realised at d. ♢
O 4.4.8 . Every ω-saturated interpretation is໦໱໨໶໮໴-saturated
P 4.4.9 . ໦໱໨໶໮໴ has the Hennessy-Milner-property, i.e. if I and H
are both໦໱໨໶໮໴-saturated then
(I, d) ≡໦໱໨໶໮໴ (H, e) iﬀ (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e),
where (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} and analogously for (H, e).
e proof is omied as it follows exactly the rationale in the proof of Propos-
ition 3.2.12: II has maintain (I, dໟ) ≡໦໱໨໶໮໴ (H, β(dໟ)) for every conﬁguration
β ∶ D⟶ E and dໟ ∈ D during the game.
It is also possible to restrict the proposition to the fragment which allows for
graded operators up to κ. We then obtain the analogue result
D 4.4.10 . An interpretation I is໦໱໨໶໮໴-κ-saturated, if for all positive
λ < κ, all r ∈ NR and every d ∈ ΔI, every ∃≥λr-type and every ∃≥λr−-type of (I, d)
is realised at d. ♢
P 4.4.11 . ໦໱໨໶໮໴κ has the Hennessy-Milner-property, i.e. if I and
H are both ໦໱໨໶໮໴-κ-saturated then κ(I, d) = κ(H, e) iﬀ (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− (H, e),
where κ(I, d) = {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C and rankC ≤ κ} and similarly
for (H, e)
e adaption of the proof given for Proposition 3.2.12 is not diﬃcult.
The Characterisation Theorem for໦໱໨໶໮໴-Concepts over 𝕂
We shall now present the characterisation theorem for໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts w.r.t.
to𝕂. Yet, with the notions for໦໱໨໶໮໴-saturatedness and໦໱໨໶໮໴-character-
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istic concepts, which were presented without referring to 𝕂, the steps taken for
the characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts can be readily extended to໦໱໨໶໮.
Let τ be arbitrary and I ∶= (ω⧵{0})×ω. Wemay assume w.l.o.g. that τ contains
at least one element in NI, for otherwise this case would reduce to໦໱໨໶໮.
L 4.4.12 . Let φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) be invariant under ∗⟷−− † in𝕂, where ∗ ∈ {‘< ω’}∪
{‘≤ κ’ ∣ κ < ω} and † < ω or simply omied. Let τφ ⊆ τ contain all signature
symbols occurring in φ and I,H in 𝕂.
(I↾τφ, d) ∗⟷−− † (H↾τφ, e) ⟹ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ φ(x)
We can directly use the proof for Lemma 4.3.1
P 4.4.13 . Every formula φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− in 𝕂
is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n in 𝕂 for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
A proof would verbatim repeat the proof of Proposition 4.3.2 and is thus omit-
ted.
T 4.4.14 . Let τ be a signature. For all φ(x) ∈ FO(τ), whi are invariant un-
der <ω⟷−− in𝕂 exists a concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ) su that φ(x) is logically equivalent
to C.
P. According to Proposition 4.4.13 φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− n for some
(κ, n) ∈ I. Let τφ ⊆ τ contain all signature symbols occuring in φ and let C ∶=
⨆{Xκ,nI↾τφ,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}, where X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept
of (I, d) over the signature τφ on level (κ, n).
Since φ(x) ⊨ C it remains to show C ⊨ φ(x). Assume (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nK↾τφ,c with
Xκ,nK↾τφ,c ∈ {X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}. en (H↾τφ, e)
≤κ⟷−− n (K↾τφ, c) ⊨ φ and Lemma
4.4.12 yields (H, e) ⊨ φ(x). Hence C ⊨ φ(x) which shows that C is logically equi-
valent to φ(x). 2
4.4.2 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴u-Concepts
Similarly to໦໱໨໶໴u, the characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴u over 𝕂 does not make
much sense as such since we can already control the cardinality via the universal
graded role: ∃=1u.a can be stated in໦໱໨໶໮໴u and can be used to force concept
names being interpreted as singleton. However, we have only indirectly invest-
igated the description logic ໦໱໨໶໮ so far. So results stated for ໦໱໨໶໮໴u are,
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without problems, reducible to໦໱໨໶໮.
As for ໦໱໨໶u and ໦໱໨໶໴u, we ﬁrst give a characterisation for graded uni-
versal roles and we shall later, in preparation for TBoxes, restrict the universal
role to ∃≥1 quantiﬁcations. Each ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concept C over the signature τ is
recursively deﬁned by
C ∶∶= ⊤ ∣ a ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃≥κr.D ∣ ∃≥κr−.D ∣ ∃≥κu.D
where a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR, κ < ω and D, E are ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concepts over τ.
u is a logical symbol, i.e. it is not part of the signature. e set of all໦໱໨໶໮໴u-
concepts over τ is denoted by ໦໱໨໶໮໴u(τ). As usual ⊥, →, ⊔, ∀≥κ etc. are
considered to be abbreviations.
e interpretation function for໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts is extended to໦໱໨໶໮໴u-
concepts by seing I ⊨ ∃≥κu.D iﬀ |DI| ≥ κ. Similar to ໦໱໨໶໴, the grade func-
tion is extended to ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concepts by seing grade ∃≥κu.D ∶= max{κ,D},
i.e. actually considering it and rank ∃≥κu.D ∶= rankD, i.e. ignoring the universal
role.
D 4.4.15 . Two interpretations I,H are ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-bisimilar, I <ω⟷−− ∀ H,
if both of the following is true:
1. for all ﬁnite D ⊆ ΔI there is an injective function β ∶ D ⟶ ΔH with
(I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, β(d)) for all d ∈ D.
2. for all ﬁnite E ⊆ ΔH there is an injective function β ∶ E ⟶ ΔI with
(I, β(e)) <ω⟷−− (H, e) for all e ∈ E.
Analogously we say I and H are໦໱໨໶໮໴u-(κ, n)-bisimilar, I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H, iﬀ
1. for all D ⊆ ΔI with |D| ≤ κ there is an injective function β ∶ D ⟶ ΔH
with (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, β(d)) for all d ∈ D.
2. for all E ⊆ ΔH with |E| ≤ κ there is an injective function β ∶ E ⟶ ΔH
with (I, β(e)) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) for all e ∈ E.
As usual, we deﬁne (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (I, e) if I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H and (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) and
similarly for < ω etc. ♢
It is straight forward to see that all these relations are equivalence relations
on the set of τ-interpretations for each signature τ and that every ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-
concept C of rankC ≤ n and gradeC ≤ κ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n. Again, this is
true for all τ-interpretations, also those outside of 𝕂.
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Characteristic Concepts for໦໱໨໶໮໴u
Since the universal role does not occur in its inverse form u− as it would mean the
same as u on its own, this section is almost identical to ໦໱໨໶໮໴. roughout
this section let τ be ﬁnite and I ∶= (ω ⧵ {0}) × ω
Let a τ-interpretation I and (κ, n) ∈ I be given. We deﬁne for all d ∈ ΔI
?κ(d) ∶=
๰
= |{d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d}| if |{d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (I, d0) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d}| < κ
≥ κ else,
where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept over τ for (I, d) on level (κ, n)
e global aracteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concept over τ on level (κ, n) is deﬁned as
Xκ,nI ∶= ෻{∃
?κ(d)u.Xκ,nI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀≥1u.෼{X
κ,n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
again, where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept over τ for (I, d) on level
(κ, n).
If C is constructed by the following scheme, C is called a global ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-
concept over τ : C ∶∶= ∃≥κu.D ∣ E⊓F ∣ ¬Ewhere D ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ) and κ < ω and
E, F are global ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concepts over τ ; clearly then C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u(τ). Ap-
parently, global ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concepts do not depend on a distinguished element.
Let
κn(I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C,C is global, rankC ≤ n, gradeC ≤ κ}.
P 4.4.16 . Let (κ, n) ∈ I and τ ﬁnite. e following three statements are
equivalent:
1. H ⊨ Xκ,nI
2. I ≤κ⟷−− ∀n H
3. κn(I) =κn(H)
e arguments used in the proof of Proposition 3.2.18 for ໦໱໨໶u can be imme-
diately transferred to show Proposition 4.4.25.
P 4.4.17 . Let (κ, n) ∈ I and τ ﬁnite. e following three statements are
equivalent:
1. (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI ⊓ Xκ,nI,d
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2. (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− ∀n (H, e)
3. κn(I, d) =κn(H, e)
where κn(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C , rankC ≤ n , gradeC ≤ κ}
and similarly for (H, e).
e proposition is the combination of eorem 4.4.5 and Proposition 4.4.25.
Saturation and Hennessy-Milner-Property
e signature τ needs not to be ﬁnite anymore but can have arbitrary size.
D 4.4.18 . Let τ be a signature, I a τ-interpretation and letΓ ⊆ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ).
1. Γ is an ∃≥κu-type of I if for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have I ⊨
∃≥κu.⨅Γ0
2. An ∃≥κu-type of I is realised in I if there is a set D ⊆ ΔI with |D| ≥ κ such
that for all d ∈ D we have (I, d) ⊨ Γ.
♢
A τ-interpretation I is ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-saturated, if it is ໦໱໨໶໮໴-saturated and
for all positive κ < ω all ∃≥κu-types are realised.
P 4.4.19 . ໦໱໨໶໮໴u has the Hennessy-Milner property, i.e. for any two
໦໱໨໶໮໴u-saturated τ-interpretations I,H the following holds:
I ≡໦໱໨໶໮໴u H ⟺ I <ω⟷−− H.
Again, one can transfer the arguments from Proposition 3.2.22, which shows
the Hennessy-Milner-Property for໦໱໨໶u, in order to show Proposition 4.4.19.
Similar to theHennessy-Milner-Property for໦໱໨໶໮໴, one can call a τ-interpretation
໦໱໨໶໮໴u-κ-saturated, whenever it is໦໱໨໶໮໴-κ-saturated and all ∃≥λu-types
for λ < κ are realised. en the following variant of the Hennessy-and-Milner
property holds:
P 4.4.20 . ໦໱໨໶໮໴u has the Hennessy-Milner property, i.e. for any two
໦໱໨໶໮໴u-κ-saturated τ-interpretations I,H the following holds:
κ(I) =κ(H) ⟺ I ≤κ⟷−− H
where κ ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C and gradeC ≤ κ} and similarly for H.
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The Characterisation Theorem for໦໱໨໶໮໴u-Concepts
We shall give a characterisation theorem for໦໱໨໶໮u-concepts instead of໦໱໨໶໮໴u-
concepts.
P 4.4.21 . Let τ be an arbitrary signature. If φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) and φ is
invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀ then φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− ∀n for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
e proof can simply be copied from Proposition 3.2.14, provided one refers
to the adapted notions of characteristic ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-concepts and ໦໱໨໶໮໴u-
bisimulation.
T 4.4.22 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀ is lo-
gically equivalent to some concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮u(τ).
With an analogous lemma to Lemma 4.4.27, and Proposition 4.4.21 one can
proof the following theorem, whose proof has been omied as it is analogous to
the proof of eorem 4.4.29:
T 4.4.23 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− ∀ in 𝕂 is
logically equivalent to some concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u(τ).
໦໱໨໶໮໴u1
໦໱໨໶໮໴u1 is the extension of໦໱໨໶໮໴ with ∃≥1u.
D 4.4.24 . Two τ-interpretation I, H are globally ໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimilar,
I ≤κ⟷−− Q H, if both of the following holds:
1. for every d ∈ ΔI there is e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e)
2. for every e ∈ ΔH there is d ∈ ΔI with (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e)
♢
We deﬁne I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H analogously. Again we abbreviate (I, d) <ω⟷−− Q (H, e) if
I <ω⟷−− Q H and (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e) and similarly we abbreviate (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (H, e).
For ﬁnite signature τ, and (κ, n) ∈ I characteristic ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-concepts for
some τ-interpretation I are deﬁned as
Yκ,nI ∶= ෻{∃
≥1u.Xκ,nI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀≥1u.෼{X
κ,n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}
where Xκ,nI,d is the characteristic໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept over τ on level (κ, n).
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P 4.4.25 . Let (κ, n) ∈ I and τ ﬁnite. e following three statements are
equivalent:
1. H ⊨ Yκ,nI
2. I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H
3. κn(I) =κn(H)
with κn(I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C,C global , rankC ≤ n, gradeC ≤ κ}.
P. ‘1.⟹ 2.’ If H ⊨ Yκ,nI then for every d ∈ ΔI H ⊨ ∃≥1u.Xκ,nI,d and so there
is e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e), and conversely, since H ⊨ ∀≥1u.⨆{Xκ,nI,d ∣ d ∈
ΔI}, for every e ∈ ΔH there is some d ∈ ΔI with H ⊨ Xκ,nI,d, and so (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n
(H, e).
‘2.⟹ 3.’ e proof is carried out by induction upon the structure of global
concepts C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1(τ) with gradeC ≤ κ and rankC ≤ n: We show I ⊨
∃≥1u.C ⟹ I ⊨ ∃≥1u.C: Assume the premise is true. en there is d ∈ ΔI with
(I, d) ⊨ C. Since I ≤κ⟷−− Qn H there is e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) ≤κ⟷−− n (H, e) and since
C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1(τ) we have (H, e) ⊨ C. e converse is obtained the same way.
e step cases are readily yielded by the induction hypothesis.
‘3.⟹ 1.’ Is immediate. 2
Let the signature τ be arbitrary. We call a τ-interpretation I ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-
saturated if it is ໦໱໨໶໮໴-saturated (cf. Deﬁnition 4.4.6) and all ∃≥1u-types (cf.
Deﬁnition 4.4.18) are realised.
P 4.4.26 . ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1 has the Hennessy-Milner property, i.e. for any
two໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-saturated τ-interpretations I,H the following holds:
(I) =(H) ⟺ I <ω⟷−− Q H.
where (I) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C,C global }.
P. Let d ∈ ΔI arbitrary. en I ⊨ ∃≥1u.⨅Γ0 for each ﬁnite subset of its
໦໱໨໶໮໴-theory(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI}. Since(I) =(H)
we have H ⊨ ∃≥1u.⨅Γ0 and so (I, d) is a type of H which is realised by some
e ∈ ΔH. e Hennessy-Milner-Property of ໦໱໨໶໮໴ stated in Proposition 4.4.9
shows (I, d) < ω⟷−− (H, e).
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e same arguments can be used to show that for every e ∈ ΔH there is d ∈ ΔI
such that (I, d) <ω⟷−− (H, e), which proves the if-direction. e only-if direction is
readily inferred from Proposition 4.4.25 2
is proposition can easily be extended to pointed interpretations. Again, the
Hennessy-Milner-Property holds for every positive cardinality κ < ω:
κ(I, d) =κ(H, d) ⟺ (I, d) <κ⟷−− Q (H, d).
where κ(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C with rankC ≤ κ}. Notice
that the universal role still has only grade 1, whilst arbitrary positive grades κ < ω
are allowed on the level of໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts.
L 4.4.27 . Let φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) be invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂. Let τφ ⊆ τ contain
the signature symbols occurring in φ, as well as at least one a ∈ NI and let I,H in
𝕂.
(I↾τφ, d) <ω⟷−− Q (H↾τφ, e) ⟹ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) ⟺ (H, e) ⊨ φ(x)
e proof for this lemma can be copied from the proof of Lemma 4.4.27 in a
straight forward way.
P 4.4.28 . Every formula φ ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂
is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn in 𝕂 for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
We skip the proof as it uses the same rational as Proposition 4.3.7.
T 4.4.29 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂
is equivalent to some concept C ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1(τ)
P. Let τφ comprise the symbols occurring in φ. If φ does not contain an
element of NI, we simply choose an element from NI and add this to τφ.
According to Proposition 4.4.28 φ is invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Qn for some (κ, n) ∈ I.
Let C ∶= {Yκ,nI↾τφ ⊓X
κ,n
I↾τφ,d ∣ (I, d) in𝕂 and (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)}where Y
κ,n
I↾τφ is the charac-
teristic ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-concept and Xκ,nI↾τφ,d is the characteristic ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept
for (I, d) over τφ on level (κ, n).
We show ⨆C ⊨ φ(x). Let (H, e) ⊨ ⨆C. en there is (I, d) in 𝕂 such that
Xκ,nI,d ∈ C and (H, e) ⊨ Xκ,nI,d. Hence (H↾τφ, e) ≤κ⟷−− Qn (I↾τφ, d) and Lemma 4.4.27
yields (H, e) ⊨ φ(x). 2
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4.4.3 The Characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes
Interestingly, the characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes is easier than for໦໱໨໶໴:
the additional expressivity of the inverse role makes every type of an element de-
scribe the whole connected component where the element is located.
Since one element of a connected component is enough, we need not realising
more types of other elements in this connected component, which led in case
of ໦໱໨໶໴ to new realisations of individuals. We dealt with the resulting ex-
cess amount of individuals by cuing out their generated subinterpretations and
engra some uniformly chosen representative of their bisimulation type in their
place; a rather technical endeavour, to say the least.
For ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes this problem is reduced to a simple pick-and-mix pro-
cedure, which makes it neat and transparent.
For the following observation we need not to refer to the class 𝕂. In particular,
this observation could be also made for໦໱໨໶໮-TBoxes.
O 4.4.30 . Let (Ii)i∈I be a family of τ-interpretations. ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes
are
1. invariant under global໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimulation <ω⟷−− Q
2. invariant under disjoint unions
P.
1. Since every ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBox is equivalent to some ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-concept,
the claim follows directly fromeorem 4.4.29.
2. Note that connected components are transferred without change or alter-
ation into the disjoint union. Since the game for (local) ໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisi-
mulation takes place only within a connected component, elements in the
disjoint union are໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimilar to their counterparts in the original
structure.
Assume ໹ is an໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBox and let (Ii)i∈I be a family of τ-interpretations.
We have to show
(∀i ∈ I ∶ I ⊨ ໹ ) ⟺ ෺i∈I
Ii ⊨ ໹.
’⟹’: Assume ∀i ∈ I ∶ I ⊨ ໹. We have to show for all C ⊑ D ∈ ໹
that C⨄i∈I Ii ⊆ D⨄i∈I Ii . Assume d ∈ C⨄i∈I Ii . en there is i ∈ I such
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that d ∈ ΔIi . Since (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d) we have d ∈ CIi and since
Ii ⊨ ໹ by assumption, it follows that d ∈ DIi , which—because (Ii, d) <ω⟷−−
(⨄i∈I Ii, d)—entails d ∈ D⨄i∈I Ii .
If on the other hand ⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹ with C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ and we have d ∈ CIi
for some i ∈ I and some d ∈ ΔIi then (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d) implies d ∈
C⨄i∈I Ii which entails, because ⨄i∈I Ii ⊨ ໹ with C ⊑ D ∈ ໹, automatically
d ∈ D⨄i∈I Ii . e fact that (Ii, d) <ω⟷−− (⨄i∈I Ii, d) implies d ∈ DIi . So
CIi ⊆ DIi which shows Ii ⊨ C ⊑ D.
2
We deﬁne NR∗ ∶= ⋃n<ωNRn where NR0 ∶= {ε} and
NRn+1 = (NR ∪ {r− ∣ r ∈ NR}) × NRn
for all n < ω. Intuitively,NR∗ contains all words (of ﬁnite length) over the alphabet
NR ∪{r− ∣ r ∈ NR}. We speak of an r∗-path, if we mean a ﬁnite sequence of edges
(di, di+1) ∈ ri for i ∈ {0,… , n} such that r∗ corresponds to the word r0…rn. For
every໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept C and every r∗ ∈ NR∗ we recursively deﬁne
∃r∗C ∶=
๰
C if r∗ = ε
∃s.∃s∗C if r∗ = s ⋅ s∗.
We use ∀r∗C as abbreviation for ¬(∃r∗¬C). Every unfolding of ∃r∗ leads to a
ﬁnite or empty chain of quantiﬁcations and for every expression ∃r∗C we obtain
a proper໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept if C is a proper໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept.
e following deﬁnition of generated subinterpretation was equivalently given
on page 58 but shall be repeated for convenience. A generated subinterpretations
in one element d is exactly the connected component of d.
D 4.4.31 . Let τ be an arbitrary signature. K is called generated subin-
terpretation of I in d ∈ ΔI if K ∶= I↾ΔK, and K contains exactly those elements
reachable on a ﬁnite path from d (including d) in I. ♢
D 4.4.32 . Let τ be a signature and φ ∈ FO(τ) a sentence. en φ is
1. invariant under <ω⟷−− Q in 𝕂 if for any two interpretations I,H in 𝕂 we have
I <ω⟷−− Q H⟹ I ⊨ φ iﬀ H ⊨ φ
2. invariant under nominal disjoint unions in 𝕂 if the following holds: Let
(Ii)i∈I be a family of τ-interpretations in 𝕂 such that Ii ⊨𝕂 φ for all i ∈ I.
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Let NI(K) ∶= {a ∈ NI ∣ aK ≠ ∅} and (Ki)i∈I be a family of generated
subinterpretations, where Ki is a generated subinterpretation of some di ∈
ΔIi in Ii for each i ∈ I such that
(a) ⋃i∈INI(Ki) = NI
(b) NI(Ki) ∩ NI(Kj) = ∅ for all i, j ∈ I with i ≠ j.
then ∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ φ iﬀ⨄i∈I Ki ⊨𝕂 φ.
♢
In particular, every sentence φ which is invariant under nominal disjoint uni-
ons, is preserved under under all subinterpretations of I which contain all indi-
viduals and which are closed under r-predecessors and r-successors for r ∈ NR.
Before the characterisation theorem for ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes will be given, we
shall make a remark about connected components. In the proof of the character-
isation theorem, we shall claim that, if a set Γ ∶= {∀r∗.¬a ∣ a ∈ NI and r∗ ∈ NR∗}
is satisﬁable with a set p ⊆ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τ) and some FO-sentence φ then there is a
model (H, e) such that no element in the connected component of e satisﬁes any
a ∈ NI.
But satisﬁability only yields that no ﬁnite path r∗ ∈ NR∗ emerging from e can
lead to an element which satisﬁes some a ∈ NI. e question is, whether there
could be, in inﬁnite distance, some element e0 that satisﬁes some a ∈ NI: Take,
e.g. the signature NI ∶= {a}, NC = ∅ and NR ∶= {<} and the τ-interpretation
with ΔH ∶= P(ω), the power-set of all natural numbers. Set aH ∶= {ω} and set
M < N iﬀ there is n < ω such thatM∪{n} = N. Is∅ ∈ ΔH connected to ω ∈ ΔH?
Apart from the fact that paths are deﬁned as ﬁnite sequences of edges and con-
nected components are deﬁned as all elements that are reachable in ﬁnitely many
steps, ω and∅ are not connected as the following observation will show in a more
general seing:
O 4.4.33 . Only elements in ﬁnite distance are connected
P. Let H be an arbitrary interpretation over some signature τ and set
E ∶= {(e0, e1) ∈ ΔH × ΔH ∣ ∃r∗ ∈ NR∗ ∶ e0 is connected to e1 by an r∗-path}
Note that r∗ describes a ﬁnite path. E is an equivalence relation: it is reﬂexive
as ε ∈ NR∗, it is symmetric since two elements connected by an r∗-path are
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connected an rev(r∗)-path. Where rev(ε) ∶= ε, rev(r ⋅ r∗) ∶= rev(r∗) ⋅ r− and
rev(r− ⋅ r∗) ∶= rev(r∗) ⋅ r. Finally E is transitive as e0 is connected by a path r∗0 ⋅ r∗1
to e2 whenever e0 is connected by a path r∗0 to e1 and e1 is connected by a path r∗1
to e2.
We construct the interpretation U: We set ΔU ∶= ΔH and for every r ∈ NR,
we set rU ∶= ⋃e0∈ΔH rU ∩ ([e0] × [e0]) and SU ∶= {e0 ∈ ΔH ∣ e0 ∈ SH} for all
S ∈ NC ∪NI. By deﬁnition of rU, there cannot be an r-edge between two diﬀerent
classes.
We show that id ∶ H⟶ U is an isomorphism. Clearly, rU ⊆ I so it remains to
show that (e0, e1) ∈ rH ⟹ (e0, e1) ∈ rU for all r ∈ NR. If the former is true then
[e0] = [e1] by deﬁnition, and so (e0, e1) ∈ rH ∩ ([e0] × [e0]), hence (e0, e1) ∈ rU. 2
Observation 4.4.33 shows that ∅ and ω are not connected. Even the transitive
closure of < from our example above does not change the fact that ∅ and ω are
not connected, showing that the subset relation ⊆ must properly comprise the
transitive closure of <. It follows that if two elements are not connected by some
ﬁnite path, they are not connected at all.
T 4.4.34 . Let τ be an arbitrary signature and φ ∈ FO(τ) a sentence su
that φ is
1. invariant under ≤κ⟷−− Q in 𝕂
2. invariant under nominal disjoint unions of generated subinterpretations in 𝕂
P. Let τφ be the signature symbols used in φ containing at least one c ∈ NI.
If τφ does not contain such an element, we simply choose one from NI and add it
to τφ. Let this c ∈ NI be ﬁxed for the rest of the proof.
cons τφ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τφ) s.t. φ ⊨𝕂 C ⊑ D}
Assume cons τφφ ⊭𝕂 φ. en there must be some H in𝕂model for cons φ∪{¬φ}.
We shall ﬁrst show that every໦໱໨໶໮໴-type of an element in H, which is not
located on a component which hosts an individual, can be realised in a model of
φ on a component which again has no individual: Let Γ ∶= {∀≥1r∗¬a ∣ a ∈ NI}
and
P ∶= {p ⊆ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τφ) ∣ p ∪ cons τφφ ∪ Γ satisﬁable in 𝕂}
Every p ∈ P is satisﬁable with Γ∪{φ} in 𝕂: For otherwise the compactness of FO
over𝕂 provides a ﬁnite subset p0 ⊆ p and a ﬁnite subset Γ0 such that p0∪Γ0∪{φ}
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is unsatisﬁable in𝕂, yielding that for all modelsK in𝕂 of φ and all d ∈ ΔKwe have
(K, d) ⊨ ¬(⨅ p0⊓⨅Γ0), which is true iﬀK ⊨ ⨅ p0⊓⨅Γ0 ⊑ ⊥. Since everymodel
K in 𝕂 of φ satisﬁes this concept inclusion, we have⨅ p0 ⊓⨅Γ0 ⊑ ⊥ ∈ cons τφφ,
a contradiction to the satisﬁability of p ∪ cons τφφ ∪ Γ in 𝕂.
Let C(ep) be the connected component of e in U where (U, e) ⊨ p ∪ Γ ∪ {φ}.
In the next step, we partition NI ∩ τφ in a way that all individuals which occur
in the same generated subinterpretation in H are in the same class:
E ∶= {(a, b) ∈ (τφ ∩ NI) × (τφ ∩ NI) ∣ (H, aH) ⊨ ∃≥1r∗.b}
With the same arguments as in Observation 4.4.33, one can show that E is an
equivalence relation. Since τφ is ﬁnite (τφ ∩ NI)/E has ﬁnitely many classes, we
can choose for each class one representative which we collect in the set N. Each
type (H, aHi ) with a ∈ N can be be satisﬁed in 𝕂 with Γa ∶= {∀≥1r∗¬b ∣ b ∈
(τφ ∩NI) ⧵ [a]} and φ. Again, otherwise we could infer that φ ⊨𝕂 ⨅Γໟa ⊓ T0 ⊑ ⊥,
where Γໟa ⊆ Γa and T0 ⊆(H, aH), a contradiction to H ⊨ cons τφφ.
Let (Ka, aKa) in 𝕂 be a model of cons τφ ∪(H, aH) ∪ Γa for all a ∈ N. With
the same model-theoretic construction as above we can ensure that no individual
from any other class than [aH] is on the same component as aKa .
Additionally, we may assume that all individual names a ∈ NI ⧵ τφ are assigned
to the individual cKa we ﬁxed above: If this is not the case, we can switch to the
interpretation Kໟa which is Ka where exactly aK
ໟa ∶= cKa for all a ∈ NI ⧵ τφ. We
have then Ka ≅τφ Kໟa and hence (Kໟa, aK
ໟ) ⊨(H, aH) ∪ Γa ∪ {φ}.
Let C(a) be the connected component of a in Ka for all a ∈ N and let C(ep) be
the connected component for each p ∈ P as discussed above. We know for
K ∶=෺p∈P
C(ep) ⊎෺a∈N
C(a)
that K in 𝕂 and since φ is invariant under nominal disjoint unions we know that
K ⊨ φ.
We set I ∶= H ⊎ ⨄p∈P C(ep) and infer that I in 𝕂. Since H ⊭𝕂 φ and φ is
invariant under nominal disjoint unions we have I ⊨𝕂 ¬φ.
Let I∗ be the ω-saturated extension of I↾(τφ ∪ NI) and likewise K∗ the one for
K↾(τφ ∪ NI). I.e. we are looking at τ-interpretations in 𝕂 where SI
∗ = ∅ for all
symbols S ∈ (NC ∪ NR) ⧵ τφ and likewise for K∗. We still have I∗ ⊨𝕂 φ and
K∗ ⊨𝕂 ¬φ
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We show K∗ ≤κ⟷−− Q I∗. Let d ∈ K∗. en each ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ (K∗, d) was
realised at some dΓ0 ∈ ΔK. Note that (K∗, d) ⊆ ໦໱໨໶໮໴(τφ ∪ NI). In case dΓ0
ﬁnds itself on one of the connected components C(dp) with p ∈ P then dΓ0 ∈ ΔI
and so I ⊨ ∃≥1u.⨅Γ0.
Otherwise there is some a ∈ N and some path r∗ such that (K, aK) ⊨ ∃≥1r∗.⨅Γ0.
Since (K, aK) ⊨(H↾(τφ∪NI), aH), we also know that (H, aH) ⊨ ∃≥1r∗.⨅Γ0. is
shows that I ⊨ ∃≥1u.⨅Γ0.
Since both interpretations K∗ and I∗ are in particular ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-saturated,
there must be dໟ ∈ ΔI∗ with (I∗, dໟ) ⊨(K∗, d). e Hennessy-Milner-Property
for໦໱໨໶໮໴u1 shows that (K∗, d) <ω⟷−− Q (I∗, dໟ).
In the same way, we can show that for every d ∈ ΔI∗ there is dໟ ∈ ΔK∗ with
(I∗, d) <ω⟷−− Q (K∗, dໟ), which proves K∗ ≤κ⟷−− Q I∗. But now K∗ ⊨𝕂 φ and I ⊨𝕂 ¬φ. A
contradiction which proves that cons τφ ⊨ φ. 2
We have seen that໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes could be characterised by invariance un-
der global ໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimulation and a pick-and-mix procedure of connected
components so that a new interpretation in 𝕂 is obtained. is is considerably
less technical than in the case for໦໱໨໶໴.
Surely, the spy-point technique comes to mind when thinking about the ques-
tion as to why the characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes is easier than໦໱໨໶໴-
TBoxes. e spy-point technique is used (e.g. [19, 2, 50]) in order to ‘internalise’
TBoxes [121]: Reasoning techniques for ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts say, can be reused
for ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes by rewriting ໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept subsumptions C ⊑ D as
໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts:
Let τ be a signature and let a be a fresh individual for τ the the spy-point trans-
lation ⋅spy is in [128] recursively deﬁned on໦໱໨໶໮໴-concepts as follows:
C spy ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
C if C ∈ NI ∪ NC
D spy ⊓ E spy if C = D ⊓ E
¬(D spy) if C = ¬D
∃≥κr.D spy ⊓ ∃≥1spy−.a if C = ∃≥κr.D
If we assume w.l.o.g. that the ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBox contains only one concept sub-
sumption of the form ⊤ ⊑ D. e spy-point translation ໹ spy of ໹ is then the
໦໱໨໶໮໴-concept a ⊓ D spy ⊓ ∀spy.D spy. It turns out that the TBox and its spy-
point translation are equi-satisﬁable (cf. [128, Lemma 5.24]), i.e. ໹ has a model iﬀ
໹ spy has a model. A model H for ໹ can be extracted from the model (I, aI) ⊨ ໹ spy
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by restricting I to only those elements which are either aI itself or connected to
aI via a spy-edge.
e argument therefore would be that ໦໱໨໶໮໴ can, via this detour, intern-
alise ໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes which accounts for the relatively moderate increase of
expressive power which expresses itself in the transparent notion of nominal dis-
joint union used for the characterisation of໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes.
But the spy-point technique makes heavily use of signature extensions which
are not in the spirit of our model theoretic characterisation where signatures
are sacrosanct. In a seing of strict invariant signatures, it is the inverse prop-
erty which yields the explanation: e໦໱໨໶໮໴-theory of a point describes the
whole connected component. In this sense we do not have forward generated
subinterpretations like in໦໱໨໶໴ but always fully connected components. ese
fully connected components reduce disjoint unions to pick and mix procedures
and make complicated unions of interpretations obsolete.
Although ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1 is close to ໸໷໴໮໶, which allows TBoxes to contain
concepts with universal operator, it does not make sense to give a separate char-
acterisation, as these ໦໱໨໶໮໴u1-TBoxes capture the whole expressivity of the
global concepts in໦໱໨໶໮໴u1.
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5. The characterisation of ໪໱
5.1 ໪໱
໪໱ emerged, as mentioned in the introduction Chapter 1, from the formalisation
of large medical ontologies like SNOMED CT. It is considered to be a sub-boolean
description logic as it is not closed under all boolean operators ⊓, ⊔, ¬ but only
under ⊓. Its expressiveness is compared with໦໱໨ and further extensions which
we treated in preceding chapters relatively weak. As beneﬁt from this sacriﬁce it
has good complexity (PTIME-complete) [66, 9, 26, 10, 12] when it comes to reas-
oning. Since reasoning under ໪໱ is tractable, the World Wide Web Commiee
(W3C) has speciﬁed the OWL 2 ໪໱ proﬁle [37], which makes ໪໱ particularly in-
teresting.
5.1.1 Syntax and Semantics
As mentioned ໪໱ does not contain negations and disjunctions. Since we consider
disjunctions to be syntactical abbreviations, its syntax is, in the style given for
DLs in the previous chapters, merely ໦໱໨ without negation: C is an ໪໱-concept
over the signature τ if
C ∶∶= ⊥ ∣ ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ∃r.D
where A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR and D, E are ໪໱-concepts over τ. Like for ໦໱໨, we
considerNI = ∅. We denotewith ໪໱(τ) the set of all ໪໱-concepts over τ including
the atomic concept ⊥. Note that ⊥ does not allow the formulation of any kind of
negation but simply states inconsistency and is never true.
As ໪໱ is a fragment of ໦໱໨, we simply apply the interpretation for ໦໱໨-
concepts to ໪໱-concepts and similarly we can restrict the rank-function for໦໱໨-
concepts (page 35) to ໪໱-concepts.
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5.1.2 ໪໱-Simulation
As our aim is to ﬁnd a characterisation for ໪໱, we need to ﬁnd a model theoretic
notion which allows, restricted to ﬁnite signatures and ﬁnite number of rounds,
to be described by characteristic concepts, as done with all description logics pre-
viously mentioned.
Since we do not have negations and in particular no ∀-quantiﬁcations, there is
no possibility to describe a symmetrical notion like bisimulation for ໦໱໨. e
notion in hand is simply simulation. We shall explain the appropriate game, at
ﬁrst not restricted to ﬁnite rounds or ﬁnite signature. Let therefore τ be arbitrary.
D 5.1.1 (Simulation-Game). Let (I, d) and (H, e) be τ interpretations. e
game G(I, d;H, e) is played by two players named I and II
e start-conﬁguration of G(I, d;H, e) is (I, d;H, e). For each conﬁguration
(I, d0;H, e0), I chooses some r ∈ NR and an r-successor d1 of d0 in I. If I cannot
make such a move, II wins the game. If II is able to respond with an r-successor
e1 of e0 such that
∀A ∈ NI ∶ d1 ∈ AI ⟹ e1 ∈ AH
holds, a new conﬁguration (I, d1;H, e1) of G(I, d;H, e) is reached; II looses other-
wise. e start-conﬁguration may be considered as the outcome of the 0-th round
and d ∈ AI ⟹ e ∈ AH must hold for all a ∈ NC too, or II has already lost the
game. ♢
D 5.1.2 (Winning-strategy). II has a winning-strategy in G(I, d;H, e) or
(I, d) −−→ (H, e), if she ﬁnds a response in G(I, d;H, e) for any challenge of I and
does not loose any round. ♢
Note that (I, d) −−→ (H, e) and (H, e) −−→ (I, d) does, in general, not imply
(I, d) ⟷−− (H, e). e reason for this is that simulation cannot capture negative
information about concepts names.
E 5.1.3 . Take ΔI ∶= {d, b, c} with rI ∶= {(d, b), (d, c)} and A ∶= {c, b}
and B ∶= {b}, whilst ΔH ∶= {e, g} rI ∶= {(e, g)} and B,A ∶= {g}. Clearly
(I, d) −−→ (H, e) and (H, e) −−→ (I, d), but (I, d) is not bisimilar to (H, e): I chal-
lenging II in the bisimulation game G(I, d;H, e) by moving from d to c cannot be
responded by II in H as g does not satisfy ¬B.
Bisimulation follows if one requires II to respond to challenges of I throughout
the game with equisimilar elements. I.e. for any conﬁguration (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) in the
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game G(I, d;H, e) we require (I, dໟ) −−→ (H, eໟ) and (H, eໟ) −−→ (I, dໟ). e notion
of equisimilarity shall be elaborated further down.
e fact that (I, d) −−→ (H, e) and (H, e) −−→ (I, d) does not imply bisimulation,
has been tried to be remedied in [85] by requiring atomic equivalence for con-
ﬁgurations occurring during the game. is notion is clearly too strong for ໪໱
since, as mentioned just now, ໪໱ cannot express negated concept names. Hence
this notion of simulation cannot be captured by characteristic ໪໱-concepts in the
way they will be introduced further down.
With a simple proof by induction, one can show that every concept C ∈ ໪໱(τ)
is preserved under simulation. e crucial point is here that C is only preserved,
i.e. if (I, d) −−→ (H, e) then (I, d) ⊨ C ⟹ (H, e) ⊨ C. e converse (H, e) ⊨ C
implies (I, d) ⊨ C cannot be expected.
D 5.1.4 . II has a winning strategy in the n-round game Gn(I, d;H, e) if
she can ward oﬀ any challenges of I during the ﬁrst n rounds. We denote this by
(I, d) −−→n (K, e) ♢
For every signature τ the relation −−→n is a reﬂexive and transitive relation on
the set of all pointed τ-interpretations. For all n < ω we have (I, d) −−→n+1 (H, e)
implies (I, d) −−→n (H, e) and (I, d) −−→(H, e) implies (I, d) −−→n (H, e). A proof by
induction shows for all C ∈ ໪໱(τ) with rankC ≤ n
(I, d) −−→n (H, e)⟹ (I, d) ⊨ C⟹(H, e) ⊨ C
Characteristic ໪໱-Concepts
Let, throughout this section, τ be ﬁnite and I a τ-interpretation. For each level
n < ω we deﬁne the aracteristic ໪໱-concept for (I, d) on level n recursively as
follows
X0I,d ∶= ⨅{A ∈ NC ∣ d ∈ AI}
Xn+1I,d ∶= X0I,d ⊓⨅r∈NR ⨅{∃r.XnI,dໟ ∣ (d, d
ໟ) ∈ rI}
P 5.1.5 . For all pointed τ-interpretations (I, d), (H, e) the following state-
ments are equivalent:
1. (H, e) ⊨ XnI,d
2. (I, d) −−→n (H, e)
3. (H, e) ⊨n(I, d)
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where n(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI and rankC ≤ n}
P. Since ‘2.⟹ 3.’ follows from the observation made directly before this
section about characteristic ໪໱-concepts and ‘3.⟹1.’ follows from the fact that
XnI,d has rank ≤ n, we sele on ‘1.⟹2.’
If n = 0 and (H, e) ⊨ X0I,d then e satisﬁes all concept names satisﬁed by d and so
II wins the game G0(I, d;H, e). In the step case, we assume that I chooses r ∈ NR
and challenges II in the start-conﬁguration in I with some r-successor dໟ of d.
en ∃r.XnI,dໟ is a conjunct of Xn+1I,d and since (H, e) ⊨ Xn+1I,d we obtain that there
must be an r-successor eໟ of e such that (H, eໟ) ⊨ XnI,dໟ .
is r-successor eໟ satisﬁes the same concept names as dໟ and also satisﬁesXnI,dໟ .
e induction hypothesis yields a winning strategy for II inGn(I, dໟ;H, eໟ). As the
challenge of I was arbitrary, it shows that II has a winning strategy in the n + 1-
round game. 2
໪໱-Saturation and the Hennessy-Milner-Property for ໪໱
We do not impose the requirement that τ must be ﬁnite any more. We shall give
an appropriate notion of type and saturation for ໪໱
D 5.1.6 . Let τ be a signature and let I be τ-Interpretation with d ∈ ΔI.
1. A set of Γ ⊆ ໪໱(τ) is called ∃r-type of d in I if for all ﬁnite subsets Γ0 ⊆ Γ
there is an r-successor dໟ of d such that dໟ ∈ (⨅Γ0)I.
2. An ∃r-type Γ is realised at d if there is an r-successor dໟ of d such that
(I, dໟ) ⊨ Γ.
3. An interpretation is ໪໱-saturated if for all d ∈ ΔI and all r ∈ NR every
∃r-type of d is realised at d.
♢
O 5.1.7 . Every ω-saturated interpretation is ໪໱-saturated.
P 5.1.8 . ໪໱ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, i.e. if H is ໪໱-saturated
then (I, d) ⊆(H, e) iﬀ (I, d) −−→(H, e)
It is a questionwhether this property should be calledHennessy-Milner-Property
as it has this asymmetric appearance. ough it will turn out that we can use this
proposition to prove the Hennessy-Milner-Property for the equisimilar invariant
175
fragment of FO. In comparison to the Hennessy-Milner-eroem 2.1.23, we just
make sure that all arguments go through in the asymmetric case.
P. We show that II has awinning strategy in the simulation game (I, d;H, e)
iﬀ she maintains conﬁgurations (I, dໟ;H, eໟ) such that (I, dໟ) ⊆ (H, eໟ). In
particular all these conﬁgurations are valid as every A ∈ NI which is satisﬁed at
dໟ is also satisﬁed at eໟ. is start-conﬁguration meets the requirement.
Assume, the game has reached the conﬁguration (I, d0;H, e0) with (I, d0) ⊆
(H, e0) and I challenges II by choosing some r ∈ NR and moving to an r-
successor d1 of d0 in I. For each ﬁnite set Γ0 ⊆ (I, d1) we have (I, d0) ⊨
∃r.⨅Γ0 and since (I, d0) ⊆(H, e0), (I, d1) forms an ∃r-type of (H, e0). As
H is ໪໱-saturated, this type is realised at e0, i.e. there is some r-successor of e1
such that (H, e1) ⊨ (I, d1). e conﬁguration (I, d1;H, e1) meets the require-
ment. is proves that II has a winning strategy in the simulation game. 2
5.1.3 The ໪໱⊔ Extension of ໪໱
e notion of simulation as consequent development from the notion of bisimula-
tion, cannot prevent disjunctions from being preserved: Let C,D be ໪໱-concepts
over some signature τ and assume the pointed τ-interpretation (I, d) ⊨ C then
(I, d) ⊨ C or (I, d) ⊨ D. For any pointed τ-interpretation (H, e) with (I, d) −−→
(H, e) we obtain that (H, e) ⊨ C or (H, e) ⊨ D since C is preserved under simula-
tion.
It shows that indeed simulation is too strong for ໪໱. We therefore introduce
the following mild extension ໪໱⊔ of ໪໱ which is for any signature τ recursively
deﬁned by
C ∶∶= ⊥ ∣ ⊤ ∣ A ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ D ⊔ E ∣ ∃r.D
where A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR, and D, E are ໪໱⊔-concepts over τ. We deﬁne ໪໱⊔(τ) as
the set of all ໪໱⊔ concepts over τ together with ⊥ as atomic concept.
໪໱⊔ is simply the closure of ໪໱ over⊔ as disjunctions commutewith existential
quantiﬁcations: ∃r.(C ⊔ D) ≡ ∃r.C ⊔ ∃r.D. We can deﬁne the semantic for ໪໱⊔-
concepts by restricting the ໦໱໨ interpretation to ໪໱⊔. e ໦໱໨ semantic will
however interpret C⊔D as abbreviation for ¬(¬C⊓¬D)which does not change its
semantic meaning and the fact that it is negation free. Similarly we can restrict
the rank function for໦໱໨ to ໪໱⊔.
A proof by induction shows that ໪໱⊔ is preserved under simulation. Since
໪໱(τ) ⊆ ໪໱⊔(τ) for every signature τ we obtain immediately
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1. characteristic concepts for ໪໱⊔ which are simply the characteristic ໪໱-
concepts
2. that Proposition 5.1.5 transfers immediately to ໪໱⊔ withn(I, d) redeﬁned
as {C ∈ ໪໱⊔ ∣ d ∈ CI and rankC ≤ n}
3. that ໪໱⊔ has, using the Deﬁnition 5.1.6 for ໪໱-types and ໪໱-saturation, the
Hennessy-Milner-Property (c.f. Proposition 5.1.8).
We can thus promptly give the characterisation theorem for ໪໱⊔
T 5.1.9 . For every signature τ and every FO-formula φ(x) over τ whi is
preserved under−−→there is a logically equivalent ໪໱⊔-concept over τ.
P. We may w.l.o.g. assume that τ contains exactly the signature symbols
occurring in φ and is therefore ﬁnite. Any FO-formula which is preserved under
−−→ is for some n < ω already preserved under −−→n: In particular φ is invariant
under⟷−− and hence φ is logically equivalent to some໦໱໨-concept C໦໱໨ over τ.
Let n ∶= rankC໦໱໨ and assume that (I, d) −−→n (H, e). For the tree-unravellings
ITd of I in d and analogously HTe of H in e we have
(I, d)⟷−− (ITd , d)⟷−− n (ITd↾n, d) −−→(HTe↾n, e)⟷−− n (HTe , e)⟷−− (H, e),
where ITd↾n is the restriction of ITd to those elements which are reachable within
n-steps from d and likewise for HTe↾n.
We set Cφ ∶= ⨆{XnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)} where XnI,d is the characteristic ໪໱-
concept over τ. e disjunction Cφ is up to logical equivalence ﬁnite and so Cφ ∈
໪໱⊔(τ). Since trivially φ(x) ⊨ Cφ it remains to show that Cφ ⊨ φ(x).
Assume (H, e) ⊨ Cφ. en there is a model (I, d) of φ(x) such that XnI,d is a
disjunct of Cφ and (H, e) ⊨ XnI,d. Proposition 5.1.5 yields (I, d) −−→n (H, e). And
since φ was preserved by−−→n, it follows that (H, e) ⊨ φ(x). 2
5.1.4 Characterisation of ໪໱ as FO-Fragment
As shown in eorem 5.1.9, ໪໱⊔ is the fragment preserved by simulation. e
question arises, whichmodel theoretic property distinguishes ໪໱ from ໪໱⊔? Note
that disjoint unions, which were used to single out TBoxes from the boolean clos-
ure over TBoxes, cannot be used: e validity of a non-global concept at some
element completely depends on the connected neighbourhood of this element
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which is not aﬀected by disjoint unions. Hence we need a notion which bars
disjunctions from ໪໱-concepts, namely the minimal model property used in [91].
E 5.1.10 . Disjoint unions are enough to exclude ⊔ ‘between’ TBoxes: As-
sume we had a disjunction of two TBoxes {⊤ ⊑ A} ⊔ {⊤ ⊑ B} which is logically
equivalent to the ໦໱໨u-concept ∀u.(⊤ → A) ⊔ ∀u.(⊤ → B). Note that this is not
an ໪໱⊔-TBox but a TBox from the boolean closure over all ໪໱-TBoxes.
en this disjunction of TBoxes is not preserved under disjoint unions: Let
ΔI = {d} with AI = {d} and BI = ∅ and let ΔH = {e} with AH = ∅ and
BI = {e}. en all elements in I satisfy A and so I ⊨ {⊤ ⊑ A} ⊔ {⊤ ⊑ B}.
Similarly, all elements in H satisfy B which entails H ⊨ {⊤ ⊑ A} ⊔ {⊤ ⊑ B}.
However the disjoint union of the two satisﬁes neither disjunct: AI⊎H = {d} and
BI⊎H = {e}.
However, the disjoint union is not enough to exclude disjunctions from con-
cepts. Let (I, d), (H, e) be models of the ໪໱⊔-concept A⊔B. Following our remark
on page 37, ໦໱໨-concepts and in particular ໪໱-concepts are not aﬀected by the
disjoint union. Hence (I ⊎ H, d) ⊨ A ⊔ B and (I ⊎ H, e) ⊨ A ⊔ B.
D 5.1.11 . A formula φ over vocabulary τ has a minimal model w.r.t.
some logic ໱ if there is a τ-interpretation Iφ such that for all ໱-formulae ψ over
τ we have Iφ ⊨ ψ iﬀ φ ⊨ ψ. ♢
If a formula has a minimal model it can only be equivalent to ‘trivial’ disjunc-
tions. To illustrate this, let φ ∈ ໱(τ) some formula that has a minimal model Iφ
w.r.t. ໱which would be equivalent to a disjunction⨆i∈I ψi of formulae ψi ∈ ໱(τ).
en Iφ ⊨ ψi for some i ∈ I and so φ ⊨ ψi. We show ψj ⊨ ψi for all j ∈ I: Let
j ∈ I be arbitrary and assume for some H ⊨ ψj then of course H ⊨ ⨆i∈I ψi which
is equivalent to H ⊨ φ. Hence H ⊨ ψi. is shows ψj ⊨ ψi. In case j ≠ i one
can remove ψj from the disjunction and obtain a logically equivalent disjunction.
Since this is true for all j ≠ i in I, we have φ is logically equivalent to⨆i∈I ψi which
is, in turn,logically equivalent to ψi.
D 5.1.12 . Let (Ii)i∈I be a family of τ-interpretations. en ⨉i∈I Ii is
deﬁned by
1. Δ⨉Ii ∶= ⨉i∈IΔIi
2. A⨉Ii ∶= {d̄ ∈ Δ⨉ Ii ∣ ∀i ∈ I ∶ d̄i ∈ AIi}
3. r⨉ Ii ∶= {(d̄, d̄ໟ) ∈ Δ⨉ Ii × Δ⨉Ii ∣ ∀i ∈ I ∶ (d̄i, d̄iໟ) ∈ rIi}
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where d̄i denotes the i-th component of d. ♢
We do not restrict the index set I to be ﬁnite but deﬁne the product for arbitrary
families (Ii)i∈I. In case i ∈ I is inﬁnite, we can interpretΔ⨉ Ii as set of all functions
d̄ ∶ I ⟶⨄ΔIi such that d̄i ∈ ΔIi . Also note that the general assumption ‘any
product of a non-empty family of non-empty sets is not empty’ requires the axiom
of choice.
Apparently, the minimal model property is what we are looking for. For ໪໱,
the minimal model property is the outcome of ໪໱ being invariant under direct
products: A sentence φ of some logic ໱ over the signature τ is invariant under
direct products, if for every family of τ-interpretations (Ii)i∈I we have
(∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ φ) ⟺ ෿i∈I
Ii ⊨ φ
P 5.1.13 . ໪໱ is invariant under arbitrary direct products.
P. Let τ be arbitrary. We shall show by induction upon the structure of
໪໱(τ)-concepts that for any family of pointed τ-interpretations (Ii, di) we have
∀i ∈ I ∶ (Ii, di) ⊨ C ⟺ (෿i∈I
Ii, (di)i∈I) ⊨ C
e claim follows for atomic concepts from the deﬁnition of the direct products.
e claim for conjunctions can be directly obtained by the induction hypothesis.
In case C = ∃r.D and assume for all i ∈ I that (I, di) ⊨ ∃r.D. en there is an
r-successor dໟi of di such that (I, dໟi) ⊨ D.
Let (dໟi)i∈I be the sequence of all those r-successors. By the deﬁnition of the
direct product, we have (dໟi)i∈I is an r-successor of (di)i∈I in⨉i∈I Ii. e induction
hypothesis yields that (⨉i∈I Ii, (dໟi)i∈I) ⊨ D. Hence (⨉i∈I Ii, (di)i∈I) ⊨ ∃r.D.
For the only-if direction we know that if (⨉i∈I Ii∈I, (di)i∈I) ⊨ ∃r.D then there is
an r-successor (dໟi)i∈I of (di)i∈I such that (⨉i∈I Ii∈I, (dໟi)i∈I) ⊨ D. By the deﬁnition
of the direct product, each dໟi is an r-successor of di in Ii. e induction hypothesis
yields that (Ii, dໟi) ⊨ D for all i ∈ I, and hence (Ii, di) ⊨ ∃r.D for all i ∈ I. 2
L 5.1.14 . (⨉i∈I Ii, (di)i∈I) −−→(Ii, di) for all i ∈ I.
P. Maintaining conﬁgurations (⨉i∈I Ii, (dໟi)i∈I; Ii, dໟi), i.e. di is always in the
sequence (di)i∈I, exhibits a winning strategy for II. Any such conﬁguration is valid
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in the way that for every atomic concept A Proposition 5.1.13 shows (Ii, di) ⊨ A.
e start conﬁguration satisﬁes the requirement. Assume we have reached the
conﬁguration (⨉i∈I Ii, (dໟi)i∈I; Ii, dໟi). Let I challenge II by moving in⨉i∈I Ii from
(dໟi)i∈I to (d໠i )i∈I. en d໠i is an r-successor of dໟi in Ii for all i ∈ I. Hence II can re-
spond with d໠i in Ii, reaching a valid conﬁguration that satisﬁes the requirement.
2
It is not diﬃcult to show that the projection πi ∶ ⨉i∈I Ii ⟶ Ii ∶ (di)i∈I ⟼ di
is a surjective homomorphism, i.e. for all role names r ∈ NR we have
((di)i∈I, (dໟi)i∈I) ∈ r⨉i∈I Ii ⟹(πi(di)i∈I, πi(dໟi)i∈I) ∈ rIi
and analogously for concept names. Lyndon’s theorem [34, 95]([116]) proves that
the FO-fragment, which is preserved under surjective homomorphisms are pos-
itive FO-sentences. Positive FO-sentences are those, which are composed from
(non-negated) atoms and closed under conjunctions, disjunctions and arbitrary
quantiﬁcations. Lemma 5.1.14 reformulates the claim within our scope.
Before we show that ໪໱ has minimal models, we recursively deﬁne over n < ω
the following τ-modelM(X) for each characteristic ໪໱-conceptX over τφ: Assume
X = XnH,e for some τ-interpretation H. For all S ∈ τ ⧵ τφ we set SM(X) = ∅.
If n = 0 then X = X0H,e and we set ΔM(X) = {d} and for all A which occur as
conjuncts in X0H,e we deﬁne AM(X) ∶= {d}, whereas all A ∈ τφ that do not occur
in X0H,e are interpreted empty.
If n = n + 1 then X = X0H,e ⊓⨅r∈NR ⨅{∃r.XnH,eໟ ∣ (e, eໟ) ∈ rH}. We set
M(X) ∶=M(X0H,e) ⊎෺{M(X
n
H,eໟ) ∣ ∃r.XnH,eໟ is a conjunct in X}
Let d be the element inM(X0H,e). We redeﬁne rM(X) for all r ∈ NR
rM(X) ∶=ෛ{(d, d
ໟ) ∣ (M(X), dໟ) ⊨ XnH,eໟ and ∃r.XnH,eໟ is a conjunct in X}
M(X) is up to isomorphy uniquely determined for X. It is also a ﬁnite tree-
interpretation of depth n that satisﬁes X, and in particular (M(X), d) −−→n (H, e) if
X = XnH,e.
P 5.1.15 . ໪໱ has the minimal model property, i.e. for all signatures τ
and all concepts C ∈ τ there is a pointed τ-model (I, d) of C su that for all concepts
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D ∈ ໪໱(τ) we have
(I, d) ⊨ D ⟺ C ⊨ D.
P. Let τ be a signature and C ∈ ໪໱(τ) be arbitrary with n ∶= rankC and let
τφ ⊆ τ be the set of all symbols occurring in C. We set
I ∶= {XnH↾τφ,e ∣ H is a τ-interpretation and (H, e) ⊨ C},
where XnH↾τφ,e is the characteristic ໪໱-concept for (H, e) over τφ on level n (cf.
page 174). As discussed, there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent characteristic ໪໱-
concepts over τ on each level n and hence I is ﬁnite.
For each i ∈ I, i.e. i = XnH↾τφ,e for some (H, e) ⊨ C, we set (Ii, di) ∶= (M(i), d).
Since (Ii, di) ⊨ XnH,e and C is preserved under n-simulation, we have (H, e) ≅τφ
(H↾τφ, e) −−→n (Ii, di) and so (Ii, di) ⊨ C. By Proposition 5.1.13, ໪໱-concepts are
invariant under direct products and so we obtain (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) ⊨ C.
We have to show that (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) ⊨ D iﬀ C ⊨ D. Assume (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) ⊨ D and
(H, e) ⊨ C for some (H, e). en (Ii, di) with i = XnH↾τφ,e is a factor in (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄)
and since (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) −−→(Ii, di) and (Ii, di) −−→(H, e), we have (H, e) ⊨ D. 2
We therefore have two characterisation theorems
T 5.1.16 . For every signature τ and every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is
preserved under simulations and has a minimal model w.r.t. ໪໱, there is a logically
equivalent concept Cφ ∈ ໪໱(τ).
P. eorem 5.1.9 shows that φ is equivalent to a disjunction ⨆{XnI,d ∣
(I, d) ⊨ φ(x)} of characteristic ໪໱-concepts over τ. Since φ has a minimal model
there is some (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) such that φ is logically equivalent to⨆{XnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨
φ(x)} which is as discussed on page 178 logically equivalent to XnI,d. 2
T 5.1.17 . For every signature τ and every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) whi is
preserved under simulations and preserved under direct products, there is a logically
equivalent concept Cφ ∈ ໪໱(τ).
Note thatwe do not distinguish between being preserved under arbitrary products
or being preserved under ﬁnite direct products, i.e. being preserved under all dir-
ect products where the index set I is ﬁnite: [34, eorem 6.3.14] tells us that every
FO-sentence which is preserved under ﬁnite direct products, is also preserved
under arbitrary products.
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P  T 5.1.17.
We may w.l.o.g. assume that τ comprises only the symbols in φ, i.e. that τ is
ﬁnite.
eorem 5.1.9 yields that φmust be equivalent to a disjunction⨆{XnH,e ∣ (H, e) ⊨
φ} of characteristic ໪໱-concepts XnH,e. We show that φ has a minimal model w.r.t.
໪໱⊔: Let I ∶= {XnH,e ∣ (H, e) ⊨ φ} and set (Ii, di) ∶= (M(i), d) for all i ∈ I.
Since we have (H, e) −−→(Ii, di) for all models (H, e) of φ with i = XnH,e, we have
(Ii, di) ⊨ φ for all i ∈ I and hence (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) ⊨ φ.
We show that φ has aminimal model w.r.t. ໪໱⊔: If (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) ⊨ D then Lemma
5.1.14 yields for all models (H, e) of φ that (⨉i∈I Ii, d̄) −−→(H, e) and therefore that
(H, e) ⊨ D. But our reﬂexion on page 178 upon minimal models shows that there
is some (I, d) ⊨ φ such that φ is logically equivalent to ⨆{XnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ}
which, in turn, is logically equivalent to XnI,d. 2
5.1.5 Characterisation of ໪໱⊔-TBoxes and ໪໱-TBoxes
In comparison to more expressive languages of the ໦໱໨-family, TBoxes consid-
erably add expressiveness to ໪໱: Following the scheme with which we treated all
other families it should be enough to deﬁne a global notion of simulation, which,
regarding the assymetric nature observed in local simulation looks somehow like
I−−→∃ H ⟺ ∀d ∈ ΔI ∶ ∃e ∈ ΔH ∶ (I, d) −−→(H, e)
is notion, however, can only preserve global existential concepts, i.e. con-
junctions and disjunctions of the form ⨆i≤n⨅j≤m ∃u.Cij where Cij is some ໪໱⊔-
concept. Invariance under disjoint unions would get rid of the disjunctions on the
global level, but there is no hope to preserve universal global concepts of the like
∀u.C.
Even the symmetrisation I ∃⟷−− H deﬁned as I −−→∃ H and H −−→∃ I, i.e. for all
d ∈ ΔI there is some e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) −−→ (H, e) and vice versa, and is not
enough to preserve ໪໱-TBoxes as the following example shows.
E 5.1.18 . Let I be deﬁned as ΔI ∶= {a, b, c}, rI ∶= {(c, a), (c, b)} with
AI ∶= {a} and BI ∶= {b} and let ΔH ∶= {d, e, f, g, h} with rH{(d, e), (d, f), (g, h)}
and AH ∶= {e, h} and BH ∶= {f}. en I ∃⟷−− H but I ⊨ {∃r.B ⊑ ∃r.A} yet
H ⊭ {∃r.B ⊑ ∃r.A}.
e reason lies in the hidden negation of the concept-inclusion ∃r.B ⊑ ∃r.A.
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Rewrien in ໦໱໨u it would read ∀u.¬∃r.B ⊔ ∃r.A. Another model-theoretic no-
tion is needed on the local level and this is equi-simulation.
The Equi-Similar Fragment of FO
D 5.1.19 . (I, d) and (H, e) are equisimilar, (I, d) -→←- (H, e) if (I, d) −−→
(H, e) and (H, e) −−→(I, d). Analogously we set (I, d) -→←- n (H, e) if (I, d) −−→n (H, e)
and (H, e) −−→n (I, d) ♢
We deﬁne ໪໱¬ to be the boolean closure of ໪໱, i.e. for every signature τ the
concepts of ໪໱¬ are recursively deﬁned by
C ∶∶= F ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D
where F ∈ ໪໱(τ) and D, E are ໪໱¬ concepts. We denote with ໪໱¬(τ) the set of
all ໪໱¬-concepts over τ. We use the usual abbreviations ⊔,→ etc. We may allow
¬∃r.C to be denoted as ∀r.¬C. However, it is not possible to obtain alternating
quantiﬁcations like ∃r.∀r.(¬)C
It should be noted that it is not necessary to deﬁne ໪໱¬ as boolean closure over
໪໱⊔: e following lemma shows that every ໪໱⊔-concept can be expressed as
disjunctions of ໪໱-concepts which, in turn, can be expressed in ໪໱¬.
L 5.1.20 . Every C ∈ ໪໱⊔(τ) is equivalent to⨆i<n Ci where Ci ∈ ໪໱(τ).
P. e proof is carried out via induction up then structure of C ∈ ໪໱(τ). If
C is atomic it is already in the desired form. With the induction hypothesis, we
obtain for each disjunct in C ⊔ D a concept of the desired form so that C ⊔ D is
logically equivalent to⨆i<n Ci ⊔⨆i<m Di which is in desired form.
For C ⊓ D we use the induction hypothesis and distributivity laws obtaining
C ⊓ D ≡ (෼i<n
Ci) ⊓ (෼j<m
Dj) ≡ ෼i<n
(Ci ⊓ ෼j<m
Dj) ≡ ෼i<n෼j<m
(Ci ⊓ Dj)
where each Ci ⊓Dj ∈ ໪໱(τ), so that the concept has the desired form. And ﬁnally
for ∃r.D the induction hypothesis yields ∃r.⨆i<n Di where ∃ commutes with dis-
junctions so that we obtain ⨆i<n ∃r.Di. Every ∃r.Di is an ໪໱(τ)-concept and so
the concept is in the desired form. 2
For all ﬁnite τ and all τ-interpretation (I, d)we deﬁne characteristic ໪໱¬-concepts
for each n < ω as follows: ZnI,d ∶= XnI,d⊓⨅{¬XnH,e ∣ (H, e) −−→/ n (I, d)}where XnH,e
183
are the characteristic ໪໱-concepts over τ. ZnI,d is well deﬁned as there are only
ﬁnitely many diﬀerent characteristic ໪໱-concepts over τ on each level n < ω. For
the following proposition we use the rank-function for໦໱໨.
P 5.1.21 . Let τ be a ﬁnite signature and let (I, d) and (H, e) be τ-inter-
pretations. en for all n < ω the following items are equivalent:
1. (H, e) ⊨ ZnI,d
2. (I, d) -→←- n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
where n(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱¬(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C and rankC ≤ n}.
P.
‘1. ⟹ 2.’: If (H, e) ⊨ ZnI,d then (H, e) ⊨ XnI,d and so (I, d) −−→n (H, e). From
(H, e) ⊨ XnH,e follows with Proposition 5.1.5 and the assumption that (H, e) ⊨ ZnI,d
that ¬XnH,e cannot be a conjunct of ZnI,d and so (H, e) −−→n (I, d).
‘2. ⟹ 3.’: We use induction upon the structure of ໪໱¬-concepts to prove the
claim. If C ∈ ໪໱(τ) then C is preserved by n-simulation. Since (I, d) −−→n (H, e)
and (H, e) −−→n (I, d), (I, d) ⊨ C iﬀ (H, e) ⊨ C. All other cases are trivially obtained
by the induction hypothesis.
‘3. ⟹ 1.’: Every characteristic concept ZnH,e has rank ≤ n. We show (I, d) ⊨
ZnI,d: Clearly (I, d) ⊨ XnI,d; but (I, d) also satisﬁes all the negated conjuncts. As-
sume ¬XnK,c is amongst the negated conjuncts and (I, d) ⊨ XnK,c. Proposition 5.1.5
yields that (K, c) −−→n (I, d) in contrast to the deﬁnition (K, c) −−→/ n (I, d). So
ZnI,d ∈n(I, d) and since n(I, d) =n(H, e), we have ZnI,d ∈(H, e) whence
1. follows. 2
We li the restriction of τ being ﬁnite.
D 5.1.22 . Let τ be arbitrary and I a τ-interpretation.
1. A set Γ ⊆ ໪໱¬(τ) is called an ∃r-type of d in I if for every ﬁnite subset
Γ0 ⊆ Γ we have (I, d) ⊨ ∃r.⨅Γ0.
2. An ∃r-type is Γ realised at d in I if there is some r-successor dໟ of d in I
such that (I, dໟ) ⊨ Γ.
3. A τ-interpretation is ໪໱¬-saturated if for all r ∈ NR and every d ∈ ΔI every
∃r-type of d is realised at d.
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♢Every໦໱໨-saturated interpretation and in particular every ω-saturated inter-
pretation is also ໪໱¬-saturated and every ໪໱¬ saturated interpretation is ໪໱-
saturated. e inverse direction of the claims is in general not true.
P 5.1.23 . ໪໱¬ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, i.e. for every signature
τ and ໪໱¬-saturated τ-interpretations (I, d) and (H, e) we have
(I, d) =(H, e) ⟺ (I, d) -→←- (H, e)
where (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱¬(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} and analogously for (H, e).
P. Assume (I, d) and (H, e) are both ໪໱¬-saturatedwith(I, d) =(H, e).
en (I, d) and (H, e) are both ໪໱-saturated and in particular (I, d) ⊨ C ⟹
(H, e) ⊨ C for every C ∈ ໪໱(τ). e Henness-Milner-Property of ໪໱ yields
(I, d) −−→(H, e). We can obtain the opposite direction in a similar fashion. 2
L 5.1.24 . Every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ)whi is invariant under equi-simulation
is already invariant under n-equi-simulation for some n < ω.
P. Assume φ is invariant under equi-simulation. en φ is invariant under
bisimulation and hence is logically equivalent to some ໦໱໨-concept Cφ. is
concept is invariant under n-bisimulation for some n < ω and we have
(I, d)⟷−− (ITd , d)⟷−− n (ITd↾n, d) -→←- (HTe↾n, e)⟷−− n (HTe , e)⟷−− (H, e)
where ITd is the tree-unravelling of I in d and ITd↾n are all elements reachable
within n-many steps from the root d; similarly for HTe and HTe↾n. With this chain
we obtain (I, d) ⊨ φ iﬀ (H, e) ⊨ φ. 2
T 5.1.25 . Let τ be an arbitrary signature. If φ(x) ∈ FO(τ) is invariant under
equi-simulation then there is a concept C ∈ ໪໱¬(τ) whi is logically equivalent to
φ.
P. We assume w.l.o.g. that τ contains exactly the signature symbols occur-
ring in φ and therefore that τ is ﬁnite. Since φ is invariant under equi-simulation,
there is some n < ω such that φ is invariant under n-equi-simulation. For this n
let Cφ ∶= ⨆{ZnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ} where ZnI,d is the characteristic ໪໱¬-concept for
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(I, d) on level n. e disjunction in Cφ is ﬁnite and thus Cφ is a concept in ໪໱¬.
φ ⊨ Cφ butCφ ⊨ φ as well: Assume (H, e) ⊨ Cφ. en (H, e) ⊨ ZnI,d where ZnI,d is
a conjunct in Cφ. Proposition 5.1.21 shows (I, d) -→←- n (H, e) and since (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)
and φ is invariant under n-equi-simulation we have (H, e) ⊨ φ(x). 2
The Globally Equi-Similar Fragment of FO
Let τ be an arbitrary signature. en ໪໱u¬-concepts are recursively deﬁned as
follows:
C ∶∶= B ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D ∣ ∃u.D
where B ∈ ໪໱(τ). e appropriate notion of global equi-simulation is deﬁned in
the following way:
D 5.1.26 . I is globally equisimilar toH, I -→←-∀ H, if both of the following
holds
1. for all d ∈ ΔI there is e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) -→←- (H, e)
2. for all e ∈ ΔH there is d ∈ ΔI with (I, d) -→←- (H, e)
For each n < ω we deﬁne I -→←-∀ n H analogously, requiring (I, d) -→←- n (H, e). ♢
We extend the notion by writing (I, d) -→←-∀ (H, e) if I -→←-∀ H and (I, d) -→←- (H, e)
and analogously (I, d) -→←-∀ n (H, e). A simple proof by induction shows that ໪໱u¬-
concepts are preserved under equi-simulation.
e set of global ໪໱u¬-concepts is recursively deﬁned as by
C ∶∶= ∃u.F ∣ D ⊓ E ∣ ¬D
where F is an ໪໱¬-concept and D, E are global ໪໱u¬-concepts. Note that ∃u.⊤ is
logically equivalent to ⊤. For each n < ω the global characteristic ໪໱u¬-concept
over a ﬁnite signature τ is deﬁned, using characteristic ໪໱¬-concepts ZnI,d over τ,
as
ZnI ∶= ෻{∃u.Z
n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} ⊓ ∀u.෼{Z
n
I,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}.
Every global characteristic ໪໱u¬-concept is a global ໪໱u¬-concept.
P 5.1.27 . For every ﬁnite signature τ and τ-interpretations I and H and
all n < ω the following statements are equivalent:
1. H ⊨ ZnI
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2. I -→←-∀ n H
3. n(I) =n(H)
with n(I) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱u¬(τ) ∣ I ⊨ C, C is a global concept and rankC ≤ n}. e
rank function applied is the one for໦໱໨u.
P.
‘1.⟹ 2.:’ Since H ⊨ ⨅{∃u.ZnI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI}, for every element d in I there is
an element e in H such that (H, e) ⊨ ZnI,d and Proposition 5.1.21 yields (I, d) -→←- n
(H, e). On the other hand, H ⊨ ∀u.⨆{ZnI,d ∣ d ∈ ΔI} and so for every e in H there
is d in I such that (H, e) ⊨ ZnI,d. From Proposition 5.1.21 we obtain (I, d) -→←- n
(H, e). is shows I -→←-∀ n H.
‘2.⟹ 3.:’ If ∃u.F ∈ n(I) then there is d in I such that (I, d) ⊨ F. Since
I -→←-∀ n H there is e inHwith (I, d) -→←- n (H, e) and Proposition 5.1.21 yields (H, e) ⊨
F. erefore ∃u.F ∈ n(H). e induction hypothesis yields the step cases for
conjunction and negation. n(H) ⊆n(I) is shown in the same way.
‘3.⟹ 1.:’ As mentioned above, ZnI is a global concept and its rank is ≤ n. Since
I ⊨ ZnI, it is contained in n(I) which by assumption entails H ⊨ ZnI. 2
C 5.1.28 . e following statements are equivalent:
1. (H, e) ⊨ ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d
2. (I, d) -→←-∀ n (H, e)
3. n(I, d) =n(H, e)
with n(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱u¬(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C and rankC ≤ n}.
P. We sele on ‘2.⟹ 3.’ Assume B ∈ ໪໱(τ). en (I, d) ⊨ B and since
໪໱(τ) ⊆ ໪໱¬(τ) for all signatures τ, Proposition 5.1.21 yields (H, e) ⊨ B.
e step cases for conjunction and negation follow immediately from the in-
duction hypothesis. In case C = ∃u.D there is dໟ ∈ ΔI such that (I, dໟ) ⊨ D.
Since I -→←-∀ n H there is eໟ ∈ ΔH with (I, dໟ) -→←- n (H, eໟ). With I -→←-∀ n H fol-
lows (I, dໟ) -→←-∀ n (H, eໟ) and the induction hypothesis yields (H, eໟ) ⊨ D, which
entails H ⊨ ∃u.D; in particular we obtain ∃u.D ∈ n(H, e). e inclusion
n(H, e) ⊆n(I, d) is shown by the same rationale. 2
We li the restriction for τ to be ﬁnite.
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D 5.1.29 . Let τ be arbitrary. en
1. Γ ⊆ ໪໱u¬(τ) is called an ∃u-type of I if for all ﬁnite subsets Γ0 ⊆ Γwe have
I ⊨ ∃u.⨅Γ0.
2. An ∃u-type Γ is said to be realised in I if there is d ∈ ΔI such that (I, d) ⊨ Γ.
3. A τ-interpretation I is ໪໱u¬-saturated if it is ໪໱¬-saturated and every ∃u-
type of I is realised in I.
♢
P 5.1.30 . ໪໱u¬ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, i.e. for arbitrary τ
and ໪໱u¬-saturated τ-interpretations I and H we have
(I, d) =(H, e) ⟺ (I, d) -→←-∀ (H, e)
where (I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱u¬(τ) ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} and analogously for (H, e).
L 5.1.31 . For ໪໱u¬-saturated τ-interpretations I and H we have
(I) =(H) ⟺ I -→←-∀ H
where (I) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱u¬(τ) ∣ C is a global concept and I ⊨ C}
P. Let d ∈ ΔI be arbitrary. en the set Γ ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱¬ ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} is
an ∃u-type realised at d. In particular for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ the global
concept ∃u.⨅Γ0 is in (I) and by assumption ∃u.⨅Γ0 is also in (H). Hence
Γ is an ∃u-type in H and, since H is ໪໱u¬-saturated, realised at some e ∈ ΔH.
Hence (I, d) and (H, e) share the same ໪໱¬ theory and are ໪໱¬-saturated. us
the Hennessy-Milner-Property for ໪໱¬ yields (I, d) -→←- (H, e). With the same
argument one shows that for every e ∈ ΔH there is d ∈ ΔI such that (I, d) -→←-
(H, e). e only-if direction is obtained immediately from the fact that ໪໱u¬-
concepts are invariant under global equi-simulation. 2
P  P 5.1.30. (I, d) and (H, e) share the same ໪໱¬-theory and
the Hennessy-Milner-Property for ໪໱¬ yields (I, d) -→←- (H, e). We obtain global
equi-simulation by from Lemma 5.1.31. e only-if direction is again yielded by
the invariance of ໪໱u¬ under global equi-simulation. 2
P 5.1.32 . Every FO-formula φ(x) that is invariant under global equi-
simulation is invariant under global n-equi-simulation for some n < ω.
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Due to the symmetric nature of equi-simulation, the proof applies the exact
same rationale as Lemma 2.1.25 which states the analogue statement for ໦໱໨
and bisimulation.
P. Assume this would be wrong. en for every n < ω there are interpreta-
tions (I, d), (H, e) such that (I, d) -→←-∀ n (H, e), but (I, d) ⊨ φ(x), yet (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x).
Let τφ be the set of signature symbols in φ, which is thus ﬁnite. We set
Zn ∶= {ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d ∣ ∃(I, d), (H, e) ∶ (I, d) -→←-∀ n (H, e)}
where ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d is the characteristic ໪໱u¬-concept over τφ. Zn is ﬁnite, as the
number of characteristic ໪໱u¬-concepts is ﬁnite. No Zn is empty.
Let Z ∶= {⨆Zn ∣ n < ω}. en every ﬁnite subset of Z is satisﬁable with φ(x):
Let Z0 ⊆ Z be ﬁnite and let m ∶= max{n ∣ ⨆Zn ∈ Z0}. en, there is some
(I, d) ⊨ φ(x) such that ZmI ⊓ ZmI,d ∈ Zm.
Also by deﬁnition of Zm, there is (H, e) such that (I, d) -→←-∀ m (H, e) and (H, e) ⊨
¬φ(x). From (I, d) -→←-∀ m (H, e) follows (I, d) -→←-∀ n (H, e) for all n ≤ m and so
ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d ∈ Zn for all n ≤ m. Hence (I, d) ⊨ ⨆Zn for all n ≤ m and so I ⊨ Z0.
Since (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) this shows that Z0 ∪ {φ(x)} is satisﬁable. Compactness of FO
shows that Z ∪ {φ(x)} is satisﬁable by some interpretation (K, g).
For this (K, g) we show that ZK,g ∶= {ZnK ⊓ ZnK,g ∣ n < ω} is satisﬁable with
¬φ(x). Let therefore Z0 ⊆ ZK,g be ﬁnite and let m ∶= max{n ∣ ZnK ⊓ ZnK,g ∈ Z0}.
Since (K, g) ⊨ Z, there is (I, d) and ZmI ⊓ZmI,d ∈ Zm such that (K, g) ⊨ ZmI ⊓ZmI,d and
hence (I, d) -→←-∀ m (K, g). By deﬁnition of Zm, there is (H, e) such that (I, d) -→←-∀ m
(H, e) and (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). us (H, e) ⊨ Z0 and so Z0 and ¬φ(x) are satisﬁable.
Compactness of FO shows ZK,g ∪ {¬φ(x)} is satisﬁable by some interpretation
(H, e). We have φ(x) ⊨(K, g) ≡໪໱u¬ (H, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x).
Let (K∗, g) and (H∗, e) be the ω-saturated extensions of (K, g) and (H, e) respect-
ively. Since both of them satisfy the same FO-theory as their originals, they still
share the same ໪໱u¬-theory and (K∗, g) ⊨ φ(x) whilst (H∗, e) ⊨ ¬φ(x). e
Hennessy-Milner-Property shows for both saturated interpretations (K∗, g) -→←-∀
(H∗, e). But this is a contradiction as φ is assumed to be invariant under global
equi-simulation. Hence, there must be some n < ω such that φ is invariant under
global n-equi-simulation. 2
T 5.1.33 . Let τ be an arbitrary signature. For every formula φ(x) ∈ FO(τ)
whi is invariant under global equi-simulation, there is a logically equivalent concept
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C ∈ ໪໱u¬(τ).
P. Let φ(x) be such a formula. We may w.l.o.g. assume that τ comprises
exactly the signature symbols in φ. In particular φ(x) is invariant under global
n-equi-simulation. We show that φ(x) is logically equivalent to Cφ with Cφ ∶=
⨆{ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d ∣ (I, d) ⊨ φ(x)} where Cφ is well deﬁned as there are just ﬁnitely
many characteristic ໪໱u¬-concepts on each level n < ω.
φ ⊨ Cφ follows immediately. For the opposite direction assume (H, e) ⊨ Cφ.
ere is (I, d) such that ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d is a disjunct in Cφ and (H, e) ⊨ ZnI ⊓ ZnI,d. Hence
(I, d) -→←-∀ n (H, e) and since (I, d) ⊨ φ(x) and φ is invariant under n-equi-simulation
we obtain (H, e) ⊨ φ. 2
Characterisation of ໪໱¬-TBoxes and ໪໱⊔-TBoxes Respectively
A ໪໱¬-concept inclusion is an expression C ⊑ D, where C,D ∈ ໪໱¬(τ) for some
τ. ໪໱¬-TBoxes are ﬁnite sets of ໪໱¬ concept-inclusions. Similarly ໪໱⊔-concept
inclusions recruit their components C,D from ໪໱⊔(τ) and likewise ໪໱-concept
inclusions are constructed from ໪໱-concepts. It is thus clear what ໪໱⊔-TBoxes
and ໪໱-TBoxes are.
Every such ໪໱-, ໪໱⊔- and ໪໱¬-TBox is an໦໱໨-TBox and interpreted as such.
Every ໪໱-, ໪໱⊔- and ໪໱¬-concept inclusion C ⊑ D can be expressed as ໪໱u¬-
concept ∀u.C → D. Hence every ໪໱-, ໪໱⊔- and ໪໱¬-TBox is invariant under
global equi-simulation.
P 5.1.34 . Every ໪໱¬-TBox ໹ is invariant under disjoint unions, i.e.
(∀i ∈ I ∶ Ii ⊨ ໹ )⟹෺i∈I
Ii ⊨ ໹
We already know that ໦໱໨-TBoxes are invariant under disjoint unions and
໪໱¬-TBoxes form a subset of໦໱໨-TBoxes.
T 5.1.35 . For all signatures τ and every sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) we have: if
φ is invariant under equi-simulation and invariant under disjoint union then φ is
logically equivalent to some ໪໱⊔-TBox over τ.
eproof applies the same rationale as all the characterisation proofs for TBoxes
presented so far. For the sake of contradiction, the opposite of the claim is as-
sumed, which leads to two interpretations which realise same ໪໱⊔-types but are
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distinguished by the sentence φ. Indeed, these interpretations need to satisfy the
same ໪໱¬-types! To obtain these interpretations, the disjoint union is used: we
show that every ໪໱¬-type of the model which violates φ is satisﬁable with φ.
Now, however, we have to be careful, as we have to derive our claim w.r.t. the
໪໱⊔-consequences of φ. We therefore have to show that we can transform ໪໱¬-
concept subsumptions accordingly to obtain ໪໱⊔-concept subsumptions.
P.
cons φ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໪໱⊔(τ) and φ ⊨ C ⊑ D}
By compactness of FO it suﬃces to show cons φ ⊨ φ. Assume this is not the
case. en there must be some model H of cons φ such that H ⊨ ¬φ. Let T ∶=
{p ⊆ ໪໱⊔(τ) ∣ p ∪ {φ} satisﬁable }. For every p ∈ T there is a model (Ip, dp) of
p ∪ {φ}. Since φ is invariant under disjoint union, I ∶= ⨄ Ip is a model of φ.
Let K ∶= I ⊎ H. en K ⊨ cons φ because every ໪໱⊔-concept-subsumption is
invariant under disjoint unions. But we also have K ⊨ ¬φ because H ⊨ ¬φ and φ
is invariant under disjoint unions, too.
We set K∗ and I∗ to be the ω-saturated extensions of K and I respectively and
show I∗ -→←-∀ K∗. Since ໪໱u¬ has the Hennessy-Milner-Property, it suﬃces to
show that for all d ∈ ΔI∗ there is e ∈ ΔK∗ such that (K∗, e) ⊨ (I∗, d) where
(I∗, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱¬(τ) ∣ (I∗, d) ⊨ C} and vice versa.
For all d ∈ ΔI∗ we have that every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ (I∗, d) is satisﬁed¹
at some dΓ0 ∈ ΔI. Hence I ⊨ ∃u.⨅Γ0 and so K ⊨ ∃u.⨅Γ0 for every ﬁnite
Γ0 ⊆ (I∗, d). us (I∗, d) is an ∃u-type in K and since K∗ is in particular
໪໱u¬-saturated, there is some e ∈ ΔK∗ such that (K∗, e) ⊨(I∗, d).
If e ∈ ΔK∗ then every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆ (K∗, e) is satisﬁable with φ: For
the sake of contradiction assume the opposite. en for every H ⊨ φ we have
(H, g) ⊨ ¬⨅Γ0 for all g ∈ ΔH.
Let τΓ0 be the signature symbols occurring inΓ0, thus τΓ0 is ﬁnite, and letZΓ0 ∶=
{ZnH,g ∣ (H, g) ⊨ ⨅Γ0} where n = rank ⨅Γ0 and ZnH,g be the characteristic ໪໱¬-
concept over τΓ0 . en⨆ZΓ0 is logically equivalent to⨅Γ0.
By assumption, for every model H of φ every g ∈ ΔH satisﬁes ¬⨆ZΓ0 and
so we have φ ⊨ {⊤ ⊑ ¬ZnH,g ∣ ZnH,g ∈ ZΓ0}. Every ZnH,g is of the form XnH,g ⊓
⨅{¬XnHໟ,gໟ|(Hໟ, gໟ) −−→/ n (H, g)}, where XnH,g and each XnHໟ,gໟ , respectively, is the
characteristic ໪໱-concept over τΓ0 . erefore each ⊤ ⊑ ¬ZnH,g can be equival-
¹For otherwise I would have been a model of the FO-sentence expressing ∀u.¬⨅Γ0. Since I
and I∗ share the same FO-theory also I∗ ⊨ ∀u.¬⨅Γ0, contradicting that d satisﬁes⨅Γ0.
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ently rewrien into an ໪໱⊔-concept subsumption XnH,g ⊑ ⨆{XnHໟ,gໟ ∣ (Hໟ, gໟ) −−→/ n
(H, g)}.
is means that each of these concept subsumptions is present in cons φ; But
then (K, e) ⊭ Γ0 since (K, e) ⊨ cons φ; a contradiction. Hence Γ0 is satisﬁable
with φ. erefore, for every ﬁnite subset Γ0 ⊆(K, e) there is some d ∈ ΔI with
(I, d) ⊨ Γ0. Since I∗ is in particular ໪໱u¬-saturated, there is dໟ ∈ ΔI
∗ such that
(I∗, dໟ) ⊨(K∗, e).
is shows that φ ⊨I∗ -→←-∀ K∗ ⊨ ¬φ. But this is a contradiction to φ being
invariant under global equi-simulation. Hence cons φ ⊨ φ. 2
Since every ໪໱¬-TBox is equivalent to some FO-sentence which is invariant
under global equi-simulation and invariant under disjoint union (see Proposi-
tion 5.1.34), this theorem shows that every ໪໱¬-TBox is logically equivalent some
໪໱⊔-TBox.
Indeed, ໪໱⊔-TBoxes are merely a syntactic variant of ໪໱¬-TBoxes:
O 5.1.36 . Every ໪໱¬-TBox can logically equivalent be rewrien as ໪໱⊔-
TBox.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the functions ⋅+NNF and ⋅−NNF which will be used to obtain the
negation normal form for ໪໱¬-concepts, where F denotes an ໪໱-concept and D
and E denote ໪໱¬-concepts:
F +NNF ∶= F F −NNF ∶= ¬F
(D ⊓ E)+NNF ∶= D+NNF ⊓ E+NNF (D ⊓ E)−NNF ∶= D−NNF ⊔ E−NNF
(¬D)+NNF ∶= D−NNF (¬D)−NNF ∶= D +NNF
In order to avoid a non-determinism, we require that it is ﬁrst checked whether
the argument of ⋅+NNF and ⋅−NNF is an ໪໱-concept. A ໪໱¬-concept C is then in
negation normal form (NNF), if C = C +NNF. It is clear that an ໪໱¬-concept C is
logically equivalent to C +NNF.
P  O 5.1.36. We assume w.l.o.g. that the ໪໱¬-TBox consists
of only one concept subsumption of the form ⊤ ⊑ C. Let E ∶= C+NNF. We can
transfer E into a conjunctive normal form⨅i<n⨆j<mi Eij where for each i < n and
j < mi we have that either Eij = Dij or Eij = ¬Dij and Dij is an ໪໱-concept. Each
disjunction⨆j<mi Eij can in turn be split into two sets of disjunctsNi and Pi, where
Ni = {Dij ∣ Eij = ¬Dij} contains all negated ໪໱-concepts and Pi = {Dij ∣ Eij = Dij}
contains all positive ໪໱-concepts of⨆j<mi Eij.
en⨆j<mi Eij is logically equivalent to (¬⨅Ni)⊔(⨆ Pi) and henceC is logically
192
equivalent to⨅i<n Ni → Pi. We set ໹ ∶= {Ni ⊑ Pi ∣ i < n} and observe that ໹ is
an ໪໱⊔-TBox which is logically equivalent to {⊤ ⊑ C}. 2
With the forestalling remarks about the hidden negation andObservation 5.1.36
it may not be surprising anymore that TBoxes lend so much expressive power to
໪໱⊔ concepts that their TBoxes even capture the expressiveness of ໪໱¬-TBoxes.
is observation also shows that global equi-simulation was just enough to
characterise ໪໱⊔-TBoxes and did not ‘exceed’ the necessary. e question arises
whether direct products will, similar to the characterisation of ໪໱, yield a char-
acterisation for ໪໱-TBox fragments.
Characterisation of ໪໱-TBoxes as FO-Fragment
In what follows we shall prove that the FO-Fragment which is invariant under
global equi-simulation, disjoint unions and is preserved under direct products,
coincides with the fragment of the ໪໱-TBoxes.
Since e.g. ∃u.A is preserved under direct products and global equi-simulation,
direct products alone are not suﬃcient to characterise ໪໱-TBoxes. Hence we
need the invariance under disjoint unions. e fact that the property of being
preserved under direct products singles out the ໪໱-TBoxes amongst the ໪໱⊔-
TBoxes analogously to the ໪໱-concepts amongst the ໪໱⊔-concepts, suggests that
being preserved direct product is indeed a natural notion. As already stated under
eorem 5.1.17, sentences which are invariant under ﬁnite direct products are
already invariant under arbitrary products so that we do not distinguish between
them.
T 5.1.37 . For all signatures τ and every sentence φ ∈ FO(τ) we have: if φ is
invariant under equi-simulation, invariant under disjoint union and preserved under
direct products then φ is logically equivalent to some ໪໱-TBox over τ.
P. Let cons φ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໪໱(τ) and φ ⊨ C ⊑ D}. We shall show
that there is a ﬁnite subset ໹ ⊆ cons φ such that ໹ is logically equivalent to φ.
Since φ ⊨ cons φ we merely have to show ໹ ⊨ φ and because FO is compact, it
suﬃces to prove cons φ ⊨ φ.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that cons φ ⊭ φ. en there is a τ-
interpretation I ⊨ cons φ yet I ⊭ φ. We shall show that for every d ∈ ΔI
there is a model of ໪໱¬(I, d) ∪ {φ}:
Let d ∈ ΔI be arbitrary, and ໪໱(I, d) ∶= {C ∈ ໪໱(τ) ∣ d ∈ CI}. Assume
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there is C ∈ ໪໱ such that d ∉ CI and໪໱(I, d)∪{¬C, φ}would not be satisﬁable.
By compactness, there is a ﬁnite subset T ⊆໪໱(I, d) such that T∪{¬C, φ} is not
satisﬁable. In particular (H, e) ⊨ ¬(⨅ T ⊓ ¬C) for every model H of φ and every
e ∈ ΔH. Hence every model H of φ satisﬁes⨅ T ⊑ C and so⨅ T ⊑ C ∈ cons φ,
contradicting the fact that I ⊨ cons φ. Hence there is (HC, eC) ⊨ T ∪ {φ, ¬C}.
We set now (Kd, g) ∶= ⨉{(HC, eC) ∣ C ∈ ໪໱(τ) ⧵ ໪໱(I, d)}. Since φ is
preserved under direct products we obtainKd ⊨ φ. However, ໪໱ is even invariant
under direct products, i.e. (Kd, g) ⊨ ໪໱(I, d) but also if (Kd, g) ⊨ D then all
(HC, eC) ⊨ D. Hence for no C ∈ ໪໱(τ) ⧵໪໱(I, d) we have (Kd, g) ⊨ C and so
໪໱(Kd, g) =໪໱(I, d). is shows (Kd, g) ⊨໪໱¬(I, d) ∪ {φ}.
Let P ∶= {p ⊆ ໪໱¬(τ) ∣ p ∪ {φ} is satisﬁable} and deﬁne K∗ to be the ω-
saturated extension of ⨄p∈P(Kp, gp) where Kp is a model of φ and (Kp, gp) ⊨ p.
Let H∗ ∶= K∗ ⊎ I∗ where I∗ is the ω-saturated extension of I. As φ is invariant
under disjoint union we have H∗ ⊨ ¬φ. Both interpretations H∗ and K∗ are ໪໱¬-
saturated.
We shall show that K∗ -→←-∀ H∗. Since H∗ is the disjoint union of K∗ and I∗,
we have (K∗, g) -→←- (H∗, g) for all g ∈ ΔK∗ . Let d ∈ ΔI∗ . en every ﬁnite
subset T ⊆ ໪໱¬(I∗, d) is satisﬁed at some dໟ ∈ ΔI, which is, as shown above,
satisﬁable with φ. By compactness ໪໱¬(I∗, d) ∪ {φ} is satisﬁable and so pd ∶=
໪໱¬(I∗, d) ∈ P. Hence ໪໱¬(Kpd , gpd) is an ∃u-type in K∗ and thus realised
at some g. e Hennessy-Milner-Property of ໪໱¬ shows that (K∗, g) -→←- (H∗, d)
which entails K∗ -→←-∀ H∗.
But φ is invariant under global equi-simulation, implying that H∗ ⊨ φ which
derives the contradiction. Hence cons φ ⊨ φ showing that φ must be logically
equivalent to some ໪໱-TBox over τ. 2
In this chapter, a characterisation for ໪໱-concepts and ໪໱-TBoxes were given.
But mere preservation under simulation was not enough to characterise the ໪໱-
concepts as the FO-fragment which is preserved under simulation is indeed ໪໱⊔.
e missing property was preservation under direct products; ໪໱ is thus the FO-
fragment which is preserved under simulation and direct products.
e preservation under direct products also implies another property, namely
having the minimal model property. A minimal model of some ໪໱-concept C is
an interpretation which satisﬁes exactly the consequences of C. It turns out that
໪໱ corresponds exactly to the FO-fragment which is preserved under simulation
and where each formula has the minimal model property.
A similar picture could be witnessed for ໪໱-TBoxes. But it also becomes clear
194
that TBoxes li the expressive power considerably compared to e.g. ໦໱໨. e
reason could be detected in the hidden negations in concept inclusions. Hence
a global version of simulation is not enough to characterise ໪໱-TBoxes as FO-
fragment. e answer was a symmetricised notion of simulation, namely equi-
simulation.
e problem of concept subsumption is to decide whether or not ໹ ⊨ C ⊑ D
holds for two given ໪໱-concepts C and D. e hidden negation in TBoxes is also
the reason why in ໪໱ concept subsumption is not interreducible with deciding
whether a concept is satisﬁable. is is, however, possible in description logics
which possess negation, like໦໱໨, as there a concept C is unsatisﬁable iﬀ C ⊑ ⊥
and similarly, a concept subsumption C ⊑ D holds iﬀ ¬C ⊓ D is unsatisﬁable.
Hence deciding concept satisﬁability and concept subsumption is from a com-
plexity theoretical point of view equally hard.
But ໪໱ does not have negation. Indeed in the variant of ໪໱, where ⊥ is ex-
cluded from the logical symbols, every concept is satisﬁable. In our deﬁnition of
໪໱ which includes ⊥, exactly those ໪໱-concepts which do not contain ⊥ are sat-
isﬁable. Hence concept satisﬁability is decidable in linear time: we have to parse
the concept in its full length and check whether or not ⊥ occurs. ໪໱-concept sub-
sumption however cannot be reduced to concept satisﬁability in ໪໱, as ໪໱ has no
means of expressing ¬C⊓D. Instead, concept subsumption for ໪໱ (w.r.t. arbitrary
໪໱-TBoxes) is already PTIME-complete [66] and thus harder than satisﬁability.
e FO-fragment which is invariant under equi-simulation are those ໪໱¬-con-
cepts, which form the boolean closure over ໪໱-concepts. It turned out that ໪໱⊔-
TBoxes are equivalent to ໪໱¬-TBoxes and that the global notion of equi-simulation
characterises ໪໱⊔-TBoxes as FO-Fragment. e complexity of concept subsump-
tion w.r.t. to arbitrary TBoxes rises for ໪໱⊔ to EXPTIME-completeness [67] and
is thus equally hard as deciding໦໱໨-concept subsumption [121, 122].
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6. Application
Of course, the question arises in which concrete way the model-theoretic charac-
terisation of the expressiveness of the DLs treated in previous chapters are suit-
able for application. It turns out that the characterisations give properties at hand
with which one can recognise whether or not a concept or TBox of a logic is ex-
pressible in a weaker logic, i.e. a fragment of this logic. E.g. if we could decide
for an ໦໱໨໮-TBox that it is invariant under global ໦໱໨-bisimulation then this
໦໱໨໮-TBox must be equivalent to some ໦໱໨-TBox. e following deﬁnition
will formalise this as a problem:
D 6.0.38 . Let໱1 and໱2 be description logics. A TBox ໹ is໱1-rewritable,
if it is equivalent to some໱1-TBox over the same signature. ໱1-to-໱2-rewritability
is the problem to decide whether a given ໱1-TBox is ໱2-rewritable. ♢
6.1 The໦໱໨໮-to-໦໱໨ Rewritability Problem
In what follows we shall ﬁrst show that we can decide ໦໱໨-rewritability for
໦໱໨໮-TBoxes and that we can decide ໪໱-rewritability for ໦໱໨-TBoxes. e
results of this section have been established in co-authorship with Carsten Lutz
and Frank Wolter and have been published in [92].
e algorithm used to decide ໦໱໨-rewritability for ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes is based
on the type elimination method [110, 106] and determines whether or not for a
given ໦໱໨໮-TBox ໹ there are two globally ໦໱໨-bisimilar interpretations I and
H, such that I ⊭ ໹ and H ⊨ ໹. In this case, obviously, ໹ is not invariant under
global໦໱໨-bisimulation and hence cannot be equivalent to an໦໱໨-TBox.
Otherwise, if no such two interpretations can be found, for every two globally
໦໱໨-bisimilar interpretation I, H we have I ⊨ ໹ iﬀ H ⊨ ໹, showing that ໹ is
invariant under global໦໱໨-bisimulation.
In this case, ໹ is equivalent to some ﬁrst order sentencewhich is invariant under
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global ໦໱໨-bisimulation and since ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes are invariant under disjoint
unions (Proposition 3.1.21) the characterisation theorem (eorem 2.3.7) for໦໱໨-
TBoxes shows that ໹ must be equivalent to some໦໱໨-TBox.
Indeed, in order to show that ໹ is not invariant under global bisimulation, it is
not necessary to determine whether there are two fully globally ໦໱໨-bisimilar
interpretations, but merely whether there are two interpretations I and H such
that I ⊭ ໹ and H ⊨ ໹ and for every d ∈ ΔI there is some e ∈ ΔH such that
(I, d)⟷−− (H, e): With K ∶= I⊎H we obtain that K is globally bisimilar to H and
since ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes are invariant under disjoint unions, we have K ⊨ ໹ if and
only if I ⊨ ໹, showing that K ⊭ ໹.
In what follows we shall give the algorithm that decides non-໦໱໨໮-to-໦໱໨-
rewritability for ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes, keeping in mind that this algorithm is meant to
construct I and H as just mentioned. We shall now deﬁne a special sort of type,
which is not a complete type as known from model theory [109, 34]. A complete
FO-type over a signature τ is a satisﬁable set of formulae Γ ⊆ FO(τ), such that
for all formulae φ ∈ FO(τ) ⧵ Γ we have Γ ∪ {φ} is unsatisﬁable. Γ is maximal
or complete in the sense that it cannot be extended. e types we are about to
deﬁne are 1-types as mentioned in Section ‘Remark on Saturation and Types’ (on
page 44) but they are not complete in ໦໱໨໮(τ). Yet they are complete w.r.t. to
all subconcepts that appear in the closure clos ໹ of a given TBox ໹. We therefore
recursively deﬁne for every໦໱໨໮-concept C
closC ∶=
⎧⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪⎩
{A, ¬A} if C = A
{C, ¬C} ∪ closD ∪ clos E if C = D ⊓ E
closD if C = ¬D
{C, ¬C} ∪ closD if C = ∃r.D
{C, ¬C} ∪ closD if C = ∃r−.D
and for every໦໱໨໮-TBox ໹ we set clos ໹ ∶= ⋃{closC ∪ closD ∣ C ⊑ D ∈ ໹}.
We set tI(d) ∶= {C ∈ clos ໹ ∣ d ∈ CI}. Let tp be a subset of the power-
set P(clos ໹ ) of clos ໹ which contains all those t ⊆ clos ໹ which are satisﬁable
and maximal w.r.t. clos ໹, i.e. t ∪ {C} is unsatisﬁable for all C ∈ clos ໹ ⧵ t. Let
furthermore tp ໹ ⊆ tp contain all those t ∈ tp such that ໹ ∪ t is satisﬁable.
Starting out with the set Y0 that will be deﬁned below, the algorithm will suc-
cessively remove all elements until we are le with a set Zwhose properties shall
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be set out as follows: Let Z be deﬁned as the set of all pairs (s, S) in
Y0 ∶= {(s, S) ∈ tp ×P(tp ໹ ) ∣ ∀A ∈ NC.∀t ∈ S ∶ A ∈ s ⟺ A ∈ t}
such that for each (s, S) ∈ Z there are interpretations I,H and a bisimulation B
between I and H with
1. H ⊨ ໹
2. for all d0 ∈ ΔI there is e0 ∈ ΔH such that (d0, e0) ∈ B, i.e. (I, d0)⟷−− (H, e0)
3. there is d ∈ ΔI with (I, d) ⊨ s and S = {tH(e) ∣ (d, e) ∈ B}
Aer Algorithm 6.1.2 we shall give an intuition for those pairs (s, S) whilst dis-
cussing the ‘asymmetry’ of the algorithm.
O 6.1.1 . ໹ is not ໦໱໨-rewritable iﬀ there is s ∈ tp ⧵ tp໹ and S ⊆ tp໹
su that (s, S) ∈ Z.
P. If ໹ is not໦໱໨-rewritable then cons໦໱໨(໹ ) ⊭ ໹ where
cons໦໱໨ ໹ ∶= {C ⊑ D ∣ C,D ∈ ໦໱໨(τ), ໹ ⊨ C ⊑ D}
for otherwise compactness of ໦໱໨໮u yields that there is a ﬁnite subset ໹0 ⊆
cons໦໱໨໹ such that ໹0 ⊨ ໹ which contradicts the non-໦໱໨-rewritability of ໹.
Now let I be amodel of cons໦໱໨(໹ ) such that I ⊭ ໹ and setH ∶= ⨄p∈THp where
(Hp, dp) ⊨ p ∪ ໹ and T ∶= {p ⊆ ໦໱໨(τ) ∣ p ∪ ໹ is satisﬁable }. e invariance of
໦໱໨໮-TBoxes under disjoint unions, yields that H ⊨ ໹.
Take the ω-saturated extensions I∗ of I and H∗ of H respectively and assume
for the sake of contradiction that there is d ∈ ΔI∗ such that for all e ∈ ΔH∗ we
have (H∗, e) ⊭ ໦໱໨(I∗, d). en ໦໱໨(I∗, d) ∉ T and from the compactness
of໦໱໨໮u we infer there is a ﬁnite subset p ⊆໦໱໨(I∗, d) such that ໹ ⊨ p ⊑ ⊥.
Hence p ⊑ ⊥ ∈ cons໦໱໨໹ and so I ⊨ p ⊑ ⊥. Since ω-saturation preserves ﬁrst
order theories, I∗ ⊨ p ⊑ ⊥ which is a contradiction to (I, d) ⊨ p.
So for all d ∈ ΔI∗ there is e ∈ ΔH∗ such that ໦໱໨(I∗, d) = ໦໱໨(H∗, e) for
which the Hennessy-Milner-Property of໦໱໨ yields (I∗, d)⟷−− (H∗, e).
We now construct (s, S) ∈ Z. Since I∗ ⊭ ໹, there is C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ and some
d ∈ ΔI∗ such that (I∗, d) ⊨ C ⊓ ¬D. Set s ∶= tI(d) and set S ∶= {e ∈ ΔH∗ ∣
(I∗, d) ⟷−− (H∗, e)}. Clearly s ∈ tp ⧵ tp ໹ and A ∈ s iﬀ A ∈ t for all A ∈ NC and
all t ∈ S. It follows that (s, S) ∈ Z which proves the if-direction.
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If on the other hand (s, S) ∈ Z and s ∈ tp ⧵tp ໹ , there is a pointed interpretation
(I, d) such that (I, d) ⊨ s which entails that I ⊭ ໹. Item 2 entails that if ໹ is
equivalent to some ໦໱໨-TBox then H ⊨ ໹ implies I ⊨ ໹. Since this is false, ໹
cannot be໦໱໨-rewritable. 2
Before we give the algorithm, we need the following notions: For elements
s0, s1 ∈ tp we deﬁne s0 ⇝r s1 and read s1 is a possible r-successor of s0 if both of
the following holds
1. if ¬∃r.C ∈ s0 then C ∉ s1
2. if ¬∃r−.C ∈ s1 then C ∉ s0
We li this deﬁnition to pairs (s0, S0), (s1, S1) ∈ Y0 by seing (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1) if
1. s0 ⇝r s1
2. for all t0 ∈ S0 there is t1 ∈ S1 such that t0 ⇝r t1.
A 6.1.2 . e algorithm is given by the following rules which are applied
to each Yn, starting with Y0 as deﬁned above and leading aer each application to
some new set Yn+1:
1. If (s0, S0) ∈ Yn and ∃r.C ∈ s0 and there is no possible r-successor (s1, S1) ∈
Yn for (s0, S0) with C ∈ s1 then Yn+1 ∶= Yn ⧵ {(s0, S0)}.
2. If (s1, S1) ∈ Yn and ∃r−.C ∈ s1 and there is no (s0, S0) ∈ Yn with C ∈ s0 for
which (s1, S1) is a possible r-successor then Yn+1 ∶= Yn ⧵ {(s1, S1)}.
3. If (s0, S0) ∈ Yn with t0 ∈ S0 and ∃r.C ∈ t0 and there is no possible r-
successor (s1, S1) of (s0, S0) with t1 ∈ S1 such that C ∈ t1 and t0 ⇝r t1 then
Yn+1 ∶= Yn ⧵ {(s0, S0)}.
Since Y0 is ﬁnite, the rules can only be applied ﬁnitely many times, until se-
quence stabilises in Ym, where none of the above rules is applicable.
e asymmetry of the rules where a symmetric counterpart of (r3) is missing
needs explaining. As noted earlier, it is enough to synthesise two interpretations
Iwhich potentially violates ໹ andH ⊨ ໹ such that for every d ∈ ΔI there is some
e ∈ ΔH with (I, d) ⟷−− (H, e). It is important to understand that s represents
some element d ∈ ΔI with (I, d) ⊨ s whilst every t ∈ S represents a an element
e ∈ ΔH such that (H, e) ⊨ t.
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For I, we are interested in realising the type s, i.e. aer the algorithm has
stopped, (s, S) has either been deleted or its element d ∈ ΔI satisﬁes s. ere-
fore the rules (r1) and (r2) delete s as soon as no corresponding successors or
predecessors for d can be found amongst the types.
For H, we can be more generous: we simply need to ensure the realisation of t
by an element e in ‘forward direction’, which is done by rule (r3): if some t ∈ S
has no corresponding successor, (s, S) and therefore t is deleted. e reason for
this asymmetric view is that bisimulation works only in ‘forward direction’, too.
Whatever predecessors e might have, they never become eﬀective for the bisim-
ulation. Hence, in order to realise the ‘backward direction’ of t we can simply
realise the type t in a disjoint connected component (Kt, et) and connect the pre-
decessors of et with e, as done in the proof of Lemma 6.1.5.
P 6.1.3 . Ym = Z
is proposition essentially shows that the algorithm is sound and complete:
Ym ⊆ Z shows that only pairs (t, s) are identiﬁed which meet requirements of Z,
hence the algorithm is sound. e algorithm is also complete because whenever
some element is present in Z, it will also be contained in the ﬁnal set of the al-
gorithm.
We shall show ﬁrst Ym ⊆ Z and then Z ⊆ Ym. Showing Ym ⊆ Z will be divided
into several lemmas, where always Ym ≠ ∅ is assumed. ese lemmas will show
the following intermediate results:
1. ere is some interpretation I with carrier-set Ym such that for all (s, S) ∈
Ym we have C ∈ s iﬀ (I, (s, S)) ⊨ C.
2. ere is some interpretation H ⊨ ໹ where triples (s, S, t) with (s, S) ∈ Ym
and t ∈ S form part of the carrier set, such that for every such triple we
have (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ t.
3. (I, (s, S))⟷−− (H, (s, S, t)) for all ((s, S), (s, S, t)) ∈ B.
L 6.1.4 . ere is some interpretation I with carrier-set Ym su that for all
(s, S) ∈ Ym we have C ∈ s iﬀ (I, (s, S)) ⊨ C.
P. We show for every (s, S) ∈ Ym that there is a pointed τ-interpretation
(I, d) ⊨ s and an interpretation H ⊨ ໹ such that for all d0 ∈ ΔI there is e0 ∈ ΔH
200
with (I, d0)⟷−− ໦໱໨ (H, e0). We begin with constructing I: Set
ΔI ∶= Ym
AI ∶= {(s, S) ∈ Ym ∣ A ∈ s} for all A ∈ NC
rI ∶= {((s0, t0), (s1, S1)) ∈ ΔI × ΔI ∣ (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1)} for all r ∈ NR.
We show that (I, (s, S)) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ s for all (s, S) ∈ ΔI. e proof is carried via
induction upon the structure of C:
Since NC ⊆ sig ໹ and s comprises every subconcept of ໹ itself or its negation,
s is complete in the sense that A ∈ s or ¬A ∈ s for all A ∈ NC. e induction
hypothesis trivially yields the cases for conjunctions and negations.
Assume ∃r.C ∈ s. en there must be (sໟ, Sໟ) ∈ Ym with (s, S) ⇝r (sໟ, Sໟ)
and C ∈ sໟ, for otherwise, (r1) could be applied to delete (s, S) in contradiction
to the assumption that Ym is stable under rule application. e deﬁnition of rI
shows that this (sໟ, Sໟ) is an r-successor of (s, S) which, according to the induction
hypothesis, satisﬁes C. Hence (I, (s, S)) ⊨ ∃r.C.
Conversely, if ∃r.C ∈ clos ໹ and (I, (s, S)) ⊨ ∃r.C then there is (sໟ, Sໟ) such that
(s, S) ⇝r (sໟ, Sໟ) and (I, (sໟ, Sໟ)) ⊨ C. e induction hypothesis yields C ∈ sໟ. But
since (s, S) ⇝r (sໟ, Sໟ), we have that ¬∃r.C ∉ s and since s is complete w.r.t. clos ໹,
we have ∃r.C ∈ s.
Analogously, since Ym is stable under rule (r2), one can show that ∃r−.C ∈ s
then there is (sໟ, Sໟ) ∈ Ym with (sໟ, Sໟ) ⇝r (s, S) and C ∈ sໟ. By the deﬁnition of rI,
(sໟ, Sໟ) is an r-predecessor of (s, S) and the induction hypothesis yields (I, (sໟ, Sໟ)) ⊨
C. Hence (I, (s, S)) ⊨ ∃r−.C.
On the other hand, assume ∃r−.C ∉ s. Since s is complete w.r.t. to clos ໹, we
ﬁnd ¬∃r−.C ∈ s and by the deﬁnition of⇝r, we have for all predecessors (sໟ, Sໟ) of
(s, S) that C ∉ sໟ. e induction hypothesis yields that C ∉ sໟ iﬀ (I, (sໟ, Sໟ)) ⊨ ¬C
and so for all r-predecessors of (sໟ, Sໟ) of (s, S) in I we have (I, (sໟ, Sໟ)) ⊨ ¬C.
Hence (I, (s, S)) ⊨ ¬∃r−.C 2
L 6.1.5 . ere is some interpretation H ⊨ ໹ where triples (s, S, t) with (s, S) ∈
Ym and t ∈ S form part of the carrier set, su that for every su triple we have
(H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ t.
P. We construct H, where H is a composition of several interpretations. At
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ﬁrst we set K0 in an analogous way as we did above:
ΔK0 ∶= {(s, S, t) ∣ (s, S) ∈ Ym, t ∈ S}
AK0 ∶= {(s, S, t) ∈ ΔH ∣ A ∈ t} for all A ∈ NC
rK0 ∶= {((s0, S0, t0), (s1, S1, t1)) ∣ (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1) and t0 ⇝r t1} for all r ∈ NR.
For every (s, S) ∈ Ym and t ∈ S we deﬁne (Kt, e) to be a model of t ∪ ໹ and set
H0 ∶= K0 ⊎⨄{Kt ∣ t ∈ S and (s, S) ∈ Ym}. We now deﬁne H to be H0 but add for
each r ∈ NR the following r-edges:
For every r ∈ NRwe set r+ to be the set containing those (eໟ, (s, S, t)) ∈ ΔKt×ΔK0
where t contains ∃r−.C and eໟ is the r-predecessor of e in Kt with (Kt, e) ⊨ t and
(Kt, eໟ) ⊨ C.
We then set ΔH ∶= ΔH0 , AH ∶= AH0 for every A ∈ NC and rH ∶= rH0 ∪ r+ for
all r ∈ NR.
We shall proceed in two further steps.
1. for every (s, S, t) ∈ ΔH we have (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ t
2. for every t0 ∈ tp ໹ and every e ∈ ΔKt we have (H, e) ⊨ t0 iﬀ (Kt, e) ⊨ t0.
We start with the ﬁrst step and show for all C ∈ clos ໹ by induction upon the
structure of C that (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ t for all (s, S, t) ∈ ΔK0 .
Since t is complete w.r.t. clos ໹, the deﬁnition of AK0 yields that (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ A
iﬀ A ∈ t. Negation and conjunction are yield by the induction hypothesis.
Let (s, S, t) ∈ ΔH be arbitrary and assume ∃r.C ∈ t then, since t ∈ S by deﬁnition
of ΔK0 and (r2) is not applicable to Ym, there must be some (sໟ, Sໟ) ∈ Ym with
(S, s) ⇝r (sໟ, Sໟ) and some tໟ ∈ Sໟ containing C such that t ⇝r tໟ. Hence (sໟ, Sໟ, tໟ) ∈
ΔK0 and (sໟ, Sໟ, tໟ) is an r-successor of (s, S, t). e induction hypothesis yields that
(H, (sໟ, Sໟ, tໟ)) ⊨ C and so (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ ∃r.C.
Assume conversely that ∃r.C ∈ clos ໹ and (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ ∃r.C. By the deﬁn-
ition of rH, (s, S, t) can only be an r-predecessor to elements from ΔK0 . Hence
(H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ ∃r.C iﬀ there is some r-successor (sໟ, Sໟ, tໟ) ∈ ΔK0 such that
(H, (sໟ, Sໟ, tໟ)) ⊨ C. From the induction hypothesis follows that C ∈ tໟ. Since
t ⇝r tໟ by deﬁnition of rK0 , we have ¬∃r.C ∉ t and since t is complete w.r.t. clos ໹
it follows that ∃r.C ∈ t.
Let ∃r−.C ∈ t. Since we do not have an analogue rule to (r2) for the range
of Y0, we can for no (s0, S0, t0) ∈ ΔK0 with t = t0 rely on the existence of an r-
predecessor (s1, S1, t1) ∈ ΔK0 . But by the construction ofH, for every (s, S, t) ∈ ΔH
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with ∃r−.C there is (Kt, e) ⊨ t∪໹ such that for some r-predecessor eໟ of e in Kt we
have (Kt, eໟ) ⊨ C and (eໟ, (s, S, t)) ∈ rH. Hence (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ ∃r−.C.
Assume now ∃r−.C ∈ clos ໹ and (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ ∃r−.C. Either the r-predecessor
which satisﬁes C is from (Kt, e). Since this predecessor is by deﬁnition of rH also
a predecessor of e in Kt, we have (Kt, e) ⊨ ∃r−.C. But (K, e) ⊨ t and since t is
complete w.r.t. clos ໹, it follows that ∃r−.C ∈ t.
In case the r-predecessor satisfying C is some element (sໟ, Sໟ, tໟ) ∈ ΔK0 we have
tໟ ⇝r t by deﬁnition of rK0 and C ∈ tໟ according to the induction hypothesis. e
deﬁnition of ⇝r forbids t to contain ¬∃r−.C and since t is complete w.r.t. clos ໹
we obtain ∃r−.C ∈ t.
We continue with the second step and show that for every t ∈ tp ໹ and every
e ∈ ΔKt we have (H, e) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ tp ໹ for all C ∈ clos ໹:
Let t ∈ tp ໹ be arbitrary. We show by induction upon the structure of concepts
for all C ∈ t0 and all t0 ∈ tp ໹ and all e0 ∈ ΔKt that (Kt, e0) ⊨ t0 implies (H, e0) ⊨ C
iﬀ C ∈ t0.
e base case is clear and conjunction and negation are trivially obtained from
the induction hypothesis. Assume we have ∃r.C ∈ t0 and (Kt, e0) ⊨ t0. en
there is e1 ∈ ΔKt such that (Kt, e1) ⊨ C. Let t1 ∈ tp ໹ such that (Kt, e1) ⊨ t1.
Since C ∈ clos ໹ it follows that C ∈ t1 and thus by induction hypothesis that
(H, e1) ⊨ C. In H, e1 is still an r-successor of e0 and so (H, e0) ⊨ ∃r.C.
In case ∃r.C ∈ clos ໹ we have (H, e0) ⊨ ∃r.C then some r-successor which
satisﬁes C which is either from Kt or from K0. In the former case there is some r-
successor e1 ∈ ΔKt of e0 which satisﬁes C and for which the induction hypothesis
yields that C ∈ t1 where t1 ∈ tp ໹ with (Kt, e1) ⊨ t1. Hence (Kt, e0) ⊨ ∃r.C and
since t is complete w.r.t. clos ໹, ∃r.C ∈ t follows.
Assume the former case were wrong, i.e. there is no r-successor of e0 from Kt
which satisﬁes C. Hence, by the construction ofH, the only r-successor satisfying
Cmust be (s, S, t) ∈ ΔK0 . With the result (H, (s, S, t)) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ t for all C ∈ clos ໹
from above and the fact that C ∈ clos ໹ we obtain C ∈ t. But since e0 is then
also a r-predecessor of e ∈ ΔKt with (Kt, e) ⊨ t we derive a contradiction to the
assumption that no r-successor of e0 exists in Kt which satisﬁes C.
Let ∃r−.C ∈ t0 with (Kt, e0) ⊨ t0. ere is some r-predecessor e1 of e0 in Kt
such that (Kt, e1) ⊨ C. Since C ∈ clos ໹ we have C ∈ t1 where t1 ∈ tp ໹ and
(Kt, e1) ⊨ t1. e induction hypothesis yields (H, e1) ⊨ C and since e1 is still an
r-predecessor of e0 in H we obtain (H, e0) ⊨ ∃r−.C.
For the last case let ∃r−.C ∈ clos ໹ and (H, e0) ⊨ ∃−r.C. en there is some
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predecessor e1, which, by the construction of H, must be in Kt: elements from
K0 can at most be r-successors of e0. Hence the induction hypothesis yields that
C ∈ t1, where t1 ∈ tp ໹ and (Kt, e1) ⊨ t1. erefore (Kt, e1) ⊨ C and so (Kt, e0) ⊨
∃r−.C. Since t0 is complete with respect to clos ໹ we obtain ∃r−.C ∈ t0.
It remains to show that H ⊨ ໹. We just have shown that every element in H
satisﬁes some type t ∈ tp ໹. Let e ∈ ΔH be arbitrary and let (H, e) ⊨ t where
t ∈ tp ໹. For the sake of contradiction, assume there is C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ such that
(H, e) ⊨ C ⊓ ¬D. en C, ¬D ∈ clos ໹ and since t is complete w.r.t. to clos ໹ we
have C, ¬D ∈ t. A contradiction to the fact that t ∈ tp ໹. 2
L 6.1.6 . We deﬁne a relation B ∶= {((s, S), (s, S, t)) ∣ (s, S) ∈ Ym and t ∈ S}
and show that B is a bisimulation.
P. We show that II has a winning strategy in the bisimulation game, if she
maintains conﬁgurations (I, (s0, S0);H, (s0, S0, t0)) s.t. ((s0, S0), (s0, S0, t0)) ∈ B:
For all (s0, S0) ∈ Ym we have S0 ≠ ∅ and so B ≠ ∅. By the deﬁnition of (s0, S0), it
follows that s0 contains exactly the same atomic concepts as t0; hence (s0, S0) and
(s0, S0, t0) are atomically equivalent. e start-conﬁguration, therefore, is valid,
as will be all other conﬁgurations of this kind.
Assume that I challenges II by moving in I from (s0, S0) via an r-labelled edge
where r ∈ NR to (s1, S1). By deﬁnition of rI, we have (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1) and in
particular S0 ⇝r S1, which entails that there is t1 ∈ S1 such that t0 ⇝r t1. Hence
(s0, S0, t0) ⇝r (s1, S1, t1) and so (s1, S1, t1) is an r-successor of (s0, S0, t0) inHwhich
satisﬁes the requirement for the conﬁgurations.
Assume I challenges II by moving in H from (s0, S0, t0) via an r-labelled edge
to (s1, S1, t1). e deﬁnition of rH yields that (s0, S0, t0) ⇝r (s1, S1, t1) whence
(s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1) follows, by the deﬁnition of ⇝r. e deﬁnition of rI entails
that (s1, S1) is an r-successor of (s0, S0) in I which satisﬁes the requirement for
the conﬁguration. 2
L 6.1.7 . If d1 is an r-successor of d, and we set s1 ∶= tI(d1) and S1 ∶= {tH(e1) ∣
(d1, e1) ∈ B} we have that (s1, S1) ∈ Z and (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1).
P. For all t ∈ S1 we have for all A ∈ NC that A ∈ t where t = tH(e1) iﬀ
(H, e1) ⊨ A iﬀ (I, d1) ⊨ A, since (d1, e1) ∈ B, iﬀ A ∈ s1. Hence (s1, S1) ∈ Y0.
(s1, S1) also satisﬁes all three requirements and so (s1, S1) ∈ Z.
We show (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1): (I, d) ⊨ s0, so for every ¬∃r.C ∈ s0 we have
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(I, d) ⊨ ∀r.¬C and hence C ∉ s1. Since d1 is an r-successor of d we have if C ∈ s0
then ¬∃r.C ∉ s1. So s0 ⇝r s1.
For every t ∈ S0 we have t = tH(e) with (d, e) ∈ B for some e ∈ ΔH. Since
(d, e) ∈ B, there exists an r-successor e1 of e such that (d1, e1) ∈ B. By deﬁnition
of S1 we have tH(e1) ∈ S1 which, as just shown, entails t ⇝r t1 since e1 is an
r-successor of e. It follows that (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1). 2
Analogously we can show for every r-predecessor d1 of d that (s1, S1) ⇝r (s0, S0)
where s1 = tI(d1) and S1 ∶= {tH(e1) ∣ (d1, e1) ∈ B}.
P  P 6.1.3. We show Ym ⊆ Z: Let (s, S) ∈ Ym be arbitrary. We
check all three points of the deﬁnition of Z:
1. Lemma 6.1.5 shows that H ⊨ ໹.
2. Lemma 6.1.6 shows the existence of an element (s, S, t) ∈ ΔH such that
(I, (s, S))⟷−− (H, (s, S, t)).
3. Lemma 6.1.4 shows (I, (s, S)) ⊨ s and Lemma 6.1.6 shows the existence of
B. We have S ⊆ {tH(e) ∣ (d, e) ∈ B} because every ((s, S), (s, S, t)) ∈ B for
all t ∈ S according to Lemma 6.1.6. Since B is deﬁned in a way such that
((s, S), (s, S, t)) ∈ B for all t ∈ S, we have we also have {tH(e) ∣ (d, e) ∈ B} ⊆
S.
We have to show that Z ⊆ Ym. We shall show by induction upon n < ω that
(s, S) ∈ Yn for all (s, S) ∈ Z. Since Z ⊆ Y0 the claim is true for n = 0.
We have to show that Z ⊆ Yn+1. By the induction hypothesis we know that
Z ⊆ Yn. Assume for the sake of contradiction Zwould not be subset of Yn+1. en
there is (s0, S0) ∈ Z which has been deleted by some rule application from Yn+1.
Since (s0, S0) ∈ Z there are interpretations I, H such that
1. H ⊨ ໹
2. ere is a bisimulation B such that for all d0 ∈ ΔI there is e0 ∈ ΔH with
(d0, e0) ∈ B
3. there is d ∈ ΔI with (I, d) ⊨ s0 and S0 = {tH(e) ∣ (d, e) ∈ B}
We now distinguish the following cases
(r1) Assume, (s0, S0) would have been deleted by (r1) because ∃r.C ∈ s0 and
there is no (s1, S1) ∈ Yn with (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1) and C ∈ s1.
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Since (I, d) ⊨ s0 there is some r-successor d1 of d in I such that C ∈ d1.
Set s1 = tI(d1) and S1 ∶= {tH(e1) ∣ (d1, e1) ∈ B}. Lemma 6.1.7 shows that
(s1, S1) ∈ Z and (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1). e induction hypothesis Z ⊆ Yn yields
that (s1, S1) ∈ Yn and so (r1) is not applicable for (s0, S0). A contradiction to
the assumption (r1) deleted (s0, S0).
(r2) Assume (s0, S0) would have been deleted by (r2) because ∃r−.C ∈ s0 and
there is no (s1, S1) with (s1, S1) ⇝r (s0, S0) and C ∈ s1.
Since (I, d) ⊨ s0 there is d1 ∈ ΔI with (d1, d) ∈ rI and C ∈ d1. Let
s1 ∶= tI(d1) and S1 ∶= {tH(e1) ∣ (d1, e1) ∈ B}. As mentioned aer the proof
of Lemma 6.1.7, we have (s1, S1) ⇝r (s0, S0) and (s1, S1) ∈ Z.
e induction hypothesis yields that (s1, S1) ∈ Yn and therefore (r2) is not
applicable to (s0, S0) in contradiction to the assumption.
(r3) Assume (s0, S0) would have been deleted by (r3) because there is t0 ∈ S0
with ∃r.C ∈ t0 and there is no (s1, S1) with (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1) and C ∈ t1.
Since t0 = tH(e) for some e ∈ ΔH with (d, e) ∈ B, there is an r-successor e1
of e inH such that (H, e1) ⊨ C. Since (d, e) ∈ B there is an r-successor d1 of d
in I such that (d1, e1) ∈ B. Set s1 ∶= tI(d1) and S1 ∶= {tH(eໟ) ∣ (d1, eໟ) ∈ B}.
Clearly tH(e1) ∈ S1 and C ∈ tH(e1) since C ∈ clos ໹ and tH(e1) is complete
w.r.t. clos ໹. Lemma 6.1.7 shows that (s1, S1) ∈ Z and (s0, S0) ⇝r (s1, S1).
e induction hypothesis entails that (s1, S1) ∈ Yn and therefore (r3) was
not applicable to (s0, S0).
is ﬁnally shows that Z ⊆ Yn for all n < ω and in particular that Z ⊆ Ym. 2
As we recruit the elements in Y0 fromP(tp ໹ ), the set Y0 is in the worst case in
the order of 22|໹ | and hence the໦໱໨໮-to-໦໱໨-rewritability problem is decidable
in 2-EXPTIME w.r.t. to size of ໹. As of yet, a lower bound has not been found.
Clearly polynomial rewritings have been devised to transcribe ໦໱໨໮-TBoxes
into໦໱໨-TBoxes [44, 33] but these rewritings introduce new signature symbols
and do not ﬁt in our seing where the retention of signatures is central.
e question nevertheless arises, how big such a rewrien TBox theoretically
can be. Assume, a given ໦໱໨໮-TBox ໹ ໟ over the signature τ is found to be re-
writable into an ໦໱໨-TBox ໹. We can w.l.o.g. assume that ໹ = {⊤ ⊑ C} with
C ∈ ໦໱໨(τ).
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At ﬁrst, we look at rankC. Let therefore k ∶= rank ໹ ໟ. Every type t ∈ tp has
rank t = k. ese types can only inﬂuence the elements in their neighbourhood,
i.e. successors and predecessors, up to depth k. Hence t inﬂuences elements in
a neighbourhood of diameter 2k and so the concept C, as well, only needs to
specify properties of elements up to (forward) depth 2k; we shall give a proof for
this intuition:
P 6.1.8 . Every global ໦໱໨໮u-concept C with rankC ≤ k whi is pre-
served under g⟷−− is already preserved under g⟷−− 2k.
L 6.1.9 . Let I andH be two τ-interpretation and IF andHF their forest-unravel-
lings. If I g⟷−− 2k H then IF gi⟷−− k HF.
P. It is important to keep in mind, that predecessors are unique in forest-
unravellings. We prove the claim by induction upon k < ω. e claim is clear
for k = 0. Let I g⟷−− 2(k+1) H and assume at ﬁrst d̄ໟ ∈ ΔI
F has a predecessor
d̄ ∈ ΔIF in distance k + 1, i.e. d̄ໟ = d̄ ⋅ r1 ⋅ d1…rk+1 ⋅ dk+1 is in depth k + 1 of the
subtree of d̄. en there is some ̄e ∈ ΔHF such that (IF, d̄) ⟷−− 2(k+1) (HF, ̄e) and
some ̄eໟ = ̄e ⋅ r1 ⋅ e1…rk+1 ⋅ ek+1 such that (IF, d̄…di)⟷−− 2(k+1)−i (HF, ̄e…ei) for all
i ∈ {1,… , k + 1}. Essentially, we require that ̄eໟ is the answer of II aer being
challenged for k rounds by I moving in IF from d̄ to d̄ໟ.
We have to show that (IF, d̄ໟ) i⟷−− k+1 (HF, ̄eໟ). Let I challenge II in the ໦໱໨໮-
bisimulation game by moving to the rk+1-predecessor d̄໠ ∶= d̄ ⋅ r1 ⋅ d1…rk ⋅ dk
of d̄ໟ, say. en II can answer with ̄e໠ ∶= ̄e ⋅ r1 ⋅ e1…rk ⋅ ek: We have that d̄ is
in distance k to d̄໠ and equally for ̄e and ̄e໠. Furthermore (IF, d̄) ⟷−− 2k (HF, ̄e)
and (IF, d̄…di) ⟷−− 2k−i (HF, ̄e…ei) for all i ∈ {1,… , k}. Hence the induction
hypothesis yields (IF, d̄໠) i⟷−− k (HF, ̄e໠). e same arguments hold if I challenges
II by moving to the predecessor in HF.
Assume I challenges II by moving in IF from d̄ໟ to d̄໠ ∶= d̄ໟ ⋅rk+2 ⋅dk+2. Because
we have (IF, d̄ໟ)⟷−− k+1 (HF, ̄eໟ), there is an rk+2-successor ̄e໠ ∶= ̄eໟ ⋅ rk+2 ⋅ ek+2 of
̄eໟ such that (IF, d̄…di)⟷−− 2k−i (HF, ̄e…ei) for all i ∈ {1,… , k+2}. In particular is
d̄⋅r1 ⋅d1 ⋅r2 ⋅d2 in distance k of d̄໠ and ̄e⋅r1 ⋅e1 ⋅r2 ⋅e2 in distance k of ̄e໠ which entails
(IF, d̄…di+2) ⟷−− 2k−i (HF, ̄e…ei+2) for all i ∈ {1,… , k}. Again, the induction
hypothesis yields (IF, d̄໠) gi⟷−− k (HF, ̄e໠). is shows (I, d̄ໟ) i⟷−− k+1 (HF, ̄eໟ).
We cover the case where d̄ໟ does not have a predecessor in distance k + 1.
Take its predecessor d with maximal distance ℓ to d̄ໟ ∶= d ⋅ r1 ⋅ d1…rℓ ⋅ dℓ. e
element d is the root of a tree in IF. Since IF ⟷−− 2k HF there is a root e ∈ ΔH
F
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with (IF, d) ⟷−− 2(k+1) (HF, e), and so there is ̄eໟ ∶= e ⋅ r1 ⋅ e1…rℓ ⋅ eℓ such that
(IF, d…di)⟷−− 2(k+1)−i (HF, e…ei) for all i ∈ {1,… , ℓ}.
In case I challenges II in the ໦໱໨໮-bisimulation game by moving to a prede-
cessor, we still have that d and e are in maximal distance < k to the (unique) pre-
decessors of ̄eໟ and d̄ໟ and (IF, d…di)⟷−− 2k−i (HF, e…ei) for all i ∈ {1,… , ℓ − 1}.
is allows to use the induction hypothesis which yields໦໱໨໮-k-bisimilarity. If
I challenges II in the ໦໱໨໮-bisimulation game by moving to a successor, then
either the successor. Since (IF, d̄ໟ) ⟷−− k+1 (HF, ̄eໟ), II can answer this challenge
yielding (IF, d̄໠) ⟷−− k (HF, ̄e໠) for successors d̄໠ of d̄ໟ and ̄e໠ of ̄eໟ. Either d̄໠ has
now the root d in distance k, for which the proof from above shows (IF, d̄໠) i⟷−− k
(HF, ̄e໠), or we are still in the situation where the successor has no root in distance
k. But then (IF, d…di)⟷−− 2(k+1)−i (HF, e…ei) for all i ∈ {1,… , ℓ + 1} and the in-
duction hypothesis applies again. is shows (I, d̄ໟ) i⟷−− k+1 (HF, ̄eໟ) and hence
proves together with the result from above that IF gi⟷−− k+1 HF 2
P  P 6.1.8. Let I ⊨ C and I g⟷−− 2k H. We show H ⊨ C.
Since I g⟷−− IF we have IF ⊨ C. e rank of C implies that C is preserved under
global໦໱໨໮-k-bisimulation and with Lemma 6.1.9 we obtain IF gi⟷−− k HF, so that
HF ⊨ C. Since HF g⟷−− H we obtain H ⊨ C. 2
Hence an ໦໱໨-rewritable ໦໱໨໮-TBox of depth k can be rewrien as ໦໱໨-
TBox of at most rank 2k. is estimation is sharp: Let ໹ ໟ ∶= {∃r−.⊤ ⊑ ∃r.⊤}
then ໹ ∶= {⊤ ⊑ ∀r.∃r.⊤} is a logically equivalent ໦໱໨-TBox with minimal
rank. Indeed, this result can be obtained by checking that all TBoxes formed from
concepts
{⊤, ⊥, ∃r.⊤, ∃r.⊥, ∀r.⊤, ∀r.⊥}
with rank equal to 1 are not equivalent to ໹ ໟ by creating a counterexample. It
is now not diﬃcult to extend this example to ໹ ໟ ∶= {(∃r−)n.⊤ ⊑ (∃r)n.⊤} and
໹ ∶= {⊤ ⊑ (∀r)n.(∃r)n.⊤} for every n < ω. It follows that rank ໹ = 2 ⋅ rank ໹ ໟ.
Now |C| and therefore |໹| can be estimated by looking at characteristic con-
cepts. We can estimate a lower bound of the length of a characteristic concept
Xn+1I,d by estimating how many characteristic concepts there are on level n: e.g.
X1I,d can contain ∃r.X0I,dໟ for every possible r ∈ NR and every possible charac-
teristic concept X0I,dໟ as subconcepts. ere are |NR| ⋅ 2|NC|-many concepts of
the form ∃r.X0I,dໟ which could be contained in X1I,d. X 2I,d could therefore contain
|NR| ⋅ 2|NR|⋅2
|NC| many. It is not diﬃcult to see that we get a tower of powers.
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Hence the length grows very fast very large and is for level n in the order of a
tower of powers of height n. So the length of a characteristic concept on level n
can be estimated by a tower of powers at whose top we have |τ| as exponent.
As discussed earlier, the rank of the translation of the TBox ໹ ໟ is n ≤ 2⋅ rank ໹ ໟ
and so the translation could be in the order of a tower of powers of height 2 ⋅
rank ໹ ໟ with |τ| as top exponent. Apart from this considerations tighter bounds
for rewritings in the same signature have not been determined.
6.2 The໦໱໨-to-໪໱ Rewritability Problem
We shall now give two algorithms which together decide the໦໱໨-to-໪໱ Rewrit-
ability problem: e ﬁrst one which will check whether or not a given TBox ໹
is invariant under global equi-simulation and the second one which will check
whether or not a given TBox is preserved under products. e characterisation
theorem for ໪໱-TBoxes (eorem 5.1.37) yields, if both algorithms return a pos-
itive result, that the given໦໱໨-TBox can be expressed as ໪໱-TBox.
We start with the algorithm which is meant to determine whether or not Z ⊆
tp ໹×tp ⧵tp ໹ is empty, where Z contains all pairs (s, t) such that there are pointed
interpretations (I, d) and (H, e)
1. (H, e) -→←-∀ (I, d)
2. (H, e) ⊨ s and (I, d) ⊨ t
3. H ⊨ ໹.
O 6.2.1 . ໹ is not ໪໱-rewritable iﬀ there is s ∈ tp⧵ tp ໹ and t ∈ tp ໹ su
that (s, t) ∈ Z.
e algorithm is inspired by the one used to determine໦໱໨໮-to-໦໱໨ rewrit-
ability: In order to determine the pairs in Z, we shall consider the components
of pairs (s, t) ∈ tp ໹ × (tp ⧵ tp ໹ ) as possible distinguished elements in pointed
interpretations (I, t) and (H, s) with (I, t) ⊨ t and (H, s) ⊨ s. But how can we
determine the entire of I and H?
Let us decouple H from I and neglect their interplay for a moment. How could
we build a model of ໹ such that (H, s) ⊨ s? Clearly s ∈ tp ໹ and therefore it is
complete w.r.t. to concept names i.e. for all A ∈ NC either A ∈ s or ¬A ∈ s. We
simply label s ∈ ΔH accordingly.
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However, if ∃r.C ∈ s then we must have an r-successor s̃ໟ ∈ ΔH that satisﬁes C.
Since H is supposed to satisfy ໹, this s̃ໟ must satisfy an element from tp ໹. Again,
we can consider this element s̃ໟ being identical to the sໟ ∈ tp ໹ containing all
concepts from clos ໹ satisﬁed by s̃ໟ. Or conversely possible r-successors of s are
at ﬁrst all sໟ ∈ tp ໹ which are not ‘prohibited’ by s because, e.g. ∃r.¬D ∈ s and
D ∈ sໟ.
Connecting s and sໟ and inductively carrying on from sໟ will eventually lead to
an interpretation (H, s) ⊨ s and evenH ⊨ ໹. If for some element s0 with ∃r.C ∈ s0,
occurring along the way, no possible r-successor sໟ0 exists, such that C ∈ sໟ0, we
must remove s0 as possible candidate: is could lead to several backtracking
steps, deleting more elements which now turn out to lack s0 as only possible rໟ-
successor.
ough, we not only need to constructH but also I such that (H, s) -→←- (I, t). So
we have to coordinate both procedures which create (H, s) and (I, t): Since every
pair (s, t) ∈ Z is contained in
Y0 ∶= {(s, t) ∈ tp ໹ × tp ∣ ∀A ∈ NC ∶ A ∈ s ⟺ A ∈ t}
we could simply delete pairs from Y0 for which we cannot ﬁnd appropriate suc-
cessors such that (H, s) −−→(I, t) and (I, t) −−→(H, s). is must eventually trans-
form Y0 into Z. Hence we need to determine whether H and I exist, such that
(H, s) −−→(I, t) and (I, t) −−→(H, s) and, at the same time, I -→←-∀ H.
Unfortunately, there is a technical diﬃculty concerning the determination of
Z: Assume we were about to test whether (s, t) ∈ Y0 is also in Z by constructing
interpretations (I, t) and (H, s). Assume furthermore that ∃r.C ∈ t.
In order obtain (I, d) -→←- (H, e) we have to assure that (I, d) −−→ (H, e) and
(H, e) −−→ (I, d). Hence for the r-successor t0 of t which we have to introduce as
witness of ∃r.C there must be some r-successor s0 of s satisfying (I, t0) −−→(H, s0).
But in particular we also have to assure (H, s) −−→(I, t) and so there must also be
some r-successor tໟ1 in I such that (H, sໟ1) −−→(I, tໟ1) and so on. Figure 6.1 illustrates
this seemingly inﬁnite ascending chain.
Lemma 6.2.2 further down however states that this chain stabilises in elements
d∗ and e∗ as the Figure 6.1 suggests. But the subconcept C in ∃r.C ∈ t might be
an ໦໱໨-concept which is not preserved under −−→ ; we cannot guarantee that
(I, t0) ⊨ C and (I, t0) −−→(I, d∗) implies (I, d∗) ⊨ C. Hence it is not suﬃcient to
take d∗ instead of t0.
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Figure 6.1: e ascending chain of simulating r-successors, oscillating between I
and H, stabilises in two equisimilar elements d∗ and e∗.
We therefore have tomake the constraint thatwe can ﬁnd a quadruple (s0, t0, s1, t1),
where (Cf. R 1 in Algorithm 6.2.5)
1. t0 is the witness for ∃r.C ∈ t
2. s0 ensures I -→←-∀ H by providing (I, t0) -→←- (H, s0)
3. t1 ∶= tI(d∗) and s1 ∶= sH(e∗) are the types of the end points of the reciprocal
simulation chain from t0 and t1
If now ∃r.C ∈ t0 we shall need an r-successor tໟ0 of t0 with (I, tໟ0) ⊨ tໟ0 and C ∈ tໟ0
with tໟ1 and sໟ1 being the elements provided by Lemma 6.2.2. Additionally we have
to keep book about the development of t1 and s1: they need to have r-successors tໟ2
and sໟ2, respectively, such that again (I, tໟ2) -→←- (H, sໟ2) but also that (I, tໟ0) −−→(I, tໟ2).
If the laer is not satisﬁed, we cannot guarantee (I, t0) −−→ (I, t1). If the former
is not satisﬁed H -→←-∀ I is endangered. As consequence we obtain an even bigger
tuple (sໟ0, tໟ0, sໟ1, tໟ1, sໟ2, tໟ2). us, the tuples in Z grow.
But the tuples do not grow indeﬁnitely: In contrast to H, where every element
needs to satisfy some element of tp ໹ to ensureH ⊨ ໹, it suﬃces that some element
in I satisﬁes some t ∈ tp ⧵ tp ໹ to create a counterexample for I ⊨ ໹. Since every
t ∈ tp ⧵ tp ໹ is ﬁnite, ⨅ t is ℓ-local, where ℓ = max{rankC ∣ C ∈ t}. I.e. it
is enough if we ensure that possible r-successors of the distinguished element t
satisfy some element tໟ ∈ tp up to rank t − 1 where tໟ is not forbidden by t. is
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will ensure (I, t) ⊨ t. As soon as we reach aer at most rank ໹-many steps tໟ with
rank tໟ = 0, any continuation is acceptable.
Similarlywe have to ensure that all concepts in newly introduced ti components
are satisﬁed which leads to R 4 in Algorithm 6.2.5. In contrast to those t ∈
tp ⧵ tp ໹, we cannot shrink the rank of the s ∈ tp ໹, as also successor elements
must satisfy ໹ and therefore must satisfy some s ∈ tp ໹. Hence an increase in
length of the tuples caused by elements from tp ໹ would not stop.
But as mentioned before: it suﬃces to have one counterexample for ໹ in I to
defy I ⊨ ໹. Hence a disjoint union I⊎H is not a model of ໹. So, for an r-successor
sໟ0 of s0, say, being a witness for ∃r.C ∈ s0, we need not provide those end-points
of the reciprocal simulation chain: we can assume that s0 is contained in I, which
preserves I -→←-∀ H. We can therefore make due with an auxiliary component, later
simply represented by an s without index, which takes care of realising witnesses
for ∃r.C ∈ s (Cf. R 2, R 3 and R 5 in Algorithm 6.2.5).
Aer stating and proving Lemma 6.2.2 which was announced above, we shall
give the algorithm and its necessary deﬁnitions.
L 6.2.2 . Let (I, d) -→←- (H, e) and let I, H be ω-saturated. For every r-successor
dໟ of d in I there is an r-successor d∗ of d in I and an r-successor e∗ of e in H su
that
(I, dໟ) −−→(I, d∗) -→←- (H, e∗)
To this end, we prove the following
L 6.2.3 . Let X ∶= {d0 ∈ ΔI ∣ (d, d0) ∈ rI and (I, dໟ) −−→ (I, d0)}. We show
that X has a maximal element w.r.t. −−→
P. We have to show that there is some element d∗ ∈ X such that for all
d0 ∈ X we have (I, d0) −−→(I, d∗) implies (I, d∗) −−→(I, d0).
In order to apply Zorn’s Lemma we have to show that every−−→-chain K ⊆ X
has an upper−−→-bound d+ in X. We shall apply the following steps: We show that
Γ ∶= ⨄d0∈K໪໱(I, d0) is satisﬁed by some r-successor d
+ of d and then, using the
ω-saturatedness of I, that d+ simulates every element in K. From Zorn’s Lemma
we then obtain the maximal element d∗.
Let Θ ∶= ⋃d0∈K{d0} ×໪໱(I, d0) and let Θ0 ⊆ Θ be ﬁnite. Set
Kໟ ∶= {d0 ∈ K ∣ ∃C ∈໪໱(I, d0) ∶ (d0,C) ∈ Θ0},
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then Kໟ is a ﬁnite −−→-chain. Take the −−→-greatest element d1 in Kໟ. We have
(I, d0) −−→ (I, d1) for all d0 ∈ Kໟ and, since all ໪໱ concepts are preserved by−−→,
we also have ໪໱(I, d0) ⊆ ໪໱(I, d1). Hence (I, d1) ⊨ ⋃d0∈K໪໱(I, d0). is
shows that every ﬁnite subset of Γ is satisﬁed at some r-successor of d
Hence Γ is an r-type of d. Since I is ω-saturated, Γ must be realised by some
r-successor d+. But also, since I isω-saturated, the Hennessy-Milner-Property for
໪໱ (Proposition 5.1.30) yields for every d1 ∈ ΔI with ໪໱(I, d1) ⊆ ໪໱(I, d+)
that (I, d1) −−→(I, d+). By deﬁnition of X, d+ must be in X
is shows that every −−→-chain K ⊆ X has an upper bound in X and Zorn’s
Lemma yields that there must be a−−→-maximal element d∗ ∈ X. 2
P  L 6.2.2. LetX be deﬁned as in Lemma 6.2.3 and let d∗ be amaximal
element of X. Since (I, d) -→←- (H, e) there is some r-successor e∗ of e inH such that
(I, d∗) −−→(H, e∗). But we also have (H, e∗) −−→(I, d∗):
(I, d) -→←- (H, e) provides dໟ such that (H, e∗) −−→(I, dໟ). Transitivity entails for
(I, d1) −−→(I, d∗) −−→(H, e∗) −−→(I, dໟ) that dໟ ∈ X and (I, d∗) −−→(I, dໟ). Since d∗
is−−→-maximal inX, we have (I, dໟ) −−→(I, d∗) and therefore that (H, e∗) −−→(I, d∗).
2
6.2.1 Algorithm to Determine Invariance under Equi-Simulation
Let clos ໹ be deﬁned as for ໦໱໨-TBoxes. tp is the set of all satisﬁable subsets of
clos ໹ and and tp ໹ are all those s ∈ tp such that ໹ ∪ s is satisﬁable. We denote
with tp k ∶= {t ∈ tp ∣ ∀C ∈ t ∶ rankC ≤ k}.
For t, tໟ ∈ tp we deﬁne t ⇝r tໟ if ¬∃r.C ∈ t implies C ∉ tໟ. Indeed this
relation is the same as the one used for the໦໱໨໮-to-໦໱໨-rewritability problem,
as ¬∃r−.C ∈ tໟ ⟹ C ∉ t is trivially true for all t, tໟ ⊆ ໦໱໨(τ).
For all k, ℓ ≥ 0 with k + ℓ ≤ rank ໹ we deﬁne
Xkℓ ∶= (s, s0, t0,… sℓ, tℓ) ∣ ∀i ∈ {0,…ℓ} ∶ s, si ∈ tp ໹ and ti ∈ tp k}
en Zkℓ is the subset of Xkℓ such that for every (s, s0, t0,… sℓ, tℓ) ∈ Zkℓ there are
pointed interpretations (I0, d0),… , (Iℓ, dℓ) and (H, e), (H0, e0),… , (Hℓ, eℓ) such
that
1. (Ii, di) ⊨ ti for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
2. (H, e) ⊨ s and (Hi, ei) ⊨ si for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
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3. H ⊨ ໹ and Hi ⊨ ໹ for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
4. (Ii, di) -→←-∀ (Hi, ei) for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
5. (Ii, di) −−→(Ii+1, di+1) for all i ∈ {1,… , ℓ − 1}
6. (H, e) −−→(H0, e0)
ese deﬁnitions give rise to the following observation:
O 6.2.4 . ໹ is not invariant under -→←-∀ iﬀ there is k ≤ rank ໹ as well as
t ∈ tp ⧵ tp ໹ and s ∈ tp ໹ su that (s, s, t) ∈ Zk0
In this sense, for all k, ℓ ≥ 0 with k + ℓ ≤ rank ໹, the set Zkℓ is a target set to
which our algorithm will have to reduce the corresponding Xkℓ or rather its subset
Ykℓ fromwhich Algorithm 6.2.5 will set out. If we can show that the set Finalkℓ ⊆ Ykℓ
which the algorithm leaves behind equals to Zkℓ then Observation 6.2.4 tells us that
we simply need to check Finalk0 for tuples (s, s, t) with t ∈ tp ⧵ tp ໹ and s ∈ tp ໹
to decide whether or not ໹ is preserved by global equi-simulation. We shall thus
use Zkℓ to show that the algorithm is correct.
A 6.2.5 . As initial sets for the algorithm, we use Ymℓ , with 0 ≤ ℓ,m and
ℓ +m ≤ rank ໹, where Ymℓ consists of all tuples (s, s0, t0,… sℓ, tℓ) ∈ Xkℓ such that
for all A ∈ NC we have
1. A ∈ s⟹ A ∈ s0
2. A ∈ ti ⟹ A ∈ ti+1 for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
3. A ∈ ti ⟺ A ∈ si for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
Starting with Ymℓ the algorithm applies the following rules to each set Ymℓ ob-
taining a new set aer each application: Let (s, s0, t0,… sℓ, tℓ) ∈ Ymℓ and for the
purpose of this algorithm, set m − 1 ∶= 0 if m = 0. We remove this tuple from
Ymℓ , i.e.
We set Ymℓ ∶= Ymℓ ⧵ {(s, s0, t0,… tℓ, sℓ)} whenever
R 1
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m > 0 and ∃r.C ∈ t0 and there is no (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sℓ, tℓ, tໟℓ+1, sໟℓ+1) ∈ Ym−1ℓ+1
with
1. C ∈ tໟ0
2. t0 ⇝r tໟ0 and t0 ⇝r tໟ1, s0 ⇝r sໟ1
3. ti ⇝r tໟi+1 and si ⇝r sໟi+1 for all i ∈ {1,…ℓ}
R 2
∃r.C ∈ s0 and there is no (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… sໟℓ, tໟℓ) ∈ Ym−1ℓ with
1. C ∈ sໟ
2. t0 ⇝r tໟ0, s0 ⇝r sໟ0 and s0 ⇝r sໟ
3. ti ⇝r tໟi and si ⇝r sໟi for all i ∈ {1,…ℓ}
R 3
∃r.C ∈ s and there is no (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sໟℓ, tໟℓ) ∈ Ym−1ℓ with
1. C ∈ sໟ
2. t0 ⇝r tໟ0, s0 ⇝r sໟ0 and s⇝r sໟ,
3. ti ⇝r tໟi and si ⇝r sໟi for all i ∈ {1,…ℓ}
R 4
m > 0 and for some i ∈ {1,… , ℓ} there is ∃r.C ∈ ti and there is no
(sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0, sໟ1, tໟ1,… , sℓ−i+1, tℓ−i+1) ∈ Ym−1ℓ−i+1 with
1. C ∈ tໟ0
2. ti ⇝r tໟ0 and ti ⇝r tໟ1, si ⇝r sໟ1
3. th ⇝r tໟh−i+1, sh ⇝r sໟh−i+1 for i < h ≤ ℓ
R 5
for some i ∈ {1,… , ℓ} there is ∃r.C ∈ si and there is no
(sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sℓ−i, tℓ−i) ∈ Ym−1ℓ−i with
1. C ∈ sໟ
2. si ⇝r sໟ and ti ⇝r tໟ0, si ⇝r sໟ0
3. th ⇝r tໟh−i, sh ⇝r sໟh−i for i < h ≤ ℓ
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Please note that the requirementm > 0 in R 1 and R 4 is redundant: We
assume ∃r.C ∈ t, which implies m > 0. But it is made explicit in order to show
that ℓ + 1 is not ’out of bounds’.
Since for all ℓ,m ≥ 0 with ℓ +m ≤ rank ໹ all sets Ymℓ are ﬁnite, this algorithm
terminates as soon as no rule is applicable. We denote with Finalmℓ the subset of
Ymℓ which is le aer the algorithm terminates.
6.2.2 Proof of Correctness for the Algorithm
Algorithm 6.2.5 starts out with sets Ymℓ whose shape and form has been discussed
in quite some length: In essence the tuples keep track of several parallel simu-
lations which originally emanated from two equisimilar points. e algorithm
deletes all those tuples from Ymℓ for which either the simulation cannot be main-
tained (mainly condition 2. and 3. in the rules) or for which the types s, t, and
si, ti with i ≤ ℓ cannot be realised (condition 1.). us only those tuples are le,
whose types can be realised and appropriate simulations and equi-simulations
exists; confer to properties 1–6 of Zkℓ on page 213 or to Table 6.1 for a diagram.
In order to prove correctness for Algorithm 6.2.5, we have to show that Zmℓ =
Finalmℓ . We split this task into Proposition 6.2.6, showing Zmℓ ⊆ Finalmℓ , i.e. for all
m ∈ {0,… , k} no tuple is deleted by any rule r(1)–r(5) from Ymℓ which is in Zmℓ
and Proposition 6.2.8 showing Finalmℓ ⊆ Zmℓ .
P 6.2.6 . For all m, ℓ < ω with m + ℓ ≤ rank ໹ we have Zmℓ ⊆ Finalmℓ .
Since this claim is trivial if Zmℓ = ∅, we shall assume that Zmℓ ≠ ∅. e proof
will be carried out by induction upon m, where we shall infer from the induction
hypothesis that Zmℓ ⊆ Finalmℓ for all ℓ with m + ℓ ≤ rank ໹. e induction hy-
pothesis is proven separately. We set tI(d) ∶= {C ∈ clos ໹ ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C} and
analogously
tIm(d) ∶= {C ∈ clos ໹ ∣ (I, d) ⊨ C and rankC ≤ m}.
L 6.2.7 . Z0ℓ ⊆ Y0ℓ.
For the proof of Lemma 6.2.7 we need to hark back to the constructions we shall
be developing in the step cases. We shall therefore, without circular reasoning,
present the step-cases ﬁrst and then prove the base case.
P  P 6.2.6. Let (m+1)+ℓ ≤ rank ໹. Assume (s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, tℓ) ∈
Zm+1ℓ . e following setup can be inferred, where w.l.o.g. H and for all i ∈
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{0,… , ℓ} Ii,Hi can be assumed to be ω-saturated:
t0 ti ti+1
⊨ ⊨ ⊨
(I0, d0) −−→ (Ii, di) −−→ (Ii+1, di+1)
--→ ←--∀ --→ ←--∀ --→ ←--∀
(H, e) −−→ (H, e0) (Hi, ei) (Hi+1, ei+1)⊨ ⊨ ⊨ ⊨
s s0 si si+1
Table 6.1: Tuples in Zmℓ represent the depicted situation, where 1 ≤ i < ℓ
For the sake of contradiction assume (s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, tℓ) has been deleted from
Ym+1ℓ by one of the rules (r1)–(r5). For each rule a contradiction is derived by
constructing a tuple, required by the rule to not exist, which will be contained,
depending on the rule, in Zmℓ+1, Zmℓ , Zm1 or Zm0 respectively. e induction hypo-
thesis then yields the contradiction.
R 1
We havem+ 1 > 0; assume ∃r.C ∈ t. Using the diagram above, we can infer that
there is some r-successor dໟ0 of d0 in I0 such that (I0, dໟ0) ⊨ C. Since I0 -→←-∀ H0
there is some eໟ0 inH0 such that (I0, dໟ0) -→←- (H0, eໟ0). Note that eໟ0 is not necessarily
an r-successor of e0. We set tໟ0 ∶= t
I0m (dໟ0), sໟ0 ∶= tH0(eໟ0) and s ∶= sໟ0. Since dໟ0 is an
r-successor of d0, we have t0 ⇝r tໟ0 and C ∈ tໟ0 follows from the deﬁnition of tໟ0.
Since (I0, d0) -→←- (H0, e0) we ﬁnd with Lemma 6.2.2 an r-successor d∗0 of d0
and e∗0 of e0 such that (I0, dໟ0) −−→ (I0, d∗0) -→←- (H0, e∗0). We set tໟ1 ∶= t
I0m (d∗0) and
sໟ1 ∶= tH0(e∗0) and obtain, since d∗0 is an r-successor of d0 and e∗0 is an r-successor
of e0, that t0 ⇝r tໟ1 and s0 ⇝r sໟ1.
Incrementing i stepwise by 1 from 0 up to ℓ−1, we ﬁnd the appropriate candid-
ates for dໟi and eໟi as follows: Assumewe have already found dໟi in the previous step.
en, since (Ii, di) −−→ (Ii+1, di+1), there is some r-successor of dໟi+1 of di+1 such
that (Ii, dໟi) −−→(Ii+1, dໟi+1). Since (Ii+1, di+1) -→←- (Hi+1, ei+1) we ﬁnd r-successors
d∗i+1 of di+1 and e∗i+1 of ei+1 such that (Ii+1, dໟi+1) −−→(Ii+1, d∗i+1) -→←- (Hi+1, e∗i+1).
Transitivity now yields (Ii, dໟi) −−→(Ii+1, d∗i+1) -→←- (Hi+1, e∗i+1) and we set tໟi+2 ∶=
tIi+1m (d∗i+1) and sໟi+2 ∶= sHi+1(e∗i+1). We obtain ti ⇝r tໟi+1 and si ⇝r sໟi+1 for i ∈
{0,… , ℓ}. Note that we have an index-shi; both, the assignment and the sub-
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sequent statement are correct in their indices:
(I0, d0) −−→ (Ii, di) −−→ (Ii+1, di+1)⊨ ⊨ ⊨
t0 ti ti+1
r⇜
⇝
r
⇝
r
⇝
r
tໟ0 tໟ1 tໟi+1 tໟi+2
⊨ ⊨ ⊨ ⊨
(I0, dໟ0) −−→ (I0, d∗0) −−→ (Ii, d∗i ) −−→ (Ii+1, d∗i+1)
erefore (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… sໟℓ+1, tໟℓ+1) ∈ Zmℓ+1. e induction hypothesis Zmℓ+1 ⊆
Finalmℓ+1 together with Finalmℓ+1 ⊆ Ymℓ+1, yields Zmℓ+1 ⊆ Ymℓ+1 and so R 1 is not
applicable to (s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, tℓ) in Ym+1ℓ .
R 2
As (H0, e0) ⊨ s0 and ∃r.C ∈ s0 there there is eໟ0 ∈ ΔH with (e0, eໟ0) ∈ rH and
eໟ0 ∈ CH. By Lemma 6.2.2 we can ﬁnd an r-successor e∗0 of e0 in H0 and an r-
successor d∗0 of d0 in I0 such that (H0, eໟ0) −−→(H0, e∗0) -→←- (I0, d∗0). Of course, still
I0 -→←-∀ H0. We set sໟ ∶= tH0(eໟ0), sໟ0 ∶= tH0(e∗0) and tໟ0 ∶= t
I0m (d∗0), which implies
C ∈ sໟ. Since eໟ0 and e∗0 are r-successors of e we have s0 ⇝r sໟ and s0 ⇝r sໟ0. e
same argument shows t0 ⇝r tໟ0.
With the same step-wise construction from the case R 1 we obtain for each
i ∈ {0,… , ℓ − 1} r-successors d∗i+1 of di+1 and e∗i+1 of ei+1 such that (Ii, d∗i ) −−→
(Ii+1, d∗i+1) -→←- (Hi+1, e∗i+1). We set ti+1 ∶= t
Ii+1m (d∗i+1) and s ∶= tHi+1(e∗i+1) for each
i ∈ {0,… , ℓ − 1} and thus obtain ti ⇝r tໟi and si ⇝r sໟi for all i ∈ {0,… , ℓ}.
It shows (tໟ, sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ1, sໟ1,… , tໟℓ, sໟℓ) ∈ Zm−1ℓ and with the induction hypothesis
(tໟ, sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ1, sໟ1,… , tໟℓ, sໟℓ) ∈ Ym−1ℓ is inferred. Hence R 2 was not applicable to
(s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, tℓ) in Ym+1ℓ , which derives the contradiction.
R 3
e case is similar to the case R 2: Assume ∃r.C ∈ s. e setup displayed in
the ﬁrst diagram shows that we can choose an r-successor eໟ of ewith (H, eໟ) ⊨ C.
Accordingly there is some r-successor eໟ0 of e0 such that (H, eໟ) −−→(H0, eໟ0).
Lemma 6.2.2 yields r-successors d∗0 of d0 and e∗0 of e0 such that (H0, eໟ0) −−→
(H, e∗0) -→←- (I, d∗0) and therefore that (H, e) −−→ (H, e∗0) -→←- (I, d∗0) We set t0 ∶=
tI0m (d∗0), s0 ∶= tH0(e∗0) and s ∶= tH(eໟ). e r-successorship for each of them yields
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s⇝r sໟ, s0 ⇝r sໟ0 as well as t0 ⇝r tໟ0.
Analogously to R 1 we can ﬁnd tໟi and sໟi such that (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , tໟℓ, sໟℓ) ∈ Zmℓ .
Using the induction hypothesis one can argue in the same fashion of R 2 that
R 3 is not applicable to (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ) in Ym+1ℓ .
R 4 uses the rationale of R 1 and R 5 use the same rationale as R 2.
2
P  L 6.2.7. Let Y0ℓ(n) denote the set Y0ℓ aer the n-th rule application.
We shall show by induction upon n that
for all n < ω and all ℓ ≤ rank ໹ we have Z0ℓ ⊆ Y0ℓ(n).
Note that we do need the deﬁnition m− 1 ∶= 0 if m = 0 used in Algorithm 6.2.5!
e base case is clear from the fact that Y0ℓ(0) is the initial set which contains
Z0ℓ: Let (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ) ∈ Z0ℓ then from the deﬁnition of Z0ℓ we obtain all re-
quirements 1–4 so that (t, s, s0, t1, s1,… , tℓ, sℓ) is a member of the initial Y0ℓ(0).
Assume now Z0ℓ ⊆ Y0ℓ(n). Clearly rule R 1 and R 4 are not applicable to
Y0ℓ(n + 1) as m > 0 is required. We show that none of the rules R 2, R 3
and R 5 is applicable to this tuple:
Let (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ) ∈ Z0ℓ. Assume ∃r.C ∈ s0/∃r.C ∈ s. e construction
method used in the step case for R 2/R 3 created a tuple (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , tໟℓ, sໟℓ)
which is in Z0ℓ and satisﬁes all requirements imposed on (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , tໟℓ, sໟℓ) in
R 2/R 3. By induction hypothesis Z0ℓ ⊆ Y0ℓ(n) and so R 2/R 3 is not
applicable to (t, s, s0, t1, s1,… , tℓ, sℓ) in Y0ℓ(n).
For R 5, assume for some i ∈ 1,… , ℓ we have ∃r.C ∈ si. Again we ﬁnd
(sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… sໟℓ−i, tໟℓ−i) ∈ Z01 such that all requirements imposed on it by R 5
are met. By induction hypothesis, Z01 ⊆ Y01(n) and so R 5 cannot be applied to
(s, s0, t0…, tℓ, sℓ) in the n + 1-st loop pass of the algorithm.
Since none of the rules is applicable, it shows that (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ) ∈ Y0ℓ(n+1)
and therefore that Z0ℓ ⊆ Y0ℓ for all stages of Y0ℓ. 2
P 6.2.8 . For all m, ℓ < ω with m + ℓ ≤ rank ໹ we have Finalmℓ ⊆ Zmℓ
Again, the claim is trivial if Finalmℓ = ∅ and we hence assume Finalmℓ ≠ ∅. We
show that we can construct for each element in Finalmℓ interpretations as required
by Zmℓ , which proves that this element must be an element of Zmℓ .
To this end, we consider the components of the tuples d̄ ∶= (s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, tℓ)
of Zmℓ as being indexed from 0 to 2ℓ + 3. For a tuple d̄ we write d̄i for the i-th
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component. We deﬁne the interpretation I by seing
ΔI ∶= ෛm+ℓ≤rank ໹
{(d̄, i) ∣ d̄ ∈ Finalmℓ and 0 ≤ i ≤ 2ℓ + 3}
and AI ∶= {(d̄i, i) ∣ A ∈ d̄i}. For each r ∈ NR we deﬁne ((d̄, i), (d̄ໟ, j)) ∈ rI, where
d̄ ∶= (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ), whenever one of the following condition holds
(r1) d̄ໟ = (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , tໟℓ+1, sໟℓ+1) ∈ Finalm−1ℓ+1 with (cf. rule (r1))
t0 ⇝r tໟ0 and tk ⇝r tໟk+1, sk ⇝r sໟk+1 for 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ
and (d̄i, d̄ໟj ) ∈ {(t0, tໟ0)} ∪ {(tk, tໟk+1), (sk, sໟk+1) ∣ 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}
(r2) d̄ໟ ∶= (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sໟℓ, tໟℓ) ∈ Finalm−1ℓ with (cf. rule (r2))
s0 ⇝r sໟ and tk ⇝r tໟk, sk ⇝r sໟk for 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ
and (d̄i, d̄ໟj ) ∈ {(s0, sໟ)} ∪ {(tk, tໟk), (sk, sໟk) ∣ 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ},
(r3) d̄ໟ ∶= (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sໟℓ, tໟℓ) ∈ Finalm−1ℓ with (cf. rule (r3))
s⇝r sໟ and tk ⇝r tໟk, sk ⇝r sໟk for 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ
and (d̄i, d̄ໟj ) ∈ {(s, sໟ)} ∪ {(tk, tໟk), (sk, sໟk) ∣ 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}
(r4) there is i ∈ {1,… , ℓ} and d̄ໟ ∶= (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sໟℓ−i+1, tໟℓ−i+1) ∈ Finalm−1ℓ−i+1
such that (cf. rule (r4)) ti ⇝r tໟ0 and ti ⇝r tໟ1, si ⇝r sໟ1
and for all h ∈ {i,… , ℓ} we have th ⇝r tໟh−i+1 and sh ⇝r sໟh−i+1
and (d̄i, d̄ໟj ) ∈ {(ti, tໟ0)} ∪ {(th, tໟh−i+1), (sh, sໟh−i+1) ∣ i ≤ h ≤ ℓ}.
(r5) there is i ∈ {1,… , ℓ} and d̄ໟ ∶= (sໟ, sໟ0, tໟ0,… , sໟℓ−i, tໟℓ−i) ∈ Finalm−1ℓ−i
such that (cf. rule (r5)) si ⇝r sໟ and si ⇝r sໟ0, ti ⇝r tໟ0
and for all h ∈ {i,… , ℓ}: th ⇝r tໟh−i and sh ⇝r sໟh−i
and (d̄i, d̄ໟj ) ∈ {(si, sໟ)} ∪ {(th, tໟh−i), (sh, sໟh−i) ∣ i ≤ h ≤ ℓ}.
L 6.2.9 . Let (d̄, i) ∈ ΔI with d̄i ∈ tpm. For all C ∈ clos ໹ with rankC ≤ m we
have (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ C ⟺ C ∈ d̄i.
P. e proof is carried out for ﬁxedm by induction upon rankC. If rankC =
0 then C is atomic and the deﬁnition of AI readily yields (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ C ⟺ C ∈
d̄i.
Assume rankC = n + 1 and n + 1 ≤ m. If C = ¬D we may show (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨
D ⟺ D ∈ d̄i instead since d̄i is complete with respect to clos ໹. Similarly,
since D0 ⊓ D1 ∈ di implies D0,D1 ∈ di by the deﬁnition of clos ໹, we can show
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(I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ Di ⟺ Di ∈ d̄i for i ∈ {0, 1} instead. Hence the step case reduces to
show (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ ∃r.D ⟺ ∃r.D ∈ d̄i.
Assume C = ∃r.D ∈ clos ໹ with 0 < rankC ≤ m and (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ ∃r.D. en
there is some (d̄ໟ, j) ∈ ΔI such that ((d̄, i), (d̄ໟ, j)) ∈ rI with (I, (d̄ໟ, j)) ⊨ D. Hence,
by deﬁnition of rI, (d̄i, d̄j) is some pair, say (tk, tໟk) ∈ tpm × tpm−1.
e induction hypothesis yields D ∈ tໟ. From the deﬁnition of r we also know
that then t ⇝r tໟ (check all 5 items) and the deﬁnition of ⇝r shows that D ∈ tໟ
implies ¬∃r.D ∉ t. Since ∃r.D ∈ clos ໹ and t is complete w.r.t. clos ໹ up to rankm
we infer that ∃r.D ∈ t.
is argument can be used for all possible combinations (s, sໟ), (s0, sໟ), (sk, sໟk),
(tk, tໟk) etc, where s, sk ∈ tp ໹ ⊆ tp rank ໹ and (tk, tໟk) ∈ tpm × tpm−1, showing for all
(d̄, i) ∈ ΔI that (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ ∃r.D implies ∃r.D ∈ di.
For the only-if direction, assume ∃r.D ∈ d̄i. In case d̄i = t0 we use the non-
applicability of R 1 to infer the existence of d̄ໟ ∈ Finalm−1ℓ+1 with D ∈ d̄ໟi (where
d̄ໟi = tໟ0). e deﬁnition of rI yields ((d̄, i), (d̄ໟ, i)) ∈ rI. With the induction hypo-
thesis we conclude that (I, (d̄ໟ, i)) ⊨ D and hence that (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ ∃r.D.
Analogously we can use non-applicability of R 2 if d̄i = s0, R 3 if d̄i = s,
the one of R 4 if d̄i = tk and the non-applicability for R 5 if d̄i = sk for any
k ∈ {1,… , ℓ} where ℓ is the length of the tuple d̄. is shows for all (d̄, i) ∈ ΔI
that (I, (d̄ໟ, i)) ⊨ D implies (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ ∃r.D 2
L 6.2.10 . Let d̄ ∶= (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ), and (d̄, i), (d̄, j) ∈ ΔI.
(d̄i, d̄j) ∈ {(tk, tk+1) ∣ 0 ≤ k < ℓ} ⟹ (I, (d̄, i)) −−→(I, (d̄, j))
(d̄i, d̄j) ∈ {(tk, sk) ∣ 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ} ⟹ (I, (d̄, i)) -→←- (I, (d̄, j))
P. For the following relation, we shall prove that it is a simulation
S ∶= ෛm+ℓ≤rank ໹
{((d̄, i), (d̄, j)) ∣ d̄ ∈ Zmℓ with d̄i = tk and d̄j = tkໟ , 0 ≤ k ≤ kໟ < ℓ}
Assume ((d̄, i), (d̄, j)) ∈ S. All tuples in Ymℓ satisfy A ∈ di ⟹ A ∈ dj for all
A ∈ NC and in particular those which are in Finalmℓ . With Lemma 6.2.9 we infer
(I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ A ⟹ (I, (d̄, j)) ⊨ A. Hence it only remains to show that S is closed
under the FORTH condition:
Let d̄ ∈ Zmℓ and ((d̄, i), (d̄, j)) ∈ S. Assume ((d̄, i), (d̄ໟ, iໟ)) ∈ rI.
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C 1
If d̄ໟ is longer than d̄ then the elements are connected due to (r1).
1. Either di = t0, then d̄ໟiໟ = tໟ0 or d̄ໟiໟ = d̄ໟi+2 = tໟ1
2. or there is k ∈ {1,… , ℓ} (shi!) with d̄i = tk and d̄ໟiໟ = tໟk+1.
In either case, (d̄, j) = tkໟ is connected via an r-edge to (d̄ໟ, j + 2) with d̄ໟj+2 = tkໟ+1
for each kໟ ∈ {0,… , ℓ} . Since k ≤ kໟ, by deﬁnition of S, we have k < k+1 ≤ kໟ+1
and so ((d̄ໟ, iໟ), (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) ∈ S.
C 2
If d̄ໟ has the same length as d̄ then the r-edge is due to either (r2) or (r3) or (r4).
We treat the laer in C 3. Is the r-edge due to (r2) and (r3) we know that
(d̄ໟ, iໟ) = (d̄ໟ, i) and also that ((d̄, j), (d̄ໟ, j)) ∈ rI. Since we have k ≤ kໟ we know by
deﬁnition of S that ((d̄ໟ, i), (d̄ໟ, j)) ∈ S.
C 3
If the r-edge is due to (r4) then there is some h ∈ {1,… , ℓ} with d̄ໟ ∈ Zm−1ℓ−h+1. In
this case, k ≤ h ≤ ℓ and di = tk where (d̄, i) is via some r-edge connected to (d̄ໟ, iໟ)
with d̄ໟiໟ = tk−h+1. Similarly (d̄, j) is connected to (d̄ໟ, jໟ) with d̄ໟjໟ = tkໟ−h+1. Again
we obtain that ((d̄ໟ, iໟ), (d̄, jໟ)) ∈ S.
If the r-edge is due to (r5) the argument is analogously to where the edge is
caused by (r4). 2
L 6.2.11 . Let d̄ ∶= (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ), and (d̄, i), (d̄, j) ∈ ΔI.
(d̄i, d̄j) = {(s, s0)} ⟹ (I, (d̄, i)) −−→(I, (d̄, j))
P. For the following relation we shall prove that it is a simulation.
S ∶= ෛm+ℓ≤rank ໹
{((d̄, i), (d̄, j)) ∣ d̄i = s and d̄j = s0}
Again, Ymℓ only contains tuples that satisfy A ∈ s ⟹ A ∈ s0 for all A ∈ NC.
Lemma 6.2.9 yields that then (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ A ⟹ (I, (d̄, j)) ⊨ A for all A ∈ NC. It
remains to show the FORTH property:
Let ((d̄, i), (d̄, j)) ∈ S. If ((d̄, i)(d̄ໟ, iໟ)) ∈ rI then only due to (r3). But this section
of the deﬁnition of rI also stipulates that ((d̄, j), (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) with (d̄ໟ, jໟ) = sໟ0. Hence
((d̄ໟ, iໟ), (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) ∈ S. 2
222
L 6.2.12 . Let d̄ ∶= (s, s0, t0,… , tℓ, sℓ), and (d̄, i), (d̄, j) ∈ ΔI.
(d̄i, d̄j) ∈ {(tk, sk) ∣ 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ} ⟹ (I, (d̄, i)) -→←- (I, (d̄, j))
P. We show that for each k ∈ {0,… , ℓ}: II has a winning strategy in
the simulation game G(I, (d̄, i); I, (d̄, j)) with d̄i = tk and d̄j = sk, by maintaining
conﬁgurations
(I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ); I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) such that d̄ໟiໟ = th and d̄ໟjໟ = shໟ where 0 ≤ h ≤ hໟ ≤ ℓ (∗)
where d̄ໟ ∈ Ymℓ . By deﬁnition of Ymℓ , we know for each such conﬁguration that
A ∈ dໟiໟ implies A ∈ dໟjໟ is satisﬁed for all A ∈ NC because h ≤ hໟ. Lemma 6.2.9
furnishes (I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ)) ⊨ A ⟹ (I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) ⊨ A for all A ∈ NC, and so all such
conﬁgurations are admissible. In particular, II does not lose the 0-th round, as the
start-conﬁguration (I, (d̄, i); I, (d̄, j)) satisﬁes requirement (∗).
Assume the game has reached conﬁguration (I, (d̄, i); I, (d̄, j)), which satisﬁes
requirement (∗) and where d̄ ∈ Ymℓ . Let I challenge II by moving for some r ∈ NR
to some r-successor (d̄ໟ, iໟ) of (d̄, i). Except for (r1) we have in all parts (r2)–(r4)
of the deﬁnition of rI that if (d̄ໟ, iໟ) is an r-successor of (d̄, i) where d̄i = tk then
d̄ໟiໟ = tໟk with the same index k. In (r2)–(r4) we then also ﬁnd that (d̄, j) has an
r-successor (d̄ໟ, jໟ) where d̄j = skໟ and d̄ໟjໟ = sໟkໟ . So, II can achieve a new conﬁgur-
ation (I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ); I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) that meets requirement (∗).
e only exception is (r1). Let I challenge II by moving choosing r ∈ NR and
moving from (d̄, i) to some r-successor (d̄ໟ, iໟ) where d̄ໟ ∈ Zm−1ℓ+1 . If d̄i = t0 then
we either have d̄ໟiໟ = tໟ0 or d̄ໟiໟ = tໟ1. In all other cases where 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ we have
d̄ໟiໟ = tໟk+1. But (r1) also endows (d̄, j) where d̄j = skໟ with an r-successor (d̄ໟ, jໟ)
where d̄ໟj = skໟ+1 for each kໟ ∈ {0,… , ℓ} So in any case of k ∈ {0,… , ℓ}, II
can provide a conﬁguration (I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ); I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) with k < k + 1 ≤ kໟ + 1, which
therefore satisﬁes (∗).
We now show for each k ∈ {0,… , ℓ}: II has a winning strategy in the simula-
tion gameG(I, (d̄, j); (d̄, i))with dj = sk and di = tkໟ if shemaintains conﬁgurations
(I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ); I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ)) so that either dໟjໟ = s and dໟiໟ = t0 or dໟjໟ = sk and dໟiໟ = tk (∗)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ and d̄ໟ ∈ Ymℓ . For each such conﬁguration we know by deﬁnition
of Ymℓ thatA ∈ s impliesA ∈ s0 and also thatA ∈ sk iﬀA ∈ tk for all k ∈ {0,… , ℓ}
and all A ∈ NC. Lemma 6.2.9 then shows that (I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ)) ⊨ A⟹(I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ)) ⊨ A
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for all A ∈ NC and all conﬁgurations satisfying (∗). Since the start conﬁguration
is of this kind, II does not lose the 0-th round.
Assume the game has reached conﬁguration (I, (d̄, j); I, (d̄, i)), which satisﬁes
requirement (∗) and where d̄ ∈ Ymℓ . Let I challenge II by moving for some r ∈ NR
to some r-successor (d̄ໟ, jໟ) of (d̄, j).
If d̄ໟ ∈ Zm−1ℓ+1 , this r-successor is due to (r1) and hence (d̄, j) = sk and (d̄ໟ, jໟ) =
sໟk+1 for some k ∈ {0,… , ℓ}. In this case II can move from (d̄, i) with d̄i = tk
via an r-edge, due to (r1), to (d̄ໟ, iໟ) with d̄ໟiໟ = tໟk+1. e resulting conﬁguration
(I, (d̄ໟ, jໟ); I, (d̄ໟ, iໟ)) meets (∗).
If d̄ໟ ∈ Zm−1ℓ , this r-successor is either due to (r4), which will be treated further
down, or (r2) and (r3) respectively. If (d̄, j) = sk with k ∈ {1,…ℓ} then (d̄ໟ, jໟ) = sໟk
with the same index k. Both, (r2) and (r3) then provide an r-successor (d̄ໟ, iໟ) for
(d̄, i) such that dໟiໟ = tໟk. If II moves via r to (d̄ໟ, iໟ), the resulting conﬁguration
meets (∗).
If however (d̄, j) = s0 or (d̄, j) = s, the r-successor could be (d̄ໟ, jໟ) = sໟ0 or
(d̄ໟ, jໟ) = sໟ depending on (r2) and (r3). In either case, since the conﬁguration
met (∗), we know d̄i = t0 and both (r2) and (r3) furnish an r-successor (d̄ໟ, iໟ)
of (d̄, i) with (d̄ໟ, iໟ) = tໟ0. II can play this r-successor (d̄ໟ, iໟ) and obtains a new
conﬁguration which meets (∗).
If d̄ໟ ∈ Zm−1ℓ−h or d̄ໟ ∈ Zm−1ℓ−h+1, where 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ, then the r-successor is due to (r4)
or (r5). Since the current conﬁguration meets (∗), (d̄, j) = sk implies (d̄, i) = tk for
all k ∈ {h,… , ℓ}. Assume, in the case of (r4), I challenges II by moving to (d̄ໟ, jໟ)
with dໟjໟ = sໟk−h. (r4) and (r5) provide an r-successor (d̄ໟ, iໟ) of (d̄, i) with d̄ໟiໟ =
tໟk−h. By choosing (d̄ໟ, iໟ), II obtains a conﬁguration which satisﬁes the desired
properties of (∗). e same argument applies for (r5).
In case of (r5), I could challenge II by moving to (d̄ໟ, jໟ) with dໟjໟ = sໟ, then
(r5) also connects (d̄, i) with (d̄ໟ, iໟ) where d̄ໟiໟ = tໟ0. Moving to this r-successor, II
obtains an admissible conﬁguration in the sense of (∗).
We showed at ﬁrst that (I, (d̄, i)) −−→(I, (d̄, j)) and we have just shown now that
(I, (d̄, j)) −−→(I, (d̄, i)). is proves Lemma 6.2.12 2
P  P 6.2.8. Let I be the interpretation we have just deﬁned.
We can now extract H from I: Let
ΔH ∶= {(d̄, i) ∈ ΔI ∣ d̄ = (s, s0, t0…, sℓ, tℓ) and d̄i ∈ {s, s0,… sℓ}}
For all r ∈ NR we deﬁne AH ∶= AI ∩ ΔH and rH ∶= rI ∩ (ΔH × ΔH).
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We have I -→←-∀ H: On the one hand H is a sub-interpretation of I on the
other hand for every element (d̄, i) ∈ ΔI with d̄ = (s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, dℓ) and di ∈
{t0,… , tℓ} we know from Lemma 6.2.12 (I, (d̄, i)) -→←- (H, (d̄, i + 1)).
Furthermore H ⊨ ໹ : Let (d̄, j) ∈ ΔH arbitrary, where d̄ = (s, s0, t0,… sℓ, tℓ) and
dj = s or dj = sk where 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ. Let w.l.o.g. dj = s. By deﬁnition of d̄, we know
that s ∈ tp ໹. In particular, we know ¬C ∈ s or D ∈ s, for every C ⊑ D ∈ ໹. Hence
every (H, s) ⊨ C → D for all C ⊑ D ∈ ໹. Since this is true for all elements in H
we have H ⊨ ໹.
For each d̄ ∈ Finalmℓ with d̄ = (s, s0, t0,… , sℓ, tℓ) we show that it satisﬁes the
six conditions for being in Zmℓ :
1. (I, (d̄, i)) ⊨ tk where i = 2 + 2k and 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ
2. (H, (d̄, 0)) ⊨ s and (Hi, (d̄, j)) ⊨ sk where j = 2k + 1 and 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ
3. H ⊨ ໹
4. (H, (d̄, i)) -→←-∀ (I, (d̄, i + 1) where i = 2k + 1 and 0 ≤ k < ℓ
5. (I, (d̄, i)) −−→(I, (d̄, i + 2)) where i = 2 + 2k and 0 ≤ k < ℓ
6. (H, (d̄, 0)) −−→(H, (d̄, 1))
1. and 2. are shown by Lemma 6.2.9. 3. Has just been argued at the beginning
of this proof. 4. is yielded by I -→←-∀ H, as argued in the beginning of this proof,
and by Lemma 6.2.12. 5. is entailed by Lemma 6.2.10 and ﬁnally 6. follows from
Lemma 6.2.11. is concludes the proof for Finalmℓ ⊆ Zmℓ . 2
6.2.3 Algorithm to Determine Preservation under Direct Products
In the characterisation of ໪໱-TBoxes we did not distinguish between being pre-
served under arbitrary direct products or being preserved merely under ﬁnite dir-
ect products. Indeed, for FO-sentences and in particular for ໦໱໨-TBoxes this
property coincides (cf. [34, eorem 6.3.14]).
But for direct products I0 ×…×In over a family (Ii)i≤n of ﬁnitely many inter-
pretations, we can determine the direct product by inductively forming pairwise
products: H0 ∶= I0 and Hk+1 ∶= Hk × Ik+1 with k < n. If Ik is a model ໹ for
each k ∈ {0,… , n} then Hk ⊨ ໹ for each k ∈ {0,… n} or ໹ is not preserved
under direct products. Hence the problem reduces to check for pairs of models of
໹ whether ໹ is preserved under direct products.
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We shall show that it suﬃces to check for certain tree-interpretations satisfying
elements from tp ໹whether or not their direct product amongst them lead to new
tree-interpretations satisfying elements from tp ໹. If this is not the case then ໹ is
not preserved under direct products.
P 6.2.13 . ⟷−− respects ×.
P. We have to show that (I0 ×I1, (d0, d1))⟷−− (H0×H1, (e0, e1))whenever
(I0, d0)⟷−− (H0, e0) and (I1, d1)⟷−− (H1, e1): Assume the premise is true.
II has a winning-strategy by maintaining conﬁgurations (I0 × I1, (dໟ0, dໟ1))⟷−−
(H0 × H1, (eໟ0, eໟ1)) such that (I0, dໟ0)⟷−− (H0, eໟ0) and (I1, dໟ1)⟷−− (H1, eໟ1).
We ﬁrst show that for each such conﬁguration (dໟ0, dໟ1) and (eໟ0, eໟ1) are atom-
ically equivalent: Assume (dໟ0, dໟ1) ∈ AI0×I1 . en dໟ0 ∈ AI0 and dໟ1 ∈ AI1 . By
assumption, dໟ0 and eໟ0 are atomically equivalent and so are dໟ1 and eໟ1. Hence eໟ0 ∈
AH0 and eໟ1 ∈ AH1 and by the deﬁnition of the direct product (eໟ0, eໟ1) ∈ AH0×H1 .
With the same arguments we obtain the only-if direction.
In particular the start-conﬁguration is of the desired kind, and so II does not
lose the 0-th round. Assume now the game has reached the conﬁguration (I0 ×
I1, (dໟ0, dໟ1)) ⟷−− (H0 × H1, (eໟ0, eໟ1)) with the desired property, and I challenges II
by moving in I0 × I1 from (dໟ0, dໟ1) for some r ∈ NR via an r-edge (d໠0 , d໠1 ). By the
deﬁnition of the direct product we have (dໟ0, d໠0 ) ∈ rI0 and (dໟ1, d໠1 ) ∈ rI0 .
Since the conﬁguration is of the desired kind, there is an r-successor e໠0 of eໟ0
in H0 and some r-successor of e໠1 of eໟ1 in H1 such that (I0, d໠0 ) ⟷−− (H0, e໠0 ) and
(I1, d໠1 )⟷−− (H1, e໠1 ). By the deﬁnition of the direct product we have that (e໠0 , e໠1 )
is an r-successor of (eໟ0, eໟ1) in H0 × H1. II can move via the r-edge to (e໠0 , e໠1 ) and
obtains a new conﬁguration which is of the desired type.
With the same arguments we can show that II can ﬁnd an appropriate answer
to any challenge from I in H0 ×H1 and thus that II has a winning-strategy in this
game. 2
C 6.2.14 . g⟷−− respects ×.
Using the same arguments one can show that⟷−− n and g⟷−− n respect ×, too.
Recall that the forest unravelling (page 56) IF = ⋃d∈ΔI Id is the union of all
tree-unravellings Id in every element d ∈ ΔI. It is necessarily a disjoint union,
as tree-unravellings consist of path-elements, which then all start with the root
element d in which they have been unravelled. (cf. page 33).
Since g⟷−− respects × we can for all interpretations I,H change over to their
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forest unravellings IF andHF. en I×H is, since IF g⟷−− I andHF g⟷−− H, globally
bisimilar to IF × HF. In particular I × H ⊨ ໹ for some given ໹ iﬀ IF × HF ⊨ ໹.
L 6.2.15 . |clos ໹| ≤ 2|໹|
P. We ﬁrst show the |closC| ≤ 2|C| for ໦໱໨-concepts C. If A ∈ NC we
have closA = {A, ¬A} and hence the claim is true in the atomic case. In case
C = ¬D then |closC| = |closD| by deﬁnition of clos , where |closD| is by the
induction hypothesis estimated as |closD| ≤ 2|D| ≤ 2|C|.
For C = D ⊓ E we have |closC| = |closD ∪ clos E ∪ {C, ¬C}| by deﬁnition of
clos which is bound by |closD| + |clos E| + 2. e induction hypothesis yields
|closD| + |clos E| + 2 ≤ 2|D| + 2|E| + 2 where |D| + |E| = |C| − 1, hence 2|D| +
2|E| + 2 = 2|C| which yields all in all |closC| ≤ 2|C|.
Finally for C = ∃r.D we have |closC| = |closD| ∪ {C, ¬C} and so the induction
hypothesis yields |closC| ≤ |closD| + 2 ≤ 2|D| + 2 where |D| ≤ |C| − 1. Hence
we obtain |closC| ≤ 2|C|.
We then have |clos ໹| = |⋃{closC ∪ closD ∣ C ⊑ D ∈ ໹}| ≤ ∑{2|C| + 2|D| ∣
C ⊑ D ∈ ໹}| ≤ 2∑{|C ⊑ D| ∣ C ⊑ D ∈ ໹}| ≤ 2|໹|. 2
P 6.2.16 . An໦໱໨-TBox ໹ is not preserved under direct products iﬀ there
are two tree-models I and H of ໹ with out-degree at most 2(|໹|2) su that I×H ⊭ ໹.
In the proof, we shall beworkingwith pruned tree-interpretationsH0,H1, where
unnecessary branches of I and H have been removed. e root (d0, d1) of the
forest-interpretation H0 × H1 locally violates ໹, i.e. if ໹ = {⊤ ⊑ C} then (H0 ×
H1, (d, e)) ⊨ ¬C.
Nevertheless, the estimation for the out-degree 2(|໹|2) seems to be high. Indeed,
in the proof not the out-degree is estimated but the number of elements connected
to the root of H0 × H1 in depth rank ໹ is estimated. If 2(|໹|
2) is high, at which
possible out-degree are we actually looking? Considered that there are at most
2|໹| diﬀerent types t ⊆ clos ໹ each element in a tree-interpretation can have any
subset of types as successors. Hence a tree of depth 2 could possibly branch into
2|໹| ⋅ |P(2|໹|)| = 2|໹|⋅2|໹| many subtrees without being redundant.
L 6.2.17 . An ໦໱໨-TBox ໹ is not preserved under direct products iﬀ there are
two tree-models I and H of ໹ su that I × H ⊭ ໹.
P. e only-if direction is immediate. If ໹ is not invariant under direct
products, there are two models I,H of ໹ such that for some concept inclusion
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C ⊑ D ∈ ໹ there is some (d, e) ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D)ΔI×H , hence ໹ is violated.
Let Id and He be the tree-unravelling for I in d and, respectively, the tree-
unravelling of H in e. Id and He are both models of ໹: since ໦໱໨-TBoxes are
preserved under global bisimulation we have IF and HF are models of ໹ and the
invariance of ໹ under disjoint unions yields that Id and He are models of ໹.
We have (I, d) ⟷−− (Id, d) and analogously (H, e) ⟷−− (He, e) and Proposition
6.2.13 yields (I×H, (d, e))⟷−− (Id ×He, (d, e)) which shows that (Id ×He, (d, e) ⊨
C ⊓ ¬D, hence ໹ is violated in Id × He. 2
P  P  6.2.16. e only-if direction is again immediate. To
prove the if-direction let ໹ = {⊤ ⊑ C} which is not preserved under direct
products and let I0, I1 be the tree-models provided by Lemma 6.2.17 with root-
elements d0 and d1 such that (I0 × I1, (d0, d1)) ⊨ ¬C.
In the following we shall prune subtrees from the tree-interpretations I0 and
I1. Let Γi ⊆ ΔIi , i ∈ {0, 1} be minimal sets, such that
1. di ∈ Γi
2. If dໟi ∈ Γi and (Ii, dໟi) ⊨ ∃r.C for some ∃r.C ∈ clos ໹ then there is d໠i ∈ Γi
such that (dໟi , d໠i ) ∈ rIi and (Ii, d໠i ) ⊨ C.
3. If (dໟ0, dໟ1) ∈ Γ0 × Γ1 such that there is a path in I0 × I1 from (d0, d1) to
(dໟ0, dໟ1) of length ℓ ≤ rank ໹ and (I0 × I1, (dໟ0, dໟ1)) ⊨ ∃r.C for some ∃r.C ∈
clos ໹ with rank ∃r.C ≤ rank − ℓ then there is (d໠0 , d໠1 ) ∈ Γ0 × Γ1 such that
((dໟ0, dໟ1), (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ∈ rI0×I1 and (I0 × I1, (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ⊨ C.
We deﬁne Hi ∶= Ii↾Γi for i ∈ {0, 1}. Note that H0 and H1 are not necessarily
cut oﬀ in some depth: We will show that H0 and H1 satisfy ໹; since they are tree-
interpretations, this can make them inﬁnite (assume ໹ ⊨ {⊤ ⊑ A,A ⊑ ∃r.⊤}). We
show that H0 × H1, (d0, d1) ⊨ ¬C.
We show for each i ∈ {0, 1} and all C ∈ clos ໹
1. for all e ∈ ΔHi : (Hi, e) ⊨ C ⟺ (Ii, e) ⊨ C
2. for the root element (d0, d1) ∈ ΔH0×H1 we have (H0 × H1, (d0, d1)) ⊨ C iﬀ
(I0 × I1, (d0, d1)) ⊨ C
We show the ﬁrst claim by induction upon the structure of the concepts C ∈
clos ໹. Let e ∈ ΔHi . en (Hi, e) and (Ii, e) are atomically equivalent. Since clos ໹
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is closed under negation and contains the separate conjuncts of conjunctions, the
induction hypothesis readily applies in both cases.
In case (Hi, e) ⊨ ∃r.C, there is an r-successor eໟ of e such that (Hi, eໟ) ⊨ ∃r.C.
e induction hypothesis yields (Hi, eໟ) ⊨ C. Since Hi is a restriction of Ii, we
have that (e, eໟ) ∈ rIi iﬀ (e, eໟ) ∈ rHi and so that (Ii, d) ⊨ ∃r.C. If (Ii, e) ⊨ ∃r.C,
requirement 2. ensures that there is eໟ ∈ ΔHi such that (e, eໟ) ∈ rHi and (Hi, eໟ) ⊨
C. Hence (Hi, e) ⊨ ∃r.C.
We show the following claim for all elements (dໟ0, dໟ1) reachable from the root
(d0, d1) via a path of length ℓ < rank ໹: For all C ∈ clos ໹with rankC ≤ rank ໹−ℓ
we have (H0 × H1, (dໟ0, dໟ1)) ⊨ C iﬀ (I0 × I1, (dໟ0, dໟ1)) ⊨ C.
e claim is clear for atomic concepts. Since clos ໹ is closed under negation and
contains the conjuncts of conjunctions, the induction hypothesis trivially applies.
Let ∃r.C ∈ clos ໹ and let (dໟ0, dໟ1) be reachable from the root (d0, d1) via a path of
length ℓ and assume rank ∃r.C ≤ rank ໹ − ℓ. en (H0 × H1, (dໟ0, dໟ1)) ⊨ ∃r.C iﬀ
((d໠0 , d໠1 ), (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ∈ rH0×H1 and (H0 × H1, (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ⊨ C. If ((d໠0 , d໠1 ), (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ∈
rH0×H1 then ((d໠0 , d໠1 ), (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ∈ rI0×I1 and the induction hypothesis yields (I0 ×
I1, (d໠0 , d໠1 )) ⊨ C, whence (I0 × I1, (dໟ0, dໟ1)) ⊨ ∃r.C is concluded. e only-if
direction is argued by Γ0 × Γ1 is closed under requirement 3.
We now estimate the out-degree:
Each element e in Hi obtains at most |໹| many successors from requirement 2:
Each successor of e is due to some concept ∃r.C ∈ clos ໹ with e ∈ (∃r.C)Ii where
the cardinality of clos ໹ is estimated by |clos ໹| ≤ 2|໹|. Clearly, since for everyC ∈
clos ໹ we also have ¬C ∈ clos ໹, e satisﬁes at most half of the concepts in clos ໹.
Hence 2. introduces at most |໹| successors. Since condition 3. is only required up
to depth rank ໹ all elements in greater depth have only up to |໹| successors.
If (e0, e1) is a pair in the treeH0×H1 with root (d0, d1) then both elements e0 and
e1 appeared in the same depth of each tree-interpretation H0 and H1 respectively.
Hence the number of pairs (e0, e1) ∈ ΔΓ0×Γ1 is for ﬁxed e0 bounded by the number
of elements e1 in the same depth of H1 as e0 in H0. For each element (e0, e1) ∈
ΔΓ0×Γ1 , connected by a path of length ≤ rank ໹ from the root, requirement 3. adds
n-successor pairs to Γ0 × Γ1. Hence we can estimate the number of elements in
depth n < rank ໹ by counting the successors of depth n+1which are bounded by
the number of elements in depth n⋅|໹|. is bound on elements in (e0, e1) ∈ ΔΓ0×Γ1
for ﬁxed depth from the root (d0, d1) then also serves as bound for the maximal
out-degree that an element can have.
We can use these two considerations to synthesise a function f which recurs-
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ively estimates the maximal number of successors for each element and each
depth in H0:
f (n) ∶=
๰
|໹| + |໹| ⋅ 1 n = 0
|໹| + |໹| ⋅ f (n − 1) otherwise
Clearly, the root di has |clos ໹|2 = |໹|-many successors plus |໹|-many additional
successors for the root element (d0, d1). e recursion exploits that it is an estim-
ation for both interpretationsH0 andH1: e number of elements (e0, e1) for ﬁxed
e0 depends on the number of r-successors of the predecessor of e1. Hence there
are f (n−1)many. Each (e0, e1) has |໹|-many successors so requirement 3 adds at
most |໹| ⋅ f (n−1) to e0 plus at most |໹|-many that are introduced by requirement
2.
Aer rewriting f, we shall give an explicit form of f: f (n) = 2 ⋅ (∑nk=0 |໹|k+1).
e proof of this equation is conducted by induction upon n < ω for which the
base case is clear. In the step-case
f (n + 1) = |໹| + |໹| ⋅ f (n) IH= |໹| + |໹| ⋅ 2 ⋅ (∑nk=0 |໹|k+1)
= |໹| + 2 ⋅ (∑n+1k=1 |໹|k+1) = 2 ⋅ (∑
n+1
k=0 |໹|k+1)
e partial sum is then explicitly given for |໹| > 1 by
f(n) = 2 ⋅ (
n
kු=0
|໹|k+1) = 2 ⋅ |໹|
n+1 − 1
|໹| − 1 ≤ |໹|
n+2
Since Item 3 only requires successors for elements up to depth rank ໹, all suc-
cessors of H0 and H1 in depth > rank ໹ have only up to |໹| successors. We
will hence reach the greatest number of successors per element in depth rank ໹:
f (rank ໹) = |໹|rank ໹+2 ≤ (2|໹|)|໹| ≤ 2(|໹|2), where the ﬁrst inequality is true for all
|໹| > 1 as rank ໹ < |໹|: e proof for |໹|rank ໹+2 ≤ 2(|໹|2) can be carried out by
hand for |໹| ∈ {2, 3} and then by induction, where
(n + 1)n+3 ≤ 2(n+1)2 if (IH) (n + 1)
n+3
nn+2 ≤
2(n+1)2
2n2
if (1 + 1n )
n+2(n + 1) ≤ 22n+1
if 2n+2(n + 1) ≤ 2n ⋅ 2n+1 if 2(n + 1) ≤ 2n
whereat the laer is true for all n ≥ 3. 2
D 6.2.18 . We deﬁne the class of potential tree-models for ໹ to exactly
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comprise all tree-models I of depth rank ໹ such that there is a mapping t ∶ ΔI ⟶
tp໹ such that
1. for all d1 ∈ ΔI which is reachable from the root d0 ∈ ΔI via a path of
length ℓ ≤ rank ໹, we have
(I, d1) ⊨ A ⟺ A ∈ t(d1) for all A ∈ NC
2. if d1 ∈ ΔI which is reachable from the root d0 ∈ ΔI via a path of length
ℓ < rank ໹ and ∃r.C ∈ t(d1) then there is t2 ∈ ΔI with (t1, t2) ∈ rI such
that C ∈ t(d2).
3. for all r ∈ NR and all (d1, d2) ∈ rI we have t(d1) ⇝r t(d2).
♢
We justify the name ‘potential tree-models for ໹’ by proving the following ob-
servation:
O 6.2.19 . Every potential tree-model of ໹ can be continued to a model
of ໹
P. Let I be a potential tree-model of ໹ with root d0 and let
leaf I ∶= {d ∈ ΔI ∣ d is a leaf in depth of rank ໹ in I}.
Recall that every t ∈ tp ໹ is satisﬁable with ໹ (page 6.1). For each d ∈ leaf I let
Kd such that (Kd, cd) ⊨ ໹ ∪ t(d) where t ∶ ΔI ⟶ tp໹ is as in Deﬁnition 6.2.18.
We create a new interpretation K being the disjoint union of I with all Kd where
d ∈ leaf I and additionally add edges (d, cໟ) to rK if (cd, cໟ) ∈ rKd for all d ∈ leaf I.
Hence we have connected a leaf d with all successors of a node that satisﬁes t(d)
and so d ∈ CK for all C ∈ t(d).
To prove that K ⊨ ໹ we show that every element in K satisﬁes some t ∈ tp ໹.
e claim is clear for every element in Kd for every d ∈ leaf I. We concentrate
on elements d ∈ ΔI and show via induction upon n < ω that (K, d) ⊨ t(d) for all
elements in distance rank ໹ − n ≥ 0.
e claim is true for n = 0, as any element d in distance rank ໹ from d0 was a
leaf in I and is hence connected to all successors of cd from Kd which proves the
claim. For rank ໹ − (n + 1) ≥ 0 let d ∈ ΔK. If d is a leaf in K, it was a leaf in I
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and so t(d) cannot have contained any concept of form ∃r.C for any r ∈ NR and
C ∈ clos ໹, so (I, d) ⊨ t(d). As (I, d)⟷−− (H, d) we obtain (H, d) ⊨ t(d).
If d is not a leaf, we prove by induction upon the structure of C ∈ clos ໹ that
(I, d) ⊨ C iﬀ C ∈ t(d). e claim is true by Item 1 of Deﬁnition 6.2.18 for atomic
concepts. Since clos ໹ contains conjuncts of conjunctions and is closed under
negation, the induction hypothesis applies. Assume ∃r.C ∈ t(d). en Item 2 of
6.2.18 guarantees the existence of an r-successor dໟ ∈ ΔI such that C ∈ t(dໟ). By
induction hypothesis (K, dໟ) ⊨ t(dໟ) which proves (K, d) ⊨ ∃r.C.
In case ∃r.C ∉ t(d) then, since t is complete with respect to clos ໹, we have
¬∃r.C ∈ t(d). Hence for all t ∈ tp ໹ with C ∈ t we have t(d)⇝̸rt and so Item 3 of
6.2.18 guarantees that C ∉ t(dໟ) for all r-successors dໟ of d. Again completeness
of t w.r.t. clos ໹ entails ¬C ∈ t(dໟ) for all r-successors dໟ when with the induction
hypothesis (I, d) ⊨ ¬∃r.C is inferred. 2
Clearly, if I is a tree-model of ໹ then (I↾rank ໹) is a potential tree-models of ໹,
where (I↾rank ໹) contains only those elements reachable via a path of length up
to rank ໹ from the root.
P 6.2.20 . An໦໱໨-TBox ໹ is not preserved under direct products, iﬀ there
are two potential tree-models I,H with maximal out-degree 2|໹|2 su that (d, e) ∈
(C ⊓ ¬D)I×H for the roots d of I and e of H, respectively, for some C ⊑ D ∈ ໹.
P. e if-direction is proved using the tree-models I,H yielded by the
Proof of Proposition 6.2.16, for whose roots d ∈ ΔH and e ∈ ΔH we have (I ×
H, (d, e)) ⊨ C ⊓ ¬D for some C ⊑ D ∈ ໹. eir restriction I↾rank ໹ and H↾rank ໹
are both potential tree-models of ໹ with maximal out-degree 2|໹|2 . For the roots
d ∈ ΔH and e ∈ ΔH we then have (I, d)⟷−− rank ໹ (I↾rank ໹, d) and (H, e)⟷−− rank ໹
(H↾rank ໹, e) and so Proposition 6.2.13 yields (I↾rank ໹×H↾rank ໹, (d, e))⟷−− rank ໹
(I × H, (d, e)) which in turn entails (I↾rank ໹ × H↾rank ໹, (e, d)) ⊨ C ⊓ ¬D.
Assume there are two potential tree-models I0,H0 of ໹ such that at their roots
d of I and e of H we have (I ×H, (d, e)) ⊨ C ⊓ ¬D for some C ⊑ D ∈ ໹. en Ob-
servation 6.2.19 yields continuations I andH, respectively which are both models
of ໹. Since I↾rank ໹ = I0 and similarly for H, we have (I, d) ⟷−− rank ໹ (I0, d)
and (H, d) ⟷−− rank ໹ (H0, d) and Proposition 6.2.13 yields (I × H, (d, e)) ⟷−− rank ໹
(I0×H0, (d, e)), which shows (I×H, (d, e)) ⊨ C⊓¬D. Hence there are two models
I,H of ໹ but I × H ⊭ ໹ which shows the only-if direction. 2
C 6.2.21 . Whether or not ໹ is preserved under direct products can be de-
232
cided in NEXPTIME.
P. Every ໦໱໨-TBox ໹ can be rendered into the form {⊤ ⊑ C}. So assume
w.l.o.g. that ໹ = {⊤ ⊑ C}. e steps of the algorithm are
1. Create two tree-interpretations I, H with out-degree at most 2n2 .
2. Test whether I↾rank ໹ and H↾rank ໹ are potential tree-models of ໹
3. If not, yield true. Otherwise, form the direct product and yield whether the
root node satisﬁes C.
We use a non-deterministic Turing-machine to execute the algorithm. If this non-
deterministic Turing-machine yields false for one computation then ໹ is not pre-
served under direct products.
S 1. Let n ∶= |໹|. ere are atmost 2n diﬀerent labellingswith symbols from
NC for each node. Hence for every node the non-deterministic Turing-machine
has to choose whether or not to realise an r-successor. is amounts to |NR| ⋅2n ≤
22n many steps in which each the Turing-machine splits up. We then follow each
copy of the Turing-machine separately.
e Turing-machine builds the tree depth-layer by depth-layer. For each node
in the same depth the Turing-machine creates a successor set as just explained
where the number of nodes in each successor set is bound by 2n2 . Hence a layer
in depth k has at most 2k⋅n2 many nodes.
Let the Turing-machine create tree-interpretations of depth 2rank ໹, which will
be explained later. Every tree, then, has at most
2⋅rank ໹
kු=0
2k⋅n2 =
2⋅rank ໹
kු=0
22⋅rank ໹⋅n2
2k
= 22⋅rank ໹⋅n2 ⋅
2⋅rank ໹
kු=1
1
2k
≤ 22⋅rank ໹⋅n2+1
many nodes, for which each at most 22n many steps are needed to determine the
successor set. Hence each copy of the machine needs, to create both interpreta-
tions at most 2 ⋅ 22⋅n+2⋅rank ໹⋅n2+1 ≤ 22⋅n+2⋅(n−2)⋅n2+2 ≤ 2n3 many steps whenever
n ≥ 3 i.e. all nonempty TBoxes.
S 2. For each interpretation we test whether C is satisﬁed at every node up
to depth rank ໹. If so, then for every node up to depth rank ໹ there is a mapping
t ∶ Δ ⟶ tp ໹ and requirements 1–3 in Deﬁnition 6.2.18 are trivially satisﬁed.
Hence we determine whether or not the two tree-interpretations in S 1 are
potential tree-models of ໹.
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We hence have to consider 2n3 subtrees of size 2n3 for which we have to check
whether each subtree is a model of the໦໱໨-concept Cwhose length is estimated
as |C| < n. Each check can be performed in at most |C| ⋅ 2n3 < n ⋅ 2n3 steps an so
for both tree-interpretations together we need at most 2 ⋅ 2n3 ⋅ n ⋅ 2n3 ≤ 23n3 many
steps.
S 3. Assume that both interpretations I and H computed in S 1 are po-
tential tree-models of ໹ with roots d ∈ ΔI and e ∈ ΔH. We then create their
direct product for their elements up to depth rank ໹ and end up with a set of size
2n3 ⋅ 2n3 = 22⋅n3 which we can compute together with the extensions for all role
names (2) and all concept names (3) in at most 22⋅n3 (2)+ n ⋅ 24⋅n3 (3)+ n ⋅ 22⋅n3 many
steps. e model checking then takes another n ⋅ 22n3 steps.
Combining the results of all steps together we get at most
22n+n3 + 23⋅n3 + 22⋅n3 + n ⋅ 24⋅n3 + n ⋅ 22⋅n3 + n ⋅ 22⋅n3 ≤ 4n ⋅ 24n3 ≤ 25n3
steps to termination for a non-deterministic Turing machine, which shows that
determining whether ໦໱໨-TBoxes are not preserved under direct products is in
NEXPTIME. 2
In [92] it is shown that the algorithm is NEXPTIME-complete.
Both, Algorithm 6.1.2 and Algorithm 6.2.5 together with its decision procedure
for whether or not an໦໱໨-TBox is preserved under direct products, do not yield
TBox rewritings, but simply decide whether or not such an rewriting exists. ey
hence decide whether two theories of diﬀerent logics are logically equivalent.
Such an approach, which exploits characterisation results in this way is novel.
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7. Conclusion
emodel-theoretic properties of description logics were, so far, mainly investig-
ated on concept level [85]. Because of the correspondence of description logic on
concept-level to modal logics [121, 88], results of the well investigated model the-
ory of modal logics could be transferred to description logic—but only on concept
level.
e special model theoretic nature of TBoxes, an original part of description
logics, has not been investigated so far. us, this thesis closes a gap in the un-
derstanding of description logics: We have imported notions and techniques from
the model-theoretic investigation of modal-logics and classical logic in order to
characterise the expressivity of some very important description logics like໦໱໨,
໦໱໨໶໮໴ and ໪໱ where we have put a special focus on TBoxes.
e characterisation results for the ໦໱໨-family on concept level, which are
mostly known from modal logic, are all based on some adaption of bisimulation.
A characterisation result for the extension of the description logic in hand with
the universal role can be obtained by deﬁning its adaption of bisimulation on the
global level. Characterisations for TBoxes make use of this global bisimulation
but also need some form of invariance under disjoint union.
e initial characterisation results for ໦໱໨, ໦໱໨໮ and ໦໱໨໶ on all levels,
i.e. on concept level, on concept level with universal role and on TBox level,
show that the notions we have chosen to characterise these description logics are
in no way ad hoc but are natural notions in connexion with the description logic
family໦໱໨.
Invariance under disjoint union implies not only being preserved under disjoint
union but also being preserved under generated subinterpretations. is is not
problematic for໦໱໨,໦໱໨໮ and໦໱໨໶ but it gets more involved for description
logics with individuals.
Since individuals are interpreted as unique elements, a disjoint union of inter-
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pretations can no longer performed as naïve set-theoretic union of disjoint parts.
Instead, conditions had to be given when a disjoint union is admissible and tech-
niques were developed in order to unify possible multiplicity of individuals.
Nominal disjoint unions, the disjoint union used for the characterisation of
໦໱໨໶໮໴-TBoxes, simply required that each of the individuals was present in
exactly one of the disjoint parts which were meant to be uniﬁed. Hence no mul-
tiplicity of individuals could occur. Disjoint unions for ໦໱໨໴-TBoxes required
that all individuals were present in some of the disjoint parts but a allowed in-
dividuals to occur multiple times. It additionally required that if a individual oc-
curred multiple times then these elements needed to be bisimilar. e same was
requirement was made for disjoint unions in the case of໦໱໨໶໴.
In order to unify these multiple individuals,໦໱໨໴ allowed to simply factorise
the disjoint union by the largest bisimulation relation. is turned out to be for
໦໱໨໶໴ more complicated. Instead of factorising, a forest-unravelling was per-
formed for every disjoint part. For the subtrees that had individuals in their root,
new subtrees were synthesised such that individuals with the same name were
roots of isomorphic subtrees. ese trees and hence the individuals could then be
uniﬁed by a factorisation.
Looking at the diﬀerent techniques needed to characterise ໦໱໨໶໮໴, ໦໱໨໴
and ໦໱໨໶໴, the diﬃculty level seems to rise which makes ໦໱໨໶໮໴ appear
more balanced in its expressivity: individuals which are the cause for the break
down of the invariance under normal disjoint unions are met by inverse roles
which reduce the notion of generated substructure to simply connected compon-
ent. It remains to be seen whether this interaction between individuals and in-
verse roles is coincidental or whether a fundamental reason can be found.
໪໱ gave a slightly diﬀerent picture as the model-theoretic notion is not bisim-
ulation but simulation. Simulation is asymmetric in nature but the model the-
oretic results are analogue to ໦໱໨ on concept level. e characterisation for
໪໱-concepts needed, since ໪໱ does not incorporate disjunctions ⊔, an extra con-
dition: either the minimal model property or preservation under direct products.
For ໪໱-TBoxes a global version of simulation is not suﬃcient but rather the
global version of a symmetricised notion of simulation: global equi-simulation.
໪໱-TBoxes are then characterised under this global equi-simulation, disjoint union
and being preserved under direct products.
We have learnt that TBoxes lend to ໪໱ a considerable amount of additional ex-
pressivity, witnessed by the fact that global equi-simulation is necessary to char-
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acterise ໪໱-TBoxes. Another interesting fact is, that ໪໱-concepts and ໪໱-TBoxes
are preserved under direct products. From a model-theoretic point of view, it
would be interesting to know how ໪໱ and ໪໱-TBoxes relate to ໦໱໨ and ໦໱໨-
TBoxes w.r.t. to the formation of direct products: Is ໪໱ the fragment of ໦໱໨
which is invariant under direct products? Are ໪໱-TBoxes the fragment of໦໱໨-
TBoxes which are preserved under direct products? e questions are open and
we shall meet them in the section on Future Work again.
Finally the TBox-rewritability introduced a new class of problems, namely de-
ciding whether or not a TBox can be equivalently expressed in a weaker language
using the same vocabulary. Hence we give a decision procedure for whether or
not two theories of diﬀerent logics are logically equivalent. is application of
model-theoretic characterisation is interesting in its own right.
e characterisations can have potential applications in areas where the ex-
pressive power of TBoxes and description logics per se are central. Such areas
could be TBox approximations [120, 82]: As discussed in the beginning, the reas-
oning complexity rises with the expressivity and hence reasoning does not scale
for very expressive description logics (see e.g. the example ontology FMA in [99])
As a solution, TBoxes for these expressive description logics are approximated by
TBoxes of less expressive languages, e.g. ໪໱ [111]. e reasoning is then per-
formed on the approximant rather than on the original TBox. As price for the
speed up, reasoning becomes incomplete w.r.t. to the original TBox.
Similarly, the results can also be interesting for TBox modularisation [83]: In
modularisation parts of a given TBox ໹ are extracted into a TBox ໹0 ⊆ ໹, the
module, such that ໹0 is contains only the part which is relevant to the reasoning
task. ‘Relevant’ is diﬀerent depending on the application in hand.
In both cases the expressive power of the description logic is of central import-
ance and thus our results may contribute for future work.
e thesis gives a model-theoretical basis to major DLs apart from the thorough
investigations of DLs in terms of complexity theory and reasoning entertained for
somany years before. e expressivity of the languages treated is nowunderstood
in model-theoretic terms and can be used as a theoretical foundation to build on.
Apart from that, the author hopes that this thesis can serve as introductory text
to the model-theoretic foundations of the treated logics, without claiming to be
complete nor extensive. We give a brief summary of the chapters before seing
out future work.
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7.1 Summary
Chapter 2
e chapter recapitulates in a rather patient manner the model-theoretic notions
and results which can be found condensed in [61]. It gives diﬀerent views on
bisimulation and explains in detail the interconnexions between the notions like
type, saturation, the Hennessy-Milner-Property and characteristic concepts. e
well known characterisation of van Benthem is recalled together with its proof.
e following section extrapolates the results to a characterisation of ໦໱໨u-
concepts, i.e. ໦໱໨ extended by a universal role, which is also known as ∀໲໱
in modal logics. is paves the way to the ໦໱໨-TBox characterisation, where
every໦໱໨-TBox is equivalent to some໦໱໨u-concept, so that the໦໱໨-TBoxes
eﬀectively form a fragment of໦໱໨u-concepts.
For the characterisation of໦໱໨-TBoxes, the notion of global bisimulation, in-
troduced in the໦໱໨u-section, is used and invariance under disjoint unions. e
characterisation gives us an insight in the expressiveness of໦໱໨-TBoxes: noth-
ing can be expressed which is sensitive to disjoint unions, generated substructures
or which is not invariant under global bisimulation. In particular this means that
it must be invariant under tree-unravellings.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 treats the model-theoretic characterisation of the expressiveness of two
extensions of ໦໱໨, namely ໦໱໨໮ and ໦໱໨໶. Syntax and semantics and all
important notions introduced for໦໱໨ are adapted and explicitly stated. One can
observe that໦໱໨໮, but in particular໦໱໨໶ behave analogously to໦໱໨, if only
the notions of saturation, bisimulation and the logic itself ﬁt together, witnessed
by the Hennessy-Milner-Property.
In particular, the stratiﬁcation of the bisimulation relation together with the
characteristic concepts for ໦໱໨໶ is developed in detail. Along with this, not
only the extension with a simple universal role for໦໱໨໶ is investigated but also
the extension with counting universal role. For both logics, a characterisation on
concept level for໦໱໨໮ and໦໱໨໶ as well as for their extensions with universal
quantiﬁers and ﬁnally for TBoxes is given.
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Chapter 4
Here, we focus on the extension with nominals namely ໦໱໨໴, ໦໱໨໶໴, and
໦໱໨໶໮໴. Nominals are sometimes treated as constants, but we felt that treating
them as predicates which are interpreted as singleton sets is more appropriate:
e local nature of bisimulation is preserved and thus the stratiﬁed bisimulation
relation can be captured by characteristic໦໱໨໴-concepts.
On concept level, also for concepts with universal role, ໦໱໨໴, ໦໱໨໶໴ and
໦໱໨໶໮໴ behave very much like their counterparts without individuals. Many
propositions and theorems can be, with caution, transferred and thus the charac-
terisations can be swily derived. Since ໦໱໨໶໮໴ might be, apart from ໪໱ the
most interesting DL treated in this thesis, so the chapter is kept fairly independ-
ent.
But໦໱໨໴ ismore challenging, when it comes to the characterisation of໦໱໨໴-
TBoxes. e invariance of disjoint unions interferes with the special nature of
nominals: a naive disjoint union destroys the uniqueness of elements, a naive
decomposition into substructures may leave nominals uninterpreted, i.e. empty.
As adaption, both, the deﬁnition of subinterpretation and disjoint union are
altered. In particular, the formation of disjoint unions is only allowed over in-
terpretations in which nominals with the same name are bisimilar. For then the
disjoint union can be factorised by the bisimulation relation, merging all nominals
with the same name.
is approach gets in particular technical for ໦໱໨໶໴ as simple factorisation
does not preserve the exact number of successors. An involved construction ﬁrst
performs tree-unravelling on the interpretations, then renders trees into uniform
trees, forms the disjoint union and factorises the result, obtaining an interpreta-
tion which is bisimilar to a naive disjoint-union, but ensures that every nominal
is interpreted by exactly one element.
As recompense for all the trouble the reader is treated with a construction for
minimal globally bisimilar companions which has been, to the best of our know-
ledge, open so far. e construction can be extended to ﬁnd ໦໱໨໶໮໴-bisimilar
companions.
It turns out that ໦໱໨໶໮໴ is much simpler than ໦໱໨໶໴, as a simple pick-
and-mix procedure of connected components already yields an adequate adaption
for the notion of disjoint unions which allows a characterisation of ໦໱໨໶໮໴-
TBoxes.
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Chapter 5
is Chapter treats the characterisation of ໪໱. e model-theoretic notions used
to characterise ໦໱໨ transfer relatively smoothly to its weak fragment. ough,
the common model-theoretic notion for ໪໱, simulation, does not only preserve
໪໱ itself but ໪໱⊔, i.e. ໪໱ extendedwith ‘OR’. To obtain ໪໱ itself, another property
is needed. Exchangeably the minimal model property or being preserved under
direct products can be used to complete the characterisation.
But the peculiarities carry on, when TBoxes have to be characterised. It turns
out that the concept inclusions introduce a hidden negation, which lis the ex-
pressiveness of ໪໱-TBoxes so much so that a symmetric notion of simulation, so
called equi-simulation, is needed to characterise ໪໱-TBoxes.
Hence Chapter 5 gave rise to the investigation of several fragments on concept
level: e one which is preserved by simulation (໪໱⊔), the one which is preserved
by simulation and direct products (໪໱) and ﬁnally ໪໱u¬, the logic which is invari-
ant under global equi-simulation.
We ﬁnally identify ໪໱-TBoxes as ໪໱u¬-TBoxes which are preserved by direct
products. is also justiﬁes the characterisation of ໪໱ by simulation and direct
products on the concept level.
Chapter 6
Chapter 6, ﬁnally, gives an application of the characterisation results: ey can be
used to decide the rewritability problem for TBoxes, i.e. whether a given TBox can
be equivalently expressed in a weaker logic using the same signature symbols. To
this end, two algorithms are presented. One, which decides whether an ໦໱໨໮-
TBox can be expressed as ໦໱໨-TBox and one which decides whether an ໦໱໨-
TBox can be expressed as an ໪໱-TBox.
Whilst the former merely has to check whether the TBox is invariant under
global bisimulation, the laer has to check whether the TBox is invariant under
global equi-simulation and whether the TBox is preserved under direct products.
7.2 Future Work
e open questions and areas for future work are plenty. An immediate question
is whether the characterisation results can be extended to DLs which incorporate
RBoxes like ໸໷໴໮໶ [77] and ໸໭໴໮໶ [81]. One would have to give a notion of
bisimulation that preserves role hierarchies, e.g. where edge labels are considered
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to be subsets ofNR rather than elements fromNR which must be respected by this
bisimulation. e idea of treating statements like trans r similar to individuals by
restricting the view to some class 𝕂 of interpretation which interpret r as trans-
itive relation, might prove to be useful.
Another, very interesting question is, how the expressivity of a language can be
increased if fresh signature symbols are allowed to be introduced. More concrete,
is it e.g. possible to express an ໦໱໨-TBox ໹ over τ by an ໪໱-TBox ໹ ໟ over τ ໟ
where τ ⊆ τ ໟ such that ໹ ໟ ⊨ ໹ and for all τ-interpretations I ⊨ ໹ there is a τ ໟ-
interpretation H ⊨ ໹ ໟ such that H ≅τ I. In this case H is called a conservative
extension [96, 56, 94, 8] of I.
Further instances of rewriting problems come to mind like ໦໱໨໶-to-໦໱໨-
rewritability and many more. ey all have not been investigated as of yet. Con-
nected to this is the question ‘is it decidable for a given TBox in໦໱໨ whether or
not it is rewritable under signature extension in ໪໱’? Again,໦໱໨ and ໪໱ are in
this problem interchangeable with other description logics.
A bit aside but not less important are questions that arose during the considera-
tion of direct products. During their investigation, we became aware that even the
precise FO-fragment which is preserved under the formation of direct products
is not known¹. On the other hand, the FO-fragment of all sentences which are
preserved under reduced products is precisely known: It is the Horn-fragment of
FO. In the context of DLs and in particular TBoxes a lot of fragments are called
Horn-fragment, e.g. DL-LiteHorn [5, 6](model theoretic investigation in [92]). But
is it really the Horn-fragment, i.e. does it comprise exactly all DL-Lite concepts
which are preserved under the formation of reduced products? And how do ໪໱
and ໪໱-TBoxes relate to ໦໱໨ and ALC-TBoxes, respectively, considering direct
products?
¹[34] referred to [133], who questions whether or not the discovered subset of the FO-fragment
is actually the whole fragment.
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